Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

We assume that the master was willing to partake of whatever animal the servant would have slaughtered. We are not concerned with his usual practice [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 8:2)]

And burnt there like other sacrifices that were disqualified.

Chapter 1, Halachah 11, states that when a person enumerates himself on two Paschal sacrifices, he should partake of the one slaughtered first. This, however, applies when the person had the intent to partake of both of them. In this instance, however, at the time the Paschal sacrifice was slaughtered, the person did not have the intent to partake of either of the sacrifices. He was waiting to make up his mind. As such, it is not considered as if he intended to partake of either of them.
The rationale for this ruling is that the principle of bereirah, that retroactively, the decision which a person ultimately made will be considered as if it was made at the outset, does not apply to questions of Scriptural Law. Thus since his decision was not made at the outset, it is considered as if he did not have in mind to partake of a Paschal sacrifice at all (Rashi, Pesachim 88b).

Rav Kapach in his translation of Rambam’s Commentary of the Mishnah (Pesachim 8:2) explains that the Sages feared the rulers were fickle and did not have the proper respect for the mitzvot. Hence they permitted this leniency rather than risk incurring their wrath. As the Kessef Mishneh explains, other commentaries interpret the Mishnah differently.

In this manner, two animals will be slaughtered and neither will have been slaughtered unnecessarily.

Because at the time the blood was cast, the sacrifice was not fit to be eaten [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 8:2)].

Because at the time the blood was cast, the sacrifice was fit to be eaten.

The Mishnah (Pesachim 8:2) indeed speaks about a Canaanite servant. The Rambam, however, initially speaks of an agent, because an agent has an independent financial capacity and hence, the difficulties concerning a servant do not apply (Kessef Mishneh).

Seemingly, the intent is a shepherd with whom his master deals with frequently. The shepherd, however, must be giving his own animals and not the master’s.

Since the servant does not have an independent financial capacity, normally, whatever he acquires becomes the property of his master. If, however, the shepherd gives it to him when making a stipulation, the animal can become the private property of the servant. It must, however, be noted that there the Rambam is speaking in general terms, quoting the wording used in Pesachim 88b. In Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13-14, the Rambam deals with this issue in particular, stating that it is not sufficient to give an article to a servant on the condition that his master does not own it. Instead, it must be given for a specific purpose, e.g., “on the condition that you use it for food.”

In the first clause.

This concept is derived from the principles stated in the laws that follow. It is considered as if both the members of the company and the agent agreed to partake of the sacrificial animal offered first. Hence, it is not considered as if they enumerated themselves on two Paschal sacrifices.

They are thus reiterating the fact that they are enumerated on his sacrifice.

Since his was slaughtered first and they were enumerated upon it, they may not remove themselves from it.

Because it has no one to partake of it.

By slaughtering their sacrifice first, they are removing themselves from the one offered by the agent.

Because by slaughtering his own sacrifice, he departed from their company.

Because it is possible that theirs was offered first and thus they were removed from his sacrifice.

Because it is possible that his was offered first and thus they would not have been permitted to partake of their own sacrifice.

Because they were enumerated on an acceptable Paschal sacrifice, whether his or their own. The fact that the unresolved doubt prevented them from partaking of it is not of consequence (Rashi, Pesachim 98b).

They did not, however, explicitly instruct him to slaughter the animal for their sake (Kessef Mishneh).

Thus he is enumerating himself on their Paschal sacrifice. This factor leads to the difference between this and the previous halachah.

Because he was enumerated on their sacrifice.

Since his was offered first, it is not considered as if he removed himself from his own sacrifice.

For they had not enumerated themselves on his sacrifice.

Since it is possible that his offering was slaughtered first, in which instance, he is not considered to be enumerated on their sacrifice.

For it is as if each one enumerated the other on their Paschal sacrifice.

After the first was slaughtered, it is impossible for those who brought the second to have removed themselves from it.

And thus it cannot be known on which sacrifice, they were all enumerated.

And each one eats from his own sacrificial animal, regardless of which was slaughtered first. If they do not find their own sacrifice, they are not permitted to partake of the other one.

And thus it is still possible to enumerate and remove persons from the sacrificial animal.

I.e., from your original company.

I.e., at least one person from the original group must remain enumerated on the animal (see Pesachim 99a). The laws that apply if there are less members of the company than stated above can be derived from the following halachah.

Even though he does not know which animal is his. He can have another person enumerated upon it. It is necessary to take another person, because, as mentioned in the notes to the previous halachah, it is necessary that at least one member of the original company remain enumerated on a Paschal sacrifice.

It appears that even the person who originally owned the sacrifice can transfer to the other sacrifice. Since he has enumerated another person on his sacrifice, they are now considered as a company and he may switch to the other (Lechem Mishneh).

For both sacrifices can be offered and eaten.

I.e., one that causes an animal to be disqualified as a sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:10).

Since it was not known which of the animals was disqualified, it is forbidden to partake of any of them, because it is possible that one is partaking of a disqualified sacrifice.

Because at the time the blood was cast on the altar, it was forbidden to partake of the sacrifices. As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6, ordinarily, the animal would be skinned after its blood was poured on the altar.

For four of the animals were offered in an acceptable manner and there is no way to ensure that the fifth sacrifice can be brought on the second Pesach, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

This is forbidden, as stated in Hilchot Shechitah 2:1-2.

In that way, the sacrifice would certainly be valid, for there would be some who would be obligated to offer it enumerated upon it.

The standard text of Pesachim 88b, the Rambam’s source states “It will be eaten by those who are not enumerated upon it.”

For those whose first Paschal sacrifice was acceptable are not obligated to bring a second one.

Because he fulfilled his obligation with the first Paschal sacrifice.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

Hilchot Ma’aseh Hakorbanot 5:6.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 2:2 which states that, after the fact, however, it is considered as if one has fulfilled his obligation.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:1, 3, 11.

As stated there, this also applies to receiving its blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and pouring it on the altar.

Zevachim 7b derives this concept from Exodus 12:27 which states: “And you shall say, “It is a Paschal sacrifice,”’ implying that it must be sacrificed for that purpose.

In contrast, all other sacrifices other than a sin-offering are acceptable if sacrificed for the sake of another type of offering, as stated in that source.

The Rambam’s statements here parallel his approach in Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 13:8 and Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:15. The Tosefta, Pesachim, 4:7, the Rambam’s source, does not mention “a later time.” Nevertheless, from Gittin 54b, the commentaries (see Meiri to Gittin, loc. cit.), understand the Rambam as following the approach of Abbaye who maintains that as long as it is within a person’s potential to bring about a change, his word should be accepted. (The rationale is that since he could disqualify the matter himself if he so chose, we accept his word that it already became disqualified.) Once the matter is out of his hands, there is no obligation to accept his word; it is only pious conduct.
It can also be explained that, as long as they have the opportunity, they should have themselves enumerated on another Paschal sacrifice, so that they will have fulfilled the mitzvah. After the time of the Paschal sacrifice passes, i.e., “at a later time,” the law stated by the Rambam applies.

And bring a second Paschal sacrifice on the fifteenth of Iyar.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, because as mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, one may not bring a sacrifice when one is unsure if he is obligated, because he may be slaughtering ordinary animals in the Temple Courtyard. Even in this instance when it is possible to make a conditional statement, saying: “If I am obligated to bring a Paschal sacrifice, this should be considered as a Paschal sacrifice and if not, as a peace-offering,” that is undesirable, because the way the blood of the two sacrifices are presented differs and as an initial preference, it is forbidden to present one in the manner the other is presented.
The Lechem Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the conclusion of the previous chapter was speaking about a situation where four of the five companies had offered acceptable sacrifices. Hence it is not appropriate that they violate a transgression, however minor, in order to enable the others to fulfill their obligation. In this instance, by contrast, it is preferable for the person to violate this minor prohibition to ensure that he is not liable for karet for failing to bring a Paschal sacrifice. He, nevertheless, notes that this explanation can be questioned based on Chapter 6, Halachah 10.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 7:7), the Rambam interprets the mishnah which is the source for this halachah as speaking about the blood of the sacrifice.

I.e., although the fats and the organs could be offered on the altar, since the primary purpose of this sacrifice is that its meat be eaten (see Chapter 2, Halachah 3), there is no point in doing so.

And he is obligated to bring a second Paschal sacrifice.

Although the sacrifice may not be eaten, the persons bringing it are not obligated to bring a second Paschal sacrifice. For at the time the blood was poured on the altar, the sacrifice had not been disqualified (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The Lechem Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:7, he states that the High Priest’s forehead plate “does not, however, bring about appeasement if the portions of the sacrifices that are eaten are impure.”
According to the above explanation, however, there is no difficulty, for the Rambam was not suggesting that the sacrifice be eaten.

Provided there is an olive-sized portion for all those enumerated upon it (Kessef Mishneh in the name of the Tosefta, Pesachim 6:4).

Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 7:7), the Rambam interprets the mishnah that is the source of this halachah as referring to the priest offering the sacrifice. In his gloss to his translation of that commentary, Rav Kappach states that the Rambam had rubbed out and written over his words, indicating that he had reconsidered the matter.

For they will not be able to partake of it and, as above, the entire purpose of the Paschal sacrifice is that it be eaten.

Hilchot Nizirut 6:18; see also Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:6, defines “impurity [likened to] the depths” as impurity stemming from contact with a human corpse, about which “no one, not even one at the end of the world, knows,” See Chapter 6, Halachah 12.

Which disqualifies it, because it was taken out of the place where it may be eaten (Rav Yosef Corcus). The commentaries explain that the Rambam’s statements here represent a reversal of his original understanding of Pesachim 7:9. There he interprets that mishnah as referring to a Paschal sacrifice taken outside of the house where it was taken to be eaten.

There is no need to wait until the following day, because the disqualifying factor concerns the meat itself.
In contrast, if the sacrifice becomes impure on the fifteenth of Nisan, it cannot be burnt until after the passage of the first day of the holiday, for disqualified sacrifices are not burnt on the sacred days of a festival (Hilchot Yom Tov 3:8).

I.e., needless to say this applies if they became impure or died after the blood was offered, for then there was a time when the sacrifice was fit to be eaten.

The literal meaning of the words used by the Rambam is “[It should be left] until its form decomposes.” The translation we used is based on Rashi (Menachot 46b). In the instances described in this clause, the sacrifice itself is acceptable. Nevertheless, it may only be eaten by those designated to partake of it. Since they are disqualified, it may not be eaten. Nonetheless, it should not be burnt immediately, because it is forbidden to burn sacrifices until they themselves have been disqualified.

In this instance, it could not be burnt until the morning of the sixteenth, because disqualified sacrifices should not be burnt on a holiday.

On the fourteenth of Nisan.

I.e., either the blood or the owners became impure after the Paschal sacrifice was slaughtered.

Thus at the time the Paschal sacrifice was slaughtered, there was no one eligible to partake of it.

Since the Paschal sacrifice was offered without anyone halachicly eligible to partake of it, it is considered as if it is inherently invalid and it should be burnt immediately (Kessef Mishneh).

Based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim, the conclusion of ch. 7, it would appear that even if those who remained pure had started eating, they acquire the portion of those who became impure if the latter had not begun eating.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 7:8). More particularly, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:4, the term birah refers to a place on the Temple Mount outside the Temple Courtyard where sin-offerings that were disqualified are burnt.

Tosafot, Pesachim 82a, explain that when the wood was consecrated for the altar, the court had in mind that it could also be used for this purpose.

I.e., if the people would have to burn it with their own wood, were there to be extra wood, when they take it home, some might think they are taking wood designated for the altar (Rashi, Pesachim 82a).

Which are not fit for the altar and thus would not arouse suspicion.

It may, however, be taken to the Temple and burnt there using wood designated for the altar. Indeed, the miserly would burn it in that manner to save money (Pesachim 7:8).

And use it for their own purposes.

As stated in Chapter I, Halachah 1, a Paschal sacrifice must be a male in the first year of its life.

The Rambam’s ruling follows the same interpretation of the mishnah in Pesachim 97b as Tosafot. It must be emphasized that the text of the mishnah as cited by the Talmud is different than it appears in the standard text of the Mishnah (and also the Rambam’s text of the Mishnah).
The commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Pesachim 98b states that this teaching leads to the conclusion that once an animal is deemed unacceptable for a sacrifice, it remains unacceptable forever and in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:23 and other sources, the Rambam rules that “living animals are not deemed unacceptable forever.” Even though an animal was deemed unacceptable for a sacrifice, it may become acceptable if circumstances change.
To relate these concepts to the issue at hand, the Talmud is stating that since the female was deemed unacceptable for a Paschal sacrifice, it is unfit to ever be sacrificed. Therefore it cannot be offered as a peace-offering itself, but must be sold (after becoming blemished) and the proceeds used to acquire another animal for the sacrifice. According to the Rambam, however, seemingly, the female animal could itself be brought as a peace-offering, instead of leaving it to contract a blemish and then selling it.
Rav Yosef Corcus resolves the apparent contradiction in the Rambam’s ruling, stating that in this instance, the female animal is inherently unfit to serve as a Paschal sacrifice. Hence it can be “deemed unacceptable forever.” In contrast, in the other instances where the Rambam refers to this principle, it is extraneous factors and not inherent ones that disqualify the sacrifice. Hence his ruling in this instance varies. Alternatively, it can be said that the Rambam follows the interpretation of the “living animals are deemed unacceptable forever” offered by Rabbenu Chananel: that since the animal was consecrated as a Paschal sacrifice (for which it is unfit), its worth and not its physical body was consecrated. Accordingly, its physical body is “deemed unacceptable forever” and can never be consecrated for another purpose.

For as stated in Shekalim 2:5 and in Halachah 10 of this chapter, any money designated for a Paschal sacrifice that is leftover should be used for a peace-offering. In this instance, it is not necessary to wait until the animal contracts a blemish.

Without enumerating anyone else on his sacrifice.

Since there was no one enumerated on this sacrifice, others cannot be enumerated on it, nor may it be offered without anyone considered as its owners. It is, therefore, offered as a peace-offering, because, as mentioned above, what is leftover from a Paschal sacrifice should be used for a peace-offering (Rav Yosef Corcus).

For then the son is considered as an owner of the Paschal sacrifice. He may offer it alone or have others enumerated with him.

The term onain refers to a person in acute mourning because one of his close relatives died that day. As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 9, “a person who is in an acute state of mourning is fit to eat a Paschal sacrifice in the evening because the observance of aninut at night is a Rabbinical institution and [the Sages] did not uphold their decree in a place of karet in this instance. Instead, [others] may slaughter for his sake…. When does the above apply? When his [relative] died after midday and he was already obligated to bring a Paschal sacrifice. If, however, his [relative] died before midday, they should not slaughter for his sake. Instead, he is deferred until the second Pesach.”

For as stated previously, what is leftover from a Paschal sacrifice should be brought as a peace-offering. This follows the principle that “living animals are not deemed unacceptable forever.” As such, there is no need to wait for the remaining animal to contract a blemish. It may itself be brought as a peace-offering.
This interpretation runs contrary to the statements of the Mishnah (Pesachim 9:6) which follows the perspective that “living animals that are deemed unacceptable remain unacceptable forever.” As explained above, the Rambam maintains that the Mishnah reflects a minority opinion and that according to Halachah, they do not remain unacceptable (Kessef Mishneh). The Ra’avad, however, protests the Rambam’s ruling, stating that the ruling of the abovementioned mishnah should be followed.

For it is what remains after a Paschal sacrifice.

See Hilchot Temurah 2:1 for a definition of this term.

For it too, is considered as what remains after a Paschal sacrifice.

In this instance, since the animal is associated with two types of sacrifices, it does not have the power to have its holiness transferred to another animal in a complete sense. Therefore the animal to which its holiness is transferred is not fit to be offered as a sacrifice itself (Kessef Mishneh).

And thus is no longer acceptable to be offered as that sacrifice.

E. g., an animal brought from what remains from a Paschal sacrifice or an animal to which the holiness of a Paschal sacrifice was transferred as explained above.

Leaning of the animal before it is slaughtered (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:6).

The wine libations and meal-offerings brought together with a peace-offering (see ibid. 2:2).

See ibid. 9:6.

For the Paschal sacrifice that became intermingled is comparable to the money that remained from a Paschal sacrifice (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., one as a peace-offering and one as the other type of sacrifice.

Since he does not know which was the more valuable and he should not bring a lesser animal in place of it, he must suffer the consequences. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 9:8), where he elaborates in his description of this situation.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:5-6.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:12; Hilchot Bechorot 1:18.
The mixture may not be sacrificed on the fourteenth of Nisan, because there is a difference in the laws applying to partaking of these sacrifices. The firstborn offering may only be eaten by priests (in contrast to the Paschal sacrifice which may be eaten by all Jews) and the Paschal sacrifice may be eaten only on the night of Pesach (in contrast to the firstborn offering which may be eaten throughout the following day). Since we do not desire to reduce either the time or the individuals eligible to partake of a sacrifice, our Sages ruled that the option described above was preferable (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:12).

For in contrast to a blemished firstborn animal, the holiness of a blemished Pachal sacrifice may be transferred to another animal (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:12; Hilchot Temurah 3:2).

If, however, his Paschal sacrifice was not offered, he may offer this animal for that sacrifice.

In all these instances, initially, the person is unable to consecrate an animal as a sacrifice and afterwards, he has that capacity.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:23.

Pesachim 70b derives this concept as follows: Deuteronomy 16:2 states: “And you shall slaughter the Paschal sacrifice... [from] sheep and cattle.” Now cattle may not be offered as a Paschal sacrifice. Why then does the verse mention them? To teach that what is left over from a Paschal sacrifice may be used for a sacrifice that may be brought from cattle, i.e., a peace-offering.

I.e., the festive offering brought with the Paschal sacrifice, as described in Chapter 10, Halachah 12.

They are not consecrated and may be used for any purpose the recipient desires, even for his personal needs.

Usually, if one desires that money that was consecrated to be considered ordinary funds, it must be used to purchase an ordinary animal and then the holiness of the money is transferred to the animal. The Rambam, based on Pesachim 90a, is explaining why this instance is an exception.

As stated in Exodus 12:8, as quoted in Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Although the money was originally set aside for the Paschal sacrifice, it may be used for these purposes.

Thus the stipulation mentioned in the previous halachah must also have been extended to apply in such situations as well.

I.e., the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 1-2, which explains that there are situations when a person is ritually impure at the time the Paschal sacrifice is offered, but the sacrifice may be offered for him, since in the evening, he will regain ritual purity and be permitted to partake of the sacrifice.

See Numbers 9:10: “If any man will be impure because of contact with a corpse or on a distant way... he may perform the Paschal sacrifice for God. In the second month, on the fourteenth day, after midday, shall he perform it.” The term “a distant way” is defined in Halachot 8-9.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 57) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 380) include this as one of 613 mitzvot.

Thus if the fourteenth of Iyar falls on the Sabbath, the second Paschal sacrifice is brought regardless. Pesachim 66a derives this concept from the fact that Numbers 9:13 uses the term bimoado, “at its time.” Whenever that term is used, the offering of the sacrifice mentioned supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.
Rav Yosef Corcus explains that according to the Rambam the term bimoado applies to both the day when the first Paschal sacrifice is offered and the day when the second Paschal sacrifice is offered.

As Rav Yosef Corcus points out, the intent is not that the second Pesach is an entirely independent festival, for it is observed only by those who did not bring the first Paschal sacrifice at the appropriate time. Instead, the intent is that one is liable for karet for failing to bring the second Paschal sacrifice as explained in the following halachah. See also Halachah 7.

As Numbers 9:13 states: “That person will be cut off from his nation.” The prevailing opinion in Pesachim 93a maintains that this verse refers to the second Paschal sacrifice.

The rationale is that he was potentially liable for karet for the first Pachal sacrifice. Although in fact he was not liable for karet, because his failure to bring the sacrifice was inadvertent or due to forces beyond his control, since he was obligated to bring the sacrifice, he is liable for karet if he willfully did not compensate by bringing the second Paschal sacrifice.
The Ra’avad notes that although Pesachim 93a states this view in the name of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, two different Rabbis offer conflicting views in that Talmudic passage. Hence, it appears that the position of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi does not represent the majority view. The Rambam does not accept that position because each of the conflicting views is based on a different rationale, and hence should not be considered as the same opinion (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Because his failure to compensate was not willful.

And hence was liable for karet. He had the opportunity to correct his transgression, but failed to make use of it.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 9:1), the Rambam explains the rationale for this ruling: there is no independent obligation for karet for failing to bring the second Paschal sacrifice. Hence even though he was given an opportunity to have fulfilled the mitzvah, since he was exempt from offering the first Paschal sacrifice, he receives no punishment for failing to offer the second. This explanation satisfies the objections raised by the Ra’avad (Rav Yosef Corcus).

And thus was exempt from the obligation to bring the Paschal sacrifice.

And thus was physically able to partake of the sacrifice. Nevertheless, since he was not obligated to bring the offering, he does not fulfill his obligation and is obligated to bring a second Paschal sacrifice.

As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

Even though he is unfit to bring the first Paschal sacrifice, he could have made himself fit.

More precisely, an uncircumcised natural born Jew. With regard to a convert, see Chapter 6, Halachah 7.

Since they could have offered the first Paschal sacrifice, as stated in Halachah 2.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 8.

The Rambam does not mention one’s children above majority, for then the obligation of circumcision is no longer the responsibility of the father, but is the son’s (Hilchot Milah 1:2).

See Chapter 9, Halachah 9.

The act which brings about their change in status from gentiles to Jews, as explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:4,6, 11.

As recorded in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai to Exodus 12:44.

I.e., together with others. A minor may not offer a sacrifice himself, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 4.

The term implies one who has attained majority.

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that there are other Rabbinic sources that appear to contradict this teaching. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s ruling has a basis, for a minor is not obligated in any of the mitzvot. Hence he is not obligated to have his servants circumcised.

For, as stated in Halachah 1, the second Pesach is an independent festival. Hence even a person like those mentioned above who were not obligated to bring the first Paschal sacrifice must bring the second.

Although the suffix the Rambam uses means “he,” it can only refer to a minor, for until a convert actually converts, he cannot be enumerated on a Paschal sacrifice (Kessef Mishneh).

Although the minor does not become personally obligated in the observance of mitzvot until he comes of age, the mitzvah he observed while being trained is considered as significant enough to exempt him from the obligation.

Since there is no obligation for them to offer this sacrifice, the Sabbath laws should not be violated to enable them to do so. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 4.

A mil is a Roman measure approximately equivalent to a kilometer.

The measurement is made from the walls of Jerusalem and not from the walls of the Temple, because-the Paschal sacrifice may be eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem.

This phrase apparently refers to hanetz hachamah, the time when the sun rises on the horizon. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 9:2), the Rambam speaks of dawn which is more than an hour earlier. The Meiri also notes that Pesachim 2b states that it is proper to wait until dawn to depart on a journey.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion in Pesachim 93b. There is another opinion that maintains that the person does not really have to be in Jerusalem until the evening of the fourteenth when the sacrifice is eaten. Hence, seemingly, he should have been granted more time and a further distance to travel before being considered “on a distant way.”

And not riding on an animal or wagon.

As mentioned in Halachah 2, there is more leniency granted to a person “on a distant way” than to one held back by other forces beyond his control.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it runs contrary to Pesachim 94b. The Kessef Mishneh states that although a surface reading of the passage would appear to support the Ra’avad’s understanding, the Rambam makes a distinction between one who is prevented from reaching Jerusalem because he is “on a distant way” and one who is on a journey, but is prevented, not because of distance, but because of external factors.

If he was imprisoned inside Jerusalem, the Paschal sacrifice may be slaughtered on his behalf even if he was not promised to be released, because the sacrificial meat could be brought to him in prison [the Jerusalem Talmud (Pesachim 8:6)]. This applies even if he was imprisoned by gentiles.

Even if he is alone. Needless to say, this applies if others are enumerated on the sacrifice with him.

For they can be expected to keep their word. Ketubot 33b explains that at times a person may be imprisoned as a means of compulsion for him to pay his debts or divorce a woman with whom he should not remain married.

For we suspect that the gentiles will not keep their word. He may, however, be enumerated on a Paschal sacrifice that is slaughtered for others (Pesachim 91a).

And at the time the blood was cast on the altar, it was thought that he would partake of the sacrifice.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 9.

The authoritative Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah offer an alternate version: “who could not have partaken....” Nevertheless, the standard published text is preferred by the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Corcus, and other commentaries.

Here we are speaking about an instance where the Paschal sacrifice was sacrificed for such a person to be eaten together with other people.

Just as with regard to an ordinary person, since he was able to partake of the Paschal sacrifice at the time the blood was poured on the altar, he is exempt from the second Paschal sacrifice. These individuals are mentioned because there is an unusual element involved with each of them. The onain is unfit to partake of sacrifices during the day and the sick and the elderly are unlikely to eat large amounts. Nevertheless, they are exempt from the second Paschal sacrifice.