Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day
Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 3, Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 4, Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 5
Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 3
Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 4
Kiddush HaChodesh - Chapter 5
Test Yourself on Kiddush HaChodesh Chapter 3
Test Yourself on Kiddush HaChodesh Chapter 4
Test Yourself on Kiddush HaChodesh Chapter 5
The Rambam does not say “a one-day distance from Jerusalem,” because after the destruction of the Temple, the High Court would sanctify the new month in other places. (See Rosh HaShanah 22b.)
Note the apparent contradiction in Halachah 15. In the light of that halachah, it would appear that the Rambam’s intent is that since the court endeavors to nullify such testimony, it is undesirable for the witnesses to come and offer it (Lechem Mishneh).
The Rambam is referring to the prohibitions associated with going beyond the Sabbath limits and the performance of any forbidden labors necessary for their journey—e.g., carrying food or weapons.
Significantly, the month of Sivan is not mentioned, although the holiday of Shavuot is celebrated then. The celebration of Shavuot depends, not on a particular day of the month, but on the conclusion of the counting of the Omer. Thus when Rosh Chodesh was determined by the testimony of witnesses, Shavuot could be celebrated on the fifth, sixth, or seventh of Sivan (Rosh HaShanah 6b).
See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:1,4, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:18.
The sacrifice of any offerings associated with a fixed time supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.
I.e., the character witnesses mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 3.
This law is based on an actual historical account. Rabbi Nehorai traveled to Usha together with witnesses to substantiate their credibility, in the hope of finding another person there to testify together with him (Rosh HaShanah 22b).
The Perush questions why the Sabbath laws are broken when there is only a possibility of performing a mitzvah, citing a similar situation—a baby born after sunset on Friday. He should not be circumcised on the following Sabbath, because there is a doubt whether circumcision should be performed on Friday or on the Sabbath (Hilchot Milah 1:12).
The subsequent commentaries offer several resolutions to this difficulty. Among them:
a) Circumcision can be performed at a later date, while the sanctification of the new moon cannot be postponed (Lechem Mishneh);
b) Traveling to Jerusalem to testify always involves violating the Sabbath laws with only a possibility of performing the mitzvah, for it is possible that the court will reject the witnesses’ testimony (Rav David Arameah).
Leading a healthy person on a donkey is not considered to be transporting him in violation of the Sabbath labors, because “a living being carries himself.” If, however, the person is sick, this principle does not apply, and he is considered a burden, so that transporting him on a donkey involves a prohibition (Hilchot Shabbat 18:16, 20:1-2). Nevertheless, this prohibition is waived in the endeavor to sanctify the new moon.
Rav David Arameah interprets this to mean that men are allowed to carry him to the court on his bed.
Rashi, Rosh HaShanah 22a, relates that the Sadducees would lie in ambush for the witnesses, with the intent of delaying their appearance in court until after the thirtieth day had passed.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Rosh HaShanah 1:5), the Rambam explains that although the moon might be seen very clearly in one place, in other locales it might have appeared low on the horizon, or covered by clouds. Therefore, it is desirable for all potential witnesses to journey to Jerusalem to make sure that the new moon is sanctified in its proper time.
I.e., there is sufficient time for the witness(es) to arrive at the High Court on the thirtieth day.
In this vein, it is worthy to note a story related in Rosh HaShanah 1:6. Forty pairs of witnesses passed through Lod on their way to Jerusalem to testify regarding the sighting of the moon. Rabbi Akiva held them back, because he saw that their testimony would not stand up under cross-examination by the court. Rabban Gamliel rebuked him, explaining that this would prevent them from journeying to Jerusalem at a future date, when their testimony might be of consequence. (See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah.)
More specifically, Rosh HaShanah 30b states that the problem concerns the song to be sung by the Levites in connection with the sacrifice. Had there not been a difficulty with the song, the afternoon sacrifice could have been offered conditionally: If no witnesses come, the lamb would be considered the afternoon sacrifice; and if the witnesses do come, it would be considered part of the musaf offering (Rishon LeTzion).
Significantly, as reflected in the discussion in Rosh HaShanah (op. cit.), the instance in question concerned the celebration of Rosh HaShanah, and not an ordinary Rosh Chodesh.
For once the afternoon sacrifice is offered, no other offerings may be sacrificed.
The time of the afternoon sacrifice, nine and a half seasonal hours (שָׁעוֹת זְמַנִּיּוֹת) after sunrise.
The Rambam is referring to Rosh HaShanah.
Indeed, regardless the people would observe the day as a holiday from nightfall on the previous day, lest witnesses come and the new moon be sanctified.
And there were no longer any difficulties concerning the sacrifices.
Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai lived at the time of the Temple’s destruction, and this decree was instituted shortly after that event.
The Lechem Mishneh and others have raised questions about the Rambam’s choice of wording, based on his previous statements in Chapter 2, Halachah 9. Merkevet HaMishneh offers a simple resolution of this difficulty. Here we are speaking of the acceptance of the witnesses’ testimony, and it is necessary to take time to cross-examine them. This process cannot be completed in the meager amount of time between sunset and the appearance of the stars.
To publicize that the month had become full.
Sanhedrin 70a relates that the participants in this meal would ascend in a time that is neither day nor night. Thus, the Rambam interprets this as referring to the time between the appearance of the first rays of the sun and sunrise itself. Rashi and others maintain that the participants would ascend in the evening, between sunset and the appearance of the stars.
The fires would be lit in the evening of the thirty-first night.
There are mountains surrounding Jerusalem on all sides. The bonfires on these mountains could be seen by people on further mountains, until in a short amount of time people throughout Eretz Yisrael could be notified that the new moon had been sanctified.
The Samaritans lived between Jerusalem and the Galilee. At one point, they desired to disrupt the calculation of the calendar and would light bonfires on the evening before the thirty-first day, regardless of whether or not the moon was sighted. The people in the Galilee would think that the chain of bonfires had begun in Jerusalem (Rosh HaShanah 22b).
The Jerusalem Talmud (Rosh HaShanah 2:1) states that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi was the one who nullified the bonfires, and substituted messengers instead. This, however, is somewhat difficult to accept because, as the Rambam mentions in Halachah 9, there were times when the messengers were sent out while the Temple was standing. Perhaps the intent is that until the time of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi there were times when both messengers were sent out and bonfires were lit. From his time onward, the bonfires were no longer used.
Rosh HaShanah 18b relates that in that era, fasting on the other commemorative fasts—the tenth of Tevet and the seventeenth of Tammuz—was not mandatory. Therefore, it was not necessary to send out messengers for these months.
The Rambam maintains that the people would observe Rosh HaShanah for two days, because of the doubt. Thus, if the people did not know when the month of Elul began, they would have to observe three days (Lechem Mishneh).
This is speaking about the villages in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem.
The commentaries note that Rosh HaShanah 19b also mentions the possibility of the messengers’ being sent out in the second month of Adar if a leap year is declared. This, however, is an infrequent event, because generally, the decision to make the year a leap year was not made at the last moment (Aruch HaShulchan).
Pesach Sheni, when all those who had not offered a sacrifice on the first Pesach were given a further opportunity to bring this offering.
The messengers for the month of Tishrei could travel only 2000 cubits beyond Jerusalem (or 4000 cubits, if they made an eruv t’chumim) on Rosh HaShanah, because of the sanctity of that day (Perush).
Since the holidays observed in these months were prescribed by the Torah itself, this further stringency was required (ibid.).
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
The observance of an additional day of the holidays is described in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Thus, if the thirtieth day following Rosh Chodesh Adar fell on the Sabbath, they would not know whether Pesach (the fifteenth day of the following month) would be celebrated on the Sabbath or on Sunday.
For, as explained in the following halachah, the messengers sent out for Tishrei would not travel on Rosh HaShanah or on Yom Kippur.
In the brackets, we mention the holiday of Sukkot, but not Yom Kippur. For Yom Kippur was never observed by a community at large for two days. Rosh HaShanah 21a relates that Rabbah would fast for two days, but this was a stringency that he accepted on himself as an individual. The people in the Diaspora would fast ten days after the thirtieth day following Rosh Chodesh Elul, for the court always endeavored to make Elul a month of 29 days. (See Or Sameach.)
Because Shavuot is dependent on the Counting of the Omer, even Jews living in the outer reaches of the Diaspora were able to know precisely when Shavuot was to be observed. Yet, they kept two days.
There is also the possibility of additional days, if there are more Sabbaths in Tishrei than in Nisan.
From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that it is necessary that the merchant receive his information from the High Court directly; hearing from others is not sufficient.
Rosh HaShanah 22b states that people will not lie about a matter when it is certain that eventually the truth will be revealed.
The commentaries compare the Rambam’s statements here with those at the conclusion of Hilchot Gerushin. In the latter source, he employs the same rationale—that the truth of the matter will eventually be revealed—to explain why leniency is shown concerning testimony given to determine that a woman’s husband has died, which enables her to remarry. In that instance, however, even greater leniency is shown, and the court accepts the testimony of witnesses who are otherwise unacceptable. The commentaries explain that the greater leniency is granted in consideration of the agonizing situation of the widow.
See Halachah 7.
The Rambam’s statements in this and the following four halachot are based on his interpretation of Rosh HaShanah 20a. Significantly, his understanding of that passage differs from that of Rashi.
Rosh HaShanah, op. cit.
Note another interpretation of the expression, “The month is made full out of necessity,” in Chapter 18, Halachah 11.
This opinion is also mentioned in the above passage.
Generally, when the Rambam uses the expression “It appears to me” in the Mishneh Torah, he is introducing an original interpretation. In this instance, the resolution offered by the Rambam is also suggested by Abbaye in the above passage. Nevertheless, there is a certain justification for the use of the phrase, because there are other interpretations offered by the Talmud, and no conclusion is reached. Therefore, the Rambam’s choice of the interpretation to follow was motivated by his own comprehension of the passage.
When Pesach and Sukkot are celebrated. One might ask why consideration was not given to the observance of Yom Kippur on the tenth of Tishrei.
The Or Sameach offers the following resolution: Yom Kippur was observed for only one day in the outlying Diaspora. The communities would assume that the moon had been sighted at its appropriate time, and they would observe Rosh HaShanah on the thirtieth day after Rosh Chodesh Elul, and Yom Kippur ten days afterwards. Thus, by accepting the witnesses’ testimony, the court will have assured that a large portion of the Jewish people observed Yom Kippur on the proper date.
Although this explanation has its advantages, it does not address itself to the observance of Yom Kippur in Eretz Yisrael, or to the sacrifices that had to be offered on that sacred day in the Temple.
The Hebrew term used, lehazim, means to nullify their testimony by stating that, at the time they claimed to have seen the moon, they were in a different place from the place where they claimed to have sighted it.
It would appear that, in both of the instances mentioned in this halachah, this law applies only when, according to the court’s calculations, the moon should have been sighted on the thirtieth night.
This month is added to juxtapose the lunar calendar upon which the months are based, with the solar calendar, which governs the years.
The Mechilta (commenting on Exodus 12:2) states that just as when a month is made full the addition is made at the end of the month, so too, when a year is made full the addition is made at the end. (The year is considered as beginning in Nisan and ending in Adar.)
Based on Hilchot Nedarim 10:6, it appears that the Rambam considers the first Adar to be the additional month of the leap year. The Tur and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 427:1) differ and consider the second Adar to be the additional month.
In practice, Purim is always celebrated in the second Adar (Hilchot Megillah 1:12). There is a difference of opinion with regard to whether to commemorate birthdays, yahrzeits, and the like that took place in Adar of an ordinary year in the first or the second Adar of a leap year. The accepted custom in the Ashkenazic community is to commemorate them in the first Adar of a leap year (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 221:3)
Based on this verse, Rav Sa’adiah Gaon considers the adjustment of the yearly calendar to be a separate mitzvah. The Rambam, by contrast, considers it one dimension of the mitzvah of establishing the calendar.
An equinox occurs twice a year (spring, around 20 March, and fall, around 22 September), when the tilt of the Earth’s axis is inclined neither away from nor towards the Sun, the center of the Sun being in the same plane as the Earth’s equator. The term equinox can also be used in a broader sense, meaning the date when such a passage happens. The name “equinox” is derived from the Latin aequus (equal) and nox (night), because around the equinox, the night and day have approximately equal length. Pesach must be after the vernal equinox to be considered חֹדֶשׁ הָאָבִיב, a ‘springtime holiday.’
We have translated the Hebrew word אביב as “ripening,” as in Exodus 9:31. Because the agricultural cycle was so much an integral part of the calendar, the word אביב also means “spring” in Hebrew.
The calculations that the court would consider are outlined in Chapter 9.
The Ra’avad (in his gloss on Halachah 16), the Ramah and others take issue with the Rambam on this point, maintaining that even when Pesach falls before the vernal equinox, another factor is necessary for a leap year to be declared.
Both these factors are, however, necessary. Neither in their own right is sufficient.
Based on Sanhedrin 13a, b, the Ramah (cited in the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Halachah 15) notes that our Sages required that the festival of Sukkot occur after the autumnal equinox. If the vernal equinox falls on the fifteenth of Nisan, it is possible that the autumnal equinox will not take place until the twenty-first of Tishrei, six days after Sukkot begins.
Several different perspectives are offered to resolve this point. Among them: The Or Sameach maintains that the Rambam’s text originally contained a reference to the autumnal equinox, and it was omitted by the later printers. Aruch HaShulchan, by contrast, maintains that, according to the Rambam, the entire discussion in Sanhedrin is not accepted as halachah. We are not at all concerned with the autumnal equinox; all that is significant is that Pesach fall after the vernal equinox.
See Leviticus 23:9-14; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:3.
The climates of these lands are different, and it is possible that the barley will have ripened in one land, but not in the others.
As opposed to the factors mentioned in the following halachot.
I.e., these factors are not associated with the juxtaposition of the lunar and solar calendars, but rather related to the celebration of the pilgrimage festival of Pesach in a complete manner.
Because they were damaged by the rains.
The ovens were earthenware, and could be damaged by substantial rains.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 1:2) states that an effort should be made to enable the entire Jewish people to celebrate the pilgrimage festivals in Jerusalem.
Rashi, Sanhedrin 12a, writes that these factors will make the people’s journey to Jerusalem uncomfortable, but will not prevent them from making the journey.
In his commentary on the tractate of Sanhedrin (one of the few tractates of the Gemara on which the Rambam wrote a commentary), the Rambam quotes Rav Hai Gaon as explaining that this instance refers to a situation in which the people were impure because of contact with a human corpse, and no ashes from the red heifer remained to purify them. One might think that the year should be made full to enable the priests enough time to offer a new red heifer and prepare ashes. Therefore, our Sages feel it necessary to explain that this measure is not taken, and in this instance the Paschal sacrifice should be offered by a priest in a state of ritual impurity.
On the one hand, an individual who is ritually impure may not offer the Paschal sacrifice at its appropriate time, but instead should offer it a month later, on Pesach Sheni. On the other hand, when the majority of the Jewish people, or the majority of the priests, are impure, the sacrifice should be offered in a state of ritual impurity. (See Hilchot Korban Pesach 7:1; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:16.)
Our Sages interpret Deuteronomy 16:16, “You shall not appear before God empty-handed,” as obligating a person to bring an olah (“burnt”) offering on the pilgrimage festivals. The Rambam maintains that doves could be brought for these offerings. (See Hilchot Chaggigah 1:1.) Other authorities differ, as explained in the commentaries on that halachah.
E. g., a woman who gives birth (Leviticus 12:8), zavim (Leviticus 15:14), and zavot (Leviticus 15:29). It was customary for people living far from Jerusalem to delay offering the sacrifices they were obligated to bring until the pilgrimage festivals.
By mentioning both factors (the barley and the fruit trees), the Rambam indicates that he does not follow the perspective suggested by Rashi (Sanhedrin 11a), which states that the lack of lambs or doves coupled with either a delay in the ripening of the barley or the blooming of the fruit trees is sufficient cause to make the year full.
See Sanhedrin 11a, which relates that Rabban Gamliel once invited seven members of the Sanhedrin to participate in the deliberations regarding whether or not to make a year full. He requested that they meet him in the loft of the court early the following morning. When an additional member of the court came, Rabban Gamliel protested and taught the Sages this halachah.
For a leap year can be declared only by the High Court, or by a court deputized by the High Court (Chapter 5, Halachah 1).
When there are fewer than seven judges in the court, a leap year is instituted only when the decision to do so is unanimous. Only when the court is expanded to include seven judges is a majority ruling accepted as binding (Rabbenu Chananel, Sanhedrin 10b).
I.e., the head of the court.
Lest the lesser judges be intimidated after hearing the decision of the head of the court, and refrain from expressing their own opinion.
For the matter is more of a formality; the head of the court merely pronounces the month as sanctified.
Based on this ruling, Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions why King Chizkiyah was able to institute a leap year, as related in Pesachim 4:10.
Rashi (Sanhedrin 18b) states that the king would pay his soldiers a yearly salary, and therefore, by instituting an extra month, he would gain.
The B’nei Binyamin explains that there is also a reason for a king to desire to refrain from instituting an extra month. Bridegrooms, those who have built new homes, and those who have planted vineyards are freed from army service for a year. If a leap year is instituted, they benefit. Therefore, if a sizable portion of the population fell into these categories, and men were required for the army, it would be preferable for the king not to institute a leap year.
I.e., the Temple in Jerusalem. Curiously, however, it does not appear that the Rambam requires the proceedings to be carried out in the Temple, or even in Jerusalem.
Sanhedrin 11b states that there is an equation between the institution of a leap year and the sanctification of the new moon. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 8, the new moon can be sanctified only during the day.
Based on the equation between these two practices, the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 4) questions the law mentioned previously: Why may the moon be sanctified throughout Eretz Yisrael (Chapter 1, Halachah 8) if a leap year may be instituted only in the territory of Judea?
Sanhedrin 12a relates that once, when Rabbi Akiva was imprisoned by the Romans, he instituted three leap years for the future.
Shorshei HaYam cites the fact that the year can be declared a leap year well in advance, as support for the Rambam’s thesis (Halachah 2) that the fact that Pesach would be celebrated before the vernal equinox is, by itself, sufficient cause to declare a leap year. At the beginning of the year, it is impossible to know the state of the barley harvest, or the fruit trees.
Rashi (Sanhedrin, ibid.) relates that this refers to a situation when it was feared that the Romans would prevent the leap year from being instituted if the court waited for the usual time.
Note the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 4), which explains that an early declaration should be made only in a pressing situation. The court may, however, calculate months and even years in advance, even in cases where the situation is not pressing.
I.e., although, as the Rambam continues, if they instituted a leap year on this date their ruling would be binding, at the outset they should not take such a step.
Retroactively, it appears that the thirtieth day was fit to be Rosh Chodesh Nisan, and therefore the institution of the leap year would not have been effective. Nevertheless, since in actual fact, the declaration of the leap year preceded the sanctification of the new month, it is effective.
Sanhedrin 12a credits Elisha the prophet with the institution of this prohibition.
The prohibition of chadash prevents one from partaking of grain from the new harvest until the offering of the omer of barley on the sixteenth of Nisan (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 10:2-5). When the previous year has been plagued with famine, it is undesirable to keep this prohibition in effect any longer than necessary.
The Rambam follows the opinion in Sanhedrin (loc. cit.), which forbids instituting a leap year only in the Sabbatical year. Another opinion forbids instituting a leap year in the year following the Sabbatical year.
Our translation follows the commentary of the Perush, which explains that according to the Torah, all agricultural labor is forbidden in the Sabbatical year. It is, nevertheless, permitted to take crops that grow from seeds strewn by the wind or that grow from other causes that did not result from conscious human labor. Although our Sages forbade benefitting from such crops for personal use, it was from these crops that the grain used for the omer offering and the two loaves of bread were harvested.
The Sages forbade using these crops for personal use. Nevertheless, since the prohibition did not originate in the Torah, our Sages feared that it would not be observed by the common people and the crops would not remain for these sacrifices.
Significantly, Rashi and others offer a second rationale for this practice, that our Sages did not want to prolong a year when it was forbidden to do agricultural work.
See Leviticus 23:17. As the verse states, this offering and the omer must be from the harvest of the new year.
So that the farmers would have an extra month to work the land and gather its crops (Rashi, Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).
This expression indicates a ruling that the Rambam derives from his own logic without an explicit source in the works of our Sages. The Or Sameach cites a passage (Sanhedrin 26a), which appears to indicate that it is impossible to declare a Sabbatical year a leap year. There are, however, other interpretations of that passage. (See Tosafot, loc. cit..)
It appears that the Rambam’s logic is that since according to the Torah, it is necessary to declare a leap year under such circumstances, the leap year should be declared. There is no obligation from the Torah to declare a leap year, because of problems with the roads or because of the other circumstances mentioned in Halachah 5. The Sages prescribed ordaining a leap year in these circumstances out of consideration for the people. In a Sabbatical year or a year of famine, the considerations mentioned in the previous halachah override those that would ordinarily require the year to be declared a leap year.
Significantly, the Ra’avad, the Ramah, and others do not accept the distinction made by the Rambam, and maintain that a Sabbatical year and a year of famine should never be declared leap years.
The Rambam’s statement is based on the narrative in Sanhedrin 11b, which relates that Rabban Gamliel sent letters to Jews throughout the diaspora notifying them of the declaration of a leap year.
Since through calculations, it is possible to know whether or not it is likely for the moon to be sighted on the thirtieth night, the court would notify the people in the outlying areas accordingly. This notification would, however, be conditional on the actual sighting of the moon.
The Ramban [in his gloss on Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 153)] differs and explains that although it was necessary for the judges who established the calendar to have semichah, there was no necessity that this function be carried out by the Sanhedrin or a court deputized by it.
This explanation was recorded for posterity in Rosh HaShanah 21b.
I.e., to the Sages of the Sanhedrin, who preserve the tradition of the Jewish court as initiated by Moses and Aaron.
In the Introduction to his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam defines a halachah communicated to Moses on [Mount] Sinai as a law that is neither explicitly stated nor alluded to in the Written Law, but communicated through the Oral Tradition.
See also the statements of the Ramban (loc. cit.), who objects to the Rambam’s statements, and asks which source states that this is a halachah communicated to Moses on Mount Sinai.
As explained in Chapter 6, the fixed calendar is based on the mean motion of the sun and the moon—i.e., their average rate of progress in the heavens. As explained in Chapter 11 onwards, the progress of the sun, and to an even greater extent that of the moon, deviates from this mean from time to time. Although ultimately these deviations will balance out, at any given time the day established as Rosh Chodesh may be before or after the day on which the moon can be sighted.
As explained in Chapter 18, Halachah 13, in the lands west of Eretz Yisrael the moon is sighted earlier than in Eretz Yisrael.
Based on the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Chatam Sofer (Yoreh De’ah, Responsum 234) explains that the Rambam’s intent is that, from that time onward, a formal court no longer held sessions in Eretz Yisrael; the land, however, remained populated by Jews. (See the notes on Halachah 5.)
This concept is derived from Rosh HaShanah 21a, which states that Ravvah fasted two days on Yom Kippur, because he did not know which day was established by the court in Eretz Yisrael.
This refers to the establishment of the fixed calendar by Rabbi Hillel (Hillel II), approximately two generations after the composition of the Jerusalem Talmud.
See Chapter 3, Halachot 11-13.
Implicit in the Rambam’s words is a concept explained in greater detail in Halachah 13: The determination of the calendar depends on the establishment of the calendar by the court in Eretz Yisrael.
As prescribed by the Torah. Once the date on which the festivals should be celebrated could be universally known because of the fixed calendar, the safeguard of celebrating the holidays for two days was no longer necessary.
Beitzah 4b explains that this rule was ordained lest the gentile authorities oppress the Jewish people and prevent the inhabitants of the Diaspora from communicating the tradition of the calendar to their descendants. They would then have to rely on information conveyed from Eretz Yisrael again.
See, however, Halachot 11 and 12.
I.e., originally, the second day of the holidays was observed because of the doubt of the day on which to observe the Torah’s commandment. In the present era there is no longer any doubt, and the observance of the second day of a holiday has the status of a Rabbinic ordinance.
Generally, the court would endeavor to structure the calendar so that the moon would be sighted on the thirtieth night of Elul. In expectation of the probability that the following day would be declared Rosh HaShanah, the people would observe all the holiday prohibitions and sound the shofar on the thirtieth day. Nevertheless, since it was possible that the moon had not been sighted, the people outside the immediate surroundings of Jerusalem would observe the following day as well.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 8.
As mentioned above, except for the offering of the Rosh HaShanah sacrifices, the thirtieth day following Rosh Chodesh Elul was always observed as Rosh HaShanah in expectation of the arrival of witnesses.
For it would actually be observed as Rosh HaShanah.
Including even the inhabitants of Jerusalem.
As the Rambam continues to explain, the determining factor is not the geographic distance of a place from Jerusalem, but rather the custom followed in this place at the time when the High Court sent out messengers.
See Bava Batra 38a and Ketubot 17b, which tell of a time when a blockade prevented communication between Jerusalem and the Galilee.
For the messengers were forbidden to travel on Rosh HaShanah, Yom Kippur, and the two Sabbaths between Rosh HaShanah and Sukkot. In the years when Rosh HaShanah is observed on the Sabbath, the messengers could proceed a further day. Nevertheless, since this is not so in the majority of the years, a ten-day journey is accepted as the standard measure.
Note Hilchot Terumah 1:3, which defines Syria as referring to lands conquered by King David before the entire territory of Eretz Yisrael proper had been conquered. Therefore, it was not considered part of the Holy Land with regard to most ritual questions according to the Torah itself. Nevertheless, the Rabbis extended many of the laws applying to Eretz Yisrael to this territory as well.
The inclusion of Ashkelon, which is located to the southwest of Eretz Yisrael, in Syria clearly indicates that the Rambam is referring to the halachic conception of the latter term, and not the geographic one, since Syria is to the northeast of Eretz Yisrael.
Based on this halachah, according to the Rambam, most Jews living in Eretz Yisrael today should celebrate the holidays for two days. Indeed, the Eretz Tzvi, a text that documents the prevailing customs in Eretz Yisrael before the waves of European immigration, states that in cities like Ramlah, that did not have an existing custom dating back to the Talmudic period, the holidays would be celebrated for two days, as the Rambam states. It was not until the resettlement of Eretz Yisrael in the present era that such cities began observing the holidays for only one day. The source for this practice is the commentary of the Ritva (Rosh HaShanah 16b), who states that, in the present era, it is the geographic definitions of Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora that determine whether or not one should celebrate one day.
Until the time of Rabbi Hillel, the court of Eretz Yisrael determined the calendar through their independent calculations. Even after the court ceased to function and the fixed calendar was adopted, the determination of the calendar still depends on the establishment of the calendar in Eretz Yisrael. The only difference is that from the time of Rabbi Hillel onward, instead of determining the calendar independently, the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael would rely on the fixed calendar. For this reason, the Rambam points to a Divine covenant insuring that there will always be Jews living in our Holy Land. For were there not to be any Jews living in Eretz Yisrael, heaven forbid, we would not be able to determine the calendar.
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