Nedarim - Chapter 2

See the parallels in Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 2:1.

I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions “the expression of her lips,” implying that one must express his intent verbally.

Hile hot Sh ‘vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term “expression” implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one’s thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one’s thoughts, it is not an “expression” (Kiryat Sefer).

The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.

See Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 2:15.

He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 210:3)].

The term “immediately thereafter” has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Alecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made.

For Numbers 30:3 associates the two (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:1).

For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim 23b).

Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: “He shall not desecrate his word,” that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect.

Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.

Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ ah 211 :2) mentions the Rambam’s view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority’s view. The Ra’avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.
As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Y om Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De’ ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.

In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aroch (Yoreh De ‘ah 211 :3)].

In one of his responsa, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart.

I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement.

I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.

For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God’s name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh’vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach.

The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for rite of the nullification of vows recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer both mention oaths as well as vows.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 211 :4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person’s original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague’s statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.

I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim 18b).

We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4.

For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13).

For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9).

For the gentiles would also salt their offerings.

For there is no way he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).

For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed.

Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.

Chapter 1, Halachah 13.

For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people.

Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.

That we explore the person's intention.

Nedarim 18b explains that it was not common for priests to live in the Galilee. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple.

For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a pennitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect.

I.e., he said: “Let this produce be like a cherem.”

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term.

The Hebrew word atzmi means “myself,” but it can also mean “my bone.” Initially, it was thought that the person’s intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was “his bone.”

His word can be accepted when he says: “This was my intent.” Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5.

I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.

Chapter 1, Halachah 30.

For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters.

The Rama (Zoe. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters.

If the common person were allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.

This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.
Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one’s own ownership over it or does it involves transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe’ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless.

Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah.

Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19.

I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).
See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.

This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, Joe. cit.).

I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13).

Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.

Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence.

Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) state that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law.

See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one’s own, not those acquired from ownerless property.

Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12).

If, however, another person acquires it, it becomes that person’s property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh).

According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding.

Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13).

And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).

Performing the kinyan of hagba ‘ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective.

Performing the kinyan of chazzakah.

See Hi/chot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.