Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 13

And thus it is less likely for him to come at frequent intervals.

Implied is that the entrance is closed with two seals, as required by Halachah 8. The Rama (Yoreh De‘ah 130:2) writes that since in the present age, most gentiles are not idolaters, only one seal is necessary. The Siftei Cohen 130: 11) states that this principle should be applied in the present instance.

Nevertheless, since we do not know for certain that the gentile touched the wine, we do not forbid benefiting from it (Radbaz).

Since the gentile was not given permission to enter the house, he would be considered as a thief if he did so. Hence, we assume that he did not enter the home to pour a libation.
The Ra’avad states that the Rambam’s words apply only when the house belongs to the Jew. When, however, the house belongs to the gentile, the wine is forbidden, even if he did not trust him with the key. The rationale is that since the gentile has a connection to the house, he will have an excuse to enter it. Hence we fear that he entered it and touched the Jew’s wine. The Radbaz defends the Rambam’s ruling explaining that since the house is rented, the owner does not have the right to enter it at will. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 129:5) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

We have translated the Rambam’s words literally. The intent, however, appears to be not ritual purity per se, but “without contact with gentiles.”

I.e., he is not present at all times. Nevertheless, it is possible that he will return at any given moment. Hence, the gentile will not take liberties. See Halachah 4.

Since he does not live on the premises, he is not considered as a permanent watchman. Hence, the fact that he enters from time to time during the day is not significant (Lechem Mishneh). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that as long as the Jew enters and leaves at will, that is sufficient to inhibit the gentile from touching the wine. [Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4: 11 ), the Rambam adopts a position similar to that of the Ra’avad.]
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ( Yoreh De’ah 131: 1 adopt an intermediate position, stating that if there is another Jew living in that city and the entrance to the building where the wine is stored is visible from the public domain, the wine is permitted. For the owner will be afraid to break the lock to the door lest he be seen and the matter become known. [This approach is also mentioned in the Ramba;n’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit).]

There is, however, nothing preventing him from selling it to other gentiles.

I.e., he wrote the bill of sale in advance, before the Jew actually paid to clarify that his intent was to sell it to him.

Since Jews can see whether or not the gentile touches it, he is afraid to do so, lest his investment be ruined. See the explanation in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:11).

Because these places are also in public view and/or access.

Our translation follows Rashi’s commentary to Avodah Zarah 70a. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 129:16) defines the term as meaning pillars.

Since the gentile would be considered as a thief for overstepping these boundaries, we do not fear that he would do so.

Were a gentile to touch them, they would be disqualified.

The rationale is that we assume that a gentile will not trouble himself to reseal the container with two seals as the Jew had sealed it. Hence the fact that he finds it with the two seals he left on it is a sign that it has not been tampered with.

To apply these concepts in contemporary terms: When a bottle of wine is closed with a cork or a bottle-cap, that is one seal. If there is a paper or plastic wrapper around the cork or the cap, that is the second seal.

Based on Avodah Zarah 3 la, some interpret this as speaking about an instance where the comer the gentile grants the Jew is closed off with a seal. The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 130:2) writes that there are opinions which rule that after the fact, one seal is sufficient in this situation.
The Lechem Mishneh explains that even if the place is not closed off, since it is designated for the Jew, one seal is sufficient. See Turei Zahav 130:4.

For in none of these instances do we fear that the gentile will use the beverage for a libation, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachot 9-10.

In these instances, we fear that the gentile will exchange another substance for the substance deposited. One seal is sufficient to dispel these suspicions (Lechem Mishneh ).

Since the prohibition involved in these instances is Scriptural in origin, we are more stringent.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 7. That halachah states that when a gentile who is not an idolater touches wine, it is only forbidden to drink it. In this instance, since the gentile did not intend to touch the wine, we are more lenient and do not forbid it at all (Radbaz).
As mentioned previously, the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 124:24) rules that in the present era, none of the gentiles are considered as idolaters and the leniency suggested by the Rambam applies universally. On that basis, he and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities have suggested several leniencies.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 5 and 9.

A gentile who has made a formal commitment to accept the Seven Universal Laws Commanded to Noah and His Descendants. These include the prohibition against worshipping false divinities.

I.e., a place where it can be exchanged without a Jew noticing.

For we fear that he exchanged it with his own wine and it is forbidden to drink such wine. Although a resident alien also accepted the prohibition against theft, we fear that he - and certainly, other gentiles - will not abide by his commitment (Radbaz).

For these are merely safeguards. Although Rashi (Avodah Zarah 58b) and other Rishonim rule more stringently, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 125:3,6,7) accepts the Rambam’ s position.

Doing so does not arouse a suspicion that perhaps he used it as a libation for his false deity. Smelling is not considered as tasting or drinking.

It is not included in the prohibition mentioned at the beginning of Ch. 11.

See the conclusion of Ch. 5 of Hilchot Meilah, where the Ranibam delivers a slightly contradictory ruling.

Chapter 8, Halachah 16. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavimn 7:9 and Hilchot Ishut 5:2.

For he is deriving benefit from gentile wine.

Even though the Jew himself does nothing to help transport the gentile wine.

I.e., throw in a place where neither he nor anyone else will benefit from them.

Nor others.

For the rental fee was not primarily paid for the sake of the wine (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 133:3).

He is being paid for the entire work as a collective entity. Were he not to have transported all the barrels, he would not be paid at all (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 65a). Accordingly, the payment for transporting the beer was never distinct from that of the wine. Hence his entire wage is forbidden.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that it is sufficient to destroy the wage paid for the forbidden barrels. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 133:3) follows the Rambam’s stringency.

Since the wage was paid for each barrel individually, the wage paid for the barrels of beer is a separate and distinct entity. Hence it is not forbidden. Nevertheless, at the outset, it is forbidden to accept such a job [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

For the craftsman have not accepted the wine and the employer owes them money.

For then it is as if they are exchanging the wine for wine. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 132:3) writes that in the present age, (when gentiles are not actually idolaters,) a worker may return the barrel of wine even though it has entered his domain.

One hundred silver zuzim.

Hence he has benefited from the existence of the gentile wine. Hence, it is forbidden. The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 132:7) states that, even if the Jew desires that the false deity continue to exist, leniency can be granted in an instance where the gentile has other resources to pay the debt or alternatively, when the debt is secured by a guarantor. Moreover, if all that is concerned is ordinary gentile wine, in the present age, there is no prohibition for the reason stated above.

Here leniency is not granted, because the convert has a share in the entities belonging to the partnership. Thus he is exchanging money for a false deity.

I.e., our Sages feared that the convert will be so disturbed about being unable to receive his inheritance, that he will forsake Jewish practice and return to his previous mode of conduct. This is undesirable, because once a person converts, he is a full-fledged Jew. If he conducts himself undesirably, his conduct affects the entire Jewish people.

For they have already entered the domain of the convert and are, therefore, forbidden. Hence it is forbidden to exchange them for others, for then one will be deriving benefit.

I.e., he acquires the wine through the kinyan of meshichah [see Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1: 14; Turei Zahav 132:4)] and the money is considered as a loan which he owes the Jew.
The Radbaz questions why the Rambam mentions meshichah, drawing the wine into his own domain. Seemingly, once a price was established and the wine was poured, the gentile acquires it whether or not he performs meshichah immediately. Conversely, if meshichah finalizes the transaction, seemingly as long as a price was set before meshichah, the wine should be permitted
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam is speaking according to the common practice. It was customary to establish a price either before measuring the wine or after meshichah.

For he fears that the Jew will ask an exorbitant price (Radbaz). Hence he always keeps the option of negating the sale.

For the payment of the money formalizes the transfer of the wine (effecting a kinyan). Thus the gentile has paid for the wine before it entered his domain and became forbidden.

There are several explanations for this ruling. The gentile left some of his wine in the container and thus as the Jew was pouring the new wine in, it became forbidden. Alternatively, the gentile was holding the container and moved it (see Chapter 12, Halachah 3). This is sufficient to cause the wine to become forbidden (Radbaz).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that (as the Rambam himself rules in Chapter 16, Halachah 29) if kosher wine becomes mixed with non-kosher wine, it is forbidden to drink it, but one may benefit from it. Nevertheless, he does not provide a rebuttal to the second explanation given above.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that since the wine in the container the gentile is holding becomes forbidden, the wine the Jew is pouring also becomes forbidden, as stated above in Chapter 12, Halachah 12.

Since he gave the storekeeper the money in advance, it is as if he paid the storekeeper for what his worker would eat. Thus it is as if the worker is drinking the employer’s wine.

The Rambam’s source (Avodah Zarah 58b) mentions both produce from the Sabbatical year and untithed produce, because it is possible that a common person is lax in his observance of both these mitzvot. Apparently, the Rambam also had this intent because he begins by mentioning produce of the Sabbatical year and concludes by mentioning untithed produce.

I.e., it is forbidden for the employer to do this, because it would be considered as if he personally gave his employee produce from the Sabbatical year or untithed produce.

I.e., he undertakes a financial obligation to the storekeeper, but since he does not pay him the money beforehand, that obligation is not explicitly associated with the food or drink of which the worker partakes.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 450:6) mentions opinions that are more stringent with regard to an employer taking financial responsibility for the food a gentile will eat on Pesach. The Turei Zahav 460:4 explains that with regard to Pesach, there is a greater reason for stringency, for it is almost cehain that the gentile will eat chametz. In the situations mentioned in our halachah, by contrast, it is possible that none of the prohibitions will be violated, for the gentile will not want wine, nor the Jewish workers, the untithed or Sabbatical produce.

A gentile king produced wine from the royal vineyard as a means of financing his nation's expenses. He would obligate each of the person's in his kingdom to buy a standard amount of wine. For a Jew, that represents a problem for the wine is gentile wine. Not only is it forbidden to drink it, it is forbidden to benefit from it. Thus not only may a Jew not partake of such wine, nor may he take it and sell it. He is forbidden even to purchase it from the king.

The Radbaz explains that in this way, the gentile is purchasing the wine from the Jew. Others explain that the gentile is acting as the Jew's agent.

For in this way, the gentile is not acting as the Jew’s agent.

This law applies when the gentile intentionally touches the wine. If the gentile touches it unintentionally, he is not liable. The rationale is that this is damage which is not outwardly noticeable (i.e., although the ritual status of the wine has changed, outwardly it is the same). In such an instance, Hilchat Chovel UMazik 7:3 states, one is not liable for causing damage inadvertently.
The Kessef Mishneh states that even if the gentile intentionally touched the wine, but did not know that by touching it, he caused it to be forbidden, the gentile is not liable and this leniency does not apply. The Siftei Cohen 132:2, however, interprets this wording as implying that even if the gentile caused it to become forbidden inadvertently, the Jew may sell it to him.
See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:4 and commentaries, where a similar concept is discussed.

For if the Jew could have stopped the gentile from touching the wine and didn’t, he is responsible for the loss (Radbaz).

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 124:2) rules that in the present age, when it is not customary for gentiles to use wine as libations, the wine may be sold to any gentile.

Avodah Zarah 59b states that in such a situation, he may charge the gentile the full price of the wine.