Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The intent in this halachah, and similarly, whenever the term ‘‘... years old and one day’’ is mentioned, is not that an additional day must pass after the woman’s twelfth birthday. Rather, the intent is that she has completed twelve complete years of life and begun the following day.

The Tur (Even HaEzer) differs with the Rambam on two points: a) the girl need only be 19 and one month, not 19 and eleven months (Chapter 155) and b) that she need manifest only one, but not all signs of barrenness (Chapter 44, 172).
With regard to the first issue, the Shulchan Aruch appears to favor the Tur’s view, although that of the Rambam is also mentioned. With regard to the second issue, the Shulchan Aruch appears to follow the Rambam’s view, while the Rama cites that of the Tur.

Our translation follows the interpretation of the Shulchan Aruch. Yevamot 80a interprets this as meaning, ‘‘one who never saw the light of the sun while fit.’’

I.e., he grows hairs of the beard and in his underarms; his voice changes; his hair grows adequately; and his flesh is not silky (Ma’aseh Roke’ach). As reflected by the following clause, these signs are sufficient to indicate physical maturity. Nevertheless, because no pubic hairs are detected, the person’s status is undermined.

Although the testimony of women is not generally accepted in court, an exception is made in this instance because of modesty.

See Leviticus, Chapter 27.

If a male is less than nine years old, or a female is less than three years old, they are not fit to engage in marital relations. Even if they do, in fact, engage in relations, these are of no halachic significance. Hence, if a boy above the age of nine engages in marital relations with a married woman, the woman is liable. Similarly, if a man engaged in relations with a three-year old girl who was married, the man is liable.

See Leviticus, Chapter 27; Hilchot Arachin 6:1.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it is necessary for these individuals to manifest physical signs of maturity before they are classified as adults. The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears that the Rambam is saying that there is no need for these individuals to manifest such signs. Needless to say, at the age of twelve these individuals are not considered to be adults with regard to the mitzvot incumbent upon males.

Because a deaf-mute’s ability to communicate and respond is so limited, such a person is considered to be intellectually and/or emotionally challenged. According to Scriptural Law, he is not held responsible for his conduct, nor is he able to enter into a marriage contract.

For it is the man’s actions that must precipitate the inception of the marriage bond, as implied by Deuteronomy 24:1: ‘‘When a man takes a wife.’’ Note, however, Chapter 5, Halachah 22, which mentions an exception to this principle.

Mishneh LaMelech offers two explanations of the doubt involved: a) We are unsure of his intent. Since he did not specify that he was giving the woman the money for the sake of kiddushin, it is possible that he gave her the money for another reason. b) The second view is that the doubt is one of principle: The Sages did not define whether the obligation that a man precipitate the marriage bond requires merely his giving money, or also making the statement.

I.e., the woman cannot marry another man until she receives a bill of divorce. Nevertheless, if another man engages in relations with her, he is not executed for adultery.

The man may not, however, write the document on a leaf attached to a tree, or any other item that must be severed, for this is unacceptable when writing a bill of divorce. (See the following halachah and notes.)

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if it is necessary for the man to make a verbal statement of intent as well. (See Beit Shmuel 32:3.) The Or Sameach points to Halachah 18 as proof that a statement is required, but Kin’at Eliyahu notes that Halachah 7 appears to indicate that a verbal statement is unnecessary.

The acceptability of a legal document for the establishment of kiddushin is derived from the association between marriage and divorce created by Deuteronomy 24:2. Kiddushin 5a states that this verse indicates that just as she ‘‘leaves’’ through a bill of divorce, she can ‘‘become’’ through a bill of kiddushin. Hence, all the particulars that apply to a get (a bill of divorce) apply to a bill of kiddushin.

This requirement does not apply with regard to a bill of divorce and is a point of debate in Kiddushin 9b. The opinion the Rambam cites maintains that since the woman is being acquired through this document, she must consent to its being written. Because of the debate in the Talmud, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 32:1) differs with the Rambam and maintains that the matter is unresolved, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt, and the stringencies required had the marriage bond been established must be followed.

Although the man must enter into privacy with the woman in the presence of witnesses, and must make the statement of intent in the presence of witnesses, the relations themselves should be private, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16, and Hilchot Gerushin 10:18.

The term ‘‘the conclusion of sexual relations’’ (g’mar bi’ah) in Hebrew is somewhat of a misnomer. It refers not to the man’s withdrawal from the woman, nor to ejaculation, but to a far earlier stage: the insertion of the penis in its entirety into the vagina (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:10).

Leviticus 19:20 associates this term with establishing relations with a maid-servant, as explained in Chapter 4, Halachah 17. Therefore, there is doubt among the Rabbis if it can be used in establishing the marriage bond with an ordinary woman. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:3) states that if this expression is used the matter is unresolved, and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

With regard to the acknowledgement of a debt, such a statement is necessary. (See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 6:6-8, 7:1-2.)

The Ra’avad and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:7) differ and maintain that the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. It is only with regard to stringencies that the kiddushin are considered to be valid.

This clause serves as the basis for the Ra’avad’s objection to the Rambam’s decisions above.

At which time, the girl has the right to accept kiddushin from a man herself.

For until the age of three, a woman is not considered to be fit for marital relations.

This refers to the second stage of the marriage relationship, as explained in Chapter 11 onward.

This and the other laws in this halachah apply when a girl is either a k’tanah or a na’arah (has reached the age of twelve), but not a bogeret (twelve and a half).

Since the kiddushin were not effective at the time they were given, the father’s subsequent consent is of no significance. This point is, however, disputed by some of the later authorities. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 37:11.)

No priest may marry a divorcee, nor may a High Priest marry a widow. Nevertheless, because these kiddushin are not effective, these prohibitions do not apply.

According to the Maharik (Responsum 30[32]), this applies when the kiddushin were given in her father’s presence, but he remained silent. In both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Caro differs and explains that according to the Rambam, the father must consent at the time of (or before) the kiddushin. If he desires to prevent the kiddushin at that time, he may. If he consents, the girl getting married can still prevent the kiddushin from taking place. For since her father charged her with this matter, even if he consented to the match, it is dependent on her. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Terumot 8:16.)

A woman below the age of majority does not have the authority to appoint an agent.

Among the explanations that are given for why this is acceptable: a) If the father had said, ‘‘Give an animal food, and my daughter will be consecrated to you,’’ the kiddushin would be binding. When he tells the daughter to receive kiddushin, it is as if he makes a statement that it is acceptable to him that the man who consecrates her gives her the money (Ra’avad, Ramban).
b) Although a minor may not normally serve as an agent, this instance is an exception. Since the kiddushin are being given for her benefit, the girl is entitled to act in this capacity (Rabbenu Asher). The Beit Shmuel 37:7 states that the Rambam subscribes to this view.

The rationale is that since the marriage bonds are established through the acceptance of the kiddushin, witnesses must be present to acknowledge the agent’s appointment, for ‘‘no matters involving forbidden sexual relations [are established if] fewer than two witnesses are present (Yevamot 88a).’’
The Rama (Even HaEzer 35:3) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if all concerned acknowledge the appointment of the agent, the kiddushin are effective. He therefore rules that in such a situation, the woman needs to receive a get before she can marry another man.

The Rambam’s statements are based on the comparison to an agent appointed to bring a woman a get. The Ra’avad objects to the comparison, because a get is a formal legal document, and possession of it serves to verify the person’s agency. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

Hilchot Gittin 6:4. This ruling itself is not accepted by all authorities, as noted in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:13).

Hilchot Terumah 4:1.

As clarified by the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 35:2), this ruling applies only when: a) the kiddushin are established by the transfer of a legal document worth less than a p’rutah, or b) the kiddushin are established by the transfer of money, and the woman admits receiving the money.

Our translation follows the Rambam’s later emendations to the Mishneh Torah. The earlier version of the text states: ‘‘The effectiveness of [the transfer of] money stems from Rabbinic Law.’’ See the discussion of this concept in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

Kiddushin 4b.

The punishment given for transgressing a Rabbinic decree.

Today, it is customary for the consecration to be made under the wedding canopy (chuppah), and the blessing is recited at this time.

The Rambam’s wording implies that the blessing should be recited by the groom himself. At present, the current customin both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities is to have the Rabbi conducting the marriage ceremony recite the blessing, lest a groom who does not know how to recite the blessing be embarrassed by his lack of knowledge. (See Hagahot Maimoniot.)

In Darchei Moshe (Even HaEzer 34), the Rama states that one may recite the blessing afterwards as well. Nevertheless, in his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch, he does not make such a statement. The current custom in both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities is to recite the blessing before the kiddushin.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 34:1) states that the blessing should read: ‘‘and commanded us concerning,’’ rather than ‘‘and separated us from.’’ This is the common practice today.

The Beit Shmuel 34:3 and others state that the blessing should read ‘‘those who are married to us.’’ This is the custom in many communities.

At present, the custom is for the officiating Rabbi to recite the blessing over the wine and then the blessing of consecration. He then has the groom and bride drink from the wine, and afterwards the groom consecrates the bride.

The first woman is consecrated based on the principle stated in the following halachah: that a woman may tell a person to give the kiddushin to an agent acting on her behalf. The second woman is consecrated, because she accepted the kiddushin in silence, which is interpreted as acquiescence.

The fact that she discarded the kiddushin is a clear indication of her rejection of his proposal.

Telling the person to give the kiddushin to someone else also indicates that she does not desire them, nor the consequences of accepting them (Tosafot, Kiddushin 8b).

I.e., that the recipient should act as her agent.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 30:11) quotes the opinion of the Tur, who maintains that if at the outset the woman says, ‘‘Put money down in this place and I will be consecrated to you,’’ or ‘‘Give food to this dog and I will be consecrated to you,’’ the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. Since the man spent money because of her wishes, one might presume that this can be compared to the law stated in the previous halachah. Nevertheless, since the kiddushin were not given to a person, it is possible that the comparison is not in place, and the kiddushin are not definitely binding. (See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21.)

The Rama (Orach Chayim 42:2) quotes an opinion that requires stringency in such an instance, but states that leniency should be granted if following the stringent view will cause a woman great difficulty in getting married.
Although the need for witnesses with regard to marriage and divorce is derived from an analogy (gezerah shavah) to claims of monetary law, a difference exists between the two. With regard to a financial claim, no witnesses are necessary if both litigants agree regarding a matter.
As stated in this halachah, this concept does not apply with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. Two rationales are given for this matter:
a) When the man and woman agree with regard to the
establishment of a marriage bond, they are limiting the privileges
of others, for they are unable to consecrate the woman. With
regard to financial matters, by contrast, the rights of others are not
restricted (Rashba).
b) There is a fundamental difference between the function of
witnesses in cases involving financial matters and their function
with regard to wedding and divorce. With regard to financial
matters, the function of witnesses is to clarify the truth (eidei
berur). With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the
witnesses’ function is to notarize the event (eidei kiyyum). For a
marriage bond to be established — or broken — even when the
husband and wife agree that the event took place, witnesses must
observe the proceedings (Tumim 90:14; Tzaphnat Paneach, Kallei
HaTorah).

This ruling sheds light on a theme of larger scope: the interrelation between Rabbinic Law and Scriptural Law. For the fact that a woman needs a get to marry another person appears to indicate that according to Scriptural Law, the kiddushin are effective.

If she is not an orphan and has never been married, the right to consecrate her belongs to her father, not to her.

I.e., she was married, the marriage was consummated, and then she was either divorced or widowed. In this and the above instance, the girl does not have sufficient authority to create a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, a bond that is binding according to Rabbinic Law may be established.

Our translation is based on the commentary of Metzudot to Isaiah 3:3.

The annulment of a marriage that a girl below the age of majority initiates, as explained in the following halachah.
When a girl is below the age of six, we assume that she does not have sufficient understanding of the nature of marriage to make a commitment that is binding in any way.

Chapter 11, Halachah 8.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gerushin 11:6, if the girl reaches majority before she states that she desires to nullify the marriage bond, Rabbinic Law requires her to receive a get before she marries another person. If she continues living with her husband and they engage in sexual relations after she attains majority, the marriage bond is binding according to Scriptural Law.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, stating that the woman should not be allowed to remain married to her deaf-mute husband. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s decision, explaining that since the marriage of a deaf-mute is a Rabbinic institution, our Sages did not impose the same restrictions that would apply had the marriage been effective according to Scriptural Law.
Others state that the Rambam’s ruling applies only when the mentally competent man merely consecrated the deaf-mute’s wife. If he consummated the marriage (nisu’in), the deaf-mute is forbidden to continue living with her after her divorce.

Our Sages differentiated between the marriage of a deaf-mute and that of a mentally and/or emotionally compromised person as follows: the marriage of a deaf-mute may be harmonious and has the possibility of enduring. The marriage of a mentally and/or emotionally compromised person, by contrast, will surely be plagued by friction and will not endure. For a mentally competent person will never be comfortable living with a mentally and/or emotionally compromised person. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 6 and Yevamot 112b.)
The Rama (Even HaEzer 44:2) states that this is a sensitive matter, for it is difficult to determine when a person is completely incompetent or not.

All the terms mentioned in this halachah are explained in Chapter 2.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 44:5) quotes the Tur as stating that an androgynous is considered to be a male, and the kiddushin that he gives are binding.

This ruling is relevant in the present age, for it is frequent that a woman is a niddah at the time of a marriage. A wedding should never be planned to coincide with the woman’s niddah state. Nevertheless, since weddings are often planned well in advance, and women’s menstrual cycles are flexible, it is possible that the calculations will be in error, and the wedding will be scheduled for the time when the woman is a niddah. In such a situation, the commonly accepted ruling is to hold the wedding. Nevertheless, restrictions are placed on the couple’s being in private until the woman purifies herself. Needless to say, martial intimacy is forbidden.

The Ra’avad states that the woman’s word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get from the second person. She is not allowed to marry him, nor may she collect her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Rama (Even HaEzer 17:2) states that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam’s ruling rests is no longer a viable support.

The situation is as follows: A man who was married to two women died while childless. As required by Deuteronomy, Chapter 5, one of his brothers (the yavam) marries one of his widows (the yevamah). Afterwards, neither the yavam nor any other of the deceased’s brothers is allowed to marry the deceased’s second wife. (See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12.)

Rav David Cohen (Section 9, Responsum 1) states that the intent is that we are obligated to force the apostate to divorce his wife, lest he cause her to violate Jewish Law.

E. g., a Canaanite maidservant who was owned in partnership by two masters. One granted the woman her freedom, but the other did not.

Our translation follows the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, who explains that there is a question whether or not the kiddushin of the first person are valid. Nevertheless, if the couple marry and consummate their relationship, this establishes their wedding bond.

Who was totally unaware of what he was doing (Genesis, Chapter 19).

The commentaries (see Beit Shmuel 31:6) debate the status of the kiddushin when one knows for a fact that they are worth a p’rutah in another place. Some maintain that they are absolutely binding, and others maintain that their status remains doubtful.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 30) states that the woman’s field or courtyard must be protected. It is possible to state that this is the Rambam’s opinion as well and he relies on the statements he makes in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9 regarding giving a present (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between the two and explain that the laws governing kiddushin are more lenient. The Beit Shmuel 30:3 maintains that this is the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 30:1). See Chelkat Mechokeik 30:2.

Although this would not be acceptable with regard to a business transaction (Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 4), an exception is made here, because of the possibility that the man lent the woman rights to his share of the property.

See the Beit Shmuel 29:9, which interprets this as meaning that two pairs of witnesses observed the throwing of the kiddushin, one maintained that the kiddushin were able to be guarded by the man, and one that they were able to be guarded by the woman. If, however, there was only one pair of witnesses and they were unsure whether the woman could guard them, the kiddushin are not effective, because it is as if they were given without being observed by witnesses.

The Makneh states that the Rambam relies on his statements in Hilchot Gerushin 5:13, which state that the woman must be able to bend over and take the object. Others do not make such a stipulation.