Chukas: A Lesson in Forgiveness

This week’s Torah reading relates the passage regarding the copper serpent made by Moshe:8

The people spoke against G‑d and against Moshe…. G‑d sent venomous snakes against the people… and many people of Israel died. The people came to Moshe and said, “We have sinned, for we have spoken against G‑d and against you. Pray to G‑d that He remove the snakes from us.” And Moshe prayed on behalf of the people.

Rashi focuses on the words, “And Moshe prayed,” and explains, “From here, [we learn] that someone who is asked for forgiveness9 should not be cruel so as not to forgive.” Other versions of Rashi’s text use slightly different wording, “should not be cruel in forgiving.”10

The source for Rashi’s interpretation is Midrash Tanchuma,11 which states:

The purpose of this is to make known Moshe’s humility, that he did not hesitate to request mercy for them and to make you aware of the power of teshuvah – as soon as [the people] said, “We have sinned…,” Moshe was immediately appeased, for a person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel to them, [but should forgive immediately. This is also reflected in Avraham’s conduct,] as it is written,12 “Avraham prayed to G‑d and G‑d13 healed Avimelech….”

(Afterwards, Midrash Tanchuma cites further support from a verse from Iyov.)

(Avimelech had taken Sarah, Avraham’s wife, and desired to be intimate with her. It was only through a Divine miracle – a plague visited on Avimelech and his household – that she was not touched. G‑d told Avimelech to return Sarah to Avraham and ask him to pray that Avimelech and his household be healed.14 )

Based on the above, clarification is necessary: Why – when speaking about Moshe granting forgiveness – does Rashi say, “From here, [we learn] that someone who is asked for forgiveness…,” when that concept can be derived from an earlier event, Avraham’s prayer for Avimelech, as is evident from Midrash Tanchuma?15

Furthermore, the derivation of this concept from Avraham’s conduct is specifically mentioned by the Mishnah in Bava Kama,16 which states that when a person injures his fellowman, even if he reimburses him for all the five types of damages due him,17 he is not forgiven for the pain or the embarrassment he caused18 until he asks the aggrieved party for forgiveness, as reflected by the verse,19 “Now, return the man’s wife….”20

The Mishnah continues,21 “From where is it derived that [if the person who was harmed] does not forgive him, he is cruel?” – or according to another version,22 “From where is it derived that the one who forgives should not be cruel? It is written, ‘Avraham prayed to G‑d and G‑d healed Avimelech….’”23

According to this, it is difficult to understand why Rashi, when interpreting the straightforward meaning of the verse, states that the above concept is derived “from here,” i.e., from Moshe’s conduct, and not, as stated in the Mishnah, from Avraham’s conduct when praying to G‑d on behalf of Avimelech.

Furthermore, Avraham’s response reflected a more encompassing innovation regarding the manner and the obligation to grant forgiveness. Firstly, the seriousness of the offense to which Avraham was subjected seemingly surpasses that to which Moshe was subjected. Taking Sarah, Avraham’s wife, to Avimelech’s home appears to be a more serious affront and caused greater pain24 than the fact that the people spoke against Moshe. Also, the forgiveness and the removal of the punishment was greater in Avraham’s instance. As soon as Avraham prayed for Avimelech, G‑d healed him. By contrast, in our Torah reading, there was a condition for the people to be saved, as it is written,25 “Make for yourself a serpent… and whoever is bitten will look up at it and live,” i.e., the punishment was not removed immediately.

On the surface, it is possible to explain that according to the straightforward reading of the verses, Rashi understands that an explicit request for forgiveness was made specifically in our Torah reading, as the Jews stated, “We have sinned, for we have spoken against G‑d and against you. Pray to G‑d….” By contrast, Avimelech did not request forgiveness. His words to Avraham26 – “What have you done to us? How have I sinned against you, that you have brought upon me and upon my kingdom a great sin? Deeds that are not done, you have done to me.… What did you see, that you did this thing?” – do not indicate a request for forgiveness. On the contrary, it sounds like he is lodging a protest against Avraham.

Indeed, from a straightforward reading of the manner in which the Tosefta27 refers to the incident, it does not appear that Avimelech requested forgiveness.28 The Tosefta states, “When a person injures his fellowman, even though the one who caused the harm did not ask the person who was harmed for forgiveness, the person who was harmed must ask for Divine mercy for [the one who caused him injury], as it is written, ‘Avraham prayed to G‑d…’”

Therefore, Rashi comments on the verse from this Torah reading, that specifically “from here” – i.e., from Moshe’s conduct – “[we learn] that someone who is asked for forgiveness should not be cruel so as not to forgive.”

Nevertheless, this resolution is not acceptable, because – according to this explanation – the question becomes even stronger: Why do we not derive from Avraham’s praying for Avimelech that even when the one who caused the injury does not ask for forgiveness, the person who was harmed should not be cruel so as not to forgive him? Needless to say, this applies if the offender has asked for forgiveness.

(Nor can it be said, in light of the above, that Avraham’s praying for Avimelech did not indicate that he forgave him. True, there are grounds to say that Avraham requested Divine mercy for Avimelech – just as he did for the inhabitants of Sodom – even though Avimelech did not ask for forgiveness, nor did Avraham forgive him. Indeed, the Tosefta can be explained in this manner.

However, a comparison of the text of the narrative here and the narrative regarding Avraham and Avimelech does not support that hypothesis. Aside from the difficulty in saying29 that Avraham requested Divine mercy for Avimelech even though Avraham did not forgive him, there is a further problem in such an understanding. According to this logic, there is also no definitive way to derive that concept from our Torah reading because, in this narrative, the Torah uses the same wording, “Moshe prayed,” that it used regarding Avraham, “Avraham prayed.”

Therefore, we are forced to say that praying for someone is proof that the one who prayed forgave the person who aggrieved him.30 Accordingly, we can derive the above concept from Avraham’s praying for Avimelech, just as it can be derived from Moshe’s prayer. Thus, our original question – why does Rashi say that this concept is derived from Moshe’s prayer and not Avraham’s? – remains in force.)

On the surface, it could be said that, according to Rashi,31 it is impossible to derive this concept from Avraham’s praying for Avimelech, because in that instance it was not necessary for Avimelech to ask for forgiveness, and for that reason, Avraham did not grant forgiveness.

Avimelech claimed, “I did this with innocence of my heart,”32 and G‑d accepted this claim, telling him, “I also know that you acted with the innocence of your heart. [Therefore,] I also prevented you from sinning against Me. Accordingly, I did not allow you to touch her.”33 In other words, Avimelech did not intend to wrong Avraham. Therefore, it could be said that it was not relevant that he ask for forgiveness or that Avraham forgive him.

This is also implied by G‑d’s words to Avime­lech, “Now return the man’s wife because he is a prophet and he will pray for you, and you will live.” All that was necessary for Avimelech to do was return Sarah. That would have been enough for Avraham to pray for him so that he live. As Rashi comments on the phrase, “Return the man’s wife” – “Do not think that perhaps [… he will not accept her,] or that he will hate you and not pray for you…, for he is a prophet and knows that you did not touch her. Therefore, he will pray for you.”

Nevertheless, from the verse,34 “Avimelech took sheep, cattle, servants, and maidservants, and gave them to Abraham” – concerning which Rashi comments, “so that he would be appeased and would pray for him” – it is obvious that it was necessary for Avimelech to request forgiveness and that Avraham be appeased.35 This is also evident from the fact that we do not find that Avraham refused to accept the gift Avimelech offered.36

Indeed, it is obvious why asking for forgiveness and offering appeasement was necessary. Since Avimelech committed a sin – seizing Avraham’s wife, a very severe sin – against Avraham, Avimelech’s intent was of little consequence. Hence, it was necessary for him to ask for forgiveness37 and to appease Avraham.38

Thus, the original question remains: Why is the concept that a person should not be cruel and refrain from forgiving not derived from Avraham’s prayers for Avimelech?

The above matters can be clarified by first focusing on the preciseness of Rashi’s wording, “From here, [we learn] that someone who is asked for forgiveness should not be cruel so as not to forgive.” Midrash Tanchuma39 uses the wording, “For a person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel (to those [who wronged him],)” and others state,40 “The one who grants forgiveness should not be cruel,” or the like. Similar wording is found in the Mishnah.41 Rashi, however, deviates from that wording. Instead of saying, “A person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel,” he says, “Someone who is asked for forgiveness… should not be cruel so as not to forgive.”42 It is possible to say that the unique dimension in Rashi’s wording is found not as much in the fundamental point – that the one who was wronged should grant forgiveness – but rather in the manner in which he should grant forgiveness.

To explain: There are several ways in which forgiveness can be granted. Among them:

a) The person who was wronged forgives the other person for wronging him so that that other person not be punished.

b) He forgives him not only to prevent him from being punished, but also because he does not harbor any ill feelings in his heart.

c) He forgives him whole-heartedly in a manner that shows he was appeased entirely; the person who is forgiven is “desirable and cherished by him as he was before he wronged [him].”43

To use slightly different wording: In the first instance, the person who grants forgiveness pardons the wrong that the other person committed against him. In the second instance, he forgives the person who wronged him. In the third instance, he also uproots the wrong from its very roots; no trace of it remains at all.44

The difference in actual practice between these three approaches is that when the wronged party is concerned only that the person who wronged him not be punished for his actions, then when granting him forgiveness, he seeks only to do what is necessary to prevent the other person from being punished for the specific wrong he committed.

In the second approach – and particularly in the third approach – when he grants forgiveness with a full heart, he is concerned with the welfare of the other person, and he invests himself in granting forgiveness with more intensity so that he can enable the other person to reach a totally desirable state, to the extent that the person who committed the wrong will be as he was before doing so.

This is the difference between the forgiveness granted by Avraham when praying for Avimelech and the forgiveness spoken about in this week’s Torah portion. With regard to Avraham, the verse states, “Avraham prayed to G‑d and G‑d healed Avimelech… and they were relieved.” Avraham’s prayer and request focused specifically on healing Avimelech – that G‑d remove the punishment that had been visited upon Avimelech and his household.

Our Torah reading, by contrast, does not only state that “Moshe prayed to G‑d,” as it states regarding Avraham’s prayer, rather it adds – and emphasizes – that “Moshe prayed on behalf of the people.”45 He was concerned about the situation of the people, not only to nullify the punishment of the snakes sent against them, but that their spiritual status be rectified.

Therefore, the verse continues that G‑d answered Moshe’s prayer, telling him, “Make a serpent for yourself….” According to a straightforward understanding of Scripture, the word lecha, “for yourself,” implies “from your own resources,”46 as Rashi comments on the command,47 “Make for yourself two silver trumpets….” On the surface, since making the serpent was for the sake of saving the Jewish people who “spoke against G‑d and Moshe,” it would have been more appropriate to use communal funds for that purpose. However, by telling Moshe that he was to use his own resources for this purpose, G‑d was showing him that it had to be evident from his actions that the forgiveness granted them was personally relevant to him; he has to invest himself when acting on their behalf.

The above helps us to understand the purpose of making the copper serpent – not only to bring about the healing of the Jewish people, but also to arouse them to “look upward and subjugate their hearts to their Father in Heaven.”48 G‑d’s intent extended beyond His concern that they repent for their undesirable words and everything connected to them. He wanted them to “subjugate their hearts to… Heaven.”49 For that reason, G‑d commanded that the serpent be “place[d] on a pole” so that “if a serpent would bite a person, he would gaze [upwards] at the copper serpent and live,”50 as Rashi explains in his interpretation of the verses in this passage.51

This is the reason why the healing of the Jewish people did not come immediately after Moshe’s prayer – in contrast to G‑d’s healing of Avimelech which came directly after Avraham’s prayer. Instead, Moshe had to make a copper serpent and place it on a pole so that the people would gaze at it. That was necessary because G‑d’s – and Moshe’s – intent was not only that punishment of the Jews be averted, but that they be aroused to teshuvah,52 “to subjugate their hearts to their Father in Heaven,” and, in that way, bring about a complete metamorphosis of their characters.

This is also the implication of Rashi’s precise wording, “From here, [we learn] that someone who is asked for forgiveness should not be cruel so as not to forgive,” and not “the one who forgives should not be cruel.”

The wording, “The one who forgives should not be cruel,” places the emphasis on the person himself – in general, he should not be cruel. Were he not to forgive the person who wronged him and, therefore, that person would be punished, it would be an act of cruelty. This concept – that the person who forgives should not be cruel – is actually derived53 from Avraham’s prayer for Avimelech.54

The new and unique concept derived from our Torah reading is that “from here”55 it can be learned that “someone who is asked for forgiveness should not be cruel so as not to forgive.” The wording Rashi uses, mei’limchol, “so as not to forgive,” does not speak about the person who caused the harm at all. The emphasis is not that the one who forgives should not be cruel and, therefore, he should grant forgiveness – for were he not to do so, the other person would be punished – but rather the emphasis is on the act of granting forgiveness. With regard to granting forgiveness, he should not be cruel, i.e., his manner of granting forgiveness should be free of cruelty.

When forgiveness is granted only to prevent punishment being visited upon the person who committed the wrong, it is not genuine forgiveness; it is a cruel type of forgiveness, because the person granting forgiveness still has negative feelings in his heart against the person whom he is forgiving. When, however, he forgives him with a full heart,56 his forgiveness is pure, without a trace of cruelty.57

This is even more clearly emphasized by the wording,58 “He should not be cruel in forgiving (limchol).” According to that version, it is understandable why the copyist of Rashi’s manuscript changed the wording to “so as not to forgive.” He did not understand how one could be cruel and simultaneously forgiving and, therefore, he added a mem, which changed the meaning to “so as not to forgive.” By contrast, were the opposite to be true – that Rashi wrote “so as not to forgive (mi’limchol)” – why would the copyist change the wording and, by mistake, write “in forgiving”?

To give an example and a parallel to “being cruel in forgiving” – “One who gives a poor person charity with a sour countenance … forfeits his merit even if he gives him 1000 gold pieces.”59

Based on the above, it is also possible to explain several differences in the wording used by Rambam regarding the concept that a person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel and should grant forgiveness. Rambam quotes this concept at least three times:60

In Hilchos Deos,61 Rambam writes, “When one person wrongs another, [the latter] should not remain silent and despise him. Instead, it is a mitzvah for him to tell [the other….]” He concludes, “If [the person who committed the wrong] shows regret and asks [his fellowman] to forgive him, he must do so. The person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel….”62

In Hilchos Teshuvah,63 Rambam writes, “It is forbidden for a person to be cruel and refuse to be appeased. Rather, he should be easily pacified and hard to anger. When the person who wronged him asks for forgiveness, he should forgive [him] with a full heart and a willing spirit.”

And in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik,64 Rambam writes:

It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel and not to forgive (the one [who caused the injury]).65 This is not the path of a descendant of Israel. Instead, since the person who caused the injury asks and pleads of [the injured person] for forgiveness once or twice, and [that person] knows that [the offender] has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him. Whoever hastens to grant forgiveness is praiseworthy and is regarded favorably by the Sages.

It is necessary to understand the differences between the wording used and the details mentioned in these three sources:

a) In Hilchos Deos, Rambam writes, “If [the person who committed the wrong] shows regret and asks [his fellowman] to forgive him, he must do so. The person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel….” By contrast, in Hilchos Teshuvah and in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam states this as a prohibition, writing, “It is forbidden66 for a person to be cruel,” and “It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel.”

b) In Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam mentions details when and how one should grant forgiveness, “Since the person who caused the injury asks and pleads of [the injured person] for forgiveness once or twice, and [that person] knows that [the offender] has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him.” However, in Hilchos Teshuvah and, similarly, in Hilchos Deos, Rambam does not state these conditions and particulars regarding the one who grants forgiveness – that he should grant forgiveness after being asked twice…. (However, he does make a similar statement in the preceding halachah in Hilchos Teshuvah regarding the person who asks for forgiveness,67 “If the person [who was the wronged party] does not desire to forgive him, [the offender] should bring a group of three…. If [the wronged party] is not appeased by them, he should [repeat the process] a second and third time.”68 )

Furthermore, in Hilchos Teshuvah, Rambam adds other details:

He should be easily pacified and hard to anger. When the person who wronged him asks for forgiveness, he should forgive [him] with a complete heart and a willing spirit. Even if he aggravated and wronged him severely, he should not seek revenge or bear a grudge. This is the path of the seed of Israel and their upright spirit.

c) The precise wording Rambam uses in the three sources differs: In Hilchos Deos, he writes, “The person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel.” In Hilchos Teshuvah, he uses different wording, “It is forbidden for a person to be cruel,” and in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, he states, “It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel.”

d) The continuation of the wording Rambam uses in the sources also differs: In Hilchos Teshuvah, he states, “It is forbidden for a person to be cruel and not be appeased,” while in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, he states, “It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel and not to forgive (the one [who caused the injury]).” And in Hilchos Deos, he does not make any additions reflecting this point.

Based on the concepts mentioned previously, it is possible to explain the above. With regard to the need for forgiveness, there are three general approaches:

a) In Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam speaks about the need for forgiveness from the standpoint of damages, i.e., since there were injuries and damages, there is a need for atonement for the sin committed by the person who caused the damages, so that he will be freed from the onus of punishment.

b) In Hilchos Teshuvah, Rambam underscores the definition of forgiveness as it relates to the repentance of the person who wronged his fellow, without placing such an emphasis on the particular sin and the punishment for which he is liable. Instead, the focus is that the teshuvah of the person who is being granted forgiveness be accomplished in the desired manner. As a result of the complete and total forgiveness that the wronged party grants the one who harmed him,69 the offender will be able – through his teshuvah – to become “beloved and cherished… as he was before the sin,”36 i.e., he will again be entirely pure and desirable.70

c) In Hilchos Deos, Rambam’s focus is on a person’s character71 development, how granting forgiveness affects the character of the person who forgives. This is reflected in the manner in which Rambam begins the halachah in Hilchos Deos, “When one person wrongs another, [the latter] should not remain silent and despise him…. Instead, it is a mitzvah for him to make [his grievance] known to him.” The obligations not to despise the person who committed the wrong and to make his grievance known to him are not so much for the sake of the person who committed the wrong, but rather for the sake of the person who was wronged – that he not harbor hatred against the other in his heart. On the contrary, it is a mitzvah for him to make his grievance “known to him and tell him…,” so that the matter can be resolved.

Developing this theme – i.e., what the wronged party should do so as a reflection of his own character development – Rambam proceeds to state, “If, afterwards, [the person who committed the wrong] asks [his fellowman] to forgive him, he must do so. The person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel.” He does not mention the prohibition involved or that he must grant forgiveness after being asked two or three times. The reason is that, here, Rambam is focusing primarily on the benefit and advantage to the one who grants forgiveness and to the virtues of his character. From the standpoint of the character and emotional development of the one granting forgiveness, “If, afterwards, [the person who committed the wrong] asks [his fellowman] to forgive him, he must do so. The person who grants forgiveness should not be cruel.” Immediately, when the person who wronged him asks for forgiveness, he should not harbor any cruelty in his heart and he should forgive him.72

By contrast, in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam is speaking about the manner in which forgiveness is granted and about its definition as it applies to the atonement for the sin that the person who caused the injury committed. As Rambam states in the preceding halachah,73 “He cannot generate atonement, nor is his sin forgiven until he asks the person who was injured [for forgiveness] and he forgives him.”

Therefore, here, it is important to state, “Since the person who caused the injury asks and pleads of [the injured person] for forgiveness once or twice, and [that person] knows that [the offender] has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him.” It is specifically when one sees from the effort that the other person invests and the manner in which he humbles himself that he “has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds,” that it is appropriate for forgiveness to be granted, so that the offender receives atonement for his sin and will not be punished for it.

In Hilchos Teshuvah, Rambam speaks about forgiveness as it relates to the entire process of repentance that a person who wrongs his fellowman must undergo, as he states in the preceding halachah:74

Teshuvah and Yom Kippur only atone for sins between man and G‑d.… However, sins between man and man [also require the wronged party] to be appeased; for example, someone who injures another person… or steals from him, or the like will never be forgiven until he gives [the person he wronged] what he owes him and appeases him.

Even if a person restores the money that he owes [the person he wronged], he must appease him and ask him to forgive him.

For this reason, Rambam proceeds to state, “It is forbidden for a person to be cruel and refuse to be appeased. Rather, he should be easily pacified....” True, seemingly, this instruction is more relevant to the laws regarding character development. However, it is included here because the manner in which the person grants forgiveness – with “a full heart and a willing spirit” – are also relevant to the complete repentance of the person who caused the injury. The forgiveness must be granted not only to remove the punishment for the specific wrong, but must be complete to the extent that the person who caused the injury is “beloved and cherished by” the one who was wronged.

Therefore, here, there is no emphasis on the request for forgiveness being made three times – instead, “When the person who wronged him asks for forgiveness, he should forgive him with a full heart and a willing spirit.” This indicates that not only did the person wronged forgive the misdeed, but that the person who committed that misdeed is entirely desirable in his eyes.

The above explanations also clarify the reasons for the other differences in the wording found in the various sources: In Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam states, “It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel and not to forgive (the one [who caused the injury]),” while in Hilchos Teshuvah, he states, “It is forbidden for a person to be cruel and not be appeased.”

The reason for the above difference is that in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, the dimension of forgiveness that is necessary is primarily that which is connected with the act of the injury so as to remove the punishment. Therefore, Rambam states, “It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury… not to forgive the one [who caused the injury]. Instead, since... he knows that [the offender] has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him.”

In Hilchos Teshuvah, however, the granting of forgiveness is not limited to removing punishment for the harm caused by an injury, a curse, a theft, or taunt, as Rambam mentioned beforehand. Instead, a person – how much more so, a Jew – who is concerned with the welfare of his fellowman should be appeased; not merely should he forgive the offender so that he will not be punished, but also to enable him to reach a complete state of teshuvah.

On this basis, it is possible to resolve an apparent contradiction in Rambam’s words raised by Lechem Mishneh:75

In Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik, Rambam states, “When a person who damages another person’s property pays him what he is obligated to pay him, he receives atonement” – the implication is that he need not ask the person whose property was damaged for forgiveness. However, in Hilchos Teshuvah, Rambam includes one who steals from his fellowman or the like among those who “will never be forgiven until he gives his colleague what he owes him and appeases him.”

There is no contradiction Rambam’s two statements because they focus on different dimensions of atonement.76 With regard to the dimension of atonement for the sin of merely damaging another person’s property – the subject matter in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik – requesting forgiveness is not necessary. However, for the person who harmed his fellowman to wipe away his inner blemish entirely and become “desirable” – the subject of Hilchos Teshuvah – it can be said that it is necessary to “appease [the injured party] and ask him for forgiveness” whenever one damages another person’s possessions regardless of the nature of those damages.77

On the verse,78 “He tells His words to Yaakov, His statutes and His ordinances to Yisrael,” the Mid­rash comments,79 “What G‑d fulfills Himself, He commands to others.” Just as regarding the Jews, it is “the path of the seed of Israel and their upright spirit” to forgive “with a full heart and a willing spirit,”80 and to do so immediately, to the extent that even regarding granting forgiveness for a particular wrong, Rambam writes in Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik,57 “Whoever hastens to grant forgiveness is praiseworthy and is regarded favorably by the Sages.” It is self-understood that how much more so does the above apply regarding the attributes of G‑d. “Forgiveness is [an expression of] the attribute of mercy and His holy attributes have no limit or end.”81 Certainly, He will hurry to grant Jews forgiveness for all their undesirable actions in a manner characterized by grace, kindness, and mercy expressed in overt and apparent good. This itself will arouse and help the Jews to do teshuvah immediately. And when the Jews do teshuvah, they will immediately be redeemed,82 in the true and Ultimate Redemption.

Adapted from a sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Chukas, 5744 (1984) Likkutei Sichos, Volume 28, P. 138ff.