Maaseh Hakorbanot - Chapter 19

I.e., if he offers it for the sake of a person without designating him as a deity, but merely as a token of appreciation, he is not liable.

In contrast to an entity which is eaten, as stated in Halachah 4.

Excluding sacrifices that are not offered on the altar, as mentioned in Halachah 7.

This applies with regard to all sacrifices, even sacrifices of a lesser order of sanctity. Since these parts are offered on the altar in the Temple, one is liable for offering them outside the Temple (Radbaz).

Both the handful of meal taken from the meal-offering and the frankincense from that offering are offered on the altar in their entirety (Chapter 13, Halachah 12).

This is offered on the inner altar twice daily (Hile hot K’lei Hamikdash 2:11).

Which is offered on the altar in its entirety (Chapter 12, Halachah 9).

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

For a wine libation never less than three lugim. See the following halachah.

The Radbaz and Kessef Mishneh maintain that one is liable for pouring water on an altar only during the holiday of Sukkos, for only then is water offered on the altar in the Temple. The Radbaz does clarify that this is not necessarily apparent from the Rambam’s wording. Indeed, on the contrary, from the following halachah, one could infer the opposite.

This refers to the sin-offerings that were burnt. See Chapter 5, Halachah 11.

I.e., the fundamental aspect of pouring the blood is the sprinkling of the blood on the altar or in the Temple Building - each sacrifice according to its laws. Pouring out the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is not of fundamental importance and the sacrifices are acceptable even if it is not performed. Hence, it is not considered as an act of significance for which one is liable.

When the water libation is offered. See the notes to the previous halachah.

For three lugim is the smallest wine libation offered (see Chapter 17, Halachot 12, 15). Similarly, the water libation offered on Sukkot is three lugim (Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 10:7).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 13:5), the Rambam explains that the rationale is that we follow the principles that two entities that are of the same substance are never considered as intervening substances.

The red heifer should be slaughtered on the Mount of Olives, as stated in Hilchot Parah Adumah 3:1-2.

As stated in Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 3:7, the goat sent to Azazel was pushed off a mountain cliff in the desert outside of Jerusalem.

See Chapter 18, Halachah 11.

I.e., the Temple. This excludes offerings like the above which, though they are consecrated, are not offered in the Temple.

Radbaz notes that Zevachim 109a mentions sacrifices disqualified for other reasons. He explains that the Rambam does not mention them here, because here he is speaking in general terms. They are detailed in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim where he discusses the particulars pertaining to these laws.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 19, which mentions the obligation to bum sacrifices that were disqualified for all these reasons.

As explained in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 3, if sacrificial meat or blood was brought to the top of the altar after being disqualified for these reasons, it should be offered on the altar’s pyre.

Any lesser amount is not considered significant. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 14:10.

I.e., a portion of it was lost or burnt.

This refers to a meal offering brought by a male priest, the meal offering of the High Priest, and the meal component of the accompanying offerings (Zevachim 13:4).

For the prooftext states “it,” and this implies that the entity must be complete.

Note a similar ruling in Hile hot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:10.

We have translated the text according to its straightforward meaning. Nevertheless, the Radbaz states that this ruling applies, not only to a burnt-offering and its own innards, but even one that is combined with the innards of another sacrifice. Thus he maintains that one is liable for combining the meat of a burnt-offering, not only with the innards of a burnt-offering, but also with the innards of a peace-offering.

For they are part of the same type of offering and are both offered on the altar in their entirety.

Provided he was notified of the transgression between the offering of each particular limb (Radbaz, based on Hilchot Shegagot 6:2).

The fact that the Torah uses two prooftexts implies that two different prohibitions are involved. The prooftext “to offer it” refers to both the_ prohibitions against slaughter and against sprinkling the blood and the prooftext “who will offer it” refers to the prohibition against offering the limbs on the altar (Radbaz and Kessef Mishneh, thus resolving the questions raised by the Ra’avad).

The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, noting that the previous halachah stated that a person is liable if the combination of a portion of a limb and the portions of the innards offered on the altar equal an olive-sized portion. This indicates that a limb need not be whole. The Kessef Mishneh and others, however, justify the Rambam’s ruling.

This law has already been stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 16. Indeed, there are some who considered its inclusion here as a scribal error.

The Hebrew original repeats the word ish meaning man, implying that even two men can be held liable for the same activity.

Even though he did not complete the required service associated with the sacrifice, as long as he sprinkled the blood on an altar once, he is liable.

The Rambam is quoting the wording of the mishnah (Zevachim13:6). Nevertheless, according to his understanding, this law applies to the blood of other sacrifices as well.

He is liable even if he does not apply the blood to the altar inside. The Rambam mentions the application of the blood inside only to emphasize that offering the blood properly does not remove the liability that was already established.

Hence if he offers any of it outside first, he is liable. The fact that he does not offer the entire amount outside is not significant. As long as a portion is offered outside, he is liable.

I.e., the offering was completed through the application of the blood to the altar inside. Although the remainder of the blood should also have been dashed on the altar, that is not an absolute requirement. Hence one is not liable for offering such blood outside the Temple Courtyard.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam regarding the latter point, explaining that Zevachim 112a states that one is exempt in the latter instance. Since the blood was first offered inside, the sacrifice is acceptable and the fact that later blood was also offered outside is not of consequence. The Radbaz explains that, according to the Rambam, that rationale applies when the blood was offered inside according to all of its specifications. In this instance, however, the Rambam is speaking about a situation where the applications of the blood to the Temple altar were not completed. Hence, the blood in the second cup is still significant.

See Chapter 13, Halachot 12-13, which describe the offering of the meal-offering.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 5:2 for a description of the offering of the showbread.

Even though the offering is not complete until both bowls of frankincense are offered (ibid.:3), one is liable for offering even one of them outside.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:15-16 for an explanation of these concepts. See also ibid. 2:4 which states that as long as the altar is built in its appropriate place, sacrifices may be offered even though the Temple is destroyed. Based on Zevachim 59a, the Radbaz states that even if the altar is not built, sacrifices can be offered on its site. Indeed, he writes that it is only because the gentiles do not allow us that we do not offer communal sacrifices in the present age. (Communal sacrifices may be offered while ritually impure.)
Based on this rationale, after the conquest of Jerusalem in 5727 (1967), the Lubavitcher Rebbe advised his chassidim to leave the holy city on the day before Pesach. The rationale is that the Paschal sacrifice may also be brought while ritually impure. Now, anyone who is close to Jerusalem on the day before Pesach and does not bring a Paschal sacrifice is liable for karet. Although many factors are involved and the Rebbe did not advise his followers to actually bring a sacrifice, he felt it necessary that precautions be taken so that they would not be held liable for not bringing the offering. This situation persisted for several years until the Rebbe felt that the Jewish control of the Temple Mount was weakened to the point that it would be impossible to bring an offering.

For slaughtering these animals outside the Temple Courtyard. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, this is speaking about a situation where the gentile desires to offer the sacrifice to God.

Zevachim 116b notes that the passage prohibiting the slaughter of sacrificial animals outside the Temple Courtyard begins: “Speak to the children of Israel,” implying that the prohibition applies only to them.

This license applies in the present era as well.