Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 191), the Rambam writes that this mitzvah only applies in a milchemet hareshut, but not in a milchemet mitzvah. Accordingly, there are commentaries who maintain that this phrase should be placed at the conclusion of the previous chapter and not at the beginning of this chapter.
However, other authorities maintain that there is no need to alter the texts. In this matter, as in the issue of offering a peaceful settlement (see commentary Chapter 6, Halachah 1), the Rambam changed his opinion from that stated in Sefer HaMitzvot.
The Or Sameach brings support for the opinion that a meshuach milchamah is appointed even in a milchemet mitzvah by citing the appointment of Pinchas to that position in the war against Midian (see Numbers 31:7 and Sotah 43a).

This appointment is included by the Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 526) as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachot 2 and 3.

The unique oil made by Moses described in Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

Literally, “the one anointed for the war.”
Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 4:1 states that the oil of anointment was entombed together with the ark by King Josiah. Accordingly, during the latter years of the first Temple and throughout the subsequent generations, this mitzvah could no longer be fulfilled. Though Josephus and the Sefer Chashmonim state that Judah, the Macabee, served in this position, from a Halachic perspective, we must consider that merely an honorary title (Minchat Chinuch 107).

The primary function of the meshuach milchamah was to speak to the nation and inspire them before the war. In order to enhance his standing among the people and cause his words to be appreciated, he was given the honor of anointment (Sefer HaChinuch 107)

The Ra’avad notes that this statement is not appropriate in a milchemet mitzvah for, as explained in Halachah 4, in a war of that nature, no one is freed from army service.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Halachah 3, this proclamation is repeated. Accordingly, he explains that first, the meshuach milchamah would mention the need for these individuals to return in general terms, telling them to heed the proclamations he would make later. Afterwards, at the battlefront, he would make the statements mentioned in Halachah 3. This interpretation concurs with the statement in Sotah 42b: “At the border, he announces: ‘Listen to what will be said at the battlefield.’”
The Radbaz notes the difficulties mentioned by both the Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh. He mentions that he discovered a manuscript of the Mishneh Torah with a different version. That text reads:
Once, at border, as the army is leaving before they assume battle positions: [At that time,] he tells the nation: “Is there a man who is afraid or faint-hearted?...” When [these individuals] hear his words, they should retreat from the battlefront....
See the following halachah.

See the following halachah.

As Deuteronomy 20:2 states: “When you approach the battle, the priest shall step forward and speak to the people.”

Sotah 42a comments that the address must be made in the holy tongue. As mentioned above, the following statements were made even in a milchemet mitzvah.

Shema Yisrael in Hebrew. With this expression, the priest implies that even if the Jews possessed only the merit of reciting the Shema, it would be sufficient to warrant victory (ibid.).

Use of the latter term reminds the soldiers that their adversaries will not show them mercy (ibid.).

The Torah mentions four commands because an army would generally employ four techniques to intimidate its foes: They raised a clamor with their shields, sounded trumpets, shouted, and had their horses neigh (Sotah 42b).

Implying that, in contrast to the gentiles who rely on physical strength, we rely on God’s power.
Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) relates that the meshuach milchamah would add inspiring words of his own to further motivate the army.

The following statements are only made in a milchemet hareshut.

The deferments granted these individuals are discussed in Halachot 5-14 of this chapter.

Deuteronomy 20:5 says: “The officers shall then speak to the people and say: ‘Is there a man?...’” Sotah 43a explains that the officer did not make these statements himself, but rather, repeated those made by the priest.

See Halachah 15.

As Deuteronomy 20:8 states: “The officers shall then continue speaking to the people: ‘Is there a man?...’”

Deuteronomy 20:9 concludes the passage describing the mobilization of the army: “When the officers have finished speaking to the people, they shall appoint commanding officers at the head of the people.”
Sotah 44a mentions that high ranking officers were also placed at the rear of the camp to prevent flight.

The translation of keshilin as “axes” is taken from Psalms 74:6.

Sotah 44a relates that officers of this rank were also placed in the front lines of the troops to lift up all those who fall and encourage them to continue the battle. See Kessef Mishneh.

Hewing down this one individual will prevent panic from spreading throughout the troops.

Sotah 44b cites I Samuel 4:17: “And Israel fled before the Philistines and there was a great slaughter among the people” and (31:1): “The men of Israel fled before the Philistines and were felled as corpses” to illustrate this principle.

No deferments are granted. There are certain opinions which maintain that Levites and priests are exempted from military service based on the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Shemitah 13:12: “[The Levites] were separated from the manner of the world. Thus, they do not wage war as the rest of Israel.”
However, most authorities explain that those statements only apply to the war to conquer Eretz Yisrael from the Canaanites. In other wars, the priests and Levites served in the army. They quote Halachah 8 of this chapter and Halachah 4 of the next as support of this view. I Chronicles 12:27 notes that 4,600 Levites were numbered among the troops who came to David at Hebron.

The phrase used by the Rambam is quoted from the Mishnah (Sotah, ibid.). It. is borrowed from Joel 1:16) and employed in a different context.
The Radbaz questions the mention of women. What part do they have in a war? Furthermore, Nazir 59a explains that the prohibition (Deuteronomy 22:5) “No male article shall be on a woman,” applies to wearing arms. Accordingly, he explains that the women would help in the preparation of food and perform other supportive functions, but would not take part in the actual fighting.

As mentioned in Halachah 3, a person who builds a new home is deferred from military service. Deuteronomy 20:5 states: “Is there a man who has built a new house and has not begun to live in it? Let him go home, lest he die in the war and another man live in it.”
By nature, a person who built a home, planted a vineyard, or consecrated a woman, thinks about these matters. In battle, he may be overcome by fear and worry that he will not benefit from his efforts. Hence, the Torah granted him a deferment in a milchemet hareshut (Ramban, Deuteronomy 20:4).

Sotah 43a explains that since the verse employs the verb “build,” any building which is fit to dwell in causes its builder to be deferred.

Sotah (ibid.) relates that this concept is derived from the use of the word “man” in the above-mentioned verse. Had the verse stated: “Is there any among you who has built a new house?”, the basic concept would have been understood. Adding the word “man” was used to infer these additions.

This term is placed in parentheses, because according to the standard printed text of Sotah 43a, mentions this as a structure for which a person receives a deferment. A Rabbinic source to the contrary has not been found. Hence, many have deemed it a printing error.

Rashi, Sotah (43a), explains that this refers to a watchman’s booth outside a courtyard.

A room with four walls, but no roof. This structure was common in Greek and Roman architecture and was frequently, employed in Eretz Yisrael in Talmudic times.

A house of this size is not fit to dwell in. Similarly, the other structures mentioned in this clause are not fit to dwell in.

The verse states “and has not begun to live in it.” The words “in it” imply that the house must be one’s own (Sotah, ibid.).

As Deuteronomy 20:6 states: “Is there a man who has planted a vineyard and has not yet redeemed its first crop? Let him go home, lest he die in war and another man redeem it.”

The word “planted” in the above verse includes plants of any species, not only a grapevine.

Rashi (Sotah, ibid.) maintains that the five trees must be planted in the manner depicted below. However, the Tosefta (Sotah 7:11) differs, allowing the trees to be planted far apart, even in five different cities. The Lecheni Mishneh presumes that the Rambam does not accept Rashi’s view. Were he also to follow that opinion, it would have been necessary for him to elaborate.

One of the ways of expanding a vineyard was to cut off a shoot of a vine and bury it in the ground until it grew roots and emerged as an independent plant.

Grafting an existing vine on the stem of another.

These techniques of expanding one’s vineyard will only cause an individual to be deferred from army service if the resulting vines are considered as entirely new plants. Under those circumstances, they will be governed by the prohibitions of orlah. Hence, no benefit can be derived from their produce for the first three years of their new growth. This is necessary for the verse speaks about "redeeming one's vineyard," i.e., bringing the worth of the fruit to Jerusalem to be eaten there. Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 10:14-18 discusses when a graft or a planting is considered an independent plant and when not.

As explained in the previous halachah, these means of acquisition can be implied from the use of the word “man” in the above-mentioned verse (Sotah 43b).

This is too small a number to be called a “vineyard.”

Trees that do not bear fruit also cannot be called a vineyard.

The Kessef Mishneh states that there is no Talmudic source for this statement, but that it is inferred from the law regarding a stolen house in the previous halachah.

Neither of the partners conceives of the vineyard as his own. Hence, neither is deferred. See Sotah 43b, Kessef Mishneh, Lechem Mishneh.

Deuteronomy 20:17 states: "Is there a man who has consecrated a woman and not married her? Let him go home, lest he die in the war and another man marry her."
Similarly, Deuteronomy 24:5 relates: "When a man takes a new wife, he shall not enter military service."
According to Torah law, marriage is a two-staged process. In the first stage, referred to as kiddushin, a man consecrates a woman as his wife. From this time onward, she may not marry another man without divorce. Sexual relations with other men are considered adultery and are punishable by death. Nevertheless, the bride and groom are not permitted to live as man and wife.
The second stage of marriage, nissuin, involves the consummation of the marriage and the beginning of the couple's life together.

Whether this is to be the first or second marriage for either of the parties involved, as long as the couple have never been married to each other, the woman is considered “a new wife” and a deferment is granted.

When a man dies without children, his widow is obligated to marry one of his brothers (yibbum) or be freed from that obligation through the chalitzah ceremony (see Deuteronomy 25:5-10). From the time of the deceased’s passing, a halachic relationship exists between his brothers and his widow. Hence, they are deferred from military service.

For each of them has the potential to marry their brother’s childless widow. Even if their brother is killed in the midst of the war, they are granted deferments.

A deferment is not granted to a man who consecrates a wife during wartime (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 8:6). Nevertheless, in these circumstances, the fact the kiddushin were given before the war began makes it clear that the groom did not use marriage as an excuse to free himself from military duty. Hence, the deferment is granted.
The commentaries question how King David went out to fight the Philistines after marrying Michal, daughter of King Saul (see I Samuel, Chapter 18). They explain that David had already been anointed as king by Samuel. Hence, his status differed from others and he was not bound by this mitzvah.

This circumstance is excluded by the Torah’s use of the expression “a new wife” in Deuteronomy 24:5 (Sotah 44a).

Sotah (ibid.) explains that the Torah would not grant a deferment for a forbidden marriage.

Leviticus 21:14 mentions the prohibition against a High Priest marrying a widow.

The prohibition against a priest marrying a divorcee is mentioned in Leviticus 21:7.
The Sages forbade a priest from marrying a woman who underwent chalitzah because the latter ritual resembles divorce (Kiddushin 78a, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:7).

The term mamzer refers to a child born from an adulterous or incestuous relationship. Deuteronomy 23:3 prohibits the marriage of a mamzer to a native born Israelite.

The term natin and natinah refer to male and female Gibeonites respectively. As mentioned above, the Gibeonites were a Canaanite nation who converted to Judaism. Despite their conversion, Joshua and later, David, forbade their marriage into the Jewish people (see Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:22-23).

In all aspects excepting the prohibition against their marriage to a native-born Israelite, a mamzer and a natin are considered as Jews and hence, bound by all the Torah’s mitzvot. Hence, they are also obligated to serve in the army and will not receive a deferment for a forbidden marriage. Nevertheless, although such individuals are required to serve, Kiddushin 76b relates that the soldiers of the House of David all had the highest pedigree of lineage. Anyone with blemished lineage was excused from service.

As described in Halachah 3.

These supportive functions are necessary for the army, yet do not involve the same danger as actual combat.

In contrast to the individuals previously mentioned who were required to present themselves at the army camp and perform supportive functions for the army.

See the following halachah. As mentioned in Halachah 4, these leniencies only apply to a milchemet hareshut. In contrast, in a milchemet mitzvah, “the entire [nation] must go out [to war], even a groom from his chamber, and a bride from her pavilion.”

In contrast, to one who has built a home, but has not had the opportunity to dedicate it.

This refers to nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship, in contrast to Kiddushin.

In the first three years after a vineyard is planted, its produce is orlah and may not be eaten. In the fourth year, the produce is considered neta reva’i and must be eaten in Jerusalem. Alternatively, it may be redeemed and the money used to purchase food to be eaten in Jerusalem.

The Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 214) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 582) count the obligation to remain free of all duties as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Sefer HaChinuch explains that this mitzvah was instituted to develop love and harmony between a man and his wife. Every two individuals possess different natures and tendencies. To overcome these differences, the Torah commands that a man and wife spend their first year together in close company, each one adopting his behavior to the other’s habits and nuances. In this manner, they will become familiar with each other and their love will grow.

Sotah 43a explains that though the verse only mentions a bride and groom explicitly, the acquisition of a house and the first benefits derived from a vineyard can also be inferred.

The Ramban (Deuieronomy 24:5) maintains that this prohibition is incumbent on the representatives of the community or the army. They are forbidden from conscripting a groom for any services. Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi differs, explaining that the prohibition against leaving home is incumbent on the groom himself. This appears to be the Rambam’s perspective (Lechem Mishneh).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 311) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 581) count this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

This clause is quoted from Sotah 44a. In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam explains that though the Talmud mentions two prohibitions, that that expression is used for greater emphasis without necessarily implying that the two should be counted as two separate mitzvot. The Ramban disagrees and maintains that the above principle only applies when the two prohibitions are directed at the same individual. In this case, one prohibition is incumbent upon the army, and one on the community. Hence, they should be counted as two separate mitzvot.

For the entire year.

And no deferment is granted.

Thus, he is still eligible for a deferment. Furthermore, even if twelve months have passed, but the tenants have not paid their rent, the owner may still be deferred (Lechem Mishneh).

Or hires someone else for this purpose.

Hence, his one-year deferment begins at that time.

Hence he is deferred from military service accordingly.

A deferment is granted only for a building or planting that is a mitzvah. In Eretz Yisrael, these activities are intrinsic to the mitzvah of settling Eretz Yisrael. In the Diaspora, they are not associated with any mitzvah (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 8:4).
The commentaries question the Rambam’s inclusion of this halachah. As explained in the commentary to Halachah 5:9, in contrast to the Ramban, the Rambam does not count the settlement of Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
They explain that though he does not count the settlement of the land as an independent mitzvah, it is an integral part of the fulfillment of other mitzvot (see Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 153). Hence, there is an element of mitzvah involved in building a home there.

Sotah 44a cites two interpretations of this phrase: Rabbi Akiva’s, as quoted by the Rambam and Rabbi Yossi ‘s, who defines it as referring to a person who is afraid of battle lest he suffer harm as retribution for his sins. The Sifri quotes a different opinion for Rabbi Yossi, explaining that the verse refers to a man over the age of forty whose strength has already begun to wane.

Such a person is excused from serving in the army, as the verse continues: “Let him go home lest he demoralize the hearts of his brethren as his own.” Sotah 44a explains that all the deferments mentioned above are granted so that many will leave the battlefront and thus, a faint-hearted person will not be embarrassed to depart.
A cowardly person should not try to muster false courage. The Tosefta (Sotah 7:14) states that anyone who is entitled to a deferment and does not leave the battlefront will ultimately die in the war and cause many of his brethren to fall with him.

Sotah 42a states: Our foes rely on the power of flesh and blood and we rely on the power of God.

I.e., be willing even to encounter danger. The phrase is borrowed from Judges 12:3.

Lest his preoccupation with them prevent him from fighting with all his heart. Vayikra Rabbah 25:2 states: “Whoever goes out to war and does not concentrate his thoughts on the battle will be killed.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 58) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 525) count this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. The Ramban and the Ra’avad differ, explaining that the Torah’s words should be interpreted as assurances of success and not as commands.

The failure of one soldier to fight valiantly can endanger the entire people: Firstly, often the defense of a strategic position depends on a single individual. Furthermore, panic and fear spread easily. The cowardice of one person can engender fear in the hearts of all his colleagues.

The Bible mentions many instances of wars in which the Jews were granted miraculous success. In the war against Midian, not one man was slain (Numbers 31:49). Similarly, in Joshua’s wars to conquer Eretz Yisrael, the Jews suffered minimal, if any, casualties.

These assurances were given King David by Avigail. At the same time, she also foresaw that he would be appointed king over Israel.

In Hilchot Teshuvah 8:3, the Rambam describes the world to come: “Since there will be no death associated with this life... it is called ‘the bond of life’.... This is the reward which no other reward can surpass. It is the ultimate good.”

Some texts substitute idolaters for the latter term.
These leniencies are only permitted when the army enters enemy territory. Though certain Rabbinic obligations are relaxed within Eretz Yisrael (See Chapter 6, Halachah 13), all Scriptural prohibitions must be observed.

Implied by that term is an which possesses a blemish, wound, or ailment that will cause it to die within twelve months (Chullin 3:1).

The soldiers are only allowed forbidden foods if they have no alternative. However, they need not be on the point of starvation. This leniency was granted for were they required to forage for kosher food, they would place themselves in danger of enemy attack (Radbaz).

Yayin Nesech in Hebrew. The prohibition against drinking Yayin Nesech is included as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. In addition, the Sages forbade drinking all wine touched by a gentile. See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot, Chapter 11.
The Ramban (Deuteronomy 6:10) objects to this ruling, maintaining that license was only granted in regard to the Rabbinic prohibition. However, Yayin Nesech itself is forbidden even during wartime. Other commentaries support his argument noting that idol worship and anything associated with it is included among the three sins for which a person should sacrifice his life rather than transgress.
However, other authorities defend the Rambam’s decision, noting that licentious sexual behavior is also one of these three sins for which for which a person should sacrifice his life and, as stated in the following halachah, soldiers are allowed relations with gentile women in wartime (Or Sameach).

See Chullin 17a.

The Ramban (loc. cit.) questions the Rambam’s statements, noting that this verse refers to the occupation of Eretz Yisrael during the time of Joshua. During the entire fourteen years when Eretz Yisrael was settled, there was no obligation to keep any of the dietary laws even outside of a battle situation. If so, how can this license be extended to the circumstances at hand?
However, the Rambam’s logic can be explained as follows: Since we see that the Torah relaxed the dietary laws entirely during the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, we can assume that temporary license would be granted in other conquests (Radbaz).

Deuteronomy 21:10-11 states:
When you go out to war against your enemies, God will give them over to your hand, and you may take captives. If you see a beautiful woman among the prisoners and desire her, you may take her as a wife.
The Torah permits this relationship only as a concession to man’s natural desires. Were the Torah to unequivocally forbid intimacy with captive women, the prohibition would probably be ignored. Hence, certain strictures are instituted so that soldiers could release their natural desires without leading to total licentiousness and a breakdown of Jewish morality and family life (Kiddushin 21b).

There are other authorities who forbid all intimacy during wartime. Relations are not permitted until the woman is brought home and undergoes the mourning procedures mentioned below. This is still a “concession” to man’s natural tendencies for the soldier realizes that ultimately, he will be able to consummate his desires (Ramban, Deuteronomy, ibid.; Rashi commenting on Kiddushin 21a; Jerusalem Talmud, Makkot 2:6).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 221) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 532) include the laws associated with relations with a captive woman, yefat toar in Hebrew, as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
However, though taking a yefat toar was permitted, the Sages looked askance at this practice. They cite the example of King David who took Ma’akah, the daughter of Talmai, King of Geshur as a captive wife. Concerning their marriage, Midrash Tanchuma comments:
See what came out of their union! Avshalom, who desired to kill his father..., was born. A controversy broke out in Israel and myriads were killed, including the wisest men of the land....

Judaism views sexuality and responsibility as fundamentally interrelated. Were the soldier permitted to engage in sexual relations with a woman and then, abandon her without any further ties, he would begin to view sexuality as cheap and commonplace Hence, the Torah instituted the practices described in the following halachot (Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 41).

The Minchat Chinuch asks why the Rambam makes a blanket statement that the soldier is required to bring a yefat toar into his home. As mentioned in Halachah 5, the Sages did not approve of marriage to a yefat toar and were pleased when her captor did not desire her and set her free. Hence, ideally, it would seem preferable for the soldier to lose his desire for the woman immediately, free her at that time, and never bring her home.
Possibly, the Rambam’s statements can be understood on the basis of the Meiri’s commentary, Kiddushin 21a. The Meiri writes that relations with a yefat toar are only permitted when the soldier intends to marry her. If he does not have that intention, all relations, even a single experience, are forbidden. (Note, however, Halachah 4 which states that a priest is permitted to engage in relations with a yefat toar even though he is not permitted to marry her.)

See Halachah 6.

Once a captive woman has been enslaved as a servant, intimacy with her is forbidden (Kiddushin 21 a).

The word eishet used in the above verse can be rendered both as “woman” or “wife of.” On that basis, Kiddusliin (ibid.) derives this law.

Sanhderin 52b teaches that a Jew is not liable for transgression of the prohibition against adultery if he has relations with a gentile’s wife. However, though a Jew is absolved for punishment for such an act, a gentile is liable. One of the seven mitzvot which the gentiles are obligated to fulfill is the prohibition against adultery.

Though the verse mentions “a beautiful women,” by using the word “desire,” it implies that the attractiveness of the woman is not the determinant factor. As long as the man desires her, these laws apply (Kiddushin, ibid.)

He may not take even one woman for the sake of another person and not for himself (Tosafot, Kiddushin 22a).

This word is lacking in the printed texts of the Rambam and was added on the basis of manuscripts brought from Yemen.

The Kessef Mishneh writes that the soldier must take his captive to a city to have relations with her. Other commentaries offer different interpretations. However, all share the same basic theme. Sexual relations must be carried out in a private place without the knowledge of the other soldiers.

A priest also has natural desires. Were a captive woman forbidden him, he might be overcome by his instincts and violate the prohibition (Kiddushin 21b).

As mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:3, a priest may not marry a convert.

The latter phrase is a euphemism for conversion based on Boaz’s blessing to Ruth 1:12: “May a full reward be granted you by God, Lord of Israel, under whose wings you have taken shelter.”
Like other converts, before conversion, she must accept all the obligations of Torah and mitzvot.

For a woman, the conversion process involves, immersion in a mikveh and acceptance of the mitzvot (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:5-6).

The mourning practices described below are only necessary if the woman hesitates to adopt Torah and mitzvot. If she willingly desires to convert, none of these rites are required (Yevamot 47b).

On a number of occasions, e.g., Numbers 20:29, Deuteronomy 34:8, the Torah mentions one month as a complete period of mourning. A similar concept is expressed in Jewish law, see Hilchot Evel 6:1-2.
This mourning period was instituted to affect both the man and the woman: The man was intended to continually confront this woman while she was mourning. Seeing her in this state, he would lose his original desire (Sifri, Rashi).
From the woman’s perspective, this period was an act of mercy, granting her an opportunity to release the grief and sorrow she felt about her forced abduction from her native country and her ruptured family ties. It also represented a purification process, during which the woman was cleansed of the idolatrous practices of her native land (Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 41).

Yevamot 48b relates that Rabbi Akiva interprets the terms “father” and “mother” as euphemisms for idol worship. Similarly, Jeremiah 2:27 chides the people for “saying to a stock of wood: ‘You are my father;’ and to a stone: ‘You brought me forth.’”

Rather, he should treat her with mercy and kindness.

She was required to shave her head to diminish her beauty. This practice also served as a sign of purification and acceptance of a new status (Chizzkuni). Compare to Leviticus 14:8 which describes the initiation of the Levites, and to Numbers 8:7, which describes the purification of a Nazirite.

The soldier is required to bring his captive to his own home. He is not permitted to find her another dwelling in which to undergo these procedures.

And set her free, rather than marry her.

Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute “and she desires him” for the latter phrase. The change answers a significant question: Can the woman’s captor marry her against her will or must she desire him?
The Rambam and other commentaries accept the principle that the woman’s consent is not required for the marriage. Certain opinions maintain that though the Rambam differs regarding forced conversion (see below), he accepts this opinion regarding marriage. However, based on those manuscripts, it appears that after conversion, the yefat toar is considered as any other Jewess and cannot be married against her will.

The Rambam requires the captive woman to willingly accept Judaism. In contrast, the Ramban maintains that she may be converted and married against her will.

This three month waiting period is not instituted because of the particular circumstances associated with a yefat to’ar, but rather, is a condition imposed on every woman who converts to Judaism.
It would take three months for a woman to realize whether she was pregnant. Thus, the Sages instituted this waiting period in order to determine the pedigree of lineage of any children born to female converts. Hilchot Gerushin 11:21 relates that even if a gentile couple convert together, they are forced to separate for three months to differentiate between children conceived before their entry into Judaism and those conceived afterwards.
Similarly, in this instance, the captive woman must wait three months to determine when a child born to her was conceived.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 4, for a definition of these terms. After her conversion, the yefat toaris granted all the rights possessed by any other Jewish woman.

In this instance as well, she is granted all the rights of any other female convert.

The Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 263) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 533) include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. In the Guide to the Perplexed (ibid.), the Rambam writes that this prohibition applies from the time the captor engages in relations with his captive (see below).

The Sifri explains that in addition to the explicit prohibitions against sale of the captive woman, she may also not be bartered, exchanged, or given to another Jew as a servant.

Tamurah 4b relates that any business transaction that violates a Torah prohibition is automatically nullified.

The Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 264) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 534) also include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.
In this instance as well, the prohibition begins from the time of relations, as implied by the verse (ibid.): “You may not sell her for money or keep her as a servant after taking advantage of her.”

The Sifri notes that the root amar is Persian for servant and is rarely used in Hebrew.

A similar interval is granted to a Canaanite servant to decide whether he is willing to become circumcised and accept the mitzvot in which he is obligated (Hilchot Milah 1:6).
During this entire period, the captor may neither engage in sexual relations with her or use her as a servant.

See Halachot 10 and 11 of this chapter and Chapters 10 and 11 for an explanation of those laws.

The latter term is a translation of the Hebrew, ger toshav. As explained in Halachah 10, it refers to a gentile who accepts upon himself the observance of the seven mitzvot. The term is appropriate for such a gentile is entitled to settle in Eretz Yisrael. For when the Jews have undisputed rule over the land, they are forbidden to allow a gentile who has not accepted the seven mitzvot to dwell there for one moment. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:7.

Deuteronomy 7:3 mentions the prohibition against marrying a gentile. It also applies to a resident alien.

The child only receives the status of a convert after he undergoes the conversion process. Before then, he is a gentile as any child born from relations between a Jew and a gentile woman.

Yevamot 23a comments: “A son born to you from a gentile woman is called her son and not yours.” Thus, this child has no relation to his natural father in regard to inheritance or Jewish lineage.

Ketubot 12a relates that a Jewish court may convert a minor. When he comes of age, he has the right renounce the Jewish faith and return to gentile practices.
The Or Sameach notes that it is only necessary for the child to be immersed in the mikveh if the mother delays her conversion until after his birth. If she converts while pregnant, her immersion is sufficient for her child as well. Needless to say, if the child is male, he must be circumcised as a convert as well.

While David ruled as King of Judah in Hebron, he conquered Talmai, king of Geshur, and took his daughter, Ma’aka, as a yefat to’ar (See commentaries, II Samuel 3:3).
Ma’aka conceived from those relations and bore a daughter, Tamar. Tamar was extremely beautiful and Amnon, David’s oldest son fell in love with her. He literally fell sick with love. His friends noticed him wasting away and helped him contrive a scheme to rape her.
Amnon feigned to be seriously ill and when David came to visit him, he requested that his father have Tamar prepare food for him. Unaware of Amnon’s intent, David consented and sent his daughter to him. When she came, Amnon ordered all his servants to leave and took hold of the girl. She protested, begging him to marry her: “Speak to the king, for he will not withhold me from you.” Amnon refused, wanting to only to fulfill his desires.
After consummating his passion, Amnon became obsessed with hate for Tamar. His despise for her exceeded his previous attraction. He sent her away rudely and paid no further attention to her. Avshalom, Tamar’s brother, was enraged at the episode. He bided his time and when he had an opportunity, slew Amnon in revenge (II Samuel, Chapter 13).

Hence, he could have been considered David’s heir.

The Or Sameach notes that Ma’aka must have converted before Tamar’s birth. Thus, she was considered the child ‘s halachic as well as natural mother. Otherwise, halachically, Tamar would not have been considered her daughter and hence, would have had no relation to Avshalom.

For there was no relation between them.

The Kessef Mislineh questions why the captive woman is allowed to worship idols for such a long time. In no other instance is such tolerance shown. The commentaries suggest that this leniency was granted because she was forcefully possessed.

Regarding the captive woman’s release, Deuteronomy 21:14 states: vishilachta linafsha which literally meaning: “You shall send her to herself.” On this phrase, the Midrash HaGadol comments: “‘Send her to herself,’ but not to her gods.”

See Chapter 6, Halachah 1.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 14.

In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6, the Rambam writes that no idol worshippers should be allowed to live among us “when the hand of Israel is powerful over them.” The extent of the authority the Jews must yield is a matter of question among the commentaries.
It appears that throughout the Second Temple period, though Judeah existed as an independent country, the Sages did not exercise this authority. Similarly, in Eretz Yisrael today, there are few, if any, Torah leaders who feel justified to assume such powers.

Chapter 10, Halachah 9, states that a gentile who studies Torah is worthy of death at the hand of God.

Just as an heir becomes the legal owner of all possessions left to him, the Torah, our national heritage, belongs to each Jew, regardless of background or upbringing.

With the exception of certain restrictions based on yichus, pedigree of lineage, converts are granted the same privileges and responsibilities as native-born Jews. They have a full share in the Torah.

In the Talmudic era, the later Hasmonean kings conquered the Idumeans and forcibly converted them to Judaism. What were the results of this act? Herod, an Idumean, became King of Judeah and ruled the land as a cruel tyrant.

This obligation is dependent upon every individual in every era. The Tosafot Yom Yov (Avot 3:14) relates:
As the Rambam writes, we were commanded by Moses [to compel the gentiles to accept the seven commands]. If this applies to compulsion at the point of the sword, with threats of execution,... it surely applies regarding compulsion through persuasion, to lead their hearts to the will of their Creator.”
The Jews must serve as “a light unto the nations” (Isaiah 42:6) teaching them the seven mitzvot and instructing them in proper behavior (See the commentary of the Radak on the above verse). Similarly, the Chatam Sofer (Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 85) writes that it is a mitzvah to guide the gentiles in the service of God.
This particularly applies in the present age, when there is far greater communication between Jews and gentiles than ever before. The Jews should take advantage of this phenomenon. Rather than be influenced by the gentiles, they should utilize this freedom of communication to convince the gentiles to accept their seven mitzvot.
With this halachah, the Rambam begins a different section of Hilchot Melachim. These two halachot, and, similarly, the following two chapters, deal with the seven mitzvot the gentiles are obligated to perform. Afterwards, the final two chapters deal with the coming of Mashiach.
An important principle is implied by this sequence. Jewish thought relates that God rewards our behavior “measure for measure.” One of the fundamental achievements of Mashiach will be the refinement of the gentile nations. As the prophet Tzephaniah 3:9 declares: “I will transform the peoples to a purer language that they all will call upon the name of God and serve Him with one purpose” (see Halachah 11:4). As a preparatory step to merit these rewards, we must involve ourselves in the refinement of the gentiles by motivating their acceptance of the seven mitzvot.

In contrast to the previous principles, this law only applies when the Jews have undisputed authority over Eretz Yisrael. See Chapter 9, Halachah 14.

The laws regarding resident aliens only applied while the entire Jewish people lived in Eretz Yisrael (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6). Nevertheless, in that era, a gentile could accept the obligations of a resident alien in any land.

Thus, comprising a court of law. The resident alien’s acceptance of the seven mitzvot requires the presence of a court as does a gentile’s conversion to Judaism.

I.e. to convert.

In Hilchot A vodat Kochavim, Chapter 10, the Rambam outlines the rules governing our relations with our fellow Jews and those governing our relations with gentiles. After a gentile has waited twelve months, his original commitment to convert is no longer taken seriously and his status reverts from that of a potential proselyte to an ordinary gentile.
The above is based on the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah which reads k’min haumot. The Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read: kmin min haumot, meaning “as a non-believer from the gentiles.” Such an individual is subjected to harsher treatment than most gentiles.

This principle can be derived from the Mishnah’s statement (Sanhderin 90a) that Bilaam will not receive a share in the world to come. It can obviously be inferred that the righteous of the gentiles will be granted a portion in that eternal good.
The Zohar Chada, fh (Ruth 78:4) relates that though the pious gentiles will merit a portion in the world to come, their portion will be separate from that of the Jewish people.

In the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah (conclusion of section 8), the Rambam writes:
The masses of people were created to be “company” for the wise that they not be alone... Everything in this world is only intended for the sake of a man who is complete in wisdom and deed... as implied by our Sages’ statement: “All that God possesses in this world are four square cubits of Halachah.”
Similarly, our Sages comment that bereishit, the first word of the Torah, can be broken up into two words: beit reishit, “two firsts”; implying that the world was created for the sake of two things that were called “first”: Israel and the Torah.
Accordingly, on one level, the purpose of the fulfillment of the seven mitzvot is to establish a stable world and a moral and hence, thriving society. However, this purpose is not an end in itself, but rather a means to allow the Jews to fulfill the Torah. Therefore, the gentiles’ acceptance of the seven mitzvot must also contain an awareness of the fundamental importance of Torah.

Though these mitzvot were commanded well before the giving of the Torah, when the Moses received the Torah, these commandments were renewed. We see a similar example in regard to other mitzvot. In his commentary on the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6), the Rambam writes:
All the [mitzvot] we fulfill should be carried out because of God’s command. transmitted by Moses.... We do not circumcise ourselves because Abraham circumcised himself, but because God commanded us, through Moses, to circumcise ourselves.

Without acknowledging them as Divine commands.

Thus, there are three levels in the gentiles’ acceptance of their seven mitzvot: a resident alien who makes a formal commitment in the presence of a Torah court; “the pious among the gentiles,” individuals who accept the seven mitzvot with the proper intent, but do not formalize their acceptance; and a gentile who fulfills the seven mitzvot out of intellectual conviction.

The Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute “but rather, of their wise men” for this phrase.
The difference between these two texts revolves around the extent in which a gentile is required to perceive his role in creation. According to the Yemenite texts, a wise man can perceive how the fulfillment of the seven mitzvot can lead to a stable society. Hence, he will commit himself to their fulfillment. However, it is piety, not wisdom, which will motivate an individual to carry them out for the sake of God and Torah.
According to the standard published text, the gentiles themselves must realize that their existence is only “for the sake of Israel and for the sake of Torah.” Anyone who does not understand that concept has not reached complete wisdom.

Sanhderin 56a. relates that Adam was commanded regarding all seven commands. Nevertheless, the Rambam choose to quote from Bereishit Rabbah 16:6 which mentions the seventh command, the prohibition against eating flesh taken from a living animal, as being given to Noah. It appears that the Rambam chose the latter source because man was not permitted to consume flesh at all until after the flood. Together with the license to eat meat, God explicitly forbade Noah from eating flesh from a live animal.

The Midrash derives all these six prohibitions from the exegesis of Genesis 2:16: “And God the Lord commanded to man, saying: ‘You may eat of all the trees of the garden....’” As evident from Hoshea 5:11, tzav, “command,” serves as an allusion to the worship of false gods. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 2.

The mention of God’s name develops an association between this verse and the prohibition against cursing God mentioned in Leviticus 24:16. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 3.

The Hebrew terms translated as “to man” refer to the command against murder, as mentioned in Genesis 9:6. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 4.

The word, “saying,” establishes an analogy between this verse and Jeremiah 3:1 which mentions this prohibition. It is discussed in Halachot 5-8.

This is derived from the license granted by the verse to eat from the trees of the garden, implying that otherwise, Adam would have been forbidden to do so because the property did not belong to him. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 9.

This command is inferred from the word Elohim. For although that term also means “Lord,” Exodus 22:27 uses that term in reference to a judge. This command is discussed in Halachah 14.

This prohibition is discussed in Halachot 10-13.

Other commentaries explain that gentiles are obligated to perform other mitzvot, for example, honoring one’s parents (See Rashi, Genesis 11:32) and charity (See Eichah 4:6). The Ran (Sanhderin 56b) relates that the number seven only applies to prohibitions. However, there are other positive commands that gentiles are obligated to fulfill.

Genesis 17:10 related God’s command to Abraham: “This is My covenant between Me and you and your offspring... Circumcise every male.”
As the Rambam writes in Chapter 10, Halachah 7, from that time onwards, the Jews were obligated to observe the mitzvah of circumcision. However, Leviticus 12:3 repeats the command to circumcise. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6), the Rambam explains the need for this repetition:
All the [mitzvot] we fulfill should be carried out because of God’s command transmitted by Moses... We do not circumcise ourselves because Abraham circumcised himself, but because God commanded us, through Moses, to circumcise ourselves.
At Mount Sinai, the Jews were singled out by God to be “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” Thus, the mitzvot given then differ, in purpose as well as in number, from the mitzvot given the gentiles. The gentiles’ seven mitzvot are intended to establish a stable and moral society. The purpose of the 613 mitzvot is to establish a complete bond between God and every aspect of man’s personality.
Similarly, the mystical nature of the commands differ. Kiddushin 31 a relates that one who carries out a mitzvah in fulfillment of God’s command is greater than one who does so out of his own volition. Why? Because by fulfilling a mitzvah commanded by God, man steps beyond his humanity and performs deeds that are Godly in nature. This quality was granted to the mitzvot at Sinai and not beforehand. Consequently, all the mitzvot previously commanded to the forefathers had to be repeated.

Genesis 19:27 relates how “Abraham rose early in the morning, [hurrying] to the place where he stood before God.” Berachot 26b infers that this applies to his morning prayers.
Kiddushin 82a states that Abraham fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given. This statement raises a question: Why does the Rambam only mention circumcision and the morning service as mitzvot which Abraham performed?
The commentaries explain that the Rambam only mentions those commands explicitly mentioned or clearly alluded to in the Torah. Furthermore, it is possible that the manner in which the Abraham and his descendants fulfilled the other commands differ from the manner in which we fulfill them today. For example, the Zohar writes that Ya’akov’s placing the rods before Laban’s sheep drew down the same spiritual energies as our donning of Tefillin.

Genesis 26:12 mentions how “Isaac reaped one hundred measures.” Bereishit Rabbah 64:6 explains that he measured his crop in order to give tithes.
The Ra’avad questions why the Rambam does not count tithes as one of the mitzvot instituted by Abraham for Genesis 14:20 explicitly mentions Abraham’s separation of tithes. The commentaries explain that Isaac and not Abraham, originated the mitzvah of tithing produce as mandated by the Torah. Abraham tithed the booty he conquered in war. In contrast, according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah to tithe applies only to certain agriculture products.

Genesis 24:63 relates how “Isaac went out in the fields to pray toward evening.”

Genesis 32:26 relates that when Jacob was wrestling with Esau’s archangel, the latter was able to dislocate Jacob’s hip joint. Verse 33 continues: “Therefore, the children of Israel do not eat the displaced nerve on the hip joint.” The nerve in question is the major nerve of the lower extremity, running down the back of the leg.

Genesis 28:11 relates that “Jacob encountered the place and spent the night there, because the sun had set.” Berachot (loc. cit.) explains that implied by the Hebrew is the recitation of the evening prayers.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the source for the Rambam’s statements, asking which mitzvot were commanded to Amram. Some commentaries point to the statements of the Mechilta (Exodus 19:10) that before the giving of the Torah, Moses reviewed the mitzvot which the Jews had been given in Egypt. Since Amram served as the leader of the people, these mitzvot were probably given to him.
Others explain that the Mechilta could be referring to the mitzvot of matzah, marror, and the other elements of the Passover sacrifice given to Moses and not mitzvot given to Amram. They suggest that the Rambam is referring to the mitzvot of divorce and marriage. When Pharaoh commanded the Egyptians to drown the Jewish babies, Amram divorced his wife. Later, at the suggestion of his daughter, Miriam, he remarried her.

As explained above, there is a difference between the mitzvot given to the gentiles and those commanded the Jews.

Every false god has an accepted manner in which its adherents serve it. The idol worshippers established many [different] services for each particular idol and image. The service of one does not resemble the service of another (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:2). A person does not incur the death penalty unless he worships a false god in its appropriate manner.

In addition to the sin of serving an idol in its appropriate manner, the death penalty is also given for bowing to one, sacrificing to it, offering incense to it, or pouring libations to it, even if the idol is generally not served in that manner (ibid. 3:3).

For example, kissing the idol, embracing it, washing it, sweeping before it, and similar acts of affection and reverence (ibid. 3:6).

A structure which attracts people and motivates them to gather around it. Construction of such a structure is forbidden even as an act of reverence to God (ibid. 6:6).

A tree which is worshipped (ibid. 8:3). The Zohar (Vol. I 49b) relates that worshippers of the moon would employ such trees in their services.

This is not a general prohibition against all artwork. In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:10, the Rambam explains that it only applies to sculptures of human faces. Other images and paintings, imprints, and tapestries of humans are not forbidden.

The Rambam uses the word berach which literally meaning “blesses” as a euphemism.

HilchotAvodah Zarah 2:7 explains that this refers to the name Adonai and, of course, the name Y-H-V-H which is only to be mentioned in the Temple.

The term kinui implies any name used to describe God and not necessarily, one of the seven names, e.g., El or Shaddai which are holy and may not be erased.

Hilchot Avodat Kochavim (ibid.) explains that a Jew is only liable if he mentions either the name Adonai or the name Y-H-V-H in the curse.
The obligation of gentiles in instances where Jews are exempt is not accepted by all Talmudic authorities (Note Sanhderin 56a). The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam follows the more severe opinion.

Intentionally, see Halachah 10:1.

This refers to a person who intentionally delivered a blow to the mother which caused the fetus to die. A Jew would not be held guilty of murder for such an act (See Exodus 21:22, Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:1). However, a gentile is considered liable. It is obvious from this statement that abortion is equated with murder and is only permitted in certain instances where the mother’s life is threatened.

Genesis 9:6 states: “He who spills human blood shall have his own blood spilled.”

This refers to a person who is trefe, possessing a blemish or illness which would cause his death within twelve months. A Jew who kills such a person is not given the death penalty (Hilchot Rotzeach 2:8).

Other texts substitute “in a lion’s mouth” for the latter phrase.

With regard to a Jew who commits such an act, Hilchot Rotzeach 3:10 states:
A person who... starves a colleague to death or... sets a dog or snake upon him: in all cases of this nature, the person is not executed. Nevertheless, he is considered a murderer and the One who avenges blood will seek his blood.

A person is allowed to kill a person who is trying to kill or rape another individual (Hilchot Rotzeach 1:6-12). However, this leniency is only ‘granted when there is no other alternative.

For he is not allowed to kill him. In contrast, if a Jewish pursuer kills a Jewish attacker under similar circumstances, “he is considered guilty of murder and obligated to die. However, he is not executed by the court” (ibid. 1:13).

There are many more relationships forbidden to a Jew. See Leviticus, Chapter 17, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapters 1 and 2.

This applies even if she is not his father’s wife. See the following halachah.

This applies even if she is not his mother, and even after his father’s death.

As mentioned in the commentary to Chapter 8, Halachah 3, a Jew is not liable for adultery if he engages in relations with a gentile’s wife. Nevertheless, the marriages of gentiles are significant for other gentiles and they are executed for committing adultery.

But not his paternal sister as obvious from the verse quoted below.

I.e., homosexuality.

This verse concludes the Torah’s description of the creation of Eve and Adam’s union with her. Thus, it serves as a guide for the sexual behavior of all his descendants.

For otherwise, there would be no need for such a prohibition for relations with males are explicitly forbidden.

It is interesting to note that there is no prohibition against relations with a daughter.

Halachah 7 explain that this refers to a woman who is married (nissuin) and not merely consecrated (erusin).

Give birth to children (Rashi, on Genesis, ibid.).

I.e., children can never be born from such a union.

Abraham made this statement to Avimelech to excuse his behavior in calling Sarah his sister rather than his wife. Abraham explained that she was like his sister (she was his father's granddaughter). However, he was allowed to marry her because they shared a common paternal ancestor, but not a common maternal ancestor.

This law is derived from the inclusion of two prohibitions; one against relations with one’s father’s wife and one against relations with one’s mother. If the prohibition against relations with one’s mother only applied to a woman married to one’s father, only one prohibition would be necessary (Sanhderin 58a).

If not, there would be no need for this prohibition for she would be forbidden as any other married woman (ibid.).

A Jew is only liable for relations with a male nine years and over. Below that age, the Torah does not consider the child as sexually developed (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:14). The Kessef Mishneh favors the view that the same laws apply to a gentile as to a Jew. The Radbaz maintains that a gentile is liable no matter what the age of the child.

The age of an animal is of no significance whatsoever. A person is sentenced to death for relations with an animal even on the day of its birth (ibid. 1:16).

The question of executing the animal was debated and left undecided by Sanhderin 55a. Since no decision was reached, the death penalty is not administered.

The animal is also executed lest it be seen in the street and the passersby comment: “See that animal! So and so was executed for having relations with it.”

I.e., vaginal, rather than anal intercourse.

“Before the Torah was given, a man would meet a woman in the market-place, if both he and she desired to marry, he would bring her to his home and possess her privately, thus, making her his wife.”
“Once the Torah was given, the Israelites were commanded [as follows]: Should a man desire to marry a woman, he must first acquire her in the presence of witnesses. Afterwards, she will become his wife” (Hilchot Ishut 1:1).
The latter paragraph describes the two stages in Jewish marriage: kiddushin and nissuin. Only a Jew is obligated to marry in this fashion. For a gentile, the law remains as it was before the giving of the Torah and the marriage bonds are established through sexual relations alone.

When Avimelech took Sarah, Abraham’s wife, God employed this phrase to warn him that relations with her were forbidden. From the use of the phrase “possessed by her husband” as opposed to “another man’s wife” or the like, our Sages derived that the marriage bond was established through sexual relations.

For capital punishment in the same manner as a Jew. With regard to relations with a Jewess, a gentile sexual offender is never granted greater leniency than a Jew.

Leviticus 20:22 uses a plural term, mishkavei ishah to describe sexual relations. This expression was chosen to teach us that one is liable for two forms of intercourse, vaginal and anal (Sanhderin 54b).

The latter term refers to a virgin girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.

See Deuteronomy 22:23-24. In this specific instance, a more severe penalty is given than in other cases of adultery.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Kiddushin 1:1) mentions that whenever a gentile is given the same punishment as Jews, his trial is also governed by the same laws. Generally, a gentile’s trial is decided by a single judge on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. In this instance, there is obligation for twenty~three judges, two witnesses, a warning and all other elements required in capital cases involving Jews.
The Ran (Sanhderin 57b) does not accept this opinion. He brings proofs that the Babylonian Talmud, on which basis halachah is decided, does not differentiate between this case and other trials involving gentiles.

Once a couple have undergone the wedding ceremony, the penalty for adultery changes from being stoned to death to strangulation, a less severe means of execution.

Although a Jew would be sentenced to strangulation for the same sin.

In the former instances, no punishment would have been exacted for relations with a gentile woman. Hence, the offender is punished according to Jewish law. However, when a parallel offence exists among the seven mitzvot, a gentile is punished accordingly. Decapitation is considered a more severe means of execution than strangulation.

The slave must also have engaged in relations with the maidservant for the issue of adultery to be raised (Radbaz).

Sanhderin 57a mentions that a master should be executed for such an act. However, the reason for his execution is a matter of debate among the commentaries.
Rashi maintains that there is no concept of marriage with regard to slaves. The master is violating the prohibition against theft, taking the woman he had given to his slave, but not adultery. The Rambam does not accept this view for the slave never really acquired the woman. ‘Nor does he have the potential to do so, for “everything acquired by a servant becomes his master’s property” (Radbaz).

The fact that the slave had relations with her is not sufficient to establish a bond between them for slaves were known for their lewdness. Their “marriage” is not recognized until the matter is publicly accepted.

The masculine conjugation of the verb is used implying that it is the master who performs this act.

Married women are obligated to cover their hair (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115) Even gentiles would observe this practice.

A Jew who desires to divorce his wife must give her a bill of divorce (get). This document must be composed by a scribe with expertise and training regarding all the particular laws involved. In contrast, gentiles do not require such a document. Their separation constitutes divorce.
Modern commentaries question whether these laws still apply to gentiles in the present age when most countries have instituted formal divorce proceedings. Since these proceedings are recognized by their court system and the laws established by a country must be observed by its inhabitants, a woman may be considered married until formally divorced.

This differs from Jewish law. According to Scriptural Law, a husband must initiate divorce and does not need his wife’s consent. In the Middle Ages, Rabbenu Gershon decreed that a woman may not be divorced against her will. However, the husband must willingly decide to grant the divorce.

The Rambam’s statements are based on the Jerusalem Talmud (ibid.) which states that the gentiles “do not have divorce.” The Ran (Sanhderin 58b) quotes an opinion which interprets that statement to mean that divorce is absolutely forbidden to a gentile couple.

The converse is also true. A Jew is prohibited against stealing from a gentile (Hilchot Genevah 1:2). However, he is not given the death penalty for such an act.

Genevah in Hebrew. In contrast to gezeilah, “robbery,” genevah involves taking someone’s money secretly without the owner’s or the public’s knowledge (Hilchot Genevah 1:3).

The command “Do not steal” in the Ten Commandments refers to kidnapping. Sanhderin 57a explains how this prohibition applies to gentiles.

For example, withholding rent due a landlord or the fee charged for the hire of a utensil or other property.

Deuteronomy 23:25 grants a worker the privilege of eating from the produce he is harvesting. However, this right is only given while he is actually working. Afterwards, taking from the produce is forbidden.

Though a Jew is also prohibited against all the above, there are different prohibitions involved. He is only labeled a robber if he forcibly taking money in the open.

A p’rutah was the smallest coin of the time. A Jew is also forbidden to steal less than this minimal amount. However, should he do so, the matter is not taken to court for surely, the owner is not concerned about the loss of such an insignificant amount (Hilchot Gezeilah 1:6).

With regard to Jews, though it is forbidden to steal from a thief, the fine the second thief is obligated to pay differs from that required of the first. See Hilchot Genevah 1:17.

The term limb implies a bone with sinews and nerves as well as meat.

The Sha’agat Aryeh explains that there is a problem implicit in the Rambam’s statements: A gentile is liable for eating even the slightest amount of meat. Since it is impossible for him to eat a limb that has no meat on it whatsoever, it appears superfluous to mention two prohibitions: one against eating a limb and the other against eating meat.

A Jew is also bound by these prohibitions. However, he is not liable for punishment until he consumes a minimum measure, the size of an olive (approx. one ounce), of these forbidden foods. Eruvin 4a explains that the concept of minimum amounts is part of the Oral Tradition which was given to Israel alone. Hence, the gentiles are liable for eating even the slightest amount of meat.

Genesis 9:4, the source for the prohibition against eating flesh from a living animal, states: “You may not eat flesh with its life, which is its blood.” Nevertheless, Sanhderin 59a relates that this verse does not prohibit a gentile from drinking blood taken from a living animal. In contrast, a Jew is prohibited against drinking all blood, whether taken from an animal before its slaughter or afterwards.

The term limb implies a bone with sinews and nerves as well as meat.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot A.ssurot (5:2), the Rambam writes:
One is not liable for [the prohibition of] a limb from a living creature unless the limb is separated... with its flesh, sinews, and bones. However, if only flesh is separated from a living creature, [a person who eats it] is liable for [the prohibition against eating] trefe [meat], but is not liable for [the prohibition against] a limb from a living creature.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that a gentile is permitted trefe meat and questions why he is prohibited against eating flesh from a living animal.
The Lechem Mishneh replies that the prohibition for Jews and for gentiles are derived from different verses. The verse that prohibits a gentile from eating a limb from a living creature states; “You may not eat flesh with its life,” explicitly mentioning flesh.

Though the Torah occasionally differentiates between these types of animals, in this instance, the same laws apply.

Throughout the Mishneh Torah, the use of this expression implies that the Rambam does not have an explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source to substantiate his statements. However, an analysis of the different references to the subject leads to this conclusion.

The Ra’avad does not accept this statement and maintains that a gentile is liable for eating flesh from a living bird. He is only exempt from eating flesh from a living creeping animal, sheretz in Hebrew.
The Radbaz defends the Rambam’s statements, noting that though Chullin 101b obligates Jews for eating flesh taken from a living bird, gentiles may be exempt from that prohibition. The verse which describes the gentiles’ prohibition mentions, basar “meat.” Nedarim 54b relates an argument among the Sages where meat from a bird is considered “meat” or not. Thus, though a gentile is forbidden from eating such meat, he is not executed as punishment.

Kosher slaughter involves slitting the gullet and the wind-pipe. Once this is done, the animal will surely die within moments.

After slaughter, an animal will frequently move its limbs convulsively for a short time.

The animal is considered alive until it stops moving. The Radbaz states that although a prohibtion exists, since the animal has been ritually slaughtered, a gentile is not executed for violating this prohibition.

In contrast, a Jew is only liable for eating a limb from a kosher species (Hilchot Ma’acholot Assurot 5:1). The prohibition against a Jew’s eating such meat is derived from the verse (Deuteronomy 12:23): “Do not eat the flesh with its life.” Chullin 102a explains that the prohibition only applies to flesh that we are permitted to eat. Such an exclusion does not apply regarding gentiles.

A Jew is not held liable under such circumstances. Chullin 121 b permits a gentile to eat flesh from an animal slaughtered in this fashion and the Rashbah and other authorities accept this view. However, the Rambam follows Chullin 33a which forbid a gentile from eating this meat.

Hilchot Sanhderin 1:1 obligates the Jews to set up courts “in every major city and town.” However, that obligation applies only in Eretz Yisrael. In the Diaspora, they are only obligated to establish courts in every major city (ibid. 1:2). Similarly, gentiles need not establish courts in towns.

The Ramban (Genesis 34:13) disagrees and explains that the main function of these courts was not to deal with the ritual elements of these mitzvot, but rather to deal with civil cases, e.g. petty theft, wage disputes, and fraud.

To cite a parallel: Tanna D’bei Eliyahu (Chapter 11) also stresses that a court’s responsibilities extend beyond the realm of judgement: “The Sanhderin is obligated to tie iron garters around their loins, lift their robes above their ankles... and travel throughout the villages of Israel... teaching the nation.”

In contrast to a Jew, a gentile offender is executed for the violation of even the slightest command. As mentioned in the commentary to Halachah 1 of this chapter, the gentiles were created in order to allow for the maintenance of a stable and orderly world. All the seven commands have that intent. Hence, by violating one of those seven commands, they contradict their very purpose for existence.

See the commentary to Chapter 3, Hachahah 8.

Genesis 33:1 8 relates that during Jacob’s return journey from Padan Aram to his father’s home, he camped outside the city of Shechem. Shechem, prince of the city, kidnapped Dinah, Jacob's daughter, and raped her.

As retribution, Shimon and Levi, two of Jacob’s sons slew every male in the entire city.
The Ramban (ibid.) does not accept the Rambam’s interpretation of those events. He notes that Jacob severely reprimanded his sons for their behavior and did not forgive them even on his deathbed. Had Shimon and Levi administered just and due punishment, Jacob surely would not have criticized them in this fashion.
Other commentaries defend the Rambam’s opinion, explaining that Jacob did not object to the sentence administered by his sons, but rather to the guile which they employed in order to enable them to execute it (see Genesis 34:13-25).

Two witnesses are required for even the slightest case in Jewish law (Hilchot Edut 5:1).

In Jewish law, capital cases are decided by 23 judges (Hilchot Sanhderin 5:2).

Jn contrast, a Jew is not punished for violation of a sin until he is warned that the act he is about to commit is a sin and that, in retribution, the appropriate punishment is given (Hilchot Sanhderin 12:1-2).

Hilchot Edut, Chapter 13 describes the relatives whose testimony is not accepted in court in cases involving Jews.

She is also disqualified in Jewish law (Hilchot Edut 9:2).