Metzorah: Uncovering the Hidden

Zohar, Vol. III, p. 50a.

See the sichah entitled “Lessons G‑d Gives so Man Can Grow and Flourish,” p. 170ff., which explains the isolation a person afflicted by tzaraas must undergo.

Rambam, the conclusion of Hilchos Tumaas Tzaraas.

Yoma 86b.

Berachos 34b; Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 7:4.

Beitzah 3b, et al.

Vayikra 14:33.

Vayikra 13:1ff.

Ibid. 14:2.

Ibid. 14:3ff.

Ibid. 14:10ff.

Ibid. 14:33ff.

See Or HaChayim, Vayikra 14:34.

True, there is a difference between the two sets of laws. The laws regarding to tzaraas blemishes on a person’s body and garments apply in all places. By contrast, as stated in Parshas Metzora, the laws regarding to tzaraas blemishes on houses apply only when “you enter the land of Canaan” (Vayikra 14:34), i.e., only in Eretz Yisrael (Toras Kohanim and Ibn Ezra on the above verse; Nega’im 12:4).

Alternatively, these laws were not relevant during the Jews’ journeys in the desert when they did not dwell in houses (see Or HaChayim loc. cit.). Nevertheless, the question raised in the main text is still relevant, because it would still have been possible to insert the passage regarding tzaraas blemishes on houses with the preface, “when you enter…” at the end of Parshas Tazria.

Note that according to Ramban (Vayikra 13:47), the laws regarding tzaraas blemishes on garments also apply “only in Eretz Yisrael.”

Vayikra Rabbah 17:6.

The main text quotes the wording in Rashi’s commentary. There are slight differences in the wording in Vayikra Rabbah. These differences is discussed in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 32, p. 91ff.

The wording of the initial portion of Rashi’s commentary is also found in Toras Kohanim on the verse and in Horios 10a. See Rashi’s and Rabbeinu Asher’s commentaries on that Talmudic passage.

Zohar, Vol. III, p. 50a.

See also the end of the commentary of K’li Yakar on the verse, quoting other sources.

Vayikra 14:42.

As evident from the Zohar, Vol. III, loc. cit. – beginning with, “if this occurrence was only to find treasures….” – these two rationales are complementary, and not conflicting. As Nitzutzei Oros comments on that passage, “Tzaraas blemishes appear on homes for two reasons.”

This understanding is not accepted by all commentators. In reference to this passage, Or HaChamah (commenting on Zohar, Vol. III, p. 50b) states, “Previously, the Zohar rejected the explanation that [the reason for tzaraas blemishes on the walls of homes] was to find the hidden treasures of the Canaanites.” Thus, in the commentary on Zohar, loc. cit.,a, s.v. ishtamode’an, Or HaChamah states, “There are two types of tzaraas blemishes. Some were solely to bring about suffering; others were so that [the Jews] would find hidden treasures.” However, even according to this interpretation, at least according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in the Zohar, loc. cit., p. 50b, the passage “comes to determine the validity of both interpretations, for they are all ‘words of the living G‑d.’ ”

Note the commentary of Alshich on this Torah reading, which states that tzaraas blemishes on the walls of homes come both “to bring suffering upon the owner for the sin that he committed,” but also to give him treasures as a reward for “whatever good deed he performed.” Thus, the blemishes serve “two opposite [purposes] for one person for two types of deeds.” Consult that source.

See Zohar, loc. cit.

See Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 177) which mentions the blemishes appearing “in some homes.” Note, however, Or HaChamah, loc. cit., which states that the blemishes appeared on the walls of homes so that the Jews would find the hidden treasures and, therefore, would not see it as a difficulty to tear down the homes and rebuild Eretz Yisrael in its entirety, because the Canaanites had “completely filled it with their idols.”

Parshas Ve’eschanan (Devarim 6:10-11) explicitly relates G‑d’s promise “to give you… houses filled with all forms of good.” However, Vayikra Rabbah, loc. cit., and the Zohar, loc. cit., interpret that verse as referring not to the homes themselves, but to the treasures hidden that would be revealed by the blemishes and the destruction of the homes.

Toras Kohanim and Rashi on Vayikra 18:3.

See K’li Yakar, loc. cit., which offers a different interpretation.

See Or HaChamah, on the Zohar, loc. cit., p. 50a, s.v. veyadaata, which explains several levels within the spirit of impurity based on the statements of the Zohar, loc. cit. The spirit of impurity rested on the homes, not only because of the fundamental presence of idol worship in the home, but also because the Canaanites would mention a mystical name associated with impurity when building the home. Consult that source.

As our Sages (Bereishis Rabbah 58:8, quoted by Rashi to that verse) comment on the verse (Berei­shis 23:17), vayakem s’dei Efron: Although the literal meaning is that Avraham acquired the field, the wording allows for the interpretation that, as a result, “[the field] was elevated.”

In this itself, there were several levels of severity. There were instances where taking other stones and other earth would be sufficient to alter the spiritual nature of the home, and there were instances where the home had to be totally destroyed. See Or HaChamah, Zohar, loc. cit.

It is not imperative to accept this interpretation. It could be said – albeit in somewhat of a strained manner – that there were two types of homes: one that contained the hidden treasures and another in which rested spirit of impurity; the Zohar mentions both possibilities. See footnote 14 above.

Pesachim 67a. See Toras Kohanim and Rashi to Vayikra 13:46.

See the sichah entitled “Lessons G‑d Gives so Man Can Grow and Flourish,” p. 170ff., which explains these three camps and the isolation a person afflicted by tzaraas must undergo.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 22, p. 74, and footnotes (included in the sichah cited in the previous footnote) which discusses whether a person afflicted by tzaraas must isolate from others who are similarly afflicted.

Pesachim, loc. cit.; Rashi, loc. cit.; Toras Kohanim, loc. cit.; see Ra’avad’s commentary on the latter source; Likkutei Sichos, loc. cit., and footnotes.

Sefer Yetzirah 2:4.

Rambam, the conclusion of Hilchos Tumaas Tzaraas. Similar statements are found in many other sources. See the maamar entitled Adam ki Yihiyeh(Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 22b), and see the elaborate treatment of the subject in Likkutei Sichos, loc. cit., p. 72, and the sources cited there.

Berachos 34b; Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 7:4.

See the commentaries to Sefer Yetzirah, loc. cit.

Nevertheless, in order to attain this good, it was necessary to destroy the house – in spiritual terms, to break the impurity.

Yoma 86b.

Etz Chayim, Shaar 49, the end of ch. 8, states that “the intentional sins become like merits,” and explains that the sins themselves become transformed. See the explanation that follows in the main text.

The Rebbe is employing the terms gavra and cheftza that are often used in Talmudic analysis. The term gavra, “man,” refers to the person involved, while the term cheftza, “object,” refers to the object with which a mitzvah or a transgression is performed.

Note a similar explanation in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 4, p. 1351, with regard to our Sages’ statement (Yoma 72b) that when a person studies the Torah with undesirable intentions, the Torah becomes “an [elixir of death] for him.” The emphasis is that the negative consequences affect only him, the person studying, but not the Torah itself, because the Torah itself is not susceptible to impurity (Berachos 22a). See, however, Toras Menachem, Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat, Vol. 4, p. 129, footnote 48, which explains that the person’s undesirable intentions also affect the Torah.

See Tanya, ch. 7 (p. 12a), which states that the sins are considered merits “because, through them, the person [comes] to this great love.” That source, however, is explaining the reason why the sins themselves become transformed to merits. Consult that source. See also the elaborate explanation in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 187ff.

Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 26c.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 3, p. 985, the footnotes there, and other sources, with regard to partaking of forbidden substances, when – as in an instance of a danger to life – it is permitted to do so. In that source, the Rebbe emphasizes that even though it is permitted to partake of the forbidden substances in such a situation, they leave a spiritually harmful effect on the person.

Tanya, loc. cit.

Cf. Yeshayahu 25:8.

Zecharya 13:2.

I.e. the actual entity will continue to exist; however, its connection with evil will cease. Note the theoretical discussion whether a prohibition affects merely the form (tzurah) of the forbidden entity and not its substance (chomer) (Mefanei’ach Tzfunos, ch. 1, secs. 8-9, and the sources cited there, et al. In any case, it does not affect its fundamental matter (chomer hiyuli). See the elaborate discussion in the sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Acharei, 5744, that is based on Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 56dff.

See also the elaborate discussion in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 184ff., and the sources cited there.

Nedarim 59a.

The rationale is that “such an entity is not entirely different from a permitted entity… since… ultimately, it will be permitted” (Ran, Nedarim 52a).

On this basis, Ranexplains the rationale for the halachic principle that a davar sheyeish lo matirin is not nullified in a mixture despite it containing a majority of permitted substances. The reasoning is that “the equivalence [between the forbidden and the permitted substances]* prevents [the davar sheyeish lo matirin] from being nullified,” because the situation resembles a mixture of a permitted and forbidden substance of the same type. See the lengthy explanation in that source.

* I.e., that after the davar sheyeish lo matirin will be permitted, it will be of a similar type as the permitted substance.

See Likkutei Sichos, loc. cit., p. 210, footnote 40, and Vol. 38, p. 18ff. See also the lengthy explanation in Chiddushim U’Biurim BeShas (Jerusalem, 5739), sec. 18.

Obviously, the intent is not a straightforward comparison to the law applying to davar sheyeish lo matirin in a simple sense, because we are speaking about an act of sin that is already past history. [Needless to say, in an instance where the forbidden entity still exists – i.e., a forbidden entity was brought into being through the commission of a sin – it will not become permitted through the repentance of the person who transgressed.*] Instead, the intent is the spiritual dimension of the concept – the life-energy of the forbidden act, as explained in Tanya, ch. 7 and other sources.

Perhaps it is possible to say – at least in an abstract sense – that this conception leads to a difference in the manner the person will be judged. Our Sages (Kiddushin 40b, Rashi, Tosafos, Rosh HaShanah 16b; Tanya, ch. 1) relate that a person is judged according to the majority of his conduct. However, if one says that a sinful act is categorized as a davar sheyeish lo matirin that can never be nullified, that principle would not apply.

* On the contrary, the existence of an entity brought into being by sin inhibits teshuvah and atonement. To borrow the wording of our Sages (Chagigah 9a; Yevamos 22b; see Tanya, the end of ch. 7), it is a matter that “cannot be corrected.”

See Rashi’s commentary on Yevamos, loc. cit., s.v. hashta, which states, “His sin is overtly recognizable and [therefore,] recalled [Above].” Conversely, however, through very powerful teshuvah, the person can erase the effects of his sin (according to the Mitteler Rebbe’s Shaarei Teshuvah, part two, p. 42d; similar statements are made in part one of that source, p. 54d; see the introduction to Pokei’ach Ivrim, p. 30ff).

For that reason, a prohibition that can only be nullified by investing effort and expense is not considered a davar sheyeish lo matirin (Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 73b, s.v. tevel. Other sources are cited in Encyclopedia Talmudis, erech davar sheyeish lo matirin, p. 7).

Kesubos 74b.

The term pesach, literally, “opening,” refers to suggesting a reason for a person to ask for the release of a vow based on the fact that a new development occurred, and had he known that it would, he would not have taken the vow initially.

See Encyclopedia Talmudis, erech hataras nedarim, p. 349ff., and the sources cited there.

Tosafos, Nazir 22a, s.v. Mar Zutra. See Encyclopedia Talmudis, loc. cit., pp. 337-338, and the sources cited there.

Nedarim 58a. See Rashi, Tosafos, and other commentaries to that passage.

In given situations, consecrated articles and produce from the second tithe can be redeemed by paying their worth and adding a fifth of their value. Afterwards, they may be used for mundane purposes. However, until they are redeemed, they are deemed sanctified and may not be used for mundane purposes.

See also K’li Yakar cited in footnote 59 below.

Therefore, even though the mitzvah of – and possibility for – teshuvah exists even at the time the person sins (see Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 18, p. 122ff. regarding the corrective dimension of teshuvah; consult that source), nevertheless, that potential cannot be ascribed to the person himself at this time. In his immediate situation, he is opposing this Divine desire. This can be easily understood.

Mishnah, Yoma 85b.

When saying that a baal teshuvah’s sins become merits, the intent is not that they are considered as merits only from the moment he repents onward, but that they become merits retroactively. This is evident from the ruling that when a man consecrates a woman on the condition that she had not sinned, if in fact she had sinned but afterwards repented in a manner that transforms sins to merits, sheis consecrated (see the end of Tzafnas Panei’ach to Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 2:2; Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 185).

The retroactive effects of teshuvah are evident from the Alter Rebbe’s explanation, Tanya, ch. 7 (quoted above, note 36), regarding the reason why sins can become merits – “because through them the person came to this great love.” Rashi explicitly states (Yoma 86a, s.v. kan mei’ahavah) that through teshuvah motivated by love, the person’s “sin is eradicated from the outset.” Certainly, this applies with regard to teshuvah motivated by such great love that sins are transformed into merits, this being a more sublime expression of teshuvah motivated by love. See the elaborate explanation in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 187ff.

This is so, even though in other instances where Torah Law speaks of actions having a retroactive effect, something similar to changing the past takes place. For example, when a Torah scholar nullifies a vow, the object or the activity is forbidden until he does so, and through his act, its status changes (see Rabbeinu Asher, Nedarim 52b, et al). Similarly, when it is specified that a conditional agreement is binding from the present time onward (mei’achshav), its legal consequences take effect retroactively (see the sources cited in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 6, p. 54, footnote 39, p. 92, footnote 36, and Vol. 8, p. 58, footnote 48*).

See Pesachim 31b, et al., where it is explained that only when it is specified that the action is binding from the present time onward (mei’achshav) that its legal consequences take effect retroactively.

Similar concepts apply regarding the nullification of vows, since as stated in the main text, it is possible only because of the regret a person feels and the new factor that arises. Thus, it is as if the vow was made conditionally; i.e., in the event that this-and-this were to happen, it would not take effect.

The above statement would seem somewhat problematic according to the authorities who maintain that a husband can nullify a vow taken by his wife, causing it to be considered as if it was never made (see Encyclopedia Talmudis, erech hafarah, p. 113ff., and the sources mentioned there; Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 21, p. 325, footnote 45, and the marginal note there). Unlike a person who asks a scholar to absolve his vow because he regrets having taken it, the nullification of vows by a husband is not because of regret. However, this can be resolved as following: we can say that from the outset, Torah Law allows for the possibility of the nullification of the vow at the time it was made. (This is comparable to the statements made in sec. 5 regarding the redemption of consecrated articles and the second tithe. However, there is a difference because in that instance, the effect is only from the time of redemption onward.)

To cite another parallel, our Sages (Kesubos 3a; see the sources mentioned there) state that in certain situations, a man’s consecration of his wife can be nullified because everyone who consecrates a woman consecrates her subject to and contingent upon the consent of the Sages and, in those instances, the Sages can nullify his consecration retroactively.

See a similar, not entirely analogous, explanation of K’li Yakar in his commentary on Bamidbar 30:3, where he explains that a husband or a father may nullify his wife’s or daughter’s vows as if they were never made at the outset because a woman is under the authority of her husband or father and it is as if she took the vow conditional to his consent. Similarly, with regard to the nullification of a vow by a Torah scholar, K’li Yakar explains that “every Jew is under the authority of the [Jewish] court…. [Therefore,] whenever anyone takes a vow, it is as if he specified at the time he took the vow that it was conditional to it being accepted by the [Jewish] court.” See Rav Yosef Engel’s Tziyunim LeTorah, general principle 23.

Tzafnas Panei’ach, loc. cit., compares the retroactive nullification of sin through teshuvah motivated by love to a Torah scholar nullifying a vow. However, that does not represent a contradiction to the statements in the main text because is possible to explain that his intent is the ultimate effect – i.e., the teshuvah nullifies a sin and a Torah scholar nullifies a vow in a retroactive manner, as if it was never made. However, there is an advantage in the way teshuvah brings about a retroactive nullification over the way a Torah scholar retroactively nullifies a vow, as explained in the main text.

Sefer HaMaamarim 5679, p. 17. See also Sefer HaMaamarim 5671, p. 22.

With regard to the person himself (the gavra;*see footnote 34 for the definition of that term), it is possible to say that this occurs since, in his innermost self, every Jew is good, even at the time he sins (see Rambam, Hilchos Geirushin 2:20; Tanya, the end of ch. 24). In particular, this is true because it is certain that ultimately he will repent (Tanya, the end of ch. 39; see also the Alter Rebbe’s Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:3). Accordingly, teshuvah bears a certain resemblance to a conditional agreement, for after-the-fact it is clarified that, from the outset, the person was good. (See the lengthy explanation in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 6, p. 54, and the footnotes there.) Note also Ikarim, Discourse 4, ch. 27. That source compares the effect of teshuvah to the nullification of a vow through regret resulting from a new development (see the discussion of these matters according to Chassidus in Or HaTorah, Bamidbar, Vol. 4, pp. 1288ff., 1319ff., et al.).

However, the above only applies regarding the person who committed the sin, the gavra. Nevertheless, with regard to the sin itself, the cheftza, that explanation does not apply.

*In a plain sense, this is also Rashi’s intent (Yoma, ibid) when he states, “his sin is eradicated from the outset,” i.e., the sin is eradicated from the person, i.e., he is not held accountable; however, the cheftza, the sin itself is not affected. In contrast, the statement, “the sins are transformed into merits” applies to the cheftza (as above in the main text).

See also Likkutei Sichos, loc. cit.

This is also reflected in the inner motif involved. The power to transform sins, which are the opposite of G‑d’s will, to merits comes from the essence of the Master of the will Who is not bound by His own will (Sefer HaMaamarim 5671, p. 21; see the lengthy explanation in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 66ff., and the footnotes there, Vol. 7, p. 23; et al.). Therefore, this transformation is specifically brought about by teshuvah motivated by love stemming from the essence of the soul. See the sources cited in footnote 62. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 249, footnote 59 (translated in Selections from Likkutei Sichos, Bereishis, p. 584, footnote 79); Vol. 7, loc. cit. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.

See Rambam, Hilchos Tumaas Tzaraas 9:2.

See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 7, p. 102ff.

The awareness of this conception is engendered by the fact that, at times, the parshiyos of Tazria and Metzora are read together and form a single Torah reading.

Note Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 65ff., and the footnotes there.

See Imrei Binah, Shaar HaKerias Shema, ch. 43; Toras Chayim, Shmos, Vol. 1, the end of p. 254b, et al.

This teaching is cited in the series of maamarim entitled Yom Tov shel Rosh HaShanah, 5666, p. 520, and elsewhere. See the beginning of Yevamos 63a and Tosafos, Yevamos, loc. cit., s.v. she’ein.

Sukkos liturgy, the Hoshaanos of the third day of Sukkos, translated according to the context in this sichah.

It is for this reason that only teshuvah that comes from the essence of the soul, the yechidah, is able to transform sins into merits (see sec. 6 and footnote 64, above). The reason is because the yechidah perceives that the descent through sin is for the ascent through teshuvah that follows.

See Vayikra Rabbah 17:7.

See the elaborate explanations in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 22, p. 197ff., and the footnotes there, interpreting Vayikra Rabbah, loc. cit.

Shmos 15:17; see Rashi’s commentary there and Zohar, Vol. III, p. 221a.