Nedarim - Chapter 4 - Chabad.org

Vows taken because of coercion,1 vows taken unintentionally,2 and vows involving exaggerations are permitted,3 as we explained with regard to oaths.4

If men of coercion or customs collectors made him take a vow, saying: "Take a vow to us that meat is forbidden to you if you possess something on which customs duty is due," should he take a vow and say: "Bread, meat, and wine are forbidden to me...", he is permitted [to partake of] all of them5 even though he added to what they asked him [to say].6 Similarly, if they asked him to take a vow [on the condition] that his wife not benefit and he took a vow [on the condition] that his wife, his children, and his brothers not benefit from him, they are all permitted. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

נִּדְרֵי אֳנָסִין וְנִדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת וְנִדְרֵי הֲבַאי הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִים כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת. הֲרֵי שֶׁהִדִּירוּהוּ הָאַנָּסִין וְהַמּוֹכְסִין וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ נְדֹר לָנוּ שֶׁהַבָּשָׂר אָסוּר עָלֶיךָ אִם יֵשׁ עִמְּךָ דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּב בְּמֶכֶס. וְנָדַר וְאָמַר הֲרֵי הַפַּת וְהַבָּשָׂר וְהַיַּיִן אֲסוּרִין עָלַי הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בַּכּל וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוֹסִיף עַל מַה שֶּׁבִּקְּשׁוּ מִמֶּנּוּ. וְכֵן אִם בִּקְּשׁוּ מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיִּדֹּר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּהָנֶה אִשְׁתּוֹ לוֹ וְנָדַר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּהָנֶה לוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וְאֶחָיו כֻּלָּן מֻתָּרִין. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

In all vows of this type, he must have the intent at heart for something that is permitted,7 for example, that they be forbidden for him for that day alone or for that hour alone or the like. He may rely on the intent in his heart, since he is being compelled by forces beyond his control.8 Thus at the time he is taking the vow for them, his mouth and his heart are not in concord. [This is required,] as we explained with regard to vows.9

וּבְכָל הַנְּדָרִים הָאֵלּוּ צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּן בְּלִבּוֹ לְדָבָר הַמֻּתָּר. כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּשִׂים בְּלִבּוֹ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בִּלְבַד אוֹ אוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה וְכֵן כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה וְסוֹמֵךְ עַל דְּבָרִים שֶׁבְּלִבּוֹ הוֹאִיל וְהוּא אָנוּס וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו וְנִמְצָא בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁיִּדֹּר לָהֶן אֵין פִּיו וְלִבּוֹ שָׁוִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת:

Similarly, vows of encouragement are permitted.10 What does this imply? One administered a vow to a colleague to eat at his [home] and that colleague took a vow not to eat there, because he did not want to trouble him. Whether he ate or did not eat, they are both exempt.

Similarly, if a merchant took a vow that he would not sell an article for less than a sela and a purchaser took a vow that he would not buy it for more than a shekel,11 if they agree on three dinarim,12 they are both exempt.13 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [The rationale is that] neither of them made a definite conclusion in his heart. He took the vow only to encourage his colleague without making a definite conclusion in his heart.14

וְכֵן נִדְרֵי זֵרוּזִין מֻתָּרִין. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִדִּיר חֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ וְנָדַר זֶה שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לְהַטְרִיחַ עָלָיו. בֵּין אָכַל בֵּין לֹא אָכַל שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּטוּרִין. וְכֵן הַמּוֹכֵר שֶׁנָּדַר שֶׁלֹּא יִמְכֹּר חֵפֶץ זֶה אֶלָּא בְּסֶלַע וְהַלּוֹקֵחַ נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא יִקָּחֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּשֶׁקֶל וְרָצוּ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה דִּינָרִין שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּטוּרִין. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. לְפִי שֶׁכָּל אֶחָד מֵהֶם לֹא גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ וְלֹא נָדַר אֶלָּא כְּדֵי לְזָרֵז אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ וְלֹא גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ:

What is the source which teaches that it is forbidden for a person to take even these four types of vows which are permitted with the intent of nullifying them? It is written [Numbers 30:3): "He shall not desecrate his word," i.e., he should not make his word an inconsequential matter.

וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאֲפִילוּ אַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי נְדָרִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֵן מֻתָּרִים שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹ לְאָדָם לִהְיוֹת נוֹדֵר בָּהֶן עַל מְנָת לְבַטְּלָן. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר (במדבר ל ג) "לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ" לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה דְּבָרָיו חֻלִּין:

When a person took a vow and then [changed his mind and] regretted his vow, he may approach a sage and ask for its release. The laws pertaining to the release of vows are the same as those applying to the release of oaths.15 A vow can be released only by a distinguished sage or by three ordinary men in a place where there are no sages.16 The same wording is used to release a vow as is used to release an oath.17 Similarly, all of the other concepts that we explained with regard to oaths apply to vows in the same way as they apply to oaths.

מִי שֶׁנָּדַר וְנִחַם עַל נִדְרוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁאָל לְחָכָם וּמַתִּירוֹ. וְדִין הֶתֵּר נְדָרִים כְּדִין הֶתֵּר שְׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁאֵין מַתִּיר אֶלָּא חָכָם מֻבְהָק אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה הֶדְיוֹטוֹת בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין חָכָם. וּבְלָשׁוֹן שֶׁמַּתִּירִין הַשְּׁבוּעָה מַתִּירִין הַנֵּדֶר. וְכֵן שְׁאָר הָעִנְיָנוֹת שֶׁפֵּרַשְׁנוּ בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת כֻּלָּן בִּנְדָרִים כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהֵן בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת:

We do not release a vow until it takes effect, as is the law pertaining to an oath.18

וְאֵין מַתִּירִין הַנֵּדֶר עַד שֶׁיָּחוּל כִּשְׁבוּעָה:

Just as we may ask for the release of vows involving prohibitions and they are repealed, so, too, may we ask for the release of vows involving consecrated property and they are repealed.19 This applies both to [articles] consecrated for the upkeep of the Temple and [animals] consecrated to [be sacrificed] on the altar. When the holiness of a sacrifice is transferred from one animal to another, that holiness cannot be released.20

וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁנִּשְׁאָלִים עַל נִדְרֵי הָאִסָּר וּמַתִּירִין אוֹתוֹ. כָּךְ נִשְׁאָלִים עַל נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמַתִּירִין אוֹתוֹ. בֵּין נִדְרֵי קָדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת בֵּין קָדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ. וְאֵין נִשְׁאָלִין עַל הַתְּמוּרָה:

Just as a father or a husband can nullify [a woman's] vows involving prohibitions,21 so, too, they can nullify vows of consecration that resemble vows involving prohibitions.

וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁהָאָב אוֹ הַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִסָּר כָּךְ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת הַדּוֹמִין לְנִדְרֵי הָאִסָּר:

When a person takes a vow, a colleague hears and says, "And also me," a third person hears and says, "And also me,"22 if the first asks for the release of his vow and it is released, all the others are also released.23

If [the one who agreed to the vow] last asks for a release and it was granted, he alone is released and the others are still bound by the vow.24 If the second person asks for a release and it was granted, he and all those after him are released,25 but the first is still bound by the prohibition.

מִי שֶׁנָּדַר וְשָׁמַע חֲבֵרוֹ וְאָמַר וַאֲנִי וְשָׁמַע שְׁלִישִׁי וְאָמַר וַאֲנִי וְנִשְׁאַל הָרִאשׁוֹן עַל נִדְרוֹ וְהֻתַּר הֻתְּרוּ כֻּלָּן. נִשְׁאַל הָאַחֲרוֹן וְהֻתַּר הָאַחֲרוֹן מֻתָּר וְכֻלָּן אֲסוּרִין. נִשְׁאַל הַשֵּׁנִי וְהֻתַּר הַשֵּׁנִי וְשֶׁל אַחֲרָיו מֻתָּרִין וְהָרִאשׁוֹן אָסוּר:

Similar principles apply when one has attached many entities to a single vow, e.g., he took a vow [forbidding] bread and extended it to meat,26 if he asks for release of [the prohibition against] bread and it is granted, the [prohibition against] meat is also released.27 If he asks for release of [the prohibition against] meat and it is granted, the [prohibition against] bread is not released.28

וְכֵן הַמַּתְפִּיס דְּבָרִים הַרְבֵּה בְּנֵדֶר כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדַר עַל הַפַּת וְהִתְפִּיס הַבָּשָׂר וְנִשְׁאַל עַל הַפַּת וְהֻתַּר בָּהּ הֻתַּר הַבָּשָׂר. נִשְׁאַל עַל הַבָּשָׂר וְהֻתַּר בּוֹ לֹא הֻתַּר הַפַּת:

When a person takes an oath or a vow saying: "I will not benefit from any one of you," if he asks for the release of his vow or oath concerning one of them and the release was granted, they are all released. [The rationale is that] when a vow is released in part, all of its [particulars] are also released.29

When a person says: "I will not benefit from this person, and from this person, and from this person," if [the prohibition against] the first is released, [the prohibitions against] all of them are released.30 If the prohibition against the last is released, that prohibition is released, but the others remain binding. If he said: "I will not benefit from this one; nor from this one; nor from this one," he must ask for a release for each one indidivually.31 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.32

יא

הַנִּשְׁבָּע אוֹ הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לְכֻלְּכֶם וְנִשְׁאַל עַל נִדְרוֹ אוֹ עַל שְׁבוּעָתוֹ עַל אֶחָד מֵהֶם וְהִתִּירוֹ הֻתְּרוּ כֻּלָּם. שֶׁהַנֵּדֶר שֶׁהֻתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ הֻתַּר כֻּלּוֹ. אָמַר שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לָזֶה וְלָזֶה וְלָזֶה הֻתַּר הָרִאשׁוֹן הֻתְּרוּ כֻּלָּן. הֻתַּר אַחֲרוֹן הָאַחֲרוֹן מֻתָּר וְכֻלָּן אֲסוּרִין. שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לָזֶה לָזֶה לָזֶה צְרִיכִין פֶּתַח לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

When a person took a nazirite vow, a vow to bring a sacrifice, and an oath [forbidding himself from partaking of something], or he took a vow, but does not know concerning which of these he took the vow, one request for release [can release] all of them.33

יב

נָדַר בְּנָזִיר וּבְקָרְבָּן וּבִשְׁבוּעָה אוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר וְאֵין יָדוּעַ בְּאֵי זֶה מֵהֶן נָדַר פֶּתַח אֶחָד לְכֻלָּן:

When a person takes a vow [not to benefit] from the people of a city and he asks for the release of that vow from the sage of that city34 or he took a vow [not to benefit] from the Jewish people and asks for the release of the vow from a Jewish sage,35 the vow is released.

יג

הַנּוֹדֵר מֵאַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר וְנִשְׁאַל לֶחָכָם שֶׁבָּעִיר. אוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וַהֲרֵי הוּא נִשְׁאַל לְחָכָם שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל הֲרֵי נִדְרוֹ מֻתָּר:

If one says: "This produce is forbidden to me today if I go to this-and-this place tomorrow," he is forbidden to partake of them that day. [This is a] decree lest he go to that place tomorrow.36 If he transgressed and partook of it that day and then undertook the journey on the morrow, he is liable for lashes.37 If he did not go, he is not liable for lashes.38

יד

הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלַי הַיּוֹם אִם אֵלֵךְ לְמָחָר לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי. הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לְאָכְלָם הַיּוֹם גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יֵלֵךְ לְמָחָר לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. וְאִם עָבַר וַאֲכָלָן הַיּוֹם וְהָלַךְ לְמָחָר לוֹקֶה וְאִם לֹא הָלַךְ אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה:

If one says: "This produce will be forbidden to me tomorrow if I go to this-and-this place today," he is permitted to go that place today and the produce will be forbidden for him tomorrow. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [The rationale is that] a person is careful about not violating a prohibition,39 but he is not careful in keeping a condition that will cause a permitted entity to become forbidden.40

טו

אָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן אֲסוּרִין לְמָחָר אִם אֵלֶךְ הַיּוֹם לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לֵילֵךְ הַיּוֹם לְאוֹתוֹ הַמָּקוֹם וְיֵאָסְרוּ עָלָיו אוֹתָן הַפֵּרוֹת לְמָחָר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָדָם זָהִיר בְּדָבָר הָאָסוּר שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ וְאֵינוֹ זָהִיר בִּתְנַאי שֶׁגּוֹרֵם לֶאֱסֹר דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר:

When a person takes a vow to fast for ten days,41 whenever he desires and he was fasting one day and had [to interrupt the fast] for the sake of a mitzvah42 or to honor a person of stature, he may eat and repay [the fast] on another day. [The rationale is that] he did not specify the days [he would fast] when he took the vow initially.43

If he took a vow that he would fast today, but forgot and ate, he must continue to refrain from eating.44 If he took a vow to fast for a day or two and when he began to fast, forgot and ate, he forfeits his fast and is obligated to fast again.45

טז

הַנּוֹדֵר לָצוּם עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים בְּאֵי זֶה יוֹם שֶׁיִּרְצֶה וְהָיָה מִתְעַנֶּה בְּיוֹם אֶחָד מֵהֶם וְהֻצְרַךְ לִדְבַר מִצְוָה אוֹ מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד אָדָם גָּדוֹל הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל וּפוֹרֵעַ יוֹם אַחֵר שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא קָבַע הַיָּמִים בִּתְחִלַּת הַנֵּדֶר. נָדַר שֶׁיָּצוּם הַיּוֹם וְשָׁכַח וְאָכַל מַשְׁלִים לָצוּם. נָדַר שֶׁיָּצוּם יוֹם אֶחָד אוֹ שְׁנַיִם וּכְשֶׁהִתְחִיל לָצוּם שָׁכַח וְאָכַל אִבֵּד תַּעֲנִיתוֹ וְחַיָּב לָצוּם יוֹם אַחֵר:

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Nedarim - Chapter 5

Footnotes

As explained immediately below.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

Note, however, Halachah 4.

Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:1, 5.

Even though he possessed items for which customs duty was due. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:2.

I.e., one might think that since he was not compelled to mention the other substances, the vow would take effect with regard to them. Hence, the Rambam explains that since he was compelled to take the vow, his additions do not change its status.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:3.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 232:14) emphasizes that the statement he makes may not be a direct contradiction to the intent in his heart. He also emphasizes that the vow may not be broken in a way that the gentile who forced the vow to be taken will be become aware of its violation. For this would lead to the desecration of God's name.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:12.

10.

The laws of this halachah do not apply with regard to oaths. Since an oath involves the mention of God's name, taking an oath for this purpose would be taking God's name in vain. A vow does not require the mention of God's name. Hence, this is permitted (Radbaz).

11.

I.e., two dinarim which are half a sela.

12.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 232:2) quotes opinions that maintain that each one can fluctuate slightly past the midway point, but may not accept the other's position completely. He also quotes other more lenient views.

13.

For neither definitely meant what he said. Taking the vow was just a bargaining technique. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 232:2) which states that this applies when they continue negotiating after taking the vow. Then it is clear that they were merely bargaining. If, however, they broke off negotiations, the vow is considered binding.

14.

Thus it could be said that his heart and his mouth were not in concord (Radbaz).

15.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:1.

16.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:1.

17.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:4.

18.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14.

19.

Nevertheless, it is undesirable to do so. One should seek their release only in a pressing situation. See Chapter 13, Halachah 25.

Since ultimately, the person did not desire to make the vow, it is as if the article were consecrated in error. In such an instance, the consecration is not effective (Radbaz, based on Ketubot 78a).

20.

The rationale is that the release of vows is based on the principle that after the person changes his mind and regrets having made the vow, it is as if the vow was made in error. Since the transfer of holiness from a sacrificial animal to another animal is binding even if it is done in error (Temurah 17a), there is no reason why a release is possible after such a transfer has been effected (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, if one regrets the original consecration, that can be nullified and then, as a matter of course, the animal to which the holiness was transferred will also lose its status (see Mishneh LeMelech).

21.

See chs. 11-13.

22.

The latter two are bound by the vow taken by the first, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

23.

For the vows of the latter individuals are dependent on the vow of the first. Once the first vow is nullified, they no longer have any basis on which they can stand.

24.

For their vows are not dependent on his.

25.

For his vow serves as the basis for theirs.

26.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

27.

For it is dependent on the prohibition against bread.

28.

For it is not dependent on the prohibition against meat.

29.

I.e., at the outset, his intent was that the oath or vow include all the individuals in the group, once that intent is no longer valid, it is as if the entire vow or oath was taken in error. Hence, it is no longer binding. The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:1) derives this concept from the exegesis of Numbers 30:3: "He should act according to everything that he uttered from his mouth." Since "everything" he uttered from his mouth need not be fulfilled, nothing must be fulfilled. If part of a vow is nullified, the entire vow is nullified.

30.

Since the person said "and" between each one, he made the latter individuals dependent on the first. Nevertheless, in contrast to the first clause, all of the individuals are not considered as being included in the same vow.

31.

Since he did not associate them by saying "and," it is considered as if he took a vow concerning each person individually. See also Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10.

32.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

33.

They are all considered as one vow. Hence, as in the previous halachah, once a portion of a vow is nullified, the entire vow is nullified. Even if he only has a reason to regret the last portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Radbaz).

34.

As the Rambam states in Chapter 7, Halachah 9, initially, it is forbidden for the person to ask such a sage to release his vow, for in this way, he is benefiting from the people of the city. After the fact, however, the vow is released, because retroactively, it is as if the vow were never taken.

35.

In this instance, he may initially ask a Jewish sage to have his vow released, for he has no alternative. Only a Jewish sage can release a vow. In the previous instance, by contrast, he can ask a sage from another city to release the vow (Radbaz).

36.

And then the vow would take effect retroactively.

37.

As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:16, to be liable for lashes, one must be given a warning. This law indicates that even if the warning was delivered conditionally, the person can be held liable for lashes.

38.

Despite the fact that he violated the advice of our Sages, since he did not violate a Scriptural commandment, he is not liable for lashes.

39.

Hence, we do not fear that he will partake of the produce on the following day.

40.

Therefore, in the previous halachah, he is forbidden to partake of the produce at the outset.

41.

I.e., not consecutively.

42.

I.e., to participate in a feast celebrating the observance of a mitzvah, e.g., a circumcision or the completion of a Talmudic tractate (Mishnah Berurah 568:9).

43.

Since he did not stipulate the day on which he would fast, even though he began fasting on a particular day, he can change his mind and switch the fast to another day.

44.

Since he took a vow against eating that day, the fact that he broke his fast does not make it permissible for him to eat afterwards. This applies even if he is willing to fast another day instead. Compare to Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:14. the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 568:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling. The Rama adds that there are some who accept upon themselves to fast another day to compensate for the fast he did not keep.

45.

Nevertheless, since he did not specify a particular day at the time of his vow, once he ate, he may eat on the day he began fasting.

By Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon ("Maimonides"); translated by Eliyahu Touger

The text on this page contains sacred literature. Please do not deface or discard.

Vowelized Hebrew text courtesy Torat Emet under CC 2.5 license.

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