Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This is a corollary to the law stated in the beginning of Chapter 18, for having to go to court concerning an object is considered a blemish that destroys its usefulness (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., if the property is expropriated from the purchaser, the seller is required to reimburse him.

Even though the purchaser will not suffer financial loss, since the time and annoyance that litigation entails is undesirable, it is forbidden to sell him an object that will force him to enter litigation without previously informing him.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 226:5) explains that this refers to a claim that has been lodged in court, and the court considers it worthy of investigation. Mere rumors of a claim, however, are not sufficient to cause a sale to be nullified.

Even if the seller’s claim to ownership is vindicated by the court, the sale is not automatically reinstated. Since it had been nullified, each has the option of retracting [Ramah, (loc. cit.)].

Our Sages (Bava Metzia 14a; Ketubot 92b-93a) maintain that once a person has already derived benefit from property, he would prefer to defend his right to it in court, rather than cede it to a claimant and sue the seller for the return of the payment. It must be emphasized that Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 226) interpret this passage in a totally different fashion. Significantly, their interpretation is not cited by the Ramah. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 226:10.

The Kessef Mishneh states that this applies only when the seller has other property from which the purchaser could seek redress if this property is expropriated from him.

The litigant may also collect half of the article’s increase in value from the purchaser, and the seller is required to reimburse the purchaser for this (Sefer Meirat Einayim 225:2). The Rambam also accepts this law, mentioning it in Hilchot Malveh ULoveh, ch. 21.

I.e., if the litigant can prove that the seller owes him money, he is considered to have a lien on all the landed property that was in the seller’s possession at the time the debt was incurred, and he may expropriate the property from the purchaser (see the following halachah).
[With regard to a servant, if the seller designated him as an apotiki for a debt - i.e., he specifically said that this servant would be given as payment for the debt - the servant is considered to be on lien for the debt.
With regard to other movable property, even if the seller designated it an apotiki, it is never considered to be on lien to a debt. (See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:5.)]
Alternatively, if the litigant can prove that the article that was sold belongs to him and was unscrupulously sold, he may expropriate it from the purchaser.

I.e., although the legal document was prepared according to all the laws of contracts, and the clause mentioning the seller’s responsibility was omitted, we do not say that the omission was intentional, and that the purchaser did not require the seller to accept this responsibility (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 225:3).

For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not spend money unless he is certain that his purchase is secure, and he will be able to maintain possession of the article he seeks to purchase (Ibid.:4).

This would allow the seller ample opportunity to defend his claim and ensure that the property had not been expropriated unjustly.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the same law applies even if it was a Jew who expropriated the property unjustly.

The Kessef Mishneh states that if the gentile’s claim would be vindicated by a Rabbinical court, the seller is required to accept the responsibility for the property.

In the Talmudic era, this was unfortunately a frequent occurrence, for the Romans would often seize Jewish property by force. The fact that it is quoted by the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 225:3) indicates that it persisted in later generations as well.

I.e., the gentile seized the field because he claimed that the seller stole it from him. If, however, the gentile seized the field for other reasons, the seller is not liable, for he accepts responsibility only for losses to which he shares some sort of connection (Kessef Mishneh).

Gittin 73a, which is the source for this incident, states that the river was dammed.

In contrast to the situation mentioned in Halachah 3, where a contract did not mention responsibility at all, this contract explicitly stated that the seller would not be held responsible. Seeing such a clause, the purchaser should have realized that something was amiss and taken the proper precautions.

The Kessef Mishneh notes an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Edut 16:4, for both are dependent on the same Talmudic passage (Bava Batra 44b).

Since the purchaser accepted the stipulation, the transaction is determined accordingly.

If, however, Reuven gave the field to Shimon as a present, this law does not apply [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 226:1)].

He is not, however, obligated to do this. It is the immediate owner of the property who must handle the litigation, as stated in Halachah 2.
It is preferable for the seller to become involved in the litigation, for he knows the details of the history of the property better than the purchaser does (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Ramban). Alternatively, if the seller designated the property as an apotiki to a creditor, he has the· fight to pay the creditor cash and thus prevent him from expropriating the field [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 226)].

For one who is not an involved party in a transaction may not enter into litigation unless one receives power of attorney.

And therefore, he is considered to be an involved party.

Even though Shimon would be held liable if Shimon had sold it to anyone else and accepted responsibility.

I.e., Reuven inherited the property from his father, Jacob. It was on lien, because of a debt Jacob had incurred, and ultimately that creditor expropriated it because of that debt (Maggid Mishneh).

For there is a difference between his father’s creditor’s expropriating the property and expropriation by his creditor.

100 zuz.

For we assume that the seller accepted the purchaser’s offer. See also the parallel in Hilchot Ishut 7:19.

For we assume that he accepted the price stipulated by the seller.

I.e., in the custody of the court [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 222:2)].

In Hilchot Gezelah 4:9, the Rambam rules that if a person steals from one of five people, but does not know the identity of the person from whom he stole, he must reimburse each of the claimants. The difference between the two is that Hilchot Gezelah describes an instance where the person committed a transgression. Therefore, he is required to make restitution to each of the claimants. In this instance, he did not commit a transgression. Hence, according to the letter of the law, he is not required to pay more than once. Similar concepts are expressed in the following halachah.

At which time, he will resolve all questions of doubt.

The term chassid, translated as “pious,” refers to a person who is willing to go beyond the measure of the law.

I.e., according to the letter of the law he is not under obligation. Nevertheless, since he received the article, he does have a moral and spiritual obligation to reimburse the seller. The only way he can be certain that this obligation is met is by paying each of the claimants.
The Ramban and the Rashba differ and maintain that with regard to a sale, a purchaser does not have even a moral and spiritual obligation to pay each claimant. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:6 maintains that this applies only when each of the five makes a claim. If, however, they do not make a claim, and it is only the purchaser who is in doubt, he is not required to reimburse each one.

I.e., he admitted making a false oath. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 222:7 states that since he must return the stolen article for his repentance to be complete, he must repay all the claimants in order to be certain that he has discharged his obligation.
The Siftei Cohen 222:7 differs and states that the same rule applies even if the person does not repent, and witnesses come and testify that he made a false oath.

I.e., he is punished because he transgressed and is required to pay all the claimants. Bava Kama 103b equates this instance with the law from Hilchot Gezelah, for there is no difference whether one stole by physically taking an object from someone or by denying a legal obligation. In both instances, one has committed a transgression.

The situation described in all the clauses of this halachah can be described as follows: Two people claimed to have purchased the article from the seller. They both paid money, but only one paid the money with the consent of the seller. The other gave him the money against his will.
In the situation described in this clause, the seller’s word is accepted when he identifies one of the claimants as the one to whom he desired to sell the article.
The seller’s word is accepted based on the principle of migo - i.e., had he desired to lie, he could have lied more effectively. He could have said: “I never sold it,” or “I repurchased it.” (See Kiddushin 73b-74a and commentaries.)
The above represents the explanation of Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rabbenu Asher. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 222:1 contests this rationale, explaining that from the Rambam’s words, it appears that the seller is believed at all times, even when there are witnesses who testify otherwise. Since there is a general principle that a migo is overruled by the testimony of witnesses, there must be another rationale.
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rashi offer this explanation: While the article is in the seller’s possession, he is very careful and knows to whom he agrees to sell the article, lest he be forced to receive the adjuration mi shepara. Many authorities maintain that the Rambam follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s position.
The Maggid Mishneh offers a third explanation, stating that as long as the object is in his possession, the seller is considered like a judge who can vindicate a litigant as he sees fit.

According to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, this statement applies only when the seller received money from two individuals. If the seller received money from only one individual, his word is accepted, even when the object is no longer in his possession. This ruling is not accepted by Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that in all instances, once the article leaves the seller’s hands his testimony is no different from that of others.
With regard to this latter point, it is very difficult to reconcile the Rambam’s wording with the position of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, for the Rambam states that once the item is no longer in his possession, “he is no more than one witness.” Seemingly, this applies in all instances. See the commentary of the Kessef Mishneh for an attempt at resolving the issue.

Implied is that if the seller claims to know from whom he took the money willingly, the other claimant must take an oath prescribed by Scriptural Law to support his claim. The claimant whose claim is supported by the seller is not required to take an oath at all. For in this instance, the requirement to take the oath is merely Rabbinical in origin. Hence, it is nullified because of the testimony of the seller (Maggid Mishneh). The Kessef Mishneh does not accept this latter point.

I.e., the seller’s statements do not support either of the claimants’ assertions.

A Torah scroll, or in certain instances tefillin.

I.e., both the article and the money that would have to be returned are divided equally among the claimants.

If, however, only one of the claimants is in possession of the article, he is entitled to maintain possession. To expropriate it from him, the other claimant must produce proof that he was the one from whom the seller took money willingly. For we follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.”

Landed property is definite and specific; its identity is known. Therefore, it is always considered to be in the possession of its previous owner unless there is a formal legal change of ownership. The fact that another person is living on the property (for less than three years) is not considered proof of ownership.
Movable property, by contrast, cannot be distinguished as easily. Most often, there is no way that an article can be positively identified as belonging to its previous owner. Hence, the person in possession is presumed to be the legal owner.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 3.

According to Scriptural Law, a person who denies a claim lodged against him is not obliged to take an oath at all. Nevertheless, the moral character of the Jewish people declined in the era of the Talmud, and there were people who would deny claims even though they were liable. Now breaking an oath is a very severe sin, and few people would dare to do that. Hence, the Rabbis instituted a special oath, a sh’vuat heset, to require a defendant to acknowledge the claim against him. Nevertheless, a sh’vuat hesset is more lenient than other oaths, for the person making it is not required to hold a sacred object at the time of the oath. See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:3 and Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:3.
Several meanings are offered for the term hesset: Rashi (Sh’vuot 40b) interprets it as meaning “placed” - i.e., an oath that has been placed upon a person by the Sages – as opposed to one required by Scriptural Law. Others note the relation to the term mesit meaning “entice” or “encourage,” and interpret it as an oath that encourages the defendant to admit his responsibility.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, Chapter 1.

And the purchaser takes possession of the produce through a kinyan (Maggid Mishneh).

This factor is significant, as reflected in the conclusion of the halachah. The public domain is not considered the property of either of the litigants.

A severe oath, as required of a person who wishes to expropriate property belonging to someone else.

The Rambam follows the view of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who delineates the situation as follows: The purchaser is considered to be in possession of the money that the seller is demanding and the seller has no proof that he did not pay. The purchaser has also taken possession of the fruits, and the seller admits selling them to him. Nevertheless, since the produce is in the public domain, it is not considered as having entered the purchaser’s domain entirely. He is therefore required to take a severe oath in order to take possession of it.
This approach is also accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 91:9) and the Ramah. (See his Darchei Moshe.) Note, however, the gloss of the D’rishah on the Tur, and the Siftei Cohen (Choshen Mishpat 91:33), which interprets Sh’vuot 45a, the source for these laws, in a different manner.

Once the produce enters the domain of the purchaser, he is considered as having the right of possession unless it is proven otherwise. He must, nevertheless, take a sh’vuat hesset, as is required of everyone who denies entirely a claim lodged against him.

Since the produce is still in the seller’s domain, he is considered to have the right of possession unless it is proven otherwise. Hence, he withholds transfer of the produce in lieu of the money that he claims not to have received. He must, however, take a sh’vuat hesset, because the purchaser claims to have paid him money and desires either the produce or the return of the money.
If the produce is in a domain belonging to both of them, it is divided equally.

This is the fundamental difference between the instance mentioned in this halachah and that mentioned in the previous halachah.

Based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:6, which has its source in Sh’vuot 48a), it is possible to explain that although seemingly redundant, it is necessary to state both this halachah and the previous two. If only the laws regarding produce were stated, we might think that with regard to coins, the purchaser would be granted the option of taking the oath regardless of the money-changer’s statements, for it is uncommon for a money-changer to give coins unless he first receives payment for them. Conversely, if only the laws regarding coins were stated, we might think that with regard to produce, the storekeeper would be granted the option of taking the oath despite his admission that he sold it, for it is common for a store-keeper to give produce to a purchaser without receiving payment for it.

I.e., the cow was acquired by the transfer of the donkey, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1. The fact that the animal was acquired by exchange is significant. If it had been acquired by the payment of money, it would not have entered the new owner’s domain until meshichah was performed. And at the time of meshichah, it would have been known whether or not the cow had already calved (Maggid Mishneh).

While still in the domain of its former owner.

And formalizes the transaction through the transfer of money or a legal document.

I.e., before the transaction was completed; the offspring thus belongs to him.

And he is therefore the owner of the offspring.

This is another application of the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” Since the offspring is presently in the domain of the previous owner, and the new owner desires to take it as his own, he must bring at least two witnesses who will testify to the truth of his claim.

The rationale is that it is the previous owner’s possession of the offspring, not his claim, that establishes his right to it.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that if the previous owner says that he does not know when the cow calved or the servant gave birth, the new offspring is not awarded to him. Instead, it is divided. His possession aids him in that the offspring is not granted to the new purchaser. The Kessej Mishneh objects to this interpretation. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 223:2) differ with the ruling of the Maggid Mishneh.

I.e., a domain that does not belong to either the seller or the purchaser. The same law would also apply in the public domain itself. The comer of the public domain is mentioned because transactions were frequently conducted in such a place (Tosafot, Bava Metzia 100a).

In this instance, neither the previous owner nor the new owner is in physical possession of the calf. Nevertheless, it is awarded to the previous owner because he possesses chezkat mara kama - i.e., he was known to be the owner of the pregnant animal or maidservant before she gave birth. Hence, unless evidence to the contrary is presented, we assume that she gave birth while still in his possession.
As evident from the following halachah, according to the Rambam this ruling applies only when the previous owner makes a definite claim, i.e., he is certain that he was in possession of the animal or maidservant when she gave birth (Maggid Mishneh).

Rashi (Bava Metzia 100a) explains that the previous owner is required to take a Scriptural oath as a modeh b’miktsat, a defendant who admits a portion of the plaintiffs claim- i.e., the plaintiff is demanding the cow and its calf, and the defendant is willing to give only the cow.
This applies, however, only when the purchaser issues a definite claim. If he is unsure of his claim, the seller is not required to take a Scriptural oath. From Halachah 13, however, it appears that he is required to take a sh’vuat hesset that he is unaware where the offspring was born.

Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

If, however, the offspring is located in a domain belonging to one of the litigants, the owner of that domain acquires it.

Since neither of the parties is making a definite claim of ownership, nor is the offspring located in the domain of either of them, neither is awarded the full right of ownership, and the offspring is divided between them; i.e., it is sold and each is given half the proceeds.
The Maggid Mishneh protests this ruling, explaining that this law is the subject of a difference of opinion between the Sages and Sumchos (Bava Metzia 100b). Sumchos maintains that since the ownership of the property is in doubt, it should be divided, while the Sages maintain that in this instance as well, the previous owner is considered to have a claim of ownership, and we follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.”
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 9:2-3, the Rambam rules according to the Sages. Therefore, he questions why in this instance he follows the view of Sumchos. The Maggid Mishneh explains that one could make a distinction in this case, saying that since, as mentioned above, the previous owner does not have a definite claim and the offspring is located in a neutral domain, one might say that even the Sages would accept the view of Sumchos. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh explains, the passage in Bava Metzia does not lend itself to such an interpretation.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 223:2) do not accept the Rambam’s ruling in this instance and maintain that the burden of proof is on the purchaser. Otherwise, the offspring is awarded to the previous owner. The Shulchan Aruch does, however, cite the Rambam as a minority opinion.

For we interpret his silence as acquiescence to the claim of the other litigant.

He is not, however, required to take a Scriptural oath as one who is modeh b’miktsat, one who agrees to a portion of the plaintiffs claim. Three reasons are given to explain why the seller is not placed in the latter category:
a) A Scriptural oath is never taken with regard to landed property or servants;
b) The smaller property or servant is considered to be heilech - the owner is willing to transfer it immediately to the purchaser; thus, there is no outstanding admission - it is as if he claims he is not liable to the purchaser at all (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 3:15);
c) The claim that the seller is admitting is not the same as that which the purchaser is pressing; it parallels a situation where a plaintiff claims to have purchased wheat, and the seller claims that he sold him barley. In such an instance, an oath is not required, as stated in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 3:8.

As stated above, the seller’s silence is considered an admission of the truth of the purchaser’s claim.

Although the purchaser is issuing a definite claim while the seller is unsure, the seller’s possession of the article is still considered to be the dominant factor.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that such an oath was instituted - although it clarifies nothing - for the following reason: If it were not required, a defendant would always say “I do not know” and thus not be held responsible to take an oath, rather than deny entirely the claim lodged against him, and be required to take an oath.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s decision differs from the ruling in Bava Metzia 8:4, his source. The reason is that, as the Rambam explains in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Mishnah is speaking about an instance when - because of the principle of gilgul sh’vu’ah - the seller is required to take a Scriptural oath. Since he cannot take that oath - because one cannot take a Scriptural oath when one is unsure - the purchaser’s claim is vindicated. In our halachah, by contrast, the oath is Rabbinic in nature, and such an oath can be taken despite the uncertainty.

At the time the owner of the donkey performs meshichah on the cow, the donkey becomes the property of the owner of the cow (Chapter 5, Halachah 1). Thus, the question is whether the donkey was alive when meshichah was performed on the cow. If it was, the owner of the cow had already acquired the donkey, and the loss is his. If the donkey was not alive, the owner of the donkey must suffer the loss, and he is obligated to return the cow.

For the donkey was originally his and was found in his possession. Therefore, he must show that it was alive at the time meshichah was performed. According to this view, if the donkey was not in a domain belonging to its owner at the time it was discovered to be dead, even if it was in a neutral domain, the burden of proof shifts to the owner of the cow.
The above is the Rambam’s interpretation of Ketubot 76a and follows that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. It is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 224:1). There are many other interpretations of that passage. The Ramah follows the interpretation of the Tur and Rabbenu Asher, who maintain that the burden of proof is on the owner of the cow, for at the time of meshichah he acquired the cow, no matter where it was located. Hence, when the doubt arose - when the donkey was discovered to be dead - it had already entered his possession.

As stated in Hilchot Shechitah 6:12, if such a perforation occurred before slaughter, the animal would be rendered trefah, unfit to be eaten. The question the halachah revolves around is whether it can be proved that the perforation took place while the cow was in the possession of the seller, not the butcher. If that fact can be established, the sale is nullified. If not, the burden of proof shifts to the butcher, because the cow was in his possession when the doubt arose.

If there is no blood on the wound, we assume that it was caused after the animal was slaughtered (Hilchot Shechitah, ibid.). See, however, Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 48:20), which rules that in the present age, we are stringent and forbid such an animal unless a substantial loss is involved.

Thus, if it was sold by the seller to the butcher within three days, the sale is considered to have been conducted under false premises - the butcher thought that he was purchasing a kosher animal - and it is nullified.

We do not know whether the animal became trefah before it was sold or afterwards.

According to the Rambam, this ruling applies whether the butcher has paid for the animal already and seeks to have his money returned, or has not paid as yet and desires to avoid paying. The Maggid Mishneh cites other commentaries that interpret the passage differently.

I.e., it was only after the butcher had taken possession of the animal - and slaughtered it - that the doubt arose.
The Kessef Mishneh and others question how the Rambam distinguishes between this instance and the previous halachah, where he says that the burden of proof is on the original owner of the donkey.

Even when he is expropriating money that is in the possession of the butcher, the seller is not required to bring proof to substantiate his claim.

See Halachah 2 for an illustration of this principle.

See Halachah 3 for an illustration of this principle.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 2-4.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

The agreement is considered an asmachta (see Chapter Eleven) and is not binding. From Hilchot Gezelah 7:6, it would appear that making such a sale is considered robbery by decree of our Sages.

Chapter 7, Halachah 1. See also Chapter 22, Halachot 3-4.

I.e., approximately six square meters. This is an interesting commentary on the socio-economics of Talmudic times. It was common for an entire family to live in a one-room domicile smaller than most bedrooms today.
The point of this halachah is that when an agreement is not specific - as in this and the following halachot, where the dimensions of the property are not specified - the norms that are usually accepted by people at large are followed. Today, although those norms have changed, this governing principle remains the same.

Since the purchaser specified that the house should be large, it must exceed the ordinary limits.

Thus, the height of a small house is approximately seven and a half meters and the height of a large house approximately nine meters (Maggid Mishneh).

These dimensions are slightly larger than a person’s ordinary size, to include space for the coffin.

It is very common for archaeologists to find crypts built in such patterns in Eretz Yisrael.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that an irrigation ditch requires walls. The land on either side of the ditch would be packed tightly to serve this purpose.

The roots of trees, by contrast, penetrate deeply and will not harm the banks of the ditch.

From any place in that field. The rationale is that we do not require the purchaser to transfer earth from another place.

A path leading to a person’s field, where it would be customary for only the owner to travel upon it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 217:6).

For it is common for a person journeying through a field to travel on (or with) a donkey rather than on a wagon (op. cit.:7).
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, who states that the above applies when there are no walls on the path, and so the burden being carried by the donkey can project further. If, however, there are walls, a larger width is necessary.
This interpretation enables us to resolve a seeming conflict between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 3:3, which states that a path for a single person is four cubits wide.

I.e., a path wide enough for two wagons to pass, one going in one direction and the other in the opposite direction (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 217:7).

This was the width of the public thoroughfare in the Jews’ encampment in the desert. See Hilchot Shabbat 14:1.

For a king has the right to tear down any structure that stands in the way of the passage of his troops. Similarly, a funeral procession need not remain confined to a path, but may spread out beyond the confines of the way, even though this will damage produce growing there. This is allowed as a sign of respect for the departed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 99b).

As in Halachah 3.

The Ra’avad differs with this ruling and maintains that a king has the right to seize property for a road, implying that a sale to a king is binding. As a corollary, the Maggid Mishneh maintains that if a person sells a path to a grave through his field, then the people have the right to pass through the entire field.
It must be noted that the Rambam cites the law concerning a king’s right to requisition property for a road in Hilchot Melachim 5:3. Hence, the Ra’avad’s objections are not in place. For the king’s right to requisition property has no effect on the question whether a sale to a king - when he is not ordering its requisition - is binding or not. The Rambam Le’am interprets the Rambam’s statements here as not referring to a sale to a king at all, but instead applying to a situation when a person tells a colleague: “I am selling you a road for a king,” the transaction is not binding.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 6:7). A more specific explanation of the term ma’amad can be found in Hilchot Eivel 12:4.

The Rashbam (Bava Batra 100b) interprets this to be referring to an area of 40 square cubits.

I.e., the seller drew lines on all four sides of the field, but drew one of the horizontal lines shorter than the other. See the accompanying diagram (diagram a).
One of the horizontal lines delineating the field’s boundaries was
drawn to its full length, and one was drawn only partially.

Since the entire field belonged to one person, the seller extended one line to show how long the other person’s field was, but his intent was to sell him only a portion of his field ending on the shorter line. See the accompanying diagram (diagram b).
The lower horizontal line reflects the boundary line of the neighbor. The closed rectangle the area the seller was willing to sell, and the open rectangle the portion he desired to retain for himself.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 219:3). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that even in such an instance the purchaser acquires a larger portion of land.

There would be no need to draw the line longer if the seller did not intend to sell the purchaser additional property on that line.

See the accompanying diagram (diagram c).
The diagonal divides between the portion the seller wishes to retain and that which he is selling.

This will clarify that the seller is selling the entire length and breadth of the area, and not just a portion of it.

According to the Rashbam (Bava Batra 62b), the purchaser does not acquire the row on which the last boundary line would be drawn. According to the Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, the field is divided (as depicted in diagram d) and the purchaser does not acquire the fourth portion.
The conception of the Ri Migash. According to his understanding, the purchaser does not acquired the darkened portion.

I.e., the two boundary lines drawn on either side of the property extend beyond the fourth boundary line. This is the interpretation of the Rashbam. See the accompanying diagram (diagram e).
The horizontal boundary lines extend beyond the vertical one.

If it were designated by a row of palm trees, it would be clear that it is a distinct entity. Since it is not designated in this manner, one may assume that it is part of the field being sold.

If this portion of the field is large enough to have this measure of grain sown within it, it is considered important. (See Hilchot Sh’chenim 1:4.) Thus, one might consider it to be a distinct entity. If it is smaller, one may assume that it is part of the field being sold.

All the three factors mentioned appear to support the purchaser’s position. Therefore, this portion of the field is awarded to him as well.

Even if it is too small to sow nine kabbim of grain in it.

Even if it is designated by a row of palm trees.

Instead, it remains the property of the seller. The rationale is that two of the three factors support the seller’s claim.

In both these instances there is one factor that supports the seller’s claim, and two that support the purchaser’s claim.

I.e., the judges are given the prerogative of deciding according to their intuitive feelings with regard to the intent of the seller (Kessef Mishneh).
This is the Rambam’s (and also the Rashbam’s) interpretation of the Talmudic concept shoda didayanei. Note Tosafot, Bava Batra, loc. cit., who differ and interpret this term as meaning that the judges have the right to award the property to whomever they desire. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpar 219:2) cites the Rambam’s interpretation.
Generally, when there is a doubt with regard to whom property belongs. we follow the principle: “When a person seeks to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” In this instance, however, since the evidence appears to support the purchaser’s claim, but the seller has the right of possession, the judges are given the right to determine who is entitled to ownership.

See the accompanying diagram (diagram f).
Although he drew only the diagonals at the quarter, the seller’s intent was the square circumscribed within its boundaries.
There were properties owned by several individuals on every side of the field and at the corners; the properties were owned by different individuals. The question is: Do we say that the seller’s intent was to sell the entire field, or perhaps his intent was merely to sell the corner portions?

See the accompanying diagram (diagram G). Here too, there is a similar question. Was he selling the entire field or only the designated portions?
Although he drew only the L’s, the seller’s intent was the square circumscribed within its boundaries.

In this instance as well, there were properties owned by several individuals on every side of the field, and the seller marked off only some of the properties, leaving empty spaces on each side. See the accompanying diagram (diagram h).
The seller marked the comers of the entire field and also the shaded portions.
The question is: Do we say that the omissions were intentional and the seller intended to sell only those portions of the field that he marked off? Or do we say that it is uncommon to sell select parts of a field, and his intent was to sell the entire field?

From a simple reading, it would appear that the Rambam is concluding with the same ruling as in the previous halachah - i.e., that the decision is reached through shoda didayanei, a decision dependent on the judges’ intuitive feelings with regard to the legitimacy of the litigants’ claims (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam rules in this fashion. Bava Batra 62b, the source for this halachah, concludes teiku, implying that there is an unresolved doubt. Generally, in such a situation, the owner of the property - in this case the seller - is allowed to maintain possession, based on the principle: “When a person seeks to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” For this reason, the Kessef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam had a different text of that Talmudic passage.
The Siftei Cohen 219:2 explains that the Rambam is not ruling that the case is decided by shoda didayanei. Instead, his intent is that the seller is allowed to keep a certain portion of the property. Nevertheless, since interpreting the seller’s intent when drawing the charts also requires knowledge, this task is assigned to judges.

The term bayit means “home,” “dwelling,” or “building.” The halachah deals with the question whether the seller sold the entire building or merely one apartment.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 214:32 emphasizes that this applies when the seller is standing in one apartment when he makes the sale and says: “I am selling you this bayit.”

The Maggid Mishneh (based on Bava Batra 61b) explains that this law does not apply in a place where most people refer to a building as a bayit. In such an instance, the purchaser would acquire the entire building. This ruling is cited by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 214:7).

As stated in Chapter 24, Halachah 14, using such an expression clarifies any questions of doubt that might arise.
Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh states that even if the seller includes this expression in the deed of sale, if there are none who refer to a building as a bayit, the purchaser does not acquire the entire building. Since none of the local people use such an expression, we assume that this is not the seller’s intent. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:22) state that this law applies only when the smaller fields in the valley are clearly divided one from the other. Otherwise, the purchaser acquires the entire valley.

Or states this in a deed of sale.

This principle is also followed in other contexts. The basis for this conclusion is that although the seller’s statement leaves room for doubt, since he is in possession of the land, the purchaser must prove that a larger number of fields were intended.

Three or four is not a limit. Mentioning this number simply illustrates that the intent is not only two. The rationale for the difference is that by stating “all,” the seller indicated that he was selling him more than the minimum number.

For gardens and orchard are not described as fields.

All the seller’s landed property, with the exception of his home, is sold. The commentaries note the contrast between this halachah and Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanalz 11:15, in which the Rambam states:
If a person on his deathbed said: “[Give] my property to so and so,” [the recipient] should take all the movable property, all the landed property, his wardrobe, his servants,... [his] tefillin.”
The Maggid Mishneh cites authorities who differentiate between one who states nechasai (“my property”) and nechasim sheli, which has the same meaning. When the possessive form is used as a suffix. these commentaries explain, the person does not have to state “all,” for all bis property to be included. For the fact that be identifies the property with himself in the same word indicates that he intends to transfer all his property. When, however, the possessive is stated in another word, this intent is lacking and the word “all” must be added for the sale to be that inclusive. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 218) makes such a distinction.
Other authorities differentiate between a sale - the subject of this halachah - where a person is restrictive in what he gives the purchaser, and a bequest - where the dying man is giving generously.

“One” seemingly means “any one,” to be chosen by the seller.

I.e., this is the one that he had sold him, and it died or collapsed after the sale.

I.e., the purchaser.

The seller is in possession of the property. Therefore, to expropriate it from him, the purchaser must be able to demonstrate his claim clearly. For that to be possible, the wording of the deed of sale must clearly prove his contention, and that is not true in this case.

For the same reason mentioned with regard to the previous halachah.

The Ir Sl111sha11 explains that the seller must prove that the second field was purchased from Reuven. Sefer Me’irat Ei11ayim 218:66 differs and explains that he must prove that the field popularly known as Reuven’s never belonged to Reuven.

Since the dimensions of the half of the field are not specified, we divide the field, giving the seller - who has the right of possession - the more select half. We assume that a person would prefer to have a smaller amount of choice property than a larger amount of inferior property (Maggid Mishneh).

This applies to both the above clauses.
The Rashbam differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Batra 107b (the source for this halachah). [Indeed, it is possible that his version of the Talmud’s text was slightly different.] According to the Rashbam, it is the seller who must provide for the building of the fence. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:20) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah cite that of the Rashbam.

He must also build the fence itself.

I.e., a small, but deft carnivorous animal. This is the translation popularly given. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:52, however, which interprets the term as referring to an animal that will destroy crops.

This wording implies that he is selling him the entire portion of the field that he owns.

I.e., half of his half.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that he specifies just its northern and southern boundaries.

Specifying also its eastern and western boundaries.

We assume that the reason the seller specified the boundaries of the entire field is that he desired to give the purchaser a significant portion of it.

For this is the minimal size of a field. This is another example of the principle that since the seller has the right of possession, any ambiguity in the deed of sale is interpreted in his favor.