Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 8

Genesis, ch. 32, relates that before his confrontation with Esau, Jacob remained alone in his camp. An unidentified being - interpreted by the Torah commentaries to be Esau's archangel - wrestled with him the entire night. When he saw that he could not defeat Jacob, he gave him a blow to his upper thigh, dislocating his gid hanesheh. In commemoration of this event, ""The children of Israel do not eat the gid hanesheh.

The Rabbis identified the gid hanesheh as the sciatic nerve, the large main nerve running down the back of an animal's hind leg. The term gid, though sometimes translated as "sinew," is a general term. As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), it is used to refer to arteries, veins, tendons, nerves, and sinews.

See Halachah 5.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 183) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 3) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 65:7 does not cite the Rambam's view, but instead quotes two differing opinions: one that the prohibition does not apply to a fetus at all and another, that it applies only when the fetus has completed the period of gestation and is discovered alive.

Although the angel only dislodged the nerve on one of Jacob's legs, we are forbidden to partake of the nerves from both sides.

See Halachah 7 concerning the removal of this nerve.

Because he violates a Scriptural prohibition.

For violating a Rabbinic prohibition.

Accordingly, even if it is less than an olive-sized portion in size, one is liable. Compare to Chapter 2, Halachah 21, Chapter 15, Halachah 17, and Chapter 16, Halachah 6.

Rav Moshe HaCohen writes that this ruling applies when the person was given a separate warning for each gid. Otherwise, he receives only one set of lashes. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept that interpretation.

This explanatory addition is based on Chullin 92b.

Chullin 92b discusses these issues and leaves both matters unresolved; hence, the Rambam's rulings.

Not for partaking of the gid and not for partaking of the meat of a forbidden animal.

Chullin 101a notes that the confrontation between Jacob and the angel took place before the Giving of the Torah, at a time when the Jews could eat non-kosher animals. Hence, there is reason to say that the prohibition could involve a non-kosher animal, for partaking of such animal was not forbidden until the Giving of the Torah.

In response, the Talmud explains that our observance of this prohibition does not stem from the practice observed by Jacob's descendants, but because this prohibition was reiterated at the time of the Giving of the Torah. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6, the Rambam elaborates on this point, explaining that our observance of Jewish practice, even the mitzvot which we know that the Patriarchs fulfilled like circumcision, stems from God's command at Sinai and not from our ancestors' observance.

Chapter 4, Halachah 18. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 65:9) which states that a gid is "like a piece of wood; it has no flavor."

I.e., the prohibition against partaking of a nevelah, trefe, or burnt offering.

Following the concept of issur kollel, "an encompassing prohibition," as explained in the conclusion of Halachah 14 (Maggid Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that Chullin 82b states that according to the opinion that a gid hanesheh does not have any flavor, one is not liable. Only the opinion that maintains that the gid hanesheh does have a flavor holds one liable. From the previous halachah, it appears that the Rambam follows the former view. Why then does he hold the person liable for two sets of lashes.

Since the gid hanesheh and the gid forbidden by Rabbinic decree subdivide into several branches, this is a rather difficult task. For this reason, in most sectors of the Jewish community today, it is customary not to eat the hind-quarters of an animal. Accordingly, several cuts of meat, e.g., sirloin steak, are not available from kosher butchers.

I.e., we rely on his word and do not inspect the meat ourselves.

If the person himself does not have a reputation for observance and knowledge of the laws, he can sell meat if he hires such a person to act as a supervisor. This is the rationale for the practice of hasgachah, kashrut inspection, practiced today.

In the present era, there is no difference between Eretz Yisrael and other lands, for the majority of the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael are currently not Torah observant.

He must return the money entirely. This applies even if the customers already partook of the non-kosher meat (Hilchot Mechirah 16:14). The rationale is that a person's soul is revolted by the commission of a transgression and he is not considered to have benefited from the meat at all (Sefer Meirat Einayim 232:4).

See Chapter 7, Halachah 21.

If he performs such an act in a place where his identity is known, it can be said that he did so in order to be reinstated.

I.e., they show that he is willing to forgo his financial benefit in order to keep Torah law. See also Hilchot Shechitah 10:14 and Hilchot Edut 12:9 which deal with the same concept. Hilchot Edut states that in order to be accepted as a witness, he must wear black garments as a sign of repentance.

See the Maggid Mishneh who maintains that the Rambam would rule in this manner even when a Jew is reputed to transgress various prohibitions. He also mentions the opinion of the Rashba who maintains that further precautions must be taken if an article is entrusted to a non-observant Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 118:8) quotes the Rambam's ruling and then cites the Rashba's view without indicating which opinion should be followed.

I.e., we do not expect that he will steal. Moreover, he will derive no benefit from doing so, for he will have to supply an equivalent piece of meat for the one he exchanges. We do not expect him to cause sin without deriving any benefit. If, however, he has a reputation for stealing, his word is not accepted (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., Canaanite servants, non-Jews purchased as servants who have undergone a partial conversion process (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 12:11).

For a gentile is never trusted in any matters involving Jewish observance. When one desires to send food that involves prohibitions with a gentile, it is necessary to take precautions as stated in Chapter 13, Halachot 8-10.

I.e., even if the proportions are heavily weighted in favor of the conclusion that the meat is kosher, we accept the possibility that it is non-kosher.

This is a general principle applying in many other contexts as well, e.g., Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 2:10, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:15.

The Hagahot Maimoniot explains that this law applies only when the meat is discovered in the public domain. If a person is seen taking meat from a store, but it is not known which store he took it from, the previous law applies.

This also is a frequently employed Talmudic principle.

As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh, there are Rishonim who permit meat found in the possession of a gentile when the majority of the sellers are Jewish, maintaining that this is evident from Chullin 95a. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 63:1, however, quotes the Rambam's view.

According to the literal meaning of the Rambam's words, if meat was placed in the freezer, it would be forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 63:2) cites, however, the opinion of Rashbam which permits the meat if it is found in the same place that it was placed. The Rama writes that it is customary to follow this view.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if a person has a reputation for upright conduct, his word is accepted in this concept even if he is not a Torah scholar. Note the contrast to Hilchot Gezeilah V'Aveidah 14:12 which accepts only the word of a Torah scholar if one claims to recognize a lost object, but cannot identify it with distinctive marks.

If, however, he found it as he left it, it is certainly permitted (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh notes that according to Pesachim 22a, it would appear that the authorities who maintain that the gid hanesheh has no flavor also maintain that it is forbidden to benefit from it. Now the Rambam follow the perspective that the gid hanesheh has no flavor (see Halachah 5). Hence his position here is somewhat difficult. The Maggid Mishneh explains, however, that the two positions are not necessary interrelated and both rulings of the Rambam can be upheld.

I.e., because there is no prohibition against receiving benefit from the gid hanesheh, he does not have to remove it before selling the meat.

Since the Jew sees a co-religionist giving the gentile the meat, he will assume that it was ritually slaughtered and that the meat was kosher. [This applies in a place where public announcements are made when an animal is discovered to be trefe (Chullin 93b). Otherwise, the Jew must tell the gentile that the animal is kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 65:11)].

Nevertheless, since the place of the gid hanesheh is recognizable - i.e., it is obvious whether the gid is still in the thigh or has already been removed - he will not partake of the meat until the gid is removed.

Since the place of the gid hanesheh is not obvious, the other Jew may think that ordinary kosher meat is being given and may partake of it.

Both of these commands are in the second person: one singular, one plural.

Sometimes the command is stated in an active voice; sometimes, it is passive; sometimes, singular and sometimes plural. The passive form implies that it is forbidden to derive any benefit that could lead to one's eating, e.g., selling it for money that could be used to purchase food.

Rav Moshe HaCohen questions this ruling, stating that if the intent of the Scriptural prohibition is that it is forbidden to benefit from these substances, why is one not liable for lashes for deriving such benefit? The Maggid Mishneh explains that he is not liable, for one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit from the food in the ordinary manner one derives benefit from food. This includes only eating. Receiving money, by contrast, is not considered as benefiting from food in the ordinary manner. Rav Moshe HaCohen, however, anticipated that attempted resolution and explains that, on the contrary, selling edible food is an ordinary way of deriving benefit.

There is one exception to this: money received in return for a false deity or articles associated with it. That money is itself forbidden (see Chapter 13, Halachah 15; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:19).

I.e., one's livelihood may not revolve around the sale of these forbidden entities or performing work with them (e.g., serving as a chef in a non-kosher restaurant). The rationale for the prohibition is that we fear that a person who has extensive involvement with forbidden substances may come to partake of them (Rashba).

The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that the above applies only with regard to food from forbidden species. One may choose a profession that involves employing a horse or a donkey as a beast of burden.

He must sell them immediately. He may not raise them until they become large [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 117:4)]. See also Siftei Cohen 117:6 who questions whether the leniency is granted only to a professional trapper or to any person.