Sanhedrin veha’Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 20

Different rules apply with regard to cases of financial responsibility. In such instances, firm circumstantial evidence is accepted, as the Rambam states in Chapter 24, Halachah 1; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:4 and other sources.

For otherwise no punishment would be given, as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 4.

I.e., no matter how strong the circumstantial evidence, unless the witnesses actually see the crime, the killer is not executed. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 290) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 82) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam explains the rationale for this mitzvah. Once the matter is left to human choice and logic, there is ultimately the possibility of error. The Torah feared that a judge would consider certain evidence as conclusive and sentence an innocent person to death.

For in neither instance did two witnesses observe a transgression. The Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot) notes that similar concepts also apply with regard to financial laws. See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 4.

The Mechilta cites the conclusion of the verse: “For I (God) will not justify the wicked.” Implied is that the court need not worry if it releases a killer because there is not sufficient evidence to have him executed. For ultimately, he and all existence is in God’s hands and He will find a means to have retribution exacted. See the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 4:3).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5, which outlines the situations in which a person is obligated to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name.

The verse speaks of the rape of a maiden who has already been consecrated. Although she is party to a sin, since she was not willfully involved, she is absolved of responsibility. Similarly, Nedarim 27a mentions the general principle: “The Torah absolves a person acting under duress (an oness). This principle also applies in financial law.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 294) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 556) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Ramban disputes this classification, stating that although the Torah does not hold the person liable, this is not considered as a mitzvah.

Hence he is considered to have acted on his own volition. The Kessef Mishneh explain that the intent is not that he was forced into having an erection, but that having an erection comes as a result of his own pleasure and desire. Hence he is considered to have acted totally willingly.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh ask: How is it possible for the man to be liable for execution? If he did not consent to the relations, he would not have accepted the warning that he was given. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the intent is not that he is executed, but that he is considered as having acted willingly. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:9 which quotes opinions which differ with the Rambam and maintain that a person who is compelled to engage in relations is not liable.

For at the outset, she is being forced against her will.

Ketubot 51a states graphically: “Even if the woman says, ‘Had he not raped me, I would have hired him,’ she is not liable.” Since initially she was forced, she is not held responsible if her natural inclination takes control of her.

See the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 521) who states that it appears that this prohibition applies only with regard to a killer and not to others condemned to death by the court.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 279) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 521) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The intent appears to be monetary compensation for injury which is considered as a k’nas, “fine,” as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 8. As indicated by the Rambam in his listing of mitzvot at the beginning of these laws, he includes this as one facet of the above mitzvah. See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:4 where the Rambam refers to this prohibition in the context of the laws regarding compensation for personal injury.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 277) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 79) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:21 states that if one of the litigants is a Torah scholar of great stature, the judge must stand in deference to him. This should not confound the other litigant, for he should realize that this is an obligation due because of the person’s scholarship alone. See also Chapter 21, Halachah 4.

I.e., seeing the judge show this courtesy to the other person may cause the litigant to become flustered to the extent that he forgets the arguments he wished to present.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 275) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 234) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sifra to the above verse.

I.e., accept the other litigant’s statements without diligent cross-examination.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 278) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 81) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In this context, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 17:10) quotes the advice of the mishnah (Avot 1:8): “When the litigants stand before you, regard them both as guilty.” See Chapter 23, Halachah 10.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 273) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 233) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 5:8).

Although as stated in the previous halachah, a judge must not delay rendering judgment, he should not be hasty in doing so either. Instead, he should patiently review the matter before coming to a decision.

Avot 1:1.

In the present age, when the breakthroughs in communication have made the world a global village, this advice applies not only to scholars located in the same city, but throughout the world.

His haughtiness will prevent him from realizing his errors and lead to a perversion of justice (Radbaz).

Hepilah, translated as “cast down” also has the connotation “miscarried.” I.e., the student is like a fetus who emerges from the womb too early (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 19b).

Atzumim, translated as “awesome,” also has the connotation to “those who hold back.” On this basis, our Sages advance this interpretation (Rashi, Ibid.). See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:4 where the Rambam quotes the same concepts.

And instead defers to another, allowing him to judge the case. This appears to be the Rambam’s interpretation. The Perisha (Choshen Mishpat 10) offers an alternate perspective, explaining that rather than render a judgment, the judge convinces the litigants to accept a compromise.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 10:3 explains: “foolish,” because he thinks he is wise, but is not, “wicked,” for he perverts judgment, and “arrogant,” because due to his haughtiness, he thinks that a person of his stature need not be patient in judgment.

I.e., a teacher who has taught him the majority of his knowledge (Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:2-3).

A parsa is twelve mil, and a mil is approximately a kilometer in modern measure.

When, by contrast, a person renders a ruling in the presence of his teacher, he is liable for death at the hand of heaven (Hilchot Talmud Torah, loc. cit.).

Anyone in the camp could approach Moses with his halachic questions. If, however, the teacher grants him permission - as Moses granted to the other judges whom he appointed - the student may also render judgment (Hilchot Talmud Torah, 5:23).

A maneh is 100 silver pieces.

A copper coin of minimal value, worth less than any other coinage in the Talmudic age.

Sanhedrin 8a states that this means that if a case involving a p’rutah is brought to a judge before one involving a large sum, the judge must adjudicate the smaller case first. The Radbaz qualifies that statement, explaining that if the smaller case involves patient judgment and the larger matter is straightforward and can be settled quickly, the larger matter should be adjudicated first.

For anything less than a p’rutah is not considered financially significant. See the Siftei Cohen 6:1 who explains that if a judgment concerns utensils that are worth less than a p’rutah, the judges must hear the case. Note the parallel to Hilchot To’ain ViNitan 3:5-6.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 55b) interprets this as referring to an instance where after ajudge renders a judgment concerning a p’rutah, the defendant tries to exonerate himself from part of the responsibility by citing a claim that is worth less than a p’rutah.
Rabbenu Asher disputes the Rambam’s decision, ruling that whenever a case does not concern a p’rutah, it is not heard by the judges regardless of the circumstances. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 6:1, quotes the Rambam’s view, the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 6:3 favors Rabbenu Asher’s perspective.

As mentioned in Halachah 6.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 280) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 590) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See note 45.

I.e., the convert.

From the Rambam’s wording here, it appears that there are two prohibitions involved, one for a convert, and a second, if the convert is an orphan. Nevertheless, in Sefer HaMitzvot (and in the mitzvot mentioned at the beginning of these halachot), he considers wronging the two as one prohibition. From Sefer HaMitzvot, it appears that a person violates the same prohibition whether he perverts the judgment of a convert or a convert who is an orphan. The intent of “three prohibitions” is not that the person has violated three separate prohibitions, but that the deed involves the spiritual severity of violating God’s decree three times. If a person perverts the judgment of a native-born Jewish orphan, however, he is not considered to have violated this commandment (Radbaz).
The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 590) notes that every convert is an “orphan,” for he no longer has any connection to his natural father. He explains that if the convert is young and unable to manage on his own, he is considered an orphan. Once he can fend for himself, he is no longer placed in that category.