Nedarim - Chapter 7

And since they are allowed, they are obligated.

For he is not returning it as a favor to him, but instead, in fulfillment of the Torah’s command [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah {Nedarim 4:2)].

Or, in the present age, to charity. This is preferable to destroying it.

I.e., he will be returning it for the sake of the reward and not for the sake of the. mitzvah (ibid.).

For ordinarily the person would pay a reward for the return of the lost article.

Technically, the other person has a share in these places, for they are owned communally. Nevertheless, since each person's individual share is so small, these places are considered as if they are ownerless and not as communal property (see Nedarim 5:4).

I.e., a well built for the pilgrims’ journey to Jerusalem from Babylon for the pilgrimage festivals (ibid.).

For in this instance, each person’s share is greater and more distinct.
The Ramban and the Ran object to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that this ruling does not apply with regard to an entity like a synagogue that cannot be divided. In such an instance, it is considered as a communal entity and the person who took the vow is allowed to make use of it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 224:1) quotes both views. See the Lechem Mishneh and the Turei Zahav 224:1 who elaborate in support of the Rambam’s position.

The leader of the Jewish people. He is mentioned, because it is very unlikely that he will forbid a member of the people from using his property (Nedarim 48a).

I.e., the person acquiring the portion need not know about his acquisition. We follow the principle that a person. can acquire property without his knowledge if it is to his benefit to do so (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2).

In the Talmudic era, it was common that several houses would open up to a courtyard that was the combined property of the homeowners. In this halachah, we are speaking of an instance where two of those homeowners took vows forbidding them to benefit from each other.

See Hilchot Shechenim 2:1 which states that if after the division of a courtyard, each of the homeowners will receive a plot of land four cubits by four cubits as his individual property, the courtyard should be divided if one of the neighbors requests that this be done.

Rabbenu Nissim explains this ruling based on the principle of bereirah, i.e., retroactively, it becomes apparent that when he enters the courtyard, he is entering property that was designated as his. We are forced to accept this definition (even though generally, the principle of bereirah is not followed in questions of Scriptural Law), for there is no alternative in this instance. The person has a right to the courtyard and he cannot be forbidden from using his own property. See the rulings of Siftei Cohen 226:4, Turei Zahav 226:1.

Whether it cannot be divided or whether it can be divided, but was not divided yet.

Bava Batra 57b relates that partners in a courtyard have the right to prevent each other from performing such activities. Although most partners do not exercise this right, in this instance, by failing to exercise the right, one is providing benefit to the other person (Rabbenu Nissim).

I.e., a courtyard too small for the owners to divide.

His vow imposes unnecessary hardship on the other person who has a legitimate right to the property. Hence, we compel him to sell his share of the courtyard rather than put his colleague in a situation where he might transgress.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 226:2) states that the person who took the vow is forbidden to enter the courtyard. The rationale is that the Rambam’ s understanding is accepted, except that an additional stringency is applied, lest the person remain in the courtyard for other purposes besides entering and departing his home (Siftei Cohen 226:10).

We do not force him to sell his portion of the courtyard because he is causing difficulty only to himself and he is willing to abide by his prohibition (Radbaz).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, citing Nedarim 46a as support for his understanding. He mentions that the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:2) appears to support the Rambam’s interpretation, but states that we should abide by the principle that whenever there is a difference of opinion between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, the perspective of the Babylonian Talmud should be followed. See the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh who try to reconcile the differences in the positions of the two Talmuds. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam’s understanding, but is even more stringent.

This is speaking about a courtyard that is too small to require division (Radbaz).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 226:1) states that this applies only when the other owner of the courtyard needs that person. Otherwise, he is forbidden to enter.

For thus he is suffering a loss every time he deals with them.

For they are suffering a loss every time they deal with him.

As a decree was made with regard to an individual. See Chapter 6, Halachah 16.

I.e., with regard to one individual, there is room for stringency, but this stringency is not required with regard to an entire nation, for there is (Radbaz).

I.e., we do not make a decree like we do with regard to an individual (Siftei Cohen 227:7).

For one of them, either they or he will be benefiting from the sale.

For this is a benefit that he is receiving.

For when a sage releases a vow, it is as if it never existed. Hence, it is as if he were never forbidden to approach the sage. See Chapter 4, Halachah 13, and notes.

Leket refers to crops that drop from a reaper's hand in the field. He is forbidden to pick them up again, but instead must leave them for the poor (Leviticus 19:10). Shichechah refers to crops or bundles forgotten in the field by accident. The harvesters may not return and collect, but must instead leave them for the poor (Deut. 24:19). Pe'ah refers to a corner of the field which must be left unharvested, so that it could be harvested by the poor (Lev. 19:9).

In the third year of the six-year agricultural, instead of taking the second tithe to be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of holiness, it is given to the poor (Deuteronomy 14:28; Hilchot Matnot Aniyim ch. 6). The person who took the vow is allowed to benefit from these crops, because the owner of the field is not considered as giving him anything of his own. Instead, he is fulfilling a mitzvah.

Nedarim 83-84a explains this distinction. When the tithe for the poor is distributed in the granaries, it may be taken by a poor person without asking. The owner does not have the right to decide to whom he will give it. If, however, he has already brought produce from the tithe for the poor home, he has the right to choose to whom to give it.

I.e., the tithes that must be given to the Levites and terumah which must be given to the priests.

Since he. is obligated to give these presents to the priests and Levites, he has no choice in the matter and must make these gifts. Generally, a person is allowed to decide to which Levite and which priest, he desires to give these gifts. In this instance, however, since he forbade all priests from benefiting from his property, there is no one to whom he can give it. Hence his right to decide “is taken from him and any priest or Levite can come and take the portions.

Since the terumah and tithes may be given to others, there is no reason to take away the person’s right to distribute them as he desires, for that right is of financial value (Nedarim 84b).

E. g., those mentioned in the previous halachah. See Siftei Cohen 227:9 and Turei Zahav 227:3 who rule that this concept also applies with regard to charity.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 221:8) is even more lenient and states that he may say: “Anyone who sustains so-and-so will not suffer a loss,” for he is still merely intimating that one should support him. He may not say: “Whoever hears my voice should sustain so-and-so,” for that it a direct command. Nor may he tell one person: “If you sustain so-’and-so, you will not suffer a loss,” for then it appears as if he is appointing him as an agent for this. purpose.

Since the person did not charge the storekeeper with providing -the colleague with food, he is not responsible for the account [Rama (Yoreh De’ah 221:8)]. If he, nevertheless, chooses to pay it, he is not considered to have given benefit to that colleague.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the two instances are not entirely analogous, for the first involves providing the person with food necessary for his livelihood, while the second involves the performance of a task that is important, but not vital for him. Perhaps this is the reason why in the preceding halachah, the Rambam stated: “The person may go to a storekeeper,” i.e., he is permitted to do so as an initial and preferred option. In this halachah, by contrast, he states: “If the person... approached workers,” i.e., the Rambam is describing a law that applies after the fact, but not initially.

The Radbaz explains that although the previous law was mentioned, it is also necessary to state this law, because it is uncommon for workers to extend credit on money due them. This is, by contrast, a common practice for storekeepers.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

I.e., a person who took a vow not to benefit from a person and that person.

Giving a present is not permitted in the situations described in the previous halachot, because there are other alternatives. Hence it is considered as too great a leniency. In this situation, there is no other alternative and therefore it is permitted. See the gloss of Siftei Cohen 221 :52.

Generally, according to Rabbinic Law, there must be three people present when an object is declared ownerless. In this instance, however, since there is no other alternative, we do not require anything more than required by Scriptural Law (Siftei Cohen 221:53).

For then he is not partaking of the property of the person from whom he is forbidden to benefit, but from ownerless property.

For he is obviously making this gift solely so that the other person may partake of it. If it is a large feast, it is obvious that a person is not preparing it for the sake of giving it to a colleague. Nedarim 48b gives as an example, an instance where a person’s father was forbidden to benefit from him. When he made a wedding feast for his son, he tried to employ this tactic to enable his father to attend.

The Kessef Mishneh states that there are opinions that maintain that this law applies only when the statements were made immediately after giving the feast. The wording chosen by the Rambam, however, indicates that the law applies even if he makes the statements later. The interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh is borne out by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 5:5).

I.e., the giver tells the recipient: “I did not give you the present so that you could consecrate it.”
Nedarim, Zoe. cit., states this principle in continuation of the above story. After the son gave the wedding feast to a colleague so that his father could attend, that colleague consecrated it. When the giver protested, saying that he had not given it to him for that purpose, the recipient complained that he was not going to serve as a medium to allow the first person to break his vow. When the Sages were asked to rule about this situation, they stated the principle mentioned by the Rambam here.

I.e., we do not say that since the first recipient is going to give it to the second, thes_econd acquires it when it is acquired by the first. This is not a situation where the first recipient is acting as an agent for the second. Instead, he acquires it first on his own behalf and then transfers it to the other person.

The first does not acquire it, because it was given to him only on condition that it be transferred to the second. Since that condition was not fulfilled, his own acquisition is not binding (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:6). The second person does not acquire it, because ownership was never transferred to him.

Ordinarily, whatever a woman acquires is immediately given to her husband’s jurisdiction. While she remains the legal owner, he has the legal right to control it and use the profits as he sees fit. In this instance, this would be forbidden, for the son-in-law is prohibited against benefiting from his father-in-law, as the Rambam states in the conclusion of the halachah.

If he gives her the food itself, it is not necessary to make any stipulations (Radbaz, Siftei Cohen 222:1).

Tosafot Yorn Tov (Nedarim 11 :8) states that Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13 appears to indicate that the inclusion of this part of the statement is not an absolute necessity. As Jong as he specifies that the present is being given for a specific purpose alone, the husband does not acquire rights to it. Rav Y osef Caro does not accept this option, however, in his Kessef Mishneh and quotes the Rambam’s wording from this halachah in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 222:1; see Siftei Cohen 222:2).

Since the father has designated the money for a specific purpose, it may be used only for that and thus the son never acquires a right t9 it. The rationale is closely related to the concept of a vow. Just as a vow can determine how property may be used even after it leaves the domain of the person who took the vow, so, too, the father can determine how his property may be used even after it leaves his domain. This ruling teaches that even though it is to the husband’s benefit that his wife eats or is clothed - indeed, he is responsible to provide for these needs of hers - the husband is not considered to have benefited from this present (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 11 :8).

In this instance, even though the specific purpose for which the present was given was not stated at the outset, when the woman decides what she desires to do with the present, retroactively, it is as if it was given for that purpose alone.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this point, noting that although the law stated in the first clause is accepted by all authorities, the one stated in this clause is the subject of a difference of opinion between the Sages Rav and Shmuel in Nedarim 88b. The Rambam’s ruling follows the opinion of Shmuel although generally, with regard to matters involving the Torah’s prohibitions, the halachah follows that of Rav. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh state that other Rishonim also follow Shmuel’s perspective and give logical support for it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 222:1) quotes both views without stating which should be followed.

See Hile hot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13. The rationale is that the giver does not have the prerogative of negating the rights given the husband by the Rabbis.

Nevertheless, the present is binding. The husband should purchase something that brings income with the money. That article belongs to his wife. He should give the proceeds to charity, since he is not allowed to benefit from them (Radbaz)