Nedarim - Chapter 6

For this also leads to him deriving pleasure from food.

For the money that he saved by not paying the fee could be used to purchase food.

E.g., he lent him attractive clothing which created a favorable impression on others who gave him gifts as a result.

To attend a feast, but not when going to his business as stated in the notes to the following halachah.

In both cases, he did not give him direct benefit, but he did enable him to receive benefit.

I.e., to tend to his business. If he took a vow against benefiting from him, he may not pass through the property, for he is deriving some benefit. Nevertheless, that benefit does not lead to food. Hence, one who prohibits all benefit is forbidden, but one who forbids benefit that leads to food is permitted. If, however, he wishes to pass through his property to attend a feast, he is forbidden in all instances, as stated in the previous halachah (Radbaz).

This is benefit, but not benefit that leads to food.

I.e., the half-shekel which every Jew is obligated to pay to the Temple treasury as his share in the communal sacrifices. See Hilchot Shekalim 1:1.

See Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 26:6 where the Rambam states that if "a person pays a promissory note of a colleague without that colleague's knowledge, even if it is a debt for which security was given, the borrower is not required to pay him anything. The borrower may take his security.... The other person forfeits his money. [The rationale is that] perhaps the borrower would have been able to appease the lender and have him waive the debt." Thus by paying Reuven's debt, Shimon is not considered to have given him anything.

See also Hilchot Ishut 12:19 which states that when a husband traveled to a distant country and left his wife without resources, if another person gives the woman money without clearly specifying that he is extending a loan to her, he forfeits his money. Even though the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's provisions, as long as a debt is not formally established, the person who pays the money has no claim upon him.

The qualifier "even" is mentioned for the Canaanite servants, because it is not as great a mitzvah to sustain them as the others who are full-fledged members of the Jewish people.

This applies even though the non-kosher animal may not be eaten by the Jew, he may sell it to a gentile and will receive a greater payment because of its increase in weight.

And thus he is not considered as having performed a favor for the person bringing the sacrifice.

For then, she is considered as having carried out the marriage. Her father is merely acting as her agent and thus is not considered as offering Reuven benefit.

A girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half who has manifested signs of physical maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:1-2). Needless to say, this applies if the girl is a minor, in which instance, her consecration is dependent entirely on her father.

For at this age, she cannot marry without her father's consent, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 3:11.

If, however, Reuven does not consent, the separation of the terumah is not effective (Bava Metzia 22a).

Since Shimon is forbidden to receive a wage from teaching Reuven, he is not giving him tangible benefit. Although he is enabling him to observe a mitzvah, the mitzvot were not given for our satisfaction (Eruvin 31a).

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:7, 3:10 where the Rambam issues such a ruling and explains that this is derived from Deuteronomy 4:5: "Behold, I [Moses] have taught you laws and statutes, as God commanded me." On this basis, Nedarim 37a teaches that Moses was implying: "Just as I learned at no cost, so, too, you have been instructed at no cost by me. And so, too, should you teach the coming generations at no cost."

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 4:3), the Rambam writes:

According to our Torah, there is no way that it is permitted to take a wage for teaching any of the Torah's professions....

I am amazed at the men of stature who aroused by desire, denied the truth had wages designated for themselves for giving Torah rulings and instruction, citing flimsy support.

See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah Avot 4:7. It must, however, be noted that most authorities [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 246:5) allow a teacher to charge for the time he spends teaching Torah on the basis of the principle of sechar batalah, i.e., he could have spent the time he spends teaching working at another profession which would bring him an income. He is allowed to be reimbursed for the money he loses by choosing to teach Torah instead. For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:2) does not accept the Rambam's ruling and forbids Shimon from teaching Reuven.

Nedarim 37a gives two reasons why it is permitted for a teacher of young children to charge a wage for his services: a) he is not charging for teaching; he is charging for being a disciplinarian; b) he is not charging for teaching the wordings of Torah; he is charging for teaching the cantillation notes. (For at that time, there were no texts with vowels and the Written Law was studied by memorizing its chants.) The first rationale does not apply with regard to adults, but the second does.

A father is obligated to teach his son the Torah. Hence, by instructing Reuven's son, Shimon is freeing him of an obligation. Nevertheless, this is not considered as providing him with benefit, for teaching his son is a mitzvah. And as stated above, the mitzvot were not given for our satisfaction. Moreover, it is possible that Reuven could find another person to teach his son without charge.

For this is also a mitzvah. Even though the sick person derives benefit from the person's visit, the benefit is not granted him directly (see Nedarim 39a).

I.e., pay a short visit and leave promptly. Since sitting with the sick person is worth money in that community, it is forbidden, by doing so, he will be providing the sick person with a tangible benefit. Payment is not given for visiting while standing. Therefore, there is no prohibition against doing so. See Siftei Cohen 221:19 who writes that if he charges for his time, he may sit and pay the sick person a longer visit.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 4:4), the Rambam states that it is a mitzvah of Scriptural origin for a doctor to heal a sick person.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:4) states that when medical attention is given without charge, he may treat him without charge. If, however, it is customary for a doctor to charge, he must also do so.

In certain manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this clause is included as the conclusion of the previous halachah rather than at the beginning of this one.

I.e., he may give him advice with regard to which treatments to employ, but may not treat the animal himself. The rationale is that treating a colleague's animal is not considered a mitzvah (Tosafot, Nedarim 41b). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 221) explains that if there is no one else capable of treating the animal but Shimon, Shimon may do so, because the mitzvah of returning a lost object also includes doing what is necessary to save a colleague's livestock. The Radbaz also adds the rationale that Scriptural Law requires us to alleviate an animal's discomfort.

For the entrance of one person into a large bath is not significant.

And that is considered as pleasurable.

Because the increase in warmth is not desirable.

The more people under the same bed clothes, the greater the warmth produced. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:5) states that this applies with regard to a small bed. If the bed is large, even in the winter, it is permitted.

This alone is not enough to create suspicion that he will offer him food.

The Meiri explains that even though the two are at odds - and for that reason one has taken a vow not to offer the other benefit - we fear that he might make such a gesture out of good manners.

The custom was that before passing the tray to another person, the host would fill it up again. Hence there would be no need for Shimon to worry about leaving a piece for Reuven [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:5)]. The Rama adds that if the serving plate contained a very large amount, there is no prohibition.

It was customary to drink wine in the house of mourners to help him overcome his sorrow (see Ketubot 8b).

A cup of hot water that was provided for bathers by the owner of the bathhouse (i.e., and not one belonging to Shimon).

Nedarim 38b states that Shimon may give Reuven "the cup of peace" and advances these two interpretations for the term. The Rambam does not consider the interpretations as mutually exclusive, for the same principle - that the satisfaction Shimon gives Reuven is minimal - applies in both instances (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation than the Rambam, explaining that the "cup of the bathhouse" is given to save the person's life, lest he dehydrate. Moreover, he explains that since the cup belongs to Reuven, there is no difficulty. And he states that giving the cup of comfort is a mitzvah.

For the coal is considered an entity of substance, while the flame is not (Siftei Cohen 221:57).

Since Shimon retains a certain dimension of ownership, when Reuven makes use of it, he is still considered as benefiting from Shimon's property.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Maaserot 1:7) the Rambam defines the term ekal as referring to a container made from ropes in which olives are placed and crushed.

Provided Shimon did not specifically forbid Reuven from entering these structures, as indicated by Halachah 14.

And once an entity has become forbidden because of a vow, it remains forbidden.

For that is ownerless and is not affected by the vow.

Although he is allowed to benefit from the produce, he is not allowed to set foot in Shimon's land, as stated in Halachah 3, and as the Rambam continues to explain.

For then, benefit from that particular field itself becomes forbidden to Reuven forever. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachah 5.

In which case, the prohibition involves only property actually owned by Shimon without applying to any particular property individually.

For the entrance of the Sabbatical year causes them to be considered as ownerless. Shimon cannot cause the produce to be forbidden for Reuven, for a person cannot cause food that does not belong to him to be forbidden to a colleague (Nedarim 42b). And when Reuven takes an oath or a vow not to benefit from Shimon's property, the oath or the vow does not pertain to this produce, for it does not belong to Shimon.

See Halachot 1 and 3.

Because in such a situation, he is not forbidden to enter Shimon's property.

Since the prohibition took effect before the Sabbatical year, it continues during the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 13.

Hence Shimon cannot cause it to be forbidden for Reuven, as above.

Reuven is not receiving any benefit from lending out either his articles or his money. Nevertheless, he is forbidden lest Shimon reciprocate and that would involve receiving benefit.

In a sale, even though the purchaser receives an article in return for his money, the seller is considered to have benefited. For if this was not so, he would not have sold the article.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, explaining the source for this law (Nedarim 38b) in another way. The Radbaz explains that halachically, both interpretations are acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:1) quotes the Ra'avad's interpretation, but not of the Rambam. Accordingly, the Bayit Chadash maintains that according to the Shulchan Aruch, the Rambam's interpretation is not accepted. See also Turei Zahav 223:1 and Siftei Cohen 223:1.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 10-11, for details on how a vow of this nature must be worded for it to be effective.

The Baer HaGolah 221:65 rules that he may not write a note specifically for that person. Instead, he should write on the wall with the intent that the person see. Others, however, do not accept this stringency.

He may not, however, speak to the wall, for in this instance, it is obvious that he is speaking to his colleague. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 221) is even more stringent, stating that when it is obvious that he is intending for the person to whom he is forbidden to speak to hear, he may not speak even to another colleague.