Metzorah: Extending Your Reach

At the conclusion of Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah, Rambam rules:3

If a wealthy man says, “I take responsibility4 for the sacrifices of this person afflicted with tzaraas,” [even though] the afflicted person is poor, the person who took the vow must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf, for he has the financial capacity. If a poor person says, “I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person,” [if] the afflicted person is wealthy, the person [who took the vow] must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf, for the person who took the vow5 is obligated to bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man.

On the surface, Rambam’s rulings require explanation: In the first case, what difference does it make that the person who took the vow has the financial capacity? He only obligated himself to take responsibility for “the sacrifices of this person afflicted with tzaraas,” and this person is poor. Why then is he obligated to bring the sacrifices required of an afflicted person who is rich?

Rambam’s ruling is based on the discussion of the issue in the Talmud, which states,6 “May a person who is wealthy [bring the sacrifices required of a poor person] if he takes a vow [to bring the offerings] for him?7 The Merciful One states, ‘If he is poor,’ and in this instance [the one taking the vow] is not poor!” I.e., since the person taking the vow is wealthy, he should bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man.

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty: Since the person taking the vow is not at all obligated to bring the sacrifices incumbent on a person afflicted by tzaraas and is liable only because he undertook the obligations of this poor man, why should he be obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a rich man in such a situation?8 Such a situation does not, in any way, involve a rich man afflicted by tzaraas.

The wording in the second case in Rambam’s teaching – “for this person who took the vow is obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man” – is also problematic. Seemingly, Rambam should have stated, “for the afflicted person is obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man,” i.e., since the afflicted person is wealthy, therefore, the one who took the vow and desires to free that person from his obligation9 must bring the sacrifices required of a rich man.

There is another aspect of this matter that requires clarification. Rambam had cited the above law previously in Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos, stating:10

If one says, “I take responsibility to bring the sacrifices of this person afflicted by tzaraas” or “…this woman who gave birth,” and if the afflicted person or the woman is poor, the one who took the vow may bring the sacrifices required of a poor person. If they are wealthy, the one who took the vow must bring the sacrifice required of a wealthy person even though he himself is poor.

There is a conflict between these two rulings.11 In Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos, Rambam rules that when the subject of the vow is poor, the person who made the vow may bring the sacrifice required of a poor person; he does not mention anything about the resources of the one making the vow. However, in Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah,12 Rambam explicitly states that if the person taking the vow is wealthy, he must bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy person.

Kessef Mishneh13 clarifies that in Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos, Rambam did not concern himself with explaining the details because he relied on what he would state in Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah. However, that explanation is acceptable only according to the approach of Kessef Mishneh,14 which maintains that when stating a law in one source in the Mishneh Torah, Rambam relies on the statements he will make in a later source. However, there are opinions15 – and that is the more logical assumption – that Rambam relies only on concepts that he explained previously in the Mishneh Torah, but it cannot be said that he relies on concepts that he will explain afterwards in that text. According to those opinions, the resolution proposed by Kessef Mishneh is untenable.

It is possible to explain that the statements in each of the sources must be understood according to the guiding principles governing that category of laws, because there are two different sets of guidelines involved. Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos (The Laws of the Performance of Sacrificial [Worship]) describes the guiding principles governing the actual offering of the sacrifices. According to those guiding principles,if the afflicted person is poor, it is sufficient that a rich man who undertook to bring the sacrifices required of a poor man bring the sacrifices befitting the financial status of a poor man. And if the afflicted person is wealthy, he must bring the sacrifices required of this afflicted person – who is wealthy – as he vowed. By contrast, Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah (The Laws [Governing] Those Requiring Atonement) describes the guiding principles governing a person requiring atonement. According to those guiding principles, even if the afflicted person is poor, the wealthy man who took the vow is required to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man.16

To elaborate regarding the above statement: Torah Law states17 that a sin offering or guilt offering may not be pledged or designated by vow. “If a person says, ‘I obligate myself to bring a sin offering’ or ‘… a guilt offering,’ … his statements are of no consequence.” However, “If one says, ‘I obligate myself [to bring] the sin offering [required]… of so-and-so,’ and if that other person agrees, he may allow [the one who took the vow] to bring the offering on his behalf and [thereby] receive atonement.”18

It is possible to say that there are two novel dimensions of the law that one may bring a sin offering or the like for another person who is obligated to do so:

a) One dimension concerns the laws of vows. True, a person may not obligate himself to bring a sin offering and if he takes a vow to that effect, he is not obligated to fulfill it. However, that applies only when there is no one obligated to bring that sin offering. If, however, the person making the vow states, “I obligate myself to bring the sin offering … of so-and-so,” and that person is in fact required to bring a sin offering, the one who makes the vow is obligated to bring that offering because of his vow.19

b) The second dimension concerns the obligations of the person requiring atonement.20 Although the obligation to bring the sin offering is obviously incumbent only upon the person who violated the prohibition or who, as in the instance of a person afflicted by tzaraas, is found in a situation where he requires atonement, the Torah nevertheless initiates a novel option. On the basis of the mutual responsibility universally shared by Jews – as our Sages state,21 “All Jews are responsible one for another” – one Jew may bring the sacrifices required of another Jew and the sacrifices he brings on his fellow’s behalf generates atonement for the sinner, the person afflicted by tzaraas, or another who requires atonement.

The fundamental distinction between the laws stated in Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos and those in Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah can be explained as follows:

Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos describes the laws regarding one who pledges to bring the sacrifices required of a given person afflicted by tzaraas in the context of the laws concerning a vow to bring a sacrifice or designate an animal for that purpose.22 Thus, the subject is the obligation incumbent upon the person who took the vow to carry out his pledge. For that reason, Rambam rules that the person who took the vow should bring the sacrifice required of a poor man even if the one taking the vow is wealthy. The rationale is that the words of the vow, “I obligate myself for the sacrifices of this person afflicted with tzaraas,” are specific. He vowed to fulfill the sacrificial obligation of a given afflicted person. Since this person is poor, from the perspective of the laws of vows, he is obligated to bring the sacrifice required of a poor man although he is personally wealthy.23 Conversely, if the one afflicted is wealthy, “the one who took the vow must bring a sacrifice required of a wealthy man even though the one who took the vow is poor,” because that was the obligation he took upon himself.

By contrast, Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah concerns itself – as reflected in its title, “The Laws [Governing] Those Requiring Atonement” – with atonement, including the atonement of the person afflicted with tzaraas. Accordingly, the emphasis is on the obligation of the person who vowed to bring the sacrifice on his fellow’s behalf; it is not that he should fulfill what is required of him as a result of his vow, but rather that he should do what is necessary to bring about the atonement the afflicted person needs.

This distinction is reflected in the careful wording chosen by Rambam: In Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos, he states, “the one who took the vow may bring the sacrifices [required] of a poor man.” By contrast, in Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah, rather than stating “the one who took the vow,” Rambam uses the phrase, “must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf.” In Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos, the emphasis is on what the person who took the vow must do with regard to bringing a sacrifice that fulfills the obligation of his vow,24 as implied by the phrase, “the one who took the vow must bring….” In Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah, however, the fundamental emphasis is that the sacrifice is being offered to bring about the atonement of the afflicted person as implied by the phrase, “on his behalf.”

For this reason, in Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah, Rambam states that “the person who took the vow must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf.” Within the context of attaining atonement for one who requires it, the law is that the principle of mutual responsibility enables one person to accept upon himself the obligation to bring sacrifices on behalf of the afflicted person as if the one taking the vow was himself afflicted. Since the person taking the vow becomes the one who must bring and offer the sacrifice required of an afflicted person, in this respect, the sacrifice required is not measured according to the financial capacity of the afflicted person, but rather according to that of the one who took the vow.25 Therefore, if the person who made the vow has the financial capacity to do so, he must bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy person. The exemption the Torah grants for bringing a poor man’s offering applies only when the person is poor, while here the one who accepted the responsibility upon himself because of mutual responsibility is not poor.

Based on the above, Rambam’s wording in the second case is also clarified:

If a poor person said, “I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person,” [if] the afflicted person is wealthy, the person [who took the vow] must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf, for the person who took the vow is obligated to bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man.

From the perspective of Hilchos Mechusrei Kapparah, the financial capacity of the person taking the vow, the one who actually brings the sacrifice, is taken into consideration. Thus, one would think that since in this instance the person bringing the sacrifice is poor, he should bring the sacrifice required of a poor man. Nevertheless, he is obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man, since “the person who took the vow obligated himself to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man,” i.e., since the vow he took required him to bring “the sacrifices of this afflicted person,” in this instance, a wealthy man, the sacrifices he brings must be appropriate to this person’s financial standing, as Rambam states in Hilchos Ma’aseh HaKorbanos, loc. cit.

Nevertheless, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. In the second case as well, Rambam states that the one who took the vow “must bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man on his behalf.” As explained above, the emphasis of the words “on his behalf” is that he is obligated “to bring the sacrifices [required] of a wealthy man,” not only to fulfill his vow, but also for the sake of the atonement of the afflicted person.26

Indeed, there is even a difference in actual practice resulting from the above:

If the obligation to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man stems only from that person’s obligation to fulfill his vow and not from the need to bring about atonement for the afflicted person, it can be assumed after the fact that if the one who made the vow, i.e., a poor man, brought the sacrifices required of a poor man, the afflicted person would receive atonement; it is only that the person who made the vow would not have fulfilled his obligation. This would not be true if the obligation stems also from the need to bring about atonement for the afflicted person, as is self-understood.

The following explanation can be given to resolve that difficulty: True, the person taking the vow is poor and thus he should be judged according to his own financial capacity. Nevertheless, since through his vow he obligated himself in the sacrifices required of a wealthy man, it is as if that vow itself caused him to be considered as wealthy even to the extent that he can atone for an afflicted person who is wealthy, and therefore he must “bring… on his [fellow’s] behalf the sacrifices required of a wealthy man.”

To cite a law that is somewhat parallel: A person may take an oath to fulfill a mitzvah27 because doing so will naturally encourage and prompt him to actually invest himself, toiling to carry out his oath – persevering to the extent that his efforts will be crowned with success, as implied by our Sages’28 words, “One who labors will find.” Similarly, in the instance at hand, by taking the vow to bring the sacrifices incumbent upon a wealthy man, the person motivates himself to arouse inner energies that will prompt him to labor to fulfill his vow. Ultimately, his efforts will bear fruit and he will be able to do so.

The above provides us with a wondrous lesson regarding the great power of ahavas Yisrael (“the love of one’s fellow Jew”)and achdus Yisrael (“Jewish unity”).

First and foremost, we see that one Jew has the potential to bring about change for the sake of a fellow Jew to the extent that, by bringing a sacrifice, the other Jew will receive atonement. This applies not only when the other Jew is a poor person and is incapable of bringing a sacrifice on his own, but also when the afflicted person is wealthy. Even so, another Jew – even a poor man – can bring a sacrifice on his behalf.

His capacity is such that, when bringing the sacrifice, the person who took the vow is considered as if he is the one who needs atonement and is judged according to his financial capacity.

As explained in Talmud Yerushalmi,29 the true concept of Jewish unity means that the entire Jewish people are like one body. Therefore, when there is a blemish or lack in one Jew – i.e., one limb of this body – it is felt in all the limbs of the entire body,30 i.e., the Jewish people as a whole. This is because the lack or blemish does not only affect the afflicted Jew, Rather, It is a personal lack and a blemish for every Jew.

As explained,31 this is the inner reason why tzaddikim also recite the confessional prayer that begins Ashamnu even though the sins – and certainly not the severe ones mentioned there – are not relevant to them32 at all. Nevertheless, since the entire Jewish people are like one body, every Jew shares in the responsibility for another’s sins. “This is the [concept of] mutual responsibility – that one person is responsible for another if he sins.”33

This also highlights a concept of an even more encompassing nature: When a Jew invests himself in bringing about atonement for another Jew even though at that time he himself is poor and the other Jew is wealthy, the Torah places him in the category of the wealthy man. He is obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man for that other person.

If the poor person making the vow was afflicted with tzaraas himself, he would not be obligated to bring the sacrifices required of a wealthy man.34 However, when he accepts upon himself to help another Jew, he is required to bring such sacrifices. Indeed, as explained above, this is now considered his financial capacity!

The inner rationale for this phenomenon can be further explained as follows: As related several times,35 when my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe Rayatz, was in the midst of the endeavor to reprint the responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek for the first time in the United States, he suggested to a certain Jew that he donate the cost of printing the books, although the funding of this project was entirely beyond that person’s financial capacity. Nevertheless, he took it upon himself, and the Rebbe Rayatz blessed him. Afterwards, he became wealthy and was able to carry out his pledge completely, paying for the entire cost of printing those books.

At that time, my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe Rayatz, said that when he asked that Jew to make this pledge, he was aware that this was truly beyond the man’s financial capacity – and even beyond the blessings destined for him from Above. However, making that positive resolution opened new channels of Divine blessing for him, generating the potential for him to carry out his pledge.

A similar explanation applies in the present instance: When G‑d sees that a Jew makes a commitment which transcends his limitations – and without considering the fact that he is poor, he makes a commitment beyond his personal capacity in order to bring atonement for another person who is wealthy – G‑d opens up new channels of blessing, making it possible for him to carry out his positive resolution, and to do so amidst wealth and prosperity.

Likkutei Sichos, Volume 27, p. 101ff.
Adapted from a sichah delivered on Tishrei 26, 5746 [1985]