This letter was addressed to R. Reuven Glick.

B”H, 16 Adar I, 5711,
Brooklyn

Greetings and blessings,

With this [letter], I acknowledge receipt of your three-volume work, Mishpatei B’nei Adam,and your letter of 7 Adar I.

With regard to your note in your letter — and in your book, Vol. II, p. 224 — regarding the words of the gloss Yam Shel Shlomo to Bava Kama 91b in connection with the law prohibiting one from harming or embarrassing himself because of financial need.

In particular, [you state that] the words of Yam Shel Shlomo apply when one embarrasses or harms himself through frivolity or the like. If, by contrast, the harm or the embarrassment comes in the process of work, it is permitted.

On that basis, you raise a question with regard to the statements of the Alter Rebbe in [his Shulchan Aruch,] his Kuntres Acharon to Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, subsec. 4. [There the Alter Rebbe cites the statement of Rav to Rav Kahana:1 “Skin an animal carcass [in the marketplace...]” and that of Yaakov our ancestor who spoke2 of being consumed by scorching heat and frost. Implied is that it is permitted to endure both embarrassment and bodily suffering for the sake of money.

I am surprised at you. On what basis do you make this distinction in the words of Yam Shel Shlomo?What connection do the concepts of frivolity and nullifying Torah study have to the issue at hand: harming oneself?3 (I do not have the text Yam Shel Shlomo at hand to check the wording he uses.)

On the contrary, look to the motivating rationale for the prohibition against harming oneself which is that “a person does not have authority over his body at all, to have it struck, to put it to shame, or to afflict it with any pain” (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, [loc. cit.]). Thus with regard to bodily suffering, one’s own body is like the body of another person.

The rationale is explained further in the gloss of Radbaz to Rambam’s Hilchos Sanhedrin 18:7: “A person’s soul is not his own property, but rather the property of the Holy One, blessed be He.” See also the wording of Rambam in Hilchos Rotzeach 1:4.

With regard to the support that you bring for your thesis based on the verses: “By the sweat of your brow you shall eat,”4 “Man was born to work,”5 and the like:

It is obvious that this is dependent on whether one is following the prevailing pattern in the world at large. For in such an instance, the Holy One, blessed be He, has granted permission to use His property in such a manner, for He stated:6 “For six days, you shall perform work.” If, however, one exceeds those norms, one is damaging G‑d’s property without His permission.

[Indeed,] from the very fact that Yaakov called attention to the fact that he was “consumed by scorching heat and frost” and Rav found it necessary to counsel “Skin a carcass...,” it is obvious that this is not the ordinary pattern. See Bava Metzia 93b which speaks of [Yaakov as guarding Lavan’s sheep with] “an extra dimension of care.” (On the surface, it appears that the matter is dependent on the difference of opinion between Rabbah and Rav Chisda (ibid.).7 See also the statements of the [Midrash] Tanchuma, [Parshas] Miketz, [sec. 10, beginning] “G‑d, Almighty” [which states]: “[Yaakov] fled from Esav to Lavan. See how much difficulty8 he underwent.... ‘During the day, I was consumed by scorching heat....’”

As the commentary of the Tur to Bereishis 31:39 states, Yaakov acted beyond his obligations.

You also commented on the statement in Tanya, ch. 1 — also mentioned in Turei Even to Rosh HaShanah (29a) — that “one who violates a light prohibition of our Sages is called ‘wicked.’ Certainly, an inference can be made9 that one who negates the observance of a positive commandment can [also] be called ‘wicked.’”

You ask: Why is it necessary to derive this from an inference? There is an explicit statement in [the Talmud,] Shevuos 12b and Zevachim 7b from our Sages [with regard to seeking atonement for the failure to perform a positive commandment]: “That positive commandment, what is the intent? If he did not repent, [how can the sacrifice have an effect? It is said:]10 ‘The sacrifice of the wicked11 is an abomination.’”

Two possible resolutions can be offered:

a) [The person described in the passages from] Shevuos and Zevachim violated two positive commandments: the positive commandment of the sin under discussion and the positive commandment of repentance.12

For from the apparent meaning of the Alter Rebbe’s wording in [Tanya,] Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 1 (p. 91a), it can be inferred that repentance is a Scriptural commandment. This runs contrary to the opinion which maintains that the mitzvah is that a person who seeks to repent must confess [his sin verbally].13 (With regard to this matter, see Minchas Chinuch, [mitzvah] 364. See also the Tzemach Tzedek’s Derech Mitzvosecha, mitzvas vidui veteshuvah; the explanations of R. Yerucham Fischel Perlowe to Rav Saadia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvos, sec. 42; Zohar, Vol. III, p. 124a. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.)

Even according to this [second] opinion, it can be said that the conception [that repentance is not a mitzvah]applies the entire year. However, Yom Kippur (which is the subject of [the passage in] Shevuos) is different. Then “everyone is obligated to repent” ([as stated by] Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 2:7). The same concept applies when one brings a sacrifice to atone for a sin (the subject of [the passage in] Zevachim). Then as a matter of course, the positive commandment to repent takes effect.

Tanya (and the Turei Even), by contrast, are bringing proof that immediately after failing to perform a positive commandment, a person is called “wicked.” This [distinction] can be easily understood.

b) Furthermore, it is possible to say that from Shevuos and Zevachim, it is clear that the person is termed “wicked.” It is, however, possible to say that his “wickedness” is slight. Tanya brings proof that his “wickedness” is severe, because it does so through the inference [mentioned above].

A note: I saw that your text begins with the section on kings. (The basis for that is found in [our Sages’ statement in] the conclusion of Tractate Horios that a king is given precedence over a High Priest, a prophet, etc. In this section itself, [you begin with] Moshe, the master of all prophets. This, however, is problematic, because Moshe’s [primary] attribute was prophecy and not kingship, as you yourself write at the beginning of page 2.

Even with regard to prophecy, one opinion in the first chapter of Rosh HaShanah14maintains that among the kings, there was an individual, [King Shlomo,] whose level equaled that of Moshe. Nevertheless, based on Rambam’s statement (Hilchos Teshuvah 9:2) that Mashiach will be a great prophet, close15 to Moshe our teacher, it would appear that he follows the other opinion mentioned in Rosh HaShanah, that even among the kings, there was none [like Moshe].

Nevertheless, [that refers to Moshe’s uniqueness as a prophet]. With regard to the uniqueness of a king, our Sages stated (Sanhedrin 93b) that Mashiach will [be on a higher level, as evidenced by the prophecy that he will] identify the worthy through his sense of smell. ([Indeed,] on that basis, the Sages took action; consult that source.)16 Thus even according to the opinion that maintains that among the kings, there was one — Shlomo — who was equivalent to Moshe, he was not given license to judge except on the basis [of the testimony] of witnesses.17 It is thus obvious that the identification of the worthy on the basis of smell is a prerogative of a king and not a prophet, because a prophet may not judge on the basis of prophecy.18

According to the version we follow, this explains the two interpretations offered by the [Midrash] Tanchuma, the end of Parshas Toldos, with regard to the King Mashiach: “‘[My servant] will flourish.... He will be elevated’ — above Yitzchak.” ([This interpretation] does not single out Moshe, because [Moshe] will surpass [Mashiach] with regard to prophecy.) [A second interpretation states:] “‘He will be elevated’ — above Moses.” (Because with regard to kingship, Mashiach will surpass Moses.)

See the notes of R. Shlomo Buber to the [Midrash] Tanchuma (fn. 138) which cites a question raised by Maharatz Chayos from this passage on the statement of Rambam quoted above that Mashiach will only approximate Moshe’s level.19

See also the maamar of my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe, [released for] Acharon Shel Pesach, 5709 (published in Kuntres 65),20 [which states] that in the Ultimate Future, Mashiach will convey [the insights of] the Torah’s inner, mystic dimensions [even] to the Patriarchs, Moshe, and Aharon. This is also obvious from sec. 2 of the Alter Rebbe’s maamar entitled VeHeinif Yado, Likkutei Torah, Parshas Tzav.

With blessings for success in Torah study with G‑d’s help and amidst spiritual and material tranquility.

A check is enclosed.