Nedarim - Chapter 12

I.e., he may nullify all vows, not merely those that a husband may nullify.

Rabbenu Asher and other Rishonim differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father's rights are the same as the husband's. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.

I.e., not necessarily on the day the vow was taken, but on the day he first heard of it.

The Emek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.

I.e., after nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship.

For Numbers 30:14 specifically mentions a husband's authority involving vows of this type. Vows that involve personal aggravation refer to vows that involve accepting a prohibition of a particular type of satisfaction.

Literally, those "between him and her."

Such conduct could arouse a husband's displeasure, for he will not be happy that his wife does not appear attractive.

The Shulchan Aruch (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam's view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship.

I.e., even if he divorces her, the vow is nullified.

The nullification applies only when they are married.

See Halachah 9 with regard to clarification when this vow must be nullified and when it need not be nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it.

These are considered vows that involve personal aggravation.

These are considered vows affecting the marriage relationship.

Our translation follows the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Yom Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one's soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.

The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as "harmful foods," arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desire for it, it would not be considered as "aggravation" for her to be prevented from partaking of it.

Since she never partook of this food, there is room to say that no aggravation would be caused by prohibiting it. Hence it is necessary to emphasize that it is forbidden.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Asher's commentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating the first, but not from not eating the second.

There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative.

Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.

I.e., it is not a matter of aggravation, because she may eat figs. Nevertheless, obtaining the figs places a difficulty upon her husband. Although it also mentions the Rambam's view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation.

As stated in Halachah 2.

I.e., this point is obvious. Even if she does not say so explicitly, she may benefit from him without him having to nullify the vow.

The Mishnah (Nedarim 11:3) quotes Rabbi Yossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation.

Our translation is based on the Kessef Mishneh who states that the wording of the original is inexact.

I.e., even if he does not nullify the vow, it does not take effect.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 3. By agreeing to marriage, a woman gives her husband rights to marital intimacy that cannot be withheld.

Hilchot Ishut 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.

Since the vow does not forbid anything to the man, it will take effect unless he nullifies it. See also parallels in Hilchot Ishut 14:7 and Chapter 1, Halachah 30, above.

Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 10, it must be concluded that we are referring to an instance where she said "Your body is forbidden to me," for satisfaction is not a tangible matter (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 234:57; Siftei Cohen 234:81). Tosafot maintains that even if he does not say "Your body...," we consider it as if he did. This intent is reflected in the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch.

I.e., in both cases, she is consecrating the future products of her labor to the Temple treasury. She must, however, be careful to phrase the vow in a manner that she is not consecrating an entity that does not exist. For then the vow would not be effective [Nedarim 85a; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28.

I.e., one of the rights given to a husband is the right to benefit from his wife's labor (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

Ketubot 59b; Nedarim 86b.

Of a servant. If a servant was designated as security for a debt and was then freed by his master, he is a free man and is not in any way subjugated to the person who had the lien (Hilchot Malveh ULoveh 18:6).

If a Jew designated leavened products (chametz) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it.

If an ox was designated as security for a loan and then its owner, the borrower, consecrated it, the lien is severed and the lender must collect the debt from another source. See also Hilchot Arachin 7:5.

As in several other instances, our Sages reinforced their decrees, giving them more power than Scriptural Law (see Chapter 3, Halachah 9 for another example). The rationale is that if Rabbinic Law was not given this additional measure of strength, people might treat it lightly.

For her vow would take effect after the divorce and then, he would not be able to remarry her because he would then be forbidden to benefit from her work, including her performance of household tasks, thus creating an impossible situation.

See Turei Zahav 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.

For, as reflected by Hilchot Ishut 21:3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people.

I.e., the animal he rides upon.

As Hilchot Ishut 21:5 states, she is obligated to provide straw for his riding animal. She is not, however, obligated to provide water for it, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman's modesty (Kessef Mishneh). As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., the Rambam's ruling is based the version of Ketubot 61b cited by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard published text of the Talmud follows a different understanding.

She is obligated to provide straw for the animal he rides upon, for that is an expression of consideration for her husband's person. She has no such obligation with regard to his cattle, for those animals are necessary only for work and that is solely her husband's concern.

I.e., were she obligated to perform these tasks, her vow not to perform them would not take effect.

A sage, by contrast, may only absolve an oath or a vow after it takes effect (Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14).

The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue.

This applies even if he is not both deaf and dumb [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)].

For Numbers 30:5 speak of her father hearing. Implied is that if he cannot hear, he cannot nullify the vow (Sifri to the verse).

Chapter 11, Halachah 21. This also applies with regard to her father, as indicated by Halachah 20 of that chapter.

Rabbenu Asher [quoted by Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.

See Hilchot Ishut 4:7; 11:6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

I.e., until nightfall, as the Rambam continues to explain.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

I.e., neither a husband, nor a father.

For the day on which he heard the vow has passed.

Which seemingly implies a 24 hour period.

In the previous halachah.

I.e., according to the Rambam, regardless of who hears about the vow and nullifies it first, the father and the husband must both nullify it on the same day. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam's decision.

I.e., this obviously applies after nissuin, when the woman is living in her husband's home.

I.e., he intended to nullify her vow afterwards, but desired that she think that the vow is binding so that she will take the matter more seriously.

I.e., since the vow was nullified, there is no prohibition involved in the action.

A punishment instituted by the Rabbis.

If she transgressed willfully.

If she transgressed inadvertently.

In contrast to the repeal of a vow by a sage, when a father or a husband nullify a vow, they do not nullify it retroactively, only from the time of their actions onward. See the notes to Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

Significantly, the Sifri derives the same concept from a different verse.

For the day he discovers new information concerning the vow is equivalent to the day he hears of it.