Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Rambam is not mentioning the number of negative commandments specifically, but rather the acts punishable by lashes. As will be explained, there are times when two acts are included in the same negative commandment, and other times when one deed will involve the transgression of two or more commandments (Ner Mitzvah).

For if they are punishable by execution, a person is never punished by lashes for their transgression. This applies even if he is not executed and indeed, even if he was given a warning for lashes, rather than a warning for execution, as explained in Chapter 18, Halachah 2, and notes.

This and the following six commandments are mentioned in Leviticus, Ch. 18, and in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah. A person who has relations with his sister violates two negative commandments, for there is a separate commandment prohibiting relations with the daughter of one’s father (Ner Mitzvah).

As forbidden by Leviticus 7:23; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 7:2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 7:26; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 6:1. Derech Mitzvotecho questions why the Rambam does not mention in this chapter the prohibitions against partaking of blood that are not punishable by kerait, but which are punishable by lashes, as explained in Hilchot Ma’achalot As.rurot 6:4.

As forbidden by Exodus 13:3; Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 23:29; Hilchot Sh’vitat Esor 1:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 23:25; Hilchot Sh’vitat Esor 1:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:8; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:10.

As forbidden by Leviticus 7:18; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:6.

As forbidden by Leviticus 7:20; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:13.

As forbidden by Numbers 5:3; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:12.

As forbidden by Leviticus 17:3-4; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:2.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 12:13; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:3.

As forbidden by Exodus 30:32; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 1:4.

As forbidden by Exodus 30:32; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 1:5.

As forbidden by Exodus 30:37; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 2:9.

Like transgressions punishable by Karait, violation of these transgressions causes a person to die prematurely. Unlike Karait, however, such transgressors receive atonement through their death [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 9:6)].

I.e., there are transgressions which warrant this punishment that do not involve a deed. Lashes are not, however, given for such transgressions, as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2.

By using this term, the Rambam includes two negative commandments [Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 133-134)], the prohibition against an Israelite partaking of terumah and the prohibition against a worker or a servant of a priest partaking of it.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:9-10; Hilchot Terumot 6:6.

This and the following two prohibitions are included in the prohibition mentioned in Leviticus 22:9-10. The Lechem Mishneh explains that even though this prohibition includes these four substances, it is not considered as being general in nature (and hence, not punishable by lashes as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2), because all of these substances are called terumah.

See Hilchot Bikurim 3:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:15; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:3.

See Hilchot Bikkurim 8:5. The dough is also considered tevel and forbidden, because of the prohibition mentioned in the previous note.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:4; Hilchot Terumot 7:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 16:2; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 10:19. See also Halachah 4, prohibition 27.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:7; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 2:5.

As forbidden by Numbers 18:3; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 3:11.

As forbidden by Numbers 18:4; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 9:1.

Sanhedrin 83b derives this concept from the exegesis of Exodus 29:9.

Hence he is included in the above prohibition. See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 10:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:2; Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:1. See Chapter 18, Halachah 6, which states that such a person would not be brought to court for lashes. Instead, he would be killed by the young priests.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:9; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:6; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 15:13-15. See the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh who cite Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:4 where the Rambam states that a person who commits this transgression is not liable for punishment. For this reason, the Maharik states that the wording here should be “a person who wears additional garments.” See Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 10:5.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:6; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:8.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:6; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:14.

At the hand of God.

Exodus 30:21 states: “They shall wash their hands and feet so that they do not die.” Implied is that if a priest does not wash his hands, he will receive that punishment. There is, however, no explicit negative commandment warning one not to do so. See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 9:10-11.

E. g., the prophet Jonah who tried to flee to Tarshish rather than deliver his prophecy against Nineveh. See Jonah,. Ch. 1.

E. g., Ido, the prophet, who was commanded to prophesy against the altar established by Jeroboam. God told him not to eat or drink until he returned. He disobeyed this command, and was therefore slain by a lion (I Kings, Ch. 13).

As Deuteronomy 18:19 states: “And a person who will not heed My words which he speaks in My name, I will seek [retribution] from him.” See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:2-3.

See, for example, Hilchot Ishut 1:8 with regard to the prohibitions against marrying Egyptian and Edomite converts.

As forbidden by Exodus 20:4 and Leviticus 19:4. As explained in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:9, the first prohibition applies when a person fashions an idol for himself. The second when he makes an idol for a gentile without the intent of worshipping it himself.

As forbidden by Exodus 20:23; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:10.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:4; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:3.

Even for the worship of God. This is forbidden by Deuteronomy 16:22; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 6:6.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 16:21; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 6:9.

Even for the sake of heaven, as forbidden by Leviticus 26:1; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 6:6.

As forbidden by Exodus 23:13; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 5:11.

This is forbidden by the prohibition mentioned in the previous note. The Lechem Mishneh questions why lashes are given, for seemingly these are prohibitions that do not involve a deed.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 7:26; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:2. As mentioned in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, loc. cit., a person who benefits from a false divinity also violates prohibition 11 and is given lashes on both counts.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 13:17; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:8.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 13:18; Hilchot A vodat Koch.avim 4:7.

As forbidden by Leviticus 20:23; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 18:10; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:6. See Chapter 18:3 which explains why this and the following prohibitions are not considered as prohibitions of a general nature.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 18:10; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:8.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:26; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:4.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 18:10; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:10.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 18:10; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:13.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 12:3-4. Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:1 discusses the prohibition against erasing God’s name. Ibid.:7 discusses the extension of the principle to include stones from the altar and wood consecrated to the Sanctuary.

As forbidden by Leviticus 6:6; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 2:6.

As forbidden by Exodus 20:23; Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:17.

As forbidden by Leviticus 17:16; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:16-17.

A urological condition which produces a secretion similar to that which results from gonorrhea.

I.e., a zavah, a woman in the niddah state, or a woman who has given birth. In all these instances, the ritual impurity is a result of a physical condition.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:11; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:3-4. The commentaries note that as stated in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:8, a metzora who enters Jerusalem is also worthy of receiving lashes. They question why the Rambam does not mention this prohibition here.

As forbidden by Exodus 25:15; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 2:13.

As forbidden by Exodus 28:28; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 9:10.

As forbidden by Exodus 28:32; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 9:3. As explained in that source, this prohibition also applies to the other priestly garments.

I.e., anything other than incense and the blood from the bull and the goat that was brought into the Holy of Holies.

As forbidden by Exodus 30:9; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 2:11.

As forbidden by Leviticus 16:2; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 2:4. As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 2, this same prohibition forbids the High Priest from entering the Holy of Holies, except during the sacrificial worship.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:23; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:1. As the latter source states, this prohibition also applies if such a priest proceeds beyond the altar in the Temple Courtyard.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:9; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:1-2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:17; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 44:9; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:8.

As forbidden by Numbers 18:3; Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 3:11.

As forbidden by Leviticus 10:6; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:16.

As forbidden by the above sources. As mentioned in Halachah 2, if a priest performs sacrificial service with torn clothes, he is worthy of death at the hand of God.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:20; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:22; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:24; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach, loc. cit..

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:22; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:25; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:6.

This prohibition is derived from the exegesis of Leviticus 22:21; see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:7-8.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 15:19; Hilchot Me’ilah 1:7.

As forbidden by the above sources.

As forbidden by Leviticus 2:11 ; Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 5:1. If a person offers both these forbidden substances at one time, he receives only one set of lashes, because they are both mentioned in the same prohibition.

As forbidden by Leviticus 6:10; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:6.

As forbidden by Leviticus 2:13; Hilchot Issurei HaMizbeach 5:11.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:19; Hilchot Issurei HaMizbeach 3:7, 4:8. In this instance as well, since the prohibition against these two subjects is mentioned in the same verse, if a person violates them both at the same time, he receives only one set of lashes.

As forbidden by Leviticus 5:11; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:7.

As forbidden by Leviticus 5:11; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:8.

As forbidden by Numbers 5:15; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:7-8.

As forbidden by the above sources.

As forbidden by Leviticus 5:8; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:6.

As forbidden by Leviticus 27:10; Hilchot Temurah 1:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 7:19; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:12.

This prohibition is also included in the warning of Deuteronomy 14:3; see Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:3-5.

Makkot 17a derives this prohibition from Deuteronomy 12:17; see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbonot 11:5.

As forbidden by Exodus 29:33; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:8.

Such animals must be offered as sacrifices and their meat given to the priests. The prohibition is stated in Deuteronomy 12:17; Hilchot Bechorot 1:16.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:12; Hilchot Terumot 6:7.

A woman born from relations forbidden to a priest, or a woman who is forbidden to a priest who has relations with one.

This prohibition is also inferred from the above verse. See Hilchot Terumot, loc. cit..

As inferred from Deuteronomy 12:17; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:5.

This prohibition is also derived from the above verse; see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 4:5.

This prohibition is also derived from the above verse; see Hilchot Bechorot 1:16.

This prohibition is also derived from the above verse; see Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 2:5-6.

This prohibition is also derived from the above verse; see Hilchot Bikkurini 3:3-4.

This prohibition is also derived from the above verse; see Hilchot Bikkurim 3:3.

As inferred from Deuteronomy 26:14; Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 3:1.

This prohibition is also derived from the same sources.

See Leviticus 10:19.

This prohibition is also derived from the same verse; see Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 3:5-7.

Yevamot 70a derives this prohibition from Exodus 12:48. See Hilchot Terumot 7:10, Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 10:9, and Hilchot Korban Pesach 9:8.

As forbidden by Leviticus 6:16; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:3.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:23; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, loc. cit.

As forbidden by Exodus 23:18; Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:5.

Brought on the fourteenth of Nisan.

Brought on the fourteenth of Iyar by a person who did not bring a sacrifice in Nisan.
This prohibition is forbidden by Exodus 12:46; Numbers 9:12; Hilchot Korban Pesach 6:1.

As forbidden by Exodus 12:46; Hilchot Korban Pesach 9:1.

This prohibition is derived from Exodus 22:30. Although that verse speaks about other subjects entirely, this prohibition is also included. See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:9, Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:6, and Hilchot Korban Pesach 9:2.

As forbidden by Exodus 12:9; Hilchot Korban Pesach 8:6. See Chapter 18:3 which explains that if a person violates both of these prohibitions at the same time, he receives only one set of lashes.

This prohibition is also derived from Deuteronomy 12:17; see Hilchot Meilah 1:3.

A person who partakes of food from which the terumot have not been separated, by contrast, is liable for death at the hand of heaven as mentioned in Halachah 2. The prohibition against partaking of food from which tithes have not been separated is also derived from Deuteronomy, loc. cit.. See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:20-21.

As forbidden by Exodus 21:25; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:22.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 14:6-8; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:1-2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 11:13; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 11:11; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:4.

E. g., a fly or a mosquito; as forbidden by Deuteronomy 14:19; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:5-6.

E. g., snakes, scorpions; as forbidden by Leviticus 11:29, 41; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:6.

I.e., any aquatic animal that is not a fish; as forbidden by Leviticus 11:43; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:12.

But rather comes into being from filth; as forbidden by Leviticus 11:44; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assuroi 2:13.

This refers to worms that come into being from fruit as it decays. While they are in the fruit, they may be eaten. After they emerge, they are forbidden, as stated by Leviticus 11:42; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 2:14.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 14:21; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:1.

As forbidden by Exodus 22:30; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:6.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 12:23; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:10, 5:1 -3.

As forbidden by Genesis 32:33; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:2.

As forbidden by Exodus 23:19; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 9:1-2.

As forbidden by Exodus 34:26; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot, loc. cit..

As forbidden by Leviticus 23:14; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:2. As explained in that source, there are three different negative commandments involved.

Fruit which grows within three years of a tree’s being planted; as forbidden by Leviticus 19:23; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:10-11.

Grain or vegetables that grow in a vineyard; as forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:9; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:7.

As forbidden by Exodus 12:20; Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:6.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 16:3; Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:8. A person who partakes of chametz on Pesach itself is liable for kerait, as stated in Halachah 1.

As forbidden by Exodus 12:19; Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:2-3. There are two prohibitions involved in possessing chametz and the person is worthy for lashes for violating each of them.
This refers to grain products that we caused to leaven on Pesach itself. If, however, a person leaves chametz in his possession before the beginning of the holiday, he violates these prohibitions, but is not punished by lashes.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 32:38; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 11:1-2.

As forbidden by Numbers 6:3-4; Hilchot Nazirut 1:2;5:2-3. Included by this wording are five negative commandments, as explained in those sources.

As forbidden by Numbers 6:5; Hilchot Nazirut 5:11.

As forbidden by Numbers 6:7; Hilchot Nazirut 5:15-18. Included by this wording are two negative commandments, as explained in those sources.

As forbidden by Leviticus 13:33; Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at 10:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:8; Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at, loc. cit.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 21:4; Hilchot Rotzeach 10:9.

As forbidden by Leviticus 25:4; Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 1:1-2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 25:4; Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 1:2-3.

As forbidden by Leviticus 25:5; Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 5:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 25:5; Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 4:22-23.

As forbidden by Leviticus 25:11; Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 10:16.

As forbidden by Leviticus 23:22; Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 1:3. If, however, the produce is not destroyed, the violator may correct his transgression and avoid lashes by giving that produce to the poor, as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2. Similar concepts apply with regard to the next six transgressions the Rambam mentions.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:10; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 4:17-18.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:9; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 1:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:10; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 4:16.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:19; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 1:6.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:6; Hilr:hot Shechitah 13:1.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:19; Hilchot Kelayim 1:1-3.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:9; Hilchot Kelayim 5:1.

As forbidden by the above verse; Hilchot Kelayim 1:5.

As forbidden by the above verse; Hilchot Kelayim 9:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:10; Hilchot Kelayim 9:7-8.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:28; Hilchot Shechitah 12:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:12; Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 3:5.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:17; Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 3:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:6; Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 3:2.

As forbidden by Exodus 20:15; Hilchot Edut 20:8-9. If, however, there is a financial penalty, he is required to make financial reimbursement and does not receive lashes. This applies with regard to the following halachah as well. See Chapter 18, Halachah 2.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 25:3; Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:12.

As mentioned by Deuteronomy 21:18; Hilchot Mamrim 7:1,7.

As mentioned by Deuteronomy 22:18; Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 3:1,6.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:14; Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:1. Included in this are also the prohibitions against cursing a judge and cursing a nasi.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:12; Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:2-3.

As forbidden by Exodus 20:6; Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:4-7.

As forbidden by Numbers 30:3; Hilchot Nedarim 1:5.

As forbidden by Exodus 16:29; Hilchot Shabbat 27:1.

As forbidden by Exodus 12:18; Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 1:1-2. There is a separate prohibition, forbidding the performance of work on each of the festivals.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:27; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:1,6.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:25; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:12.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 14:1; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:15.

As forbidden by Leviticus 19:28; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:11.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:11; Hilchot Kelayim 10:30.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 20:19; Hilchot Melachim 6:8.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:5; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:10.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:5; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:10.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:1; Hilchot Eivel 3:1-3. As explained in these sources, by contracting ritual impurity, a priest violates three prohibitions. Each one is punishable by lashes.

This term is defined as referring to any woman who is not a native-born Jewess or who has engaged in sexual relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:7; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:1-2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:7; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:1-2.

This term is defined as referring to any woman who was forbidden to a priest and afterwards had relations with a priest or a woman fathered by a priest through relations that are forbidden to him.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:7; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:1-2.

As forbidden by Leviticus 21:15; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:3.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 24:4; Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 25:5; Hilchot Yibbum 2:18. Yibbum refers to a person's marriage to the childless widow of his deceased brother.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:18; Hilchot Ishut 1:4.

A person born from an adulterous or incestuous relationship.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:3; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:2. The Ra’avad questions why marriage is mentioned. Seemingly, the prohibition is violated by any sexual relations, within or without the context of marriage. In his gloss to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 15:2, the Maggid Mishneh quotes a responsa attributed to the Rambam which deals with this question.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:2; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 16:1-3.

As forbidden by Leviticus 22:24; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 16:9-10.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:29; Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:7.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 22:19; Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 3:4.

As forbidden by Leviticus 18:6; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:1-2.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 7:3; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:1.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 23:4; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:17.

This prohibition is mentioned in the same sources.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 17:17; Hilchot Melachim 3:2.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 17:16; Hilchot Melachim 3:3.

As forbidden by Deuteronomy 17:17; Hilchot Melachim 3:4.

This acronym is found in the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah indicating it was included by the Rambam himself.

Different rules apply with regard to cases of financial responsibility. In such instances, firm circumstantial evidence is accepted, as the Rambam states in Chapter 24, Halachah 1; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:4 and other sources.

For otherwise no punishment would be given, as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 4.

I.e., no matter how strong the circumstantial evidence, unless the witnesses actually see the crime, the killer is not executed. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 290) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 82) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam explains the rationale for this mitzvah. Once the matter is left to human choice and logic, there is ultimately the possibility of error. The Torah feared that a judge would consider certain evidence as conclusive and sentence an innocent person to death.

For in neither instance did two witnesses observe a transgression. The Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot) notes that similar concepts also apply with regard to financial laws. See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 4.

The Mechilta cites the conclusion of the verse: “For I (God) will not justify the wicked.” Implied is that the court need not worry if it releases a killer because there is not sufficient evidence to have him executed. For ultimately, he and all existence is in God’s hands and He will find a means to have retribution exacted. See the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 4:3).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5, which outlines the situations in which a person is obligated to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name.

The verse speaks of the rape of a maiden who has already been consecrated. Although she is party to a sin, since she was not willfully involved, she is absolved of responsibility. Similarly, Nedarim 27a mentions the general principle: “The Torah absolves a person acting under duress (an oness). This principle also applies in financial law.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 294) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 556) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Ramban disputes this classification, stating that although the Torah does not hold the person liable, this is not considered as a mitzvah.

Hence he is considered to have acted on his own volition. The Kessef Mishneh explain that the intent is not that he was forced into having an erection, but that having an erection comes as a result of his own pleasure and desire. Hence he is considered to have acted totally willingly.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh ask: How is it possible for the man to be liable for execution? If he did not consent to the relations, he would not have accepted the warning that he was given. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the intent is not that he is executed, but that he is considered as having acted willingly. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:9 which quotes opinions which differ with the Rambam and maintain that a person who is compelled to engage in relations is not liable.

For at the outset, she is being forced against her will.

Ketubot 51a states graphically: “Even if the woman says, ‘Had he not raped me, I would have hired him,’ she is not liable.” Since initially she was forced, she is not held responsible if her natural inclination takes control of her.

See the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 521) who states that it appears that this prohibition applies only with regard to a killer and not to others condemned to death by the court.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 279) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 521) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The intent appears to be monetary compensation for injury which is considered as a k’nas, “fine,” as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 8. As indicated by the Rambam in his listing of mitzvot at the beginning of these laws, he includes this as one facet of the above mitzvah. See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:4 where the Rambam refers to this prohibition in the context of the laws regarding compensation for personal injury.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 277) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 79) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:21 states that if one of the litigants is a Torah scholar of great stature, the judge must stand in deference to him. This should not confound the other litigant, for he should realize that this is an obligation due because of the person’s scholarship alone. See also Chapter 21, Halachah 4.

I.e., seeing the judge show this courtesy to the other person may cause the litigant to become flustered to the extent that he forgets the arguments he wished to present.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 275) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 234) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sifra to the above verse.

I.e., accept the other litigant’s statements without diligent cross-examination.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 278) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 81) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In this context, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 17:10) quotes the advice of the mishnah (Avot 1:8): “When the litigants stand before you, regard them both as guilty.” See Chapter 23, Halachah 10.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 273) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 233) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 5:8).

Although as stated in the previous halachah, a judge must not delay rendering judgment, he should not be hasty in doing so either. Instead, he should patiently review the matter before coming to a decision.

Avot 1:1.

In the present age, when the breakthroughs in communication have made the world a global village, this advice applies not only to scholars located in the same city, but throughout the world.

His haughtiness will prevent him from realizing his errors and lead to a perversion of justice (Radbaz).

Hepilah, translated as “cast down” also has the connotation “miscarried.” I.e., the student is like a fetus who emerges from the womb too early (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 19b).

Atzumim, translated as “awesome,” also has the connotation to “those who hold back.” On this basis, our Sages advance this interpretation (Rashi, Ibid.). See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:4 where the Rambam quotes the same concepts.

And instead defers to another, allowing him to judge the case. This appears to be the Rambam’s interpretation. The Perisha (Choshen Mishpat 10) offers an alternate perspective, explaining that rather than render a judgment, the judge convinces the litigants to accept a compromise.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 10:3 explains: “foolish,” because he thinks he is wise, but is not, “wicked,” for he perverts judgment, and “arrogant,” because due to his haughtiness, he thinks that a person of his stature need not be patient in judgment.

I.e., a teacher who has taught him the majority of his knowledge (Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:2-3).

A parsa is twelve mil, and a mil is approximately a kilometer in modern measure.

When, by contrast, a person renders a ruling in the presence of his teacher, he is liable for death at the hand of heaven (Hilchot Talmud Torah, loc. cit.).

Anyone in the camp could approach Moses with his halachic questions. If, however, the teacher grants him permission - as Moses granted to the other judges whom he appointed - the student may also render judgment (Hilchot Talmud Torah, 5:23).

A maneh is 100 silver pieces.

A copper coin of minimal value, worth less than any other coinage in the Talmudic age.

Sanhedrin 8a states that this means that if a case involving a p’rutah is brought to a judge before one involving a large sum, the judge must adjudicate the smaller case first. The Radbaz qualifies that statement, explaining that if the smaller case involves patient judgment and the larger matter is straightforward and can be settled quickly, the larger matter should be adjudicated first.

For anything less than a p’rutah is not considered financially significant. See the Siftei Cohen 6:1 who explains that if a judgment concerns utensils that are worth less than a p’rutah, the judges must hear the case. Note the parallel to Hilchot To’ain ViNitan 3:5-6.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 55b) interprets this as referring to an instance where after ajudge renders a judgment concerning a p’rutah, the defendant tries to exonerate himself from part of the responsibility by citing a claim that is worth less than a p’rutah.
Rabbenu Asher disputes the Rambam’s decision, ruling that whenever a case does not concern a p’rutah, it is not heard by the judges regardless of the circumstances. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 6:1, quotes the Rambam’s view, the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 6:3 favors Rabbenu Asher’s perspective.

As mentioned in Halachah 6.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 280) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 590) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See note 45.

I.e., the convert.

From the Rambam’s wording here, it appears that there are two prohibitions involved, one for a convert, and a second, if the convert is an orphan. Nevertheless, in Sefer HaMitzvot (and in the mitzvot mentioned at the beginning of these halachot), he considers wronging the two as one prohibition. From Sefer HaMitzvot, it appears that a person violates the same prohibition whether he perverts the judgment of a convert or a convert who is an orphan. The intent of “three prohibitions” is not that the person has violated three separate prohibitions, but that the deed involves the spiritual severity of violating God’s decree three times. If a person perverts the judgment of a native-born Jewish orphan, however, he is not considered to have violated this commandment (Radbaz).
The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 590) notes that every convert is an “orphan,” for he no longer has any connection to his natural father. He explains that if the convert is young and unable to manage on his own, he is considered an orphan. Once he can fend for himself, he is no longer placed in that category.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 177) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 235) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

A judge may, however, instruct both litigants to speak concisely.

For the manner in which a person is dressed creates an impression and influences the way a judge will look at the case. Moreover, this may cause the litigant who is poorly dressed to be disconcerted and prevent him from presenting his arguments articulately (Rashi, Sh’vuot 31a).
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:2 states that when there is not a radical difference in the litigants’ manner of dress, even though one’s clothes are more elegant than the other’s, there is no necessity for the court to equate them entirely. The Siftei Cohen 17:2 extends this principle, stating that at present, since it is not customary for anyone to wear the extremely expensive clothing that some wore in the Talmudic age, this law is not practiced.

For this would indicate favoritism.

As indicated by Deuteronomy 19:17: “And the two men who have the dispute shall stand before God.”

This is the custom at present, as stated in Halachah 5.

The license to sit.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:5 states that after the fact, if the witnesses sit, their, testimony is not invalidated. Moreover, he cites authorities who maintain that even at the outset, the requirement applies only to judges who possess semichah. Before judges of the present era, the litigants may sit.

Although literally, the verse is speaking about the litigants, Sh’vuot 30a states that the words “who have the dispute” refer to the litigants. Who then are “the two men”? The witnesses.

For it is a mitzvah to show deference to a Torah scholar (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:1).

So that they appear equal.

For everyone realizes that the scholar is given this respect in appreciation of his scholarship. That does not necessarily mean that the judges will favor him in judgment.

For it will appear that he told him his perspective concerning the dispute. See also Halachah 7.

Our translation follows the version found in the manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a slightly different version.

For it is obvious that he came at the time he usually comes and not to provide him with information concerning the dispute.

We have left the term in its Hebrew original in which instance, it connotes Talmudic academies, i.e., the courts sanctioned by all the Talmudic academies. It could, however, be interpreted as meaning "settlements," i.e., throughout the international Jewish community, this practice was accepted.

I.e., common people might begin arguing if they were asked to stand. The Siftei Cohen 17:7 quotes the Bayit Chadash who states that although this dispensation is granted, it is proper for the litigants and the witnesses not to accept it and stand when delivering testimony.

I.e., the sequence of the verse implies the order of precedence.

Since widows have experienced grief and suffering, their spirits are weak and we undertake this and other measures to alleviate their anguish.

This is one of the expressions of deference for Torah scholars, as stated in Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10.

Yevamot 100a states that women are rarely involved in judicial disputes and hence, having to appear in court would be very embarrassing. Kina’at Eliyahu questions if the changes in the socio-economic norms and the wider role women have in society today would cause this ruling to be altered.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:2 quotes these principles. It also states (loc. cit.:1) that generally a judge should hear the cases in the order that the litigants appear in court.

For in this way, the other litigant can challenge the statement if he maintains that it is false. Moreover, we assume that a person will have greater difficulty lying in the presence of the person he is trying to mistreat.

The Rambam’s apparent source is the Zohar, Vol. I, p. 179b. This is significant, because there are questions whether or not he was ever exposed to the teachings of the Kabbalah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 281) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 74) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 10, and see Chapter 22, Halachot 2-3. This warning is also applied to judges, see Chapter 23, Halachah 10, and Chapter 24, Halachah 3.

For the judge must hear the words of the litigants and the witnesses [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:6)] directly. See the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:14 who states that at present, leniency is taken in this regard and it has become customary for litigants to give others power of attorney to argue their cases.

This clarifies that he understood them correctly. Implied is that he should restate their statements in their presence, so that they can correct him if he errs (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:15).

Saying “He appears to have made a proper argument” or the like (Kessef Mishneh).

Our translation is based on the interpretation of the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:18.

Avot 1:8 states: “Do not accept the role of a counselor.” In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam writes:
One should not advise a litigant to assert a claim that will benefit him or [teach him] to defend himself... This applies even when [the judge] knows that he is being exploited and that the other litigant is making a false claim. It is, nevertheless, forbidden to teach [the litigant] a claim that will advance his interests.
As explained in the next halachah and notes, there is room for leniency in certain situations. Nevertheless, this is the general rule.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 17) differs with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that a judge can take greater leniency and advise a litigant with regard to a just claim. In that vein, he cites the example of Rav Huna stated by the Jerusalem Talmud who would offer assistance when he saw a litigant who did not know how to state his claims.
Ketubot 52b cites an example of Rabbi Yochanan who did offer such assistance to a litigant, but then regretted it stating: “I have conducted myself like a legal counselor.” The Rambam himself states in Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 9:24: “When a creditor brings the promissory note... we tell the defendant: ‘Pay him.’ If the defendant protests: ‘Where is your pruzbol?’ [The judge] may ask the plaintiff: ‘Did you have a pruzbol and lose it?’”
The issue is a very delicate one and the Rabbis (see the Sefer Me’irat Einryim 17:19 and the Turei Zahav) have debated it extensively. Ultimately, as the Rambam states, every judge must employ his own discretion.