Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 16

I.e., it does not become mixed with the forbidden substances into a single blend, nevertheless, it cannot be distinguished from the kosher substances.

The presence of the forbidden substance is never nullified no matter how great the ratio between it and the permitted substances. Needless to say, this stringency was instituted by Rabbinic degree. As mentioned above, according to Scriptural Law, a simple majority is sufficient to nullify the presence of an entity.

If, however, there is not enough to cause the dough to leaven, it is not considered a leavening agent and its presence can be nullified [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 2:6-7)].

And must be sold to a priest at the price of terumah.

If, however, they do not contain the same substance, according to the Rambam (loc. cit.), we see if their flavor can be detected or not. If it cannot be detected, the mixture is permitted.

Perach and Baden are names of places. These and the following terms are defined in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:8).

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) states that this applies only when the barrels are large and therefore important. A small barrel is not important and its presence can be nullified by a simple majority.

In contrast to those baked by a baker.

I.e., all the pomegranates are considered as if they are the pomegranate that is orlah.

The Radbaz mentions opinions that state that one may throw away the value of the forbidden pomegranate, but then benefit from the entire mixture. He, however, brings support for the Rambam's position.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 101:1) appears to support the Rambam's ruling. Note, however, the comments of the Siftei Cohen 110:2 who writes that even though a Jew may not benefit from any one of the forbidden pomegranates himself, he may sell the entire mixture to a gentile, minus the price of the forbidden pomegranate. See also the notes to Halachah 7.

This refers to an instance when the forbidden piece of meat was cooked with the other pieces.

If its form changes, different rules apply, as apparent from Halachah 11.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 109:1) state that if a piece of meat is not of the type that will bring a person respect by serving it to guests, the stringency mentioned in this halachah does not apply.

Tosafot (Chulin 100a) explains that even though in practice, the piece of meat will not bring honor to the person - because since it is forbidden, he cannot serve it - it is placed in this category, for were it not to be forbidden, it would bring him honor.

There is an important insight associated with this ruling. The stringency relating to a piece of meat from which one receives honor applies only when the meat is inherently forbidden. When, however, a piece of kosher meat falls into a stew of non-kosher meat, it is not considered a piece of meat from which one receives honor, for it is not inherently forbidden. What is forbidden is the flavor of the non-kosher meat and that flavor is not a substance from which one receives honor.

This does not apply with regard to milk and meat. Although it is absorbing the milk that causes the meat to be considered forbidden, once it absorbs that milk, it becomes inherently forbidden. For both of the substances are themselves permitted, it is their mixture that is forbidden by the Torah (Radbaz).

I.e., this stringency is applied even though we are speaking only about a Rabbinic prohibition (Kessef Mishneh).

Chapter 2, Halachah 3.

The Lechem Mishneh states that this is speaking about a situation when the gid hanesheh was cooked without its fat. Otherwise, 60 times its volume is required, for the fat does impart flavor.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 100:1) gives the following criteria for a creation in its own right: It must be alive, in contrast to a kernel of wheat. It must be inherently forbidden, in contrast to a kosher fowl that was slaughtered improperly. It must be a complete entity to the extent that were it to be divided it would no longer be referred to with that name in contrast to non-kosher fat. And it must actually be whole, in contrast to a gid hanesheh that was cut in half.

This principle applies with regard to all entities that are creations in their own right. Until they are removed, the mixture is forbidden regardless of the ratio of kosher to nonkosher substances. Once they are removed, the ratio must be 60:1 (ibid.:2).

An ox sentenced to execution for goring a human being. See Chapter 4, Halachah 22.

This calf is an atonement offering brought by the elders of a city when there is an unresolved murder. See Hilchot Rotzeach , ch. 9.

Tzara'at refers to a unique affliction of the skin resembling leprosy that afflicted a person because of he spoke lashon hora, unfavorable gossip. When the physical signs of his affliction have disappeared, the person must bring two doves as sacrifices. One is slaughtered and one is sent away, as stated in Hilchot Tumat Tzara'at 11:1. It is forbidden to benefit from the one that is slaughtered.

A firstborn donkey must either be either exchanged for a lamb and the lamb given to a priest or the donkey's neck must be broken (Exodus 13:13; Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 12).

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, stating that all that is necessary is to destroy the benefit one would receive from one of the forbidden entities. The benefit from the remainder is permitted. The Kessef Mishneh points to Halachah 29 as indication that the Rambam would also accept the ruling stated by the Ra'avad. The Migdal Oz differs and maintains that the Rambam would not accept that ruling. As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 101:2 defends the position of the Kessef Mishneh, stating that the Rambam would allow one to sell the entire mixture to a gentile, minus the price of the forbidden article.

The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 110:1) cite the view of other Rishonim who state that whenever an article is always sold by number, not by a package, its presence is never nullified.

I.e., what is an example of an article that is sold by number being nullified.

For according to Scriptural Law, a substance mixed with substances of the same type are not forbidden when there is a majority of the permitted substance. When mixed with substances of a different type, they are nullified when the taste can no longer be detected.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law; according to Rabbinic Law, both the first and the second mixtures are forbidden.

For with regard to each of the pomegranates in the second mixture, there is a question if it is forbidden by Scriptural Law or not (Radbaz).

The Radbaz notes that the Rambam's ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:10 where the Rambam rules that if a goblet used for idol worship becomes mixed with other goblets and then one from the first mixture falls into a second mixture, one may use the goblets of the second mixture. The Radbaz maintains that with this ruling, the Rambam changed his mind and adopted a more stringent position.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam rules more stringently in this instance than with regard to idol worship because the prohibition against idol worship is universally known. The prohibition against benefiting from a significant entity, by contrast, is less recognized. Therefore there is need for greater stringency. Alternatively, here the Rambam is speaking about partaking of the forbidden mixture, while in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, he is speaking about benefiting from the mixture. Obviously, there is greater reason to prohibited a substance from which one partakes.

The position followed by the Rambam in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim is followed by other Rishonim even with regard to a significant entity. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 110:8) quotes the Rambam's view and the Rama adds further stringencies. The Turei Zahav 110:10 and the Siftei Cohen 110:3 mention the more lenient views.

Perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the first mixture into the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Even if it was forbidden, perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Thus there is a multiple doubt if an entity forbidden by Scriptural Law is present.

As required with regard to the prohibitions of orlah and mixed species in a vineyard. I.e., the stringency of a significant article no longer applies, because the entities are no longer whole and in their present form, they are not significant.

Which would be forbidden because one derives honor from serving it as stated in Halachah 5. Once it has been minced, the meat is no longer a piece from which one would derive honor [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah101:6)].

The commentaries question the Rambam's statement, noting that in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, the Rambam states that we may nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Since the prohibition against these mixtures is Rabbinic in origin, seemingly, it would be possible to nullify their presence.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 25.

As mentioned in Halachah 1, if an entity is sufficient to cause a dough to leaven or to spice a pot, its presence can never be nullified. Although neither forbidden entity on its own is large enough to bring about this change, when the two are combined, this result is achieved. Therefore an Israelite is forbidden to partake of the dough or the pot. With regard to a priest, by contrast, since terumah is not forbidden to him, we do not say that an article forbidden to him brought about this change. For the mixed species alone is not of sufficient size. Hence, he is permitted to partake of the bread or the cooked food.

If the combined flavor is not that of wheat, the dough does not become forbidden, because the yeast is considered as giving a different flavor to the dough. Hence the dough is forbidden only of that flavor is detectable.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, offering a different interpretation of Avodah Zarah 65a, the Rambam's source. Significantly, their disagreement is mirrored by similar difference in interpretation by Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi and the Rambam follow one approach and Tosafot and the Ra'avad, the other.

Although in actual fact the forbidden yeast or spices did not have an effect, because the dough leavened and the pot was spiced without them. Nevertheless, since they could have had an effect, they cause the dish to become forbidden.

Avodah Zarah 68a notes that when a dough is already leavened, adding yeast will spoil its flavor. Hence, seemingly, it should not be forbidden. Nevertheless, an exception is made with regard to dough, for when extra yeast is added to dough, that dough is then used to cause other doughs to leaven. Hence, it is not considered to be spoiled.

The Ra'avad understands the emphasis of the passage from Avodah Zarah differently and objects to the Rambam's ruling. He note that Avodah Zarah does not mention spices; the Rambam added those on the basis of his logic. And the Ra'avad, argues, that logic can be disputed. For the addition of yeast to the dough has an effect as explained. The addition of the spices, by contrast, have no effect - for the pot was already spiced. Why then do they cause the pot to be forbidden?

The Lechem Mishneh answers, that even according to the Ra'avad's understanding, the Rambam's logic can be defended, for the food from the heavily spiced pot could be used to spice other pots.

The mixture is, however, forbidden to Israelites and permitted only to priests, for the presence of the terumah is not nullified.

This and the following halachah represent the Rambam's interpretation of Orlah 2:2 which is based on the Jerusalem Talmud.

I.e., the presence of the orlah or the mixed species from the vineyard are nullified.

This example is the product of the Rambam's own deduction. Although the simple interpretation of Orlah, loc. cit., would imply that the concept stated in this halachah could also be derived from the situation described in the previous halachah, it does not work out mathematically. Hence, the Rambam had to find a new example.

The prohibition is thus nullified because the ratio of permitted to forbidden substances is 200:1.

The Ra'avad criticizes the Rambam, questioning why he uses extremely large numbers. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam's figures enable all the calculations to be made without fragments.

I.e., after it was discovered that the forbidden substance had fallen into the permitted substances. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 5:8).

Thus despite the fact that it contains produce that was originally forbidden, the entire quantity may be used to nullify the presence of the second measure of forbidden produce that falls in.

The rationale for this leniency is that according to Scriptural Law, the entire measure is permitted when there is a simple majority of forbidden substances.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:8), the Rambam quotes the Sifra (Parshat Kedoshim) which teaches that since it is forbidden to benefit from Orlah, it is also forbidden to use it as a dye. The Rambam emphasizes that, accordingly, this applies, not only to fruit which is orlah, but also to the shells from which dye is made. In his notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Rav Kapach cites a responsa from the Rambam from which it appears that this applies only to shells because they serve a fruit. It is not forbidden to make dye from the wood or the bark of a tree that is orlah. See Halachah 24 and notes.

Since the substance from which the dye comes is forbidden, the entire article becomes forbidden.

The Rambam's wording - and hence, our translation - implies that one may cause the presence of the forbidden garment to be nullified by adding 200 other garments to it. The Radbaz explains that the mixture is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law. As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, as an initial and preferred option, one may add a sufficient quantity of permitted substances to nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Note, however, the glosses of the Tosafot Yom Tov and Rav Kapach to Orlah 3:1, that do not accept this interpretation and state that one may not nullify the prohibition as an initial and preferred option.

See Halachah 22.

In his notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:2), Rav Kapach elaborates on the definition of this term, concluding that it is equal to two thumbbreadths. This is also reflected in the Rambam's ruling, Hilchot Shabbat 9:18.

I.e., if the entire garment is not 201 times the size of the portion dyed with the forbidden dye. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this law teaches us that if even a small portion of a garment is dyed with forbidden dye, the entire garment may become forbidden.

The Radbaz explains that a more lenient ruling is issued in this instance, because:

a) Here there is no substance that is forbidden, it is only the color that comes from the forbidden dye that is problematic. A differentiation can be made between this instance and the previous laws, for in those instances, the forbidden dye has already become permanently associated with a substance.

b) In this instance, the majority of the dyeing will result from the permitted dye. The effect of the prohibited dye is secondary.

If so, it is then permitted to use even a new oven. Heating a new oven with the shells of orlah completes the task of fashioning the oven. Thus there is reason to say that since it was completed in a forbidden manner, the oven itself would be forbidden. Nevertheless, when permitted fuel is used even for such an oven, the products are permitted. The rationale is that they are produced by two substances: the oven which is forbidden and the fuel which is permitted. Whenever there are two factors involved, one permitted and one forbidden, the result is permitted to be used (Pesachim 26b). We do not require the oven to be destroyed, for the oven is not inherently forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

One might ask: If so, why is an oven that is heated with shells that are orlah forbidden to be used. Here also there are two factors involved, the oven which is permitted and the fuel which is forbidden. It is possible to explain that the leniency of allowing to use the yield produced by a forbidden and a permitted substance only after the fact. In this instance, cooling the oven provides an easy alternative (Radbaz).

One might ask, since the oven is permitted, even though the fuel is forbidden, there is both a permitted and a forbidden factor producing this result. Why, then, is the food forbidden? It is possible to explain that since the fire which is forbidden is evident and apparent, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

As indicated by the Halachah 24, this applies even if there are still glowing coals in the oven.

One might ask: In the case of a new oven, since both factors - the oven and the fuel - are forbidden. Nevertheless, it appears that according to the Rambam, removing the fire is sufficient for the food to be permitted. For the oven itself is not inherently forbidden, it was only completed in a forbidden manner (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the fuel used to fire the kitchenware is the primary element in completing them, they are forbidden. The Turei Zahav 142:7 explains that here we are speaking about kitchenware on which food is served cold. Since the kitchenware was made in a forbidden manner, it is forbidden to benefit from it. If, however, a pot was fired with forbidden fuel and then used to cook kosher food, that food would be permitted as is the law concerning a new oven. The Meiri (in his gloss to Pesachim 26b), however, explains that if one cooks food with a pot forbidden because of these factors, the food is forbidden.

The Radbaz emphasizes that here, too, we are speaking about shells from fruit that is orlah. The wood of a tree never becomes forbidden as orlah.

For once the wood is consumed by fire, it is no longer considered forbidden. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:13 which states that it is permitted to benefit from the ashes of substances that are forbidden and required to be burnt.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, this applies when the permitted fuel was added after the forbidden fuel. Implied is that were the two fuels mixed together at the outset, the dish would be permitted.

The Kessef Mishneh gives two interpretations for this halachah. Our translation follows the first interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh, however, questions that interpretation, stating that seemingly, the fact that the pot in which the food was cooked was permitted would add another permitted factor and thus the food was never cooked in a totally forbidden setting. He therefore offers another interpretation, stating that here the Rambam is speaking about firing the pot in which the food was cooked. First it was fired with forbidden fuel, then it was fired with permitted fuel, and then food was cooked in it with permitted fuel. Since it was originally fired with forbidden fuel, it becomes forbidden and any food cooked in it is likewise prohibited. The Turei Zahav 142:9 favors the first interpretation, explaining that the situation resembles food cooked in an oven with forbidden fuel.

I.e., it was known that one plant or row was forbidden, but one was not able to identify the forbidden plant. It is somewhat difficult to conceive how a row of crops could not be recognized as mixed species growing in a vineyard.

Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:6), the Rambam rules that at the outset, it is forbidden to gather this produce. The leniency stated in this halachah applies only after the fact. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam changed his mind, because the more lenient opinion is mentioned in the Talmud (Gittin 54b).

I.e., perhaps we should ordain a decree, forbidding benefit from the entire field, lest one intentionally mix a forbidden orlah plant into his vineyard.

Hence we do not fear that he will introduce a forbidden plant into the vineyard.

I.e., we do not fear that he left the orlah plant intentionally.

In Hilchot Terumot 13:12, the Rambam rules more stringently with regard to terumah. A distinction between the two instances can be made, for terumah may be eaten by priests, while orlah is forbidden to everyone.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:7), the Rambam states that it is common to use the white syrup that drips from underdeveloped figs as a catalyst to cause cheese to harden.

I.e., using the renin as a catalyst.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 13. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 2:5), the Rambam writes that the laws applying to a catalyst used to make cheese are more severe than those applying to spices and yeast (Halachah 1, for the latter can be nullified when they fall into a substance of another type) for the reason explained above. As the Radbaz explains, even without yeast a dough would be able to be baked and a dish could be served without spices, but without a catalyst, milk would never harden into cheese.

Kiddushin 56b derives this from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 22:9, pen tikadeish, "lest it become hallowed," interpreting it as pen tukad eish, "lest it be consigned to fire."

Chapter 15, Halachot 6-7.

The Siftei Cohen quotes Rishonim who rule that if a quantity of permitted wine that is 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine falls into the forbidden wine at the same time, the presence of the forbidden wine is nullified. The stringency mentioned by the Rambam applies only when the kosher wine is poured into the forbidden wine little by little. The Siftei Cohen rules that if a severe loss is involved, one may rely on this leniency.

I.e., a bottle from which the wine is poured one drop at a time.

The Radbaz states that this applies even if the majority of the mixture comes from the forbidden wine. Since each drop was nullified, the entire quantity is permitted. The Siftei Cohen 134:4 differs and requires that the permitted wine be 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine.

According to the Rambam, it is even permitted to drink the wine of the mixture. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 73a) rules that it is permitted to benefit from the wine, drinking it, however, is forbidden. And the Ra'avad rules that it is forbidden even to benefit from it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling.

I.e., a container with a large opening.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) rules leniently, stating that in the present era, since it is no longer customary to pour wine as libations to false divinities, one may be lenient and permit the mixture if there is 60 times more kosher wine than forbidden wine, provided the kosher wine is not poured into the forbidden wine in one column.

I.e., cast into a place where one will not benefit from it.

One may, however, destroy one jug and then benefit from the others - e.g., to use the wine as a dye - for it is possible that one will be benefiting directly from the forbidden wine. The advice suggested by the Rambam, by contrast, allows the Jew to benefit from the remainder of the wine without any possibility of benefiting directly from the forbidden wine.

The advice suggested applies only to jugs, for each jug is a separate entity. It does not apply when wine becomes mixed with wine, as indicated by the previous halachah (Avodah Zarah 74a).

See the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) who explains that this applies only when the jugs are large and therefore important as mentioned in Halachah 3. Otherwise, the presence of the forbidden jug can be nullified by a simple majority.

Seemingly, this ruling is obvious. The Kessef Mishneh states that it was added to emphasize the stringency that one must destroy the value of the forbidden jug.

As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

See Halachah 28.

Rav Moshe HaCohen questions how the presence of the forbidden entity can be nullified, since its flavor can be detected. Indeed, when quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:3) states this leniency applies only when the taste of the forbidden substance cannot be detected.

Avodah Zarah 73a emphasizes that the leniency mentioned in this halachah applies only when the water falls into the wine before the forbidden wine. If the forbidden wine falls in first, the permitted wine becomes prohibited.

And thus it is not automatically forbidden.

I.e., the water alone. The permitted wine is not considered, for any amount of the forbidden wine mixed into it would cause the permitted wine to be prohibited.

For the forbidden wine will not have entered them.

And thus the forbidden wine could enter.

They may, however, be sold to a gentile, minus the increase in their value produced by the forbidden wine [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:8)].

Avodah Zarah 66a emphasizes that even if the fresh wine has the same flavor as the grapes, the grapes are not forbidden. For the wine is considered as a different type of substance.

Hence even if it imparts its flavor, the figs are not forbidden. Although the version of Avodah Zarah 5:2 which the Rambam relies on differs from the standard published text of the Mishnah, the Rambam's ruling is accepted as halachah by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah134:9).

This is permitted, for the gentile is paying for the bread alone. He is not paying for the wine at all.

If, however, the Jew selling a fellow Jew selling bread to the gentile, he might purchase it from him.

Chapter 17, Halachah 9. A Jew will have no way of knowing that this bread was not baked by the gentile. Hence he will refrain from purchasing it from him. In a place where it is customary to purchase bread from gentiles, there is no way of benefiting from the wheat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:11)].

As Avodah Zarah 65b states, the kernels of wheat are cracked and this causes them to absorb the wine (Lechem Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

The Radbaz emphasizes that the taste of the wine becomes blended in with the taste of the wheat to the extent that it cannot be detected.

The vinegar is forbidden, as the wine was.

The fact that originally one was wine and one was beer is not significant.

If it does, the mixture is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. Even if the vinegar originally came from wine, it is considered as a different substance.

It is not automatically permitted, because vinegar impairs the flavor of wine, for there are some who prefer vinegar to wine (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 134:8).