Shvuot - Chapter 6

Kiryat Sefer emphasizes that the concept of repealing an oath applies only with regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the future. With regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the past, an oath taken in vain, a sh'vuat hapikadon, or an oath regarding testimony, it does not apply. These oaths cannot be repealed for the transgression was performed at the time they were uttered.

More particularly, as the Radbaz explains, there is a difference between a sh'vuat bitui that involves the future and one that involves the past. For when taking a sh'vuat bitui that involves the past as well, as soon as one utters the oath it is false. Nevertheless, he states that it is customary to repeal even this oath to minimize one's punishment.

The Rambam uses the passive form, nishal, rather than the active form sho'el. Tosafot Yom Tov, Shabbat 24:5 explains that form is used because the person asked for the repeal of the oath is asked many questions by the sage.

The sage must be of unique distinction in Torah knowledge to be given the privilege of releasing oaths alone. Nevertheless, he need not have been granted the special semichah extending back to Moses our teacher. For the Torah does not describe the judges with the term elohim in the passage concerning oaths (Rabbenu Nissim).

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that the Rambam's words can be interpreted simply: Even three ordinary people can perform this function. The Radbaz, by contrast, maintains that the intent is three Torah scholars who are knowledgeable, but are not worthy of being called sages. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:1), Rav Caro, however, rules that the three men repealing the oath must be knowledgeable. He also states that in the present age, there are no sages of the stature to repeal an oath alone.

See Chagigah 10a which states: "The release of vows is hanging in the air and they have nothing to depend on."

That verse begins: "You shall not take a false oath in My name."

See also Chapter 12, Halachah 12.

This is an expression of respect for the greater scholar. The Radbaz states that he has not seen this restriction observed and question why this leniency is taken. If the greater scholar grants permission, the lesser scholar may release the oath [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:2)]. Nevertheless, after the fact, if a lesser scholar releases an oath even without permission, the release is binding.

Nor may he send a written request to the court (Radbaz). He may, however, use a translator [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 10:8); Rama (Yoreh De'ah 228:16)].

For a husband and his wife are considered as the same person.

Nedarim 8b explains that if a person takes the effort to gather a court together, we fear that he will also exaggerate his wife's statements and the court's cross-examination of him will not be effective.

I.e., he may not serve as one of the three judges who release the vow [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:57)]. This interpretation resolves the objection raised by the Ra'avad. Since he is identified with his wife to the extent that he is considered as the same person, he cannot act objectively with regard to her issues.

See Halachah 1.

I.e., he need not make a formal statement in Hebrew.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 10:8, the Rambam elaborates on this rite:

He tells [the sage or the three ordinary people]: "I took a vow... and I changed my mind."

They ask him the reason he changed his mind and he tells them.... The foremost among the three asks: "At the time, you took the vow, had you known that this and this would occur to you, would you have taken the vow?" And he says: "No."...

He asks him: "Do you regret this oath?" and he says: "Yes."

The foremost of the three addresses him with this wording: "It is permitted for you; it is permitted for you; it is permitted for you. It is absolved for you in the heavenly academy and the earthly academy as it is written (Numbers 15:26): 'And it will be forgiven for the entire congregation of Israel and the stranger who dwells among them for the entire nation has acted inadvertently.'

The Torah gave them this power. See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 13, for an explanation of this issue.

The Radbaz explains that the term "nullify" or "uproot" imply being overpowered by a stronger authority without reason. For the woman is placed under the control of her husband or father and with or without reason, he may nullify her oath even against her will. His authority overpowers the oath, as it were. "Permit," "release," or the like, by contrast, imply that a decision is made on the basis of logic and the oath is revoked as if it never existed. See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit., where he discusses the differences between these two terms.

Thus two relatives may sit on the same "court" that releases vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah.

Although they are not acceptable to serve on the same court with regard to cases of law.

In contrast to judgments of law which may be rendered only during the day.

In contrast to judgments that are rendered while sitting.

When it is forbidden to render judgments (Hilchot Shabbat 23:14).

If, however, it is not for the sake of the Sabbath, it may not be released on the Sabbath, because it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath (Radbaz). See Hilchot Nedarim 13:8 with regard to the nullification of vows and oaths by a husband or a father.

Which causes the oath to take effect, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:20) states that Reuven must "be notified." The Rama maintains that he must also consent to the oath being released. The Shulchan Aruch also states that this law applies only when the oath was taken in response to a favor the person performed for him.

Lest Shimon see Reuven not paying attention to the oath and think that he violated the Torah's prohibition. Alternatively, so that Reuven will be embarrassed and not treat oath and vows frivolously [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:4)].

The Radbaz and the Hagahot Maimoniot state that, after the fact, if Reuven had the oath released outside Shimon's presence, the release is binding. The Radbaz, however, states that if the oath involves financial claims, the person in whose presence the oath was taken must be present.

Who are not obligated in the observance of mitzvot. Nedarim 65a states that since Moses took an oath in the presence of Jethro, his father-in-law, to stay in Midian, he had to have the oath nullified in Jethro's presence. At that time, Jethro was not Jewish.

The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah concludes "or provide benefit for him." This appears to be a printing error; it is not found in manuscripts or early printings.

I.e., we do not say that since the respect due God's name will be compromised, the oath may not be released.

At least three (Radbaz, based on Gittin 46a).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah228:21) state that we may release the oath or vow if those people consent. The Rama states that the oath can never be released. The difference between these rulings depends on the rationale for this decision. Rabbenu Nissim explains that taking an oath based on the understanding of others reinforces the severity of the oath and prevents it from being repealed. Others explain that the person is merely substituting the others for himself. Just as ordinarily an oath is dependent on his own understanding, now it is dependent on that of others.

For we assume the others would agree not to enforce the oath when doing so would prevent the fulfillment of a mitzvah (Tosafot, Gittin 36a).

I.e., the person who took the oath.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that he misinterpreted the passage from Gittin, loc. cit. The Ra'avad continues, explaining that in the situation described by the Rambam, it is preferable for the person to teach without charging a wage. Moreover, he is not responsible for the Torah education of those children and hence, the motivation to have the oath rescinded is not his.

The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam's ruling, noting (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:2) that a sage is obligated to teach all the students, not only the members of his family. The Radbaz explains that it is preferable that he work for a wage than do so gratuitously, for a person who does not receive a wage for his work will not apply himself sufficiently.

I.e., they try to influence him to change his mind and express his regret.

The Ma'aseh Rokeach explains that we are talking about a situation in which the person feels uncomfortable with keeping the oath in the future, but does not regret having made it. In such a situation, the oath cannot be repealed (see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:7). Therefore the court, as the Rambam illustrates, explains the negative consequences of the oath so that the person will feel genuine regret.

I.e., people will spread rumors that the children were conceived out of adultery and are illegitimate.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.

For example, Nedarim 66b states that we warn him that paying the woman's ketubah is a significant expense.

See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 7:1 which mentions these obligations.

See Hilchot Shabbat 30:10; Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:16,18 which detail how partaking of these foods leads to the fulfillment of these mitzvot.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that we do encourage the person to ask for the repeal of an oath if the factor that caused the oath was a reasonable probability. To support his argument, he refers to Nedarim 64b which states that God encouraged Moses to nullify his vow not to return to Egypt, telling him that the people who caused him to flee had died. The Talmud explains that the individuals concerned, Datan and Aviram, had not actually died; they merely became impoverished and "a poor person is considered as if he died." Since poverty is a frequent occurrence, it was appropriate for God to encourage Moses to ask to have his oath repealed. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would also accept this principle, but the Kessef Mishneh differs.

I.e., he regretted taking the oath not to benefit from him, because he realized that he could become the city scribe.

Otherwise, asking for the repeal of the first oath would violate the second oath (Kessef Mishneh).

And the second oath will not take effect until the first oath is released. The Siftei Cohen 228:30 writes that even after the fact, an oath cannot be nullified until it takes effect.

This refers to the repeal of a vow or an oath by a sage. A father or a husband, by contrast, may nullify a vow before it takes effect. See Hilchot Nedarim 12:12.

For as above, the second oath cannot be repealed until it takes effect. See the Radbaz who offers explanations why the Rambam includes this and the following halachah though seemingly they could easily be derived from the previous one.

Even though it is a mitzvah, a nazirite vow can be repealed. See Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.

For even though he is not liable for that second oath until the first oath is repealed, the second oath is not nullified. Instead, it is valid and thus can take effect after the first oath is nullified.

The Rambam maintains that since this oath is prevented from taking effect only because of another oath, one can ask for it to be repealed. Based on this view, the Radbaz maintains that one may have all the relevant oaths repealed with one request. There are, however, other views (the Ramban), who maintain that since the second and third oaths have not taken effect, they cannot be repealed. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:46) cites the Ramban's view, while the Siftei Cohen 228:110 mentions that of the Rambam.

Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

Once the court begins administering the lashes, the oath cannot be repealed (Radbaz).