Biat Hamikdash - Chapter 9

I.e., and it does not forbid merely entering the Temple or ascending the Altar.

I.e., where is stated the prohibition for which this punishment is given? (Sifri)

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 74) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 390) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Thus restricting the priestly service to males and excluding females. The Radbaz questions why two verses are necessary to exclude the women of the priestly family. He explains that since they are permitted to partake of terumah and certain sacrificial foods, they are not entirely similar to Israelites. Hence, a second verse is necessary.

Service which is the final stage in a sacrifice being brought to the altar (Yoma 24a).

E. g., receiving the blood, carrying the blood or the limbs to the altar.

See Halachah 3.

See Halachah 4.

As performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur and also when offering certain atonement offerings.

The sprinkling or dashing of blood on the external altar.

See Hilelwt Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2 where these sprinklings are mentioned.
Rav Yosef Corcus questions why the water libations and the wine libations are considered as separate categories and the sprinkling of blood and oil are not. He explains that the two different libations stem from entirely different commandments. The sprinkling of the oil, by contrast, is not a commandment in its own right, but an ancillary element to the offering of a sacrifice and that sacrifice also involves sprinkling blood. Hence, the two are included in the same category.

I.e., entities that are usually set afire on the altar.

As Sh’vuot 17b states, this applies even if the entity would have ultimately been consumed by fire without his activity, but his act hastens its consumption.

For one to be liable, a portion of this minimum size is necessary, for an incense offering may not be smaller, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:2. Hence, if he sets afire less, he is not performing service. Even though a larger amount of incense is offered each day, that is a Rabbinic enactment and not a Scriptural requirement (Radbaz).

Leviticus 16:12. If he sets fire to a lesser amount, he is not performing service. Hence, he is not liable.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:l. Arranging these two logs is the final stage in the arrangement of wood on the altar. Hence a non-priest is liable (Radbaz).

Rabbi Akiva Eiger cites Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:23 which states that the preliminary stages of the offering of a meal offering may be performed by a non-priest.

See Halachah 7.

Se also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:1; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:1.

Even as an initial preference (Radbaz). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that, after the fact, if a non-priest kindled the lamps, it is valid, but as an initial preference, he is not allowed to kindle them. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam’s position from Yoma 24b which states that kindling the lamps of the Menorah is not an act of service. Since it is not an. act of service, asks the Radbaz, why should a non-priest be restricted from performing it? How is it different from the slaughter of an animal?
The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 98) reinforces the Ra’avad’s question, asking how is it possible for the Menorah to be lit outside its proper place? The Rambam LeAm explains that the mitzvah is not lighting the lamps, but rather putting the lamps in their place.

I.e., out from the Temple building to a place in the courtyard where a non-priest is allowed to stand. Note the discussion of the meaning of the term hatavah in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 3:12 and notes.

See ibid. 2:10.

See Halachah 2.

I.e., the verse has two connotations: a) that the priestly service is a gift to the priests, b) (and this is the focus here), that the priestly service involves giving: offering sacrificial substances on the altar.

I.e., the removal of the ashes.

Because arranging the wood is considered sacrificial service (Radbaz). The Kessef Mishneh points out that from Yoma 27-28a, one might conclude that it is permitted for a non-priest to arrange the wood of the altar. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam that passage only absolves a non-priest from the punishment of death. It does not grant him permission to arrange the wood.

The commentaries question why the Rambam omits a priest who does not wear the priestly garments. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that it is not necessary to mention such a person because in Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 10:4, the Rambam stated that a priest who does not wear the priestly garments is considered as a non-priest.

I.e., each one is liable according to the punishment appropriate for him. An impure priest and one who did not wash his hands and feet are liable for death and one who is physically blemished is liable for lashes (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., services that are not followed by other services which involve giving.

And must wait until the evening before performing service.

E. g., a person afflicted with tzara'at who must bring an atonement offering before serving.

With another type of impurity.

Since he violated many prohibitions with one act of service, he is liable for a sacrifice for each violation.
The Ra’avad cites a Tosefta that does not accept the Rambam’s ruling on this point and instead, maintains that he is liable for only one sacrifice. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh, however, support the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that each of the prohibitions expands the scope of the obligation. See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 7:2 and Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:6 which discusses the ground rules for these concepts.

Even if he also possessed all the other disqualifying factors.

For all of the other prohibitions were given only to a priest. They do not apply to a non-priest (Kessef Mishneh).

For the Temple services involve performance of forbidden labors. These prohibitions are superseded by the obligation to offer the sacrifices, but since a non-priest’s service is not valid, he is considered as liable for these prohibited acts.

Here also although a single act is performed, since two different prohibitions are involved, he is liable for both of them. We do not follow the principle: One prohibition does not fall on another prohibition, because the prohibition against performing the Sabbath labors is greater in scope, encompassing other acts besides the Temple service.

For the ritual impurity increases the scope of his liability, making him liable also for entering the Temple and partaking of sacrifices. Since it is of a greater scope, we do not follow the principle, one prohibition does not fall on another (Radbaz).

A parallel also exists with regard to the recitation of the priestly blessing. See Hilchot Nesiat Kapayim 15:3. There the Rambam also excludes a priest who was compelled to serve idols and he cites a different prooftext, II Kings 23:9.

The priests who “who distanced themselves from Me during Israel’s straying, when they strayed after false deities” (Ezekiel 44:10).

I.e., though it is not disqualified, it is not considered as desirable.

Note a parallel in Hilchot Shechitah 2:15.

The Rambam is not speaking about a mere hypothetical situation. As he relates in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:10), Chonio, the son of Shimon the Just, entered into a power struggle with his brother Shimi to inherit his father’s position as High Priest. Chonio incurred the people’s wrath, because he brought about a very deprecating situation in the Temple. He fled to Alexandria where he established a following, constructed a temple to God resembling the Temple in Jerusalem, and offered sacrifices there just like those offered in Jerusalem. Needless to say, our Sages shunned Chonio’s shrine, because its sacrificial worship violated the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside the Temple. Indeed, the majority of those who worshiped there were non-Jewish Egyptians whom Chonio had attracted to God’s service.

This represents a conclusion reached by the Rambam on the basis of deduction without a prior Rabbinic source.

Since they were disqualified by Rabbinic decree, after the fact, their service is acceptable (Kessef Mishneh).

Halachah 13.

Halachah l.

Chapter 6, Halachot 1-2.

Ibid.:8.

Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

Ibid.:4.

Ibid.:5.

Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 10:4.

Ibid.:5.

Chapter 1, Halachah 14.

Ibid.:8-9.

Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

Ibid.:17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.:18.