Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 9

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 186-187) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 113 and 92) include these prohibitions among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:11,13.

I.e., together the mixture is the size of an olive. It is not necessary that one have an olive-sized portion of milk and an olive-sized portion of meat.

If, however, the meat and milk have not been. cooked together, there is no Scriptural prohibition against partaking of them together (Maggid Mishneh). According to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to partake of them in any manner.

Even if a prohibition was not violated when cooking them together (e.g., they were cooked by a gentile), it is forbidden for a Jew to partake of the mixture. The implication is that the prohibitions against cooking the mixture and partaking of it are separate issues that do not necessarily share a connection (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., nowhere in the Torah does it state that it is forbidden to partake of such a mixture.

Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit., the Rambam explains that the prohibitions against partaking of and benefiting from milk and meat are derived from the fact that the Torah repeats this prohibition three times. Perhaps the reason the Rambam does not mention this means of derivation here is to avoid the following question being raised: Why are lashes not given for benefiting from milk and meat?
To explain: In Chapter 8, Halachah 16, the Rambam writes that one is not liable for lashes for deriving benefit from a forbidden substance. As explained in the notes to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh explains that one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit- from the food in an ordinary manner. This includes only eating and not other forms of deriving benefit. Nevertheless, seemingly this should not apply with regard to benefiting from a mixture of milk and meat. For, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 10, in that instance, one is liable even if one does not derive benefit in the ordinary manner. Hence, it would appear that one should be liable for lashes for· partaking of such a mixture.
Among the explanations given why one is not liable is that the prohibition against deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat is derived from an inference from a more lenient instance to a more stringent one (a kal vichomer; see Chullin 115b). And we follow the principle that punishment is not meted out when a prohibition is derived in such a fashion, only when it is stated explicitly (Sifri, Naso). If, however, there was an explicit prohibition in the Torah teaching us that deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat was forbidden, seemingly, one would be liable for lashes (Lechem Mishneh).

See Hilchot Jssurei Bi’ah 2:6.

With regard to the meat or milk of a kosher wild beast or fowl, see the following halachah and notes.

I.e., the prohibition involves only a kid that could be eaten and milk of which one could partake.

I.e., the term g’di translated as “kid,” commonly means “kid-goat.” Nevertheless, according to the Bible, it is not necessarily restricted to this meaning unless the verse specifies so explicitly, as in Genesis 27:16; 38:20.

I.e., the intent is not that one is liable only for cooking an offspring in the milk of its mother and not in any other situations.

Needless to say, one is liable for partaking of the non-kosher meat or the non-kosher milk.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis in Chullin 116a whether the prohibition against eating the meat of a wild beast [cooked] in milk is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin. According to some interpretations, that difference of opinion is perpetuated among the Rishonim (see Siftei Cohen 87:4). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Rishonim and Achronim follow the opinion the Rambam states here. This is also the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 87:3).
Significantly, iri (Hilchot Mamrim 2:9), the Rambam states that the meat of a wild beast that is cooked in milk is forbidden according to Scriptural Law. In their glosses to Hilchot Mamrim, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that there, the Rambam is speaking theoretically: Were the halachah to follow the opinion that the meat of a wild beast is forbidden according to Scriptural law, the ruling would be such and such. The Merkevat HaMishneh, however, maintains that a printing error crept into the text in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot and the text should be changed to fit the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Mamrim.

Hence were the Sages to allow one to partake of the meat of a wild beast and fowl cooked in milk, one might think that the prohibition applies only in its most literal context. As a safeguard, they instituted this prohibition.

The Turei Zahav 87:3 and the Siftei Cohen 87:5 mention that there are authorities who forbid eating fish and milk together because it can cause health dangers. They, however, reject that ruling.

This refers to eggs that already have a yolk and whites, but are still connected to the chicken’s body (Maggid Mishneh). See the Turei Zahav 87:6 and the Siftei Cohen 87:9 who quote authorities who explain that even though such eggs are considered as meat in certain contexts, there is no prohibition against partaking of them together with milk.

Nevertheless, there is a prohibition against partaking of all these mixtures

I.e., milk that was in the animal’s udders when it died or was slaughtered. See Halachah 12.

The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 87:6) states that, after the fact, there is no prohibition against a mixture of milk from a male and meat. The Siftei Cohen 87:16 explains that this refers to milk from a male human. Even the Rama would forbid milk from a male animal according to Rabbinic Law.

Implied is that in the latter instance, one is liable for partaking of blood. The Siftei Cohen 87:15 notes that according to many authorities, one is not liable for lashes for partaking of blood that has been cooked.

In this instance, we do not say that “one prohibition does not fall upon another,” because there is no prohibition against cooking a neveilah or forbidden fat.

He is, hP. wever, liable for partaking of a nevelah or of forbidden fat.

For as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 18, such substances are not fit to be eaten and thus are not considered as meat.

The pot must be boiling hot. If meat falls into cold milk, it will not absorb it. See Halachah 17.

Chullin 97a states “An Aramean chef shall taste it.” Tosafot and others explain that only a chefs word is accepted. He will not lie, because if his falsification is discovered, his professional reputation will be tarnished and he will suffer a loss. We suspect that an ordinary gentile, by contrast, will lie. His word is only accepted with regard to ritual matters when he makes statements in the course of conversation, without knowing that a Jew is depending on his word.
This interpretation is not evident from the Rambam’s words. On the contrary, it appears that according to the Rambam, the statements of any gentile are acceptable (see Chapter 15, Halachah 30, and notes). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 92:1 quotes the Rambam’s words. The Siftei Cohen 92:1 mentions the view of Tosafot. The Rama states that in the Ashkenazic community, the custom is not to rely on the word. of a gentile in this context. Instead, we require sixty times the volume of the meat in all instances. Otherwise, both the milk and the meat are forbidden.

For it certainly absorbed milk.

As will be explained (see Chapter 15, Halachah 6, and notes), our Sages received the tradition that a forbidden substances will not impart its flavor to a mixture when the mixture contains sixty times its volume.

There is no way of distinguishing the remainder of the milk from the forbidden milk. Hence the entire mixture is forbidden unless there is more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s words in this and the following halachah, we are speaking of an instance where milk falls on a piece of nieat that is not in the sauce. According to Rashi, the lower portion of the meat is resting within the sauce in the pot and its upper portion - on which the milk falls - projects beyond it. According to Rabbenu Yitzchak, the entire portion is outside the sauce. See Turei Zahav 92:2; Siftei Cohen 92:4. (From the Rambam’s wording at the beginning of the following halachah, it would appear that he follows Rabbenu Yitzchak’s position.)

I.e., we have the meat tasted by a gentile as above.

I.e., the piece itself is permitted and therefore all the contents of the pot.

Since the meat becomes forbidden, because it is meat that has been mixed with milk, tasting the mixture for milk is not sufficient. Instead, we consider the meat as a forbidden article and measure 60 times its volume. It is not possible to distinguish between the flavor of the forbidden meat and that of the permitted meat.

Once it becomes forbidden, it is considered as a prohibited entity and cannot become permitted again. Our Sages [Chullin 108b; Rama (Yoreh De’ah 92:34)] use the expression: “The piece becomes like carrion,” i.e., as Wit is _inherently forbidden.

As if it were mixed with 60 times its volume of non-kosher meat. If the entire mixture is not 60 times the volume of the forbidden piece, the entire mixture becomes forbidden.

Since he mixed at the end, after the meat became forbidden, the entire mixture may become forbidden.

Thus the piece of meat on which the milk fell remained a discrete entity, separate from the entire mixture. Hence it becomes forbidden.

The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 82) states that it is sufficient for him to stir the mixture at the beginning. This will cause the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture. There is no need for him to continue stirring the pot. Rav Y aakov ibn Chaviv maintains that the Rambam would also accept this position. The Rambam mentions stirring the put until the end only for stylistic reasons. This interpretation is also apparent in the Rambam’ s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 8:3).
In his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef, Rav Y osef Caro differs and maintains that the Rambam’s words here should be understood literally. Unless he mixed the pot from the beginning until the end, we fear that it was not mixed well. Hence in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 92:2, he quotes the Rambam exactly. The Rama, however, cites the Tur’s position.

For covering the pot also causes the flavor of the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture.

And we have a gentile taste the mixture as above.

The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 92:2) emphasize that if the person does not stir the pot immediately after the milk fell in, the piece on which the milk fell becomes forbidden. Since its identity is unknown, all the pieces are forbidden unless the entire mixture is 60 times larger than its largest piece.
Rav Yaakov ibn Chaviv and Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef) interpret the Rambam’ s intent as analogous to that of the Tur. They maintain that the Rambam also would agree that if person waited after the milk fell on the piece, that piece - and perhaps all the pieces - become(s) forbidden.
The Maggid Mishneh offers a different interpretation, explaining that in this instance, we do not say that the piece of meat on which the milk fell becomes forbidden because we do not know which piece it is. Hence rather than have the taste of the milk affect that piece, we stir the entire mixture so that the milk will become blended into it and become nullified as explained in the following note.
The Turei Zahav 92:6 and the Siftei Cohen 92:8 follow the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh, explaining that in this instance, the principle (Beitzah 4b) : “We do not nullify the existence of a forbidden substance at the outset,” does not apply. For since the identity of the forbidden substance was never established, there is no specific prohibited substance involved. Hence at the outset, the entire pot is considered as subject to being forbidden. To prevent that from happening, we stir it so that the prohibition will not take effect.

I.e., intentionally mixing the milk throughout the entire pot and thus nullifying its presence. As the Tur (loc. cit) writes, if the milk fell into the sauce, even if the person did not stir the mixture, this would be the ruling. Nevertheless, the Rambam advises the person to stir the mixture so that it will be mixed thoroughly and no trace will remain.

More precisely, the permitted substance must be sixty times the volume of the forbidden substance.

This applies even on a later day. According to Scriptural Law, after 24 hours, there is no prohibition. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, at the outset, one should be stringent and not cook milk in a pot in which meat was cooked previously even if it had been cooked several days beforehand.

I.e., it should be tasted by a gentile. According to the Ashkenazic custom not to rely on a gentile, we require that the contents be 60 times the volume of the pot. The Siftei Cohen 93: I states that it would be very rare for such a situation to exist. Generally, the ratio between a pot and its contents is less than 60. Hence, in most instances, the food would be prohibited.

I.e., we are afraid that a certain amount of milk remained in the udder or that the udder absorbed a certain amount of milk. Since we do not know how much milk it absorbed, we assume that it is entirely forbidden.

Halachah 6.

The ruling regarding roasting is more lenient than the ruling regarding cooking, because when meat is roasted, any fluids it contains are discharged and flow outward without being absorbed (see Halachah 14). When it is cooked, by contrast, it stews in its juices and it and any other meat will absorb the milk it discharges.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 90:2) writes that the accepted custom is not to cook it with other meat at all and to cook it alone only after it has been cut vertically and horizontally and pressed into a wall. The Rama adds that it is Ashkenazic custom not to cook it at all.

I.e., our Sages enforced their decree universally, without differentiating between one animal and another.

In Chapter 15, Halachah 18, the Ram. barn explains that since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages were more lenient. Thus the Rambam interprets this ruling as being of general significance. The Rashba offers a different rationale for this ruling, explaining that since the meat of the udder is acceptable, we include it in the reckoning of 60. Thus in contrast to other instances where 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance is required, here, we require only 59.

Rashi, Chullin 97b, explains that we assume that the milk imparted its flavor to the udder. Hence it becomes forbidden as the Ram. barn proceeds to state.

Thus according to the Rambam, only 59 times its volume is required. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 90:l). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that the second mixture is judged more stringently than the first. They follow the rationale of the Rashba cited above. Thus they maintain at first, the udder is included in the reckoning, because its meat is permitted. With regard to the second mixture, by contrast, it is the meat, not the milk of the udder which is forbidden. Hence 60 times its volume is required.

This is a safeguard so that it will not discharge milk which will flow over other pieces of meat.

For even if its milk does flow over other pieces of meat, they are not forbidden. The rationale is that since it has been cut open, we do not suspect that perhaps some milk remained. Since the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, we are not overly stringent. The Rama states if the udder was not cut open beforehand, the meat that is lower on the spit is forbidden.

I.e., a calf that had drank its mother’s milk and was cooked with that milk in its stomach.

The Kessef Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, this applies even to milk that is still liquid. Since it has already undergone preliminary digestive processes, it is no longer considered as milk. See Chapter 4, Halachah 19.

Hence the logic mentioned in the following note does not apply.

Chapter 3, Halachah 13. As the Rambam states in that halachah, since the amount of skin used is minimal, we might think that no prohibition is involved, for the forbidden substance would be nullified. Nevertheless, the Rabbis ruled stringently, explaining that since the catalyst which causes the milk to curdle is forbidden, everything is forbidden.

For in this instance, the two substances will be absorbed by each other just as if they had been cooked together.

For we follow the principle (Pesachim 76a): “The lower one dominates,” and the food is considered as hot.

We assume that the meat’s surface absorbed a small amount of milk while it was cooling down (ibid.). Hence the surface is forbidden and must be removed. The milk does not, however, permeate beyond the surface. Therefore the remainder is permitted. With regard to the milk, it appears that there is no prohibition. The Radbaz explains that since it is not possible to remove the surface of the milk, there is no prohibition whatsoever. Other Rishonim require that the milk be sixty times the volume of the surface of the meat. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 91 :4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. As explained by the Siftei Cohen 91 :8, this decision is accepted by the Rama despite the fact that this might appear incompatible with some of the other rulings of the Rama. The Turei Zahav 91 :7, however, argues in favor of the view of the other Rishonim.

Since they are both cold, there is no suspicion that one will be absorbed by the other. Washing the meat is necessary only to remove any traces of milk that might be left.

The Bayit Chadash rules that this applies only when one of them is moist. If they are both solid, they need not even be washed.

In previous eras, before the advent of refrigeration, meat was salted thoroughly to preserve it. Afterwards, when one desired to partake of it, he would soak it in water to remove the salt (Rashi, Chullin 112a). The Radbaz states that we are speaking about salting meat in a manner similar to the way it is salted to remove its blood. If less salt than that is used, these laws do not apply. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 91:5) which discusses these laws.

I.e., we assume that it will cause substances to be discharged and absorbed as cooking does. This is merely a Rabbinic stringency.

A mixture of milk, breadcrumbs, salt, and spices, commonly served as a dip in Babylon.

All that is necessary is to wash the meat and/or cheese thoroughly.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if this is speaking about a roasted fowl that is hot, or even one that is not hot. According to the latter opinion, it will still absorb some milk because it has become soft and permeable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 91:7) quotes the first view while the Tur and the Rama mention the second.

I.e., instead of being a solid surface, the surface of the meat cracks open in several places.

Because the cracks in its surface or the spices will cause it to absorb the milk to a greater extent than it would otherwise. This clause appears also to be referring to meat that has been roasted.

Needless to say, this applies to meat (see Lechem Mishneh).

They may, however, be placed together on a serving table (Chullin 104b).

Since both substances are permitted and they are served together, one might accidentally partake of them together.
Implied is that if substances are forbidden and one would not ordinarily partake of them, there is no difficulty in having them served on the table at which one is eating. See Siftei Cohen 88:2.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 88:2) which explains that if a distinction is made, e.g., the milk is placed on one type of placemat and the meat on another, there is no prohibition.

Thus there is little likelihood that they will share their food together.

Even to be eaten alone [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 97:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch, however, grants license if only a small amount of bread was prepared in this manner and thus it can be eaten at one time.

Even if the fat is kosher.

We fear that the fat from the oven became absorbed in the bread, causing it to become fleishig.

Firing the oven to the point that it becomes red-hot will burn away all traces of the fat.

Even if they did not touch each other. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 116) and the Turei Zahav 95:3) which mention that there is a prohibition against eating fish roasted with meat because it could cause a health problem.

For the vapors from the meat will become absorbed in the bread or in the fish. In Chapter 15, Halachah 32, the Rambam rules that vapors do not cause an object to become forbidden. There is not necessarily a contradiction between these two rulings, for here we are speaking about a small oven [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 97:3)]. Even though, after the fact, kosher meat roasted together with non-kosher meat in a small oven is permitted, here one is not deeming the bread or fish forbidden, one is merely prohibiting that it be eaten with milk (Siftei Cohen 97:4).

Or cooked [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 95:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch adds -that this ruling applies only when the dish was thoroughly washed and no trace of meat remains.

Even though the kutach contains milk. The rationale is that although the flavor of the meat was imparted to the dish and from the dish, it was imparted to the fish. Nevertheless, since it went through these two intermediate stages, it is not considered significant and does not cause the fish to be considered fleishig.

The Rambam’s wording implies that the meat was hot (Radbaz). This ruling applies also to hot cooked meat (Kessef Mishneh). There are opinions that. maintain that this ruling also applies when the meat was cold (Radbaz).

Rashi, Chullin 111 b, states that the rationale is that it is likely that there will be a small amount of fat left on the knife. Thus when the knife is used to cut the sharp food, its sharpness will cause the flavor of the fat will be imparted to it. According to this view, if the knife was cleaned or used to cut another substance first, it does not cause the radish to be forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 96:5); note also the dissenting view of the Rama]. (This opinion speaks of fat being left on the knife, for if there was no fat there, seemingly, this instance would resemble the concept of nat bar nat mentioned in the previous halachah.)
There are, however, other opinions (Tosafot, Sefer HaTerumot) which maintain that this ruling would apply even if the knife was clean. The rationale is that the pungency of the food and the pressure of the knife cause it to absorb more than an ordinary instance of nat bar nat.
From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the entire radish is forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 96:1), however, rules that it is sufficient to remove a piece a fingerbreadth in thickness. The Rama, however, mentions the Rambam’s view.

I.e., substances that are not pungent and soft and contain moisture. If one cuts a vegetable that is not soft and moist, it is sufficient to wash it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 96:5)].

The Ra’avad and the Radbaz note that the Rambam apparently had a slightly different version of Chullin 112a, the source for this halachah, than that found in the standard printed texts of the Talmud. According to the standard version, the rationale is that we fear that some drops of kutach will fall into the salt. The Radbaz adds that according to the Rambam, the prohibition applies only with regard to earthenware jugs. If they are made from metal, the material will be too dense to allow for the flavor to be drawn out.

According to the other rationale, the kutach will remain a distinct entity if it falls into the salt, but it will become mixed with the vinegar and nullified if it falls into it (Radbaz; Turei Zahav 95:16).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 89:2) states that if one sees that his hands are clean, it is not necessary to wash them.

The Rama quotes a view that requires one to wait six hours after eating hard cheese. It is, however, questionable if this would be required for most hard cheese commercially produced today.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states th~t one should also wash his mouth.

The requirement of this stringency for the meat of a domesticated animal is understandable, for the prohibition is of Scriptural origin. Nevertheless, according to the standard text of Halachah 4, the prohibition against a mixture of milk and the meat of a wild beast is also Rabbinic in origin. What then is the difference between the meat of a wild beast and that of a fowl? The Kessef Mishneh, however, explains that the meat of a domesticated animal resembles the meat of a wild beast. Hence it was necessary for the Rabbis to forbid it. Alternatively, Rabbenu Tam explains that the meat of a wild beast will stick to a person’s mouth and hands more than the meat of a fowl.

Since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages did not enforce any further stringency.

This is the view stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 89:1) and in the Rama’s conclusion, although the Rama does mention that there are some more lenient views.

The Tur (Yoreh De ‘ah 89) gives a different rationale: that because meat is fatty, its taste persists for a long time.