Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Since the article does not yet exist, ownership over it cannot be transferred.

See the explanation of this convention in Hilchot ‘Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapters 8-12.

This ruling applies even if the animal is already pregnant [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 209:4)].

I.e., this indicates that the agreement does not automatically take effect once the produce comes into existence.

This ruling is somewhat difficult to understand. For according to the previous and following clauses of this halachah, the agreement is not binding at all. As such, the seller should seemingly be able to retract and expropriate the produce from the purchaser if he desires.
The commentaries explain that once the purchaser has taken possession of them, it is as if the seller has formally waived his rights over them. The protests that he issues later are considered to have been issued after the fact. (See D’rishah, Choshen Mishpat 209.)

Because the agreement was never binding.

The Rambam is referring to a convention frequently employed by farmers who desire to sell their crops even though they have yet not harvested them. If, for example, a market price for grain has already been established, a farmer may sell grain that he intends to harvest, so that he will have ready cash and deliver the produce later. Even if the price of the produce rises afterwards, this is permitted and is not considered to be involving interest, because the purchaser could buy the produce in the market place at that time. If, however, the produce is not available on the market and a price has not been established, it is forbidden to pre-purchase produce from a farmer. Doing so is prohibited as part of the Rabbinic prohibitions against interest. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 9:1.

I.e., it is considered to be a sale that was completed, but the produce was not delivered, in which instance the adjuration mi shepara is in place.
Although, as the Rambam states in Halachah 5, a person cannot sell an entity that is not in his possession, this situation is considered to be an exception, because the produce is easily available in the market place (Kessef Mishneh).

A farmer who is in dire need of funds might be willing to make such an agreement even if it involves offering the purchaser a considerable profit.

Generally, a farmer may not sell produce until the harvest-time, when the produce is already fully ripened. This instance describes a preliminary stage, where the produce is far from ready to be harvested. Nevertheless, an exception is made and the produce is allowed to be old if the conditions mentioned by the Rambam are met.
The difficulty with selling the produce in a preliminary stage is that we question whether the buyer or the seller will consider the transaction as having been in fact completed. When the produce is available in the market place, even when the seller does not himself own any produce, the sale is taken seriously, because the produce is accessible and its price has already been fixed. When, however, the produce is in a preliminary stage, it is possible that the purchaser will consider buying it from others, and that the seller, knowing that possibility, will also not take the sale seriously.

In which instance, both parties take the sale seriously, because it is associated with an article that actually exists.

In which instance, the issue of whether the sale is to be considered seriously has clearly been addressed.

Bava Metzia 63b relates that this was in fact a frequent practice. Realizing that he would receive a low price, a wholesaler would buy wheat from several farmers, waiting to see whose fields would produce the best crops. Afterwards, he would renege from certain of these sales.

The rationale is that for the purchaser, it is as if the article does not exist. It is not in his power to sell it.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 211:1) agree with the Rambam’s ruling when the seller states “a field that I will inherit.” If, however, he states “this field that I will inherit,” these authorities maintain that the sale is binding. For since he will ultimately inherit the field, and he specifies the article explicitly, the sale is binding.
(Kin’at Eliyahu explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the appreciation of the underlying rationale for this concept. According to the Rambam, the difficulty is that since the person does not own the field, he cannot sell it. According to the Tur, the difficulty is that since the person does not own the field, neither he nor the purchaser will take the sale seriously. Therefore, when there is reason - as in this instance - to say that they will take the sale seriously, it is binding.)

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 209:5) also quotes Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 320), which states that if - to maintain his reputation - a person goes out and purchases the article that he had sold although he did not own it, the sale is binding.

He is allowed to sell only what is necessary to provide for the immediate necessities for burial - e.g., the grave, the shrouds and the like. Nevertheless, if there is no way that he can sell an article that will provide for this amount exactly, he may sell articles that will bring in a larger sum [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 211:2)].

The Nimukei Yosef and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 211:4 state that this leniency is granted only when the son is poor. If he has means, he is not entitled to make such a sale.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rav Hai Gaon, who states that he may sell in advance only what he needs for his livelihood for that day. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 211:6, however, interprets the wording used by the Rambam a implying that if he lacks food for that one day, he may sell in advance what he needs for many days.

Or any other heir.
The Maggid Mishneh understands this halachah to be a continuation of the principles stated in Halachah 5 and not those stated in Halachah 6. Accordingly, he explains that even the son who sold the property may expropriate it from the purchaser, because the sale was not valid. There is, however a difference. If the son expropriates the property, he must return the money he received from the sale. If the grandson, by contrast, expropriates the property, he is not obligated to return anything. For he is demanding the property on behalf of his grandfather’s estate, and his grandfather is not responsible for his father’s debts.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 211:3) interpret this as a continuation of the previous halachah. Therefore, it is only the grandson and not the son who can nullify the sale. Moreover, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 221:7 explains that the grandson can nullify the sale without reimbursing the purchaser only when the money was not used for his grandfather’s burial, nor benefited his grandfather in any other way. If the money was used for such purposes, it would have to be returned.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 8 and 9. As stated in those halachot, there are different requirements as to whether or not the movable property being transferred through the kinyan agav must be contained within the landed property. All authorities agree that the giver must possess the movable property at that time (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rambam is obviously speaking of a situation in which the giver no longer desires to give the money, but the recipient is trying to obligate him to do so by virtue of his commitment. Since he is trying to expropriate property from his colleague, the burden of proof is upon him (Maggid Mishneh).

For, unlike the case with a loan, the person to whom it was entrusted either may not use it, or at least may not use it in a manner that will destroy it.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 8, for an explanation of this convention.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 10-12, for an explanation of this convention.

Although the unborn child exists, he is not considered to be a person able to own property until he emerges into the world. See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 9:2).

Even if the person does not formally retract his statements, the fetus does not acquire the property at birth.

A grandson, by contrast, is considered as any other individual [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 210:1)].

The Maggid Mishneh states that there is a difference of opinion with regard to this matter whether this law applies to all gifts a person makes to his on (as implied by the Rambam’s wording), or only to endowments made by a person on his deathbed through an oral will. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 210:1) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam’s view.

Some authorities require the woman to be at least 40 days pregnant, but the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 210:1) do not make such a distinction.

Since the transfer to the animal or the fetus is not effective. the person cannot acquire property “as they do.”

In this instance, the fact that the animal or the fetus does not acquire anything does not detract from the person’s acquisition.

Bava Batra 147b makes these statements when discussing the limits of the powers of an oral will made by a dying person. Although there are certain extensions granted to a person making such a deposition, he - like any other person - may transfer ownership only of objects of substance.

This law applies even when the produce exists at the time the seller makes this statement. For he is not transferring the produce itself, but rather the right to partake of it. And that is not an object of substance.

This convention is the subject of the following chapter. Through it, the recipient does not become the full owner of the field. He does, however, become the owner of the field with regard to its ability to yield produce. And thus, the produce is his.

Both dedications to the Temple treasury and promises to the poor are considered to be vows.

The Rambam states this entire halachah in Hilchot Arachin Va’Charamin 6:31. Significantly, however, he prefaces his words there with the phrase “It appears to me,” which indicates that the law that follows is based on the Rambam’s logic and has no explicit source in the Talmud or other Rabbinic literature.

The commentaries question the Rambam’s choice of wording, because it is forbidden to consecrate an unblemished animal to the Temple treasury. Instead, it must be offered as a sacrifice (Hilchot Arachin 5:5).

Implied is that although a transaction has not been concluded from the point of view of business law, the individual’s statements have established a personal obligation that is binding upon him.

For a person’s heirs are obligated to carry out his expressed wishes.

The Ra’avad, Rabbenu Asher and the Tur take issue with the Rambam, explaining that when the person says: “I will give such and such to the poor or to the Temple treasury,” he is obligated to uphold his commitment even when the object has not yet come into existence. When, however, a person on his death bed says: “The fruits of this tree should be given to the poor,” he is not bound by a vow, because when the present is to be given, he is no longer alive. Nor is his estate bound by the vow, because the obligation is upon him personally and not on his property.
The Rambam differs and maintains that since the deceased person obligated himself by making a commitment, the obligation becomes incumbent on his heirs as if they had taken the vow themselves (Kessef Mishneh). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 212:7) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah follows that of the other authorities.

Hilchot Arachin 6:31-33.

I.e., the property remains the possession of its original owner, but its produce is acquired by the recipient.
The Rambam is describing a halachic convention instituted to circumvent the legal problems mentioned at the conclusion of the preceding chapter regarding the acquisition of property that has not yet come into existence. Using the convention the Rambam mentions here, the transaction involves an entity that exists, and yet it does not transfer ownership over that entity entirely, for it applies only to the property’s quality to yield produce.

There is, however, a distinction between a person who uses this convention and one who rents a field, as explained in Halachah 8.

E. g., for a month or for a year.

But after the seller dies, the field reverts to his heirs.

After the purchaser dies, the field reverts to the seller or his heirs.

Neither can retract, although the produce or benefit sold has not yet come into existence [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 209:4); Sefer Meirat Einayim 209:15].

Of 30 silver Shekalim, as stated in Exodus 21:32.

The unresolved question can be explained as follows: Can this example be compared to selling a field for its produce, and the same laws applied? Or should a distinction be made between the two? For a field will generally yield produce, while with regard to a servant, even if he is gored to death, there may not be a requirement of a fine. The owner of the ox may admit his responsibility before witnesses testify, in which instance he is not liable.

This is the Rambam’s ruling with regard to all questions of unresolved financial liability. As explained in the notes on Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:11, other authorities differ and maintain that the property that is seized must be returned.

We explain that his intent was to retain the produce itself that the tree will produce. And just as a person cannot transfer ownership of an object that has not come into existence, he cannot retain ownership over an object that has not come into existence [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 209:7)]. We do not say that the person intended to sell the tree to the second person with regard to the produce it yields. Instead, the first purchaser also receives the right to the produce (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).

The additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., as opposed to an ordinary sale, which is binding forever, this sale is binding only for a specified duration of time.

For his rights to the land involve only the produce the land yields, and not the land itself.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, maintaining that since there are limitations on the time for which the purchaser owns the land, he may not make lasting changes. The Ra’avad does suggest that perhaps a person who purchases land for 60 or 70 years may make some changes. Since he owns the land for longer than a jubilee period, he is considered to be like a permanent owner. (Perhaps this is the precedent for the 99 year leases common in certain real-estate transactions.
The Maggid Mishneh uses the principle of the jubilee as support for the Rambam’s thesis. When the jubilee was practiced, a person was considered the complete owner of property with the right to do as he chose, even though the land would return to its original owner in the jubilee year. Similarly, in the present era, a person who buys landed property for a limited time may do as he chooses. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 212:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

The Kessef Mishneh raises an obvious difficulty: As stated in Chapter 22, Halachah 2, when a person sells the fruit that a field will produce, the sale is not binding. What then is the Rambam’s question? The difference between the two is that one sale is binding and one is not.
The Kessef Mishneh answers his question, explaining that this halachah is speaking about an instance where the seller bound himself by oath to fulfill his commitment – in which instance, he is obligated to do so, as stated in Chapter 22 Halachah 15. Or it is speaking about an instance where both the buyer and the seller desire to uphold the agreement, even though neither is obligated to do so.
See also the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 21:14 which states that this refers to a situation in which crops are already growing on the field.
Oz) follow a different version and include the point raised by the Kessef Mishneh’s question within the halachah itself.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim maintains that there is a printing error, and the intent is that the purchaser may not collect the produce within the field.

For he has purchased only the produce.

For the purchaser has purchased not only the produce, but the right to the field itself.

Seemingly, both acquire the right to use the field and harvest its fruit.

Even if the owner desired that the field be left fallow, the person who purchases it has the right to plant crops. He may even plant more crops than the norm in a particular year.

See Hilchot Sechirut 8:6,9-10, which explains that a person who rents a field from a colleague should not depart from the practices that are routine in that locale.

Hilchot Sechirut 1:4. For when a person rents property, he has the right to benefit from it, but has no right with regard to the property itself.
The Kessef Mishneh raises a question with regard to the Rambam’s statements, for the Rambam rules (Hilchot Sechirut 5:5) that although a renter of movable property may not sublet it, a renter of landed property has that option.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 212:16 explains that the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Sechirut apply only to a house, and not to a field. For if a person rents a house to someone and the renter - or the sub-leaser - damages it, the damage will be evident. If he rents a field, by contrast, the renter - or the sub-leaser - may sow additional crops in it and harm the field without that harm being detectable immediately. Hence, just as with regard to movable property, a person may tell the renter: “I do not want my property in the hands of another person,” so too, he can protest handing over his field to someone else.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that an explicit statement must be made that the dovecote is being sold with regard to its benefit. Otherwise, it is considered as if the person is purchasing an entity that does not yet exist.
The Rambam, by contrast, maintains that even if he does not say so explicitly, it is as if he made such a statement. The Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam’s decision, stating that it is impossible to sell “the benefit to be obtained from a dovecote or the benefit to be obtained from a beehive,” because in such an instance, the purchaser would be prohibited from entering the seller’s property to care for the dovecote or the beehive. (See Halachah 7.) Since such care is absolutely necessary, it is assumed that the seller is selling the rights to the dovecote or the beehive itself.
Alternatively, a dovecote and a beehive themselves have little value; they are clearly ancillaries of the doves or the honey. Therefore, they are subsidiary to the doves and the honey. When the dovecote and the beehive are sold, they are obviously being sold for that purpose. A field, by contrast, has intrinsic value and is not considered subsidiary to its crops.

In contrast to crops, which grow from the land, fish do not grow from the stream. Nevertheless, the renter has the right to catch fish. Similarly, with regard to the dovecote and the beehive, even though they do not produce their products directly, a person who purchases them is entitled to them (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 213:1).

I.e., the seller. (See Hilchot Shechitah 13:18.)

And thus, he cannot transfer ownership of them to another person.

Once the fledglings are capable of flying on their own, the prohibition of taking the mother and the fledglings together no longer applies (Hilchot Shechitah 13:9).

For according to Scriptural Law, the prohibition is against taking only the mother away from her young, not against taking the young away from their mother (Kessel Mishneh).

Once the mother bird lifts herself off the nest, the owner of the dovecote automatically acquires the eggs and the fledglings by virtue of their presence in his property. He can then transfer owner-hip of them to his colleague.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 5.

A kinyan agav, as described in Chapter 3, Halachot 8 and 9.
Even if the mother bird returns after he has acquired the eggs and the fledglings, he is no longer required to send her away. In such an instance, the dove is not considered any different from domesticated poultry, concerning which this prohibition does not apply (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 213:4).

Out of loneliness.

This is unfair, for he did not purchase the dovecote or the mothers, but only the offspring. Hence, he would be causing the seller unjust lost.

I.e., at least two fledglings.

I.e., the Rambam maintains that a mother dove must have at least two pairs of fledglings with her to feel at ease and satisfied.

I.e., the daughters of the original mother, who also breed fledglings.

For just as the mother dove needs offspring with which to establish rapport, so too, her offspring need their offspring. Thus, there must be at least five pairs of doves in the dovecote. The mother pair, the pair of offspring that were present at the time of the sale, a second pair of offspring that the mother bore, and two pair of offspring that the first pair of offspring bore.

Bees produce a new swarm of offspring every nine or ten days. The purchaser is allowed to take the first three swarms of bees to start a new beehive of his own. Afterwards, he must leave every other swarm, so as not to destroy the original beehive [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:18)].

The bees build blocks of wax containing caverns in which honey is stored.

The honey is stored as food. If it is taken from the hive, the bees will have no nourishment in the winter and will abandon the hive.

This, like the previous halachot, protects the rights of the seller. Since the buyer did not purchase the entire hive, he must leave some blocks of wax in the hive so that it will not be destroyed.

I.e., he must leave enough of the tree above ground for it to regenerate and grow again. For each species of tree, a different height is required.

Since this tree was never cut down before, it needs a larger measure. Alternatively, it refers to a young fig tree (Maggid Mishneh).

Which are positioned as a segol, as stated in Halachah 3.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:6) state that if the trees are weak enough to be bent over by a yoke, the purchaser does not acquire the land that nurtures them.

This refers to a practice in which the branches of a tree are pulled down and implanted in the ground again without being severed from the original tree. A new tree sprouts forth from the implanted branch. Bava Batra 83a questions whether or not three branches planted in this manner are considered to be trees.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim with regard to the conclusion to be derived from this passage. The Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, rules that the entire planting is considered to be one tree. Rashbam and the Rambam follow the opinion that they are considered to be separate trees.
Other versions of the Mishneh Torah read “three branches of trees” - i.e., the seller sold the purchaser three branches, one from each of three different trees. The Maggid Mishneh mentions this interpretation, but he - and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 216:6) - favor the first interpretation.

Even if this was not explicitly stated in the deed of sale. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:16 explains that three trees are referred to as an orchard, and the land therefore belongs to the purchaser.

And may plant other trees or crops there.

The Tur and the Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 216) state that this refers only to small insignificant trees. Such clarification, however, is not made in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.).

Since the land belongs to the purchaser, he also acquires the trees growing on it.

The Rabbis explain that this refers to a measure of two cubits.

The space beneath the trees and between the trees, by contrast, may be sown by the purchaser [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:6)].

The owner of the field [the seller] may not sow this land, because by plowing the land he may spoil any fruit that falls from the purchaser’s trees. The purchaser may not sow this land, because it does not belong to him. He is granted the right merely to stand there when harvesting his fruit (Maggid Mishneh).

That the purchaser acquires land.

I.e., in the form of a segol, as seen in the following diagram.
The rationale for this ruling is that when the trees are positioned in such a manner, it is not feasible to plow between them. Therefore, we assume that when selling the trees, the purchaser also sold him the land (Maggid Mishneh).
Three trees planted in the shape of a tripod.

If there are less than four cubits between the trees, they do not have sufficient land for nurture, and it as if they have already been cut down (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:24).

Once the trees are more than sixteen cubits apart, the land between them is too large to be considered secondary to the trees, and is instead considered to be an independent entity.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 216) interprets this to mean the portion of the tree trunk that emerges from the ground.

In which instance, it would be possible to plow the land around them. If this is the case, since the land would be useful for him, we assume that the seller would prefer to retain the land for himself, rather than grant it to the purchaser.

When the trees are this close together, they cannot receive adequate nurture, and we assume that they are being purchased to be cut down for lumber.

In this instance as well, one could plow between them. Hence, they are not associated with each other.

In this instance, no one sale of a tree is inclusive enough to grant the purchaser the land between the trees. Nor do we say that the fact that he has made several purchases is sufficient to grant him land (Maggid Mishneh).

This and the following two situations are questions that the Talmud (Bava Batra 83a) left unresolved. Thus, there is a doubt with regard to the ruling, and we follow the principle that whenever there is an unresolved doubt, the person in possession of the property - in this instance, the seller - is allowed to retain possession (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi).
The doubt in this instance is that we are unsure whether or not a tree on the border of the property is associated with the other two trees.

The doubt in this instance is that we are unsure whether a tree in property that originally belonged to one person can be associated with the two other trees that belonged to another person.

Since a significant entity is interposed between these trees, we are unsure whether or not they can be associated with each other.

I.e., since he does not acquire the land itself, he does not acquire these rights.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:7) emphasizes that this applies with regard to a tree that will not grow back. If the tree will grow back, it remains the property of the purchaser.

The Kessef Mishneh states that this refers to a branch that extends beyond the place in which a person picking fruit can stand together with his basket. For the land until that point belongs to the purchaser.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:26 quotes the Tur, whose opinion differs from that of the Kessef Mishneh. He maintains that the branches must be cut off even if they grow in the area belonging to the purchaser. His rationale is that if these branches are allowed to grow, the owner of the trees will claim that his property extends beyond the range of these branches.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:8) quote the Ramban, who states that if there is a difference of opinion between the seller and the purchaser whether the branches have grown outward and must be cut down, the burden of proof is on the purchaser.

This final clause is included to explain why the owner of the trees receives those twigs that sprout from the roots. Note the contrast to Halachah 7.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:9) state that the purchaser is granted the right to stand under and near his tree to harvest his produce. Similarly, he has the right to walk through the seller’s field to approach his trees. This area may not be sown by the seller.

I.e., he may not plant another tree in place of the one that was cut down.

Even when the twigs and branches belong to the owner of the tree, he must cut them off, for the reason stated by the Rambam.

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) state that if the branches grow outward, there is no obligation to trim them.

Even though it is possible to prove that this tree sprouted from an implanted branch, it is possible that it was sold that way at the outset. (See the notes on Halachah 1.) Thus, proving that the tree sprouted from a branch would not disprove the purchaser’s claim.

For everything that the trees produce belongs to him.

The branches are growing in the ground, and since the ground belongs to the owner of the field, they belong to him.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:36 explains that the Rambam’s rationale is as follows: When a person retains ownership over a portion of property that he is selling, he retains a generous portion for himself. If he were selling the trees to another person, he would be giving the other person the land necessary to care for them. Therefore, for himself, he retains a greater portion - half the total land.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, claiming that it does not have a source in the Talmud. The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position, stating that it depends on a different interpretation of Bava Batra 37a.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that the passage in Bava Batra does speak of the purchaser’s receiving “half of the land,” but considers it an exaggeration and maintains that the seller retains only the land required to care for the trees and harvest them.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 216:11) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Tur and the Ramah follow the Maggid Mishneh’s position and grant the seller only the smaller amount of land.

I.e., the land beneath them, between them and beyond them in which a person picking fruit can stand together with his basket, as stated in Halachah 2. Here also, the person retains a little more for himself than he would grant to another person. Since another person would not receive any land at all, the person himself retains enough land to care for his trees.

See Halachah 2.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:38 explains that the Rambam’s rationale is that since the seller sold the trees at the same time as he sold the land, and he sold enough trees that the purchaser of the trees receives a share in the land, the purchaser of the trees can claim that the seller sold him a portion of land equal to that which he sold the purchaser of the land.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there are some who interpret “half the land” as an exaggeration, and explain that the intent is the amount of land necessary to care for the trees. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 216:13) differ with this ruling and maintain that the purchaser of the trees does not acquire any of the land at all. He is, however, granted the right to plant other trees in the place of the original trees if they die.

Rashi (Bava Batra 7a) and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 173:4) explain that this extra land is necessary for the plowing of the vineyard.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that these laws apply even when the tree under discussion is not the highest quality tree in the orchard.

For the seller specified that he was retaining ownership of only that one tree.

Rabbenu Asher describes an inferior tree as one that does not produce a kav of produce in a year.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this law applies even if the tree specified is not the lowest quality tree in the orchard.

Since the tree he specified was not at all valuable, we assume that he meant that tree and all the others as well.
The Rashbam differs and maintains that all the trees that are of lower quality than the tree specified are sold together with the field. The Rambam’s opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 216:3), while the Tur and the Ramah cite that of the Rashbam.

Both date palms and vines are not always referred to as “trees.” Hence, there is room to say that they should not be retained by the seller. Nevertheless, since he stated that he is retaining ownership over the trees, and there are no other trees in the field, we assume that he desired to retain ownership over the date palms or the vines.

The rationale is that since we assume that he is selling the field in a generous manner and that neither vines nor date palms are always referred to as trees, we assume that he retains his ownership over only one of them. Since vines are more similar to other trees than date palms, we assume that he desires to retain his ownership over them (Maggid Mishneh).

For the vines are not necessarily considered “trees.”

And therefore, the purchaser is given anything that would not definitely be described as a tree.

Since they are small, they are not considered to be significant and distinct. Therefore, they are considered part of the field.

I.e., saplings that are still small and supple.

The expression the seller used does not imply that the date palms must be located on the land. It could easily be interpreted as meaning a field in one place and date palms in another place.

The use of the plural implies that there must be at least - but not necessarily only - two trees on the land.

The Ra’avad differs and maintains that if it is possible for the seller to purchase two date palms and give them to the purchaser, he is obligated to do so. For although the field did not have the date palms at the time of the sale, since they were easily available in the market, it is not considered as if they had not come into existence at the time of the sale. (See Chapter 22.)
The Maggid Mishneh substantiates the Ra’avad’s view. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that the Rambam’s intent is that the seller may purchase the trees and give them to the purchaser if he desires to, but he is not obligated to do so. If he does not give the purchaser the trees, the sale is nullified, but if he does add the trees, the purchaser is obligated to go ahead with the purchase:
Rav Karo explains that the ruling is somewhat self-contradictory. If we say that the sale can be nullified, that implies that the date palms are considered to be entities that have not yet come into existence. And if they have not come into existence at the time of the sale, the purchaser should not be compelled to uphold his part of the transaction.
In resolution, Rav Karo explains that since the trees were not on the land at the time of the transaction, the trees should be considered articles that have not come into existence, and the sale should be nullified. And so, if the seller does not give the purchaser the trees, that ruling should stand, for the stipulations of the original contract were not met.
A certain measure of leniency is, however, granted to the seller. Since it is possible for him to purchase trees and give them to the purchaser, if he does so the sale is allowed to stand. The rationale is that he can tell the purchaser: “I am giving you exactly what you asked for.”
(See the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who explains that this depends on the difference between an entity that has not yet come into existence and an entity that the seller does not possess. When an entity does not exist, both the buyer and the seller are aware of this fact, and therefore, the sale is nullified. When an article is not in the possession of the seller, only he knows of this, and hence he has the prerogative of correcting the situation.)
In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 216:5), Rav Karo cites the Rambam’s ruling. The Rashbam, the Tur and the Ramah rule that if the seller has date palms on another piece of land, he is obligated to give them to the purchaser. This perspective, however, considers the sale of the land and the sale of the date palms as two separate transactions. Therefore, if the seller does not own any date palms, he is not obligated to purchase them. Nevertheless, the sale of the field is binding, and it becomes the property of the purchaser - but when paying the seller, the purchaser should subtract the price of two date palms from the price of the field. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 216:14.)

Needless to say, if it does have date palms, they become the property of the purchaser.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim notes that Bava Batra 69b mentions this law with regard to selling “land.” The Rambam uses the word “orchard” to teach that even though the seller speaks of selling an orchard - which implies that he is selling the trees - he should still specify that the sale encompasses all of the field’s contents.

These can be used to make wicker baskets and the like.

I.e., since they are attached to the land, they are automatically acquired with the land.

These expressions clarify the purchaser’s rights beyond the shadow of a doubt.

He must make this statement if he desires to transfer ownership of distinct entities that are included in the physical building he is transferring, but are not integral parts of the dwelling.

Unlike the previous law, in this instance - as the Rambam continues to explain - the preciseness of the wording has an effect on the extent of the purchaser’s rights to the property.

I.e., that he may build on the roof.

I.e., that he may hollow out cisterns or storage rooms below the dwelling.
The Maggid Mishneh states that if the seller does not make such statements, the purchaser is not permitted to build above or below the house. Instead, the seller retains these rights for himself.

Our translation reflects the standard texts of the Mishneh Torah, which read הַבִּנְיָנֹות. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 214:3) in its citation of this law states הַבִּנְיָנִים, “the buildings.”

The intent of these Hebrew terms is more specifically explained in Halachah 2 of the following chapter.

The Beit Yosef and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 214:3) add a further law, which applies when the deed is worded in this manner. If the building has a roof that is four cubits wide and is surrounded by a guardrail ten cubits high, the roof is considered to be a distinct entity and is not transferred to the purchaser.

The Rashbam and others interpret this to refer to a roof enclosed by a guardrail at least ten cubits high.

Even though this infringes on the purchaser’s rights to the courtyard. We assume that the seller wished to retain this privilege.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling and asks why, if the second storey belongs to the seller, may he not build a third storey on it whenever he wants, even though it was not there originally.

See Hilchot Eivel 12:4, which explains that the funeral procession halts seven times while dirges are said

In Talmudic times, it was customary for several graves of a single family to be located together in one large crypt. It would be embarrassing for the members of a family to have a person from their family buried elsewhere and a stranger buried together with them (Rashi, Ketubot 84a).

They need not, however, pay for the other privileges - for after the funeral is concluded, this property returns to the purchaser (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 217:15).