Maaseh Hakorbanot - Chapter 15

This is speaking about an animal that is not consecrated. If an animal that is consecrated becomes pregnant, its status is automatically transferred to its offspring [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:1)].

In which instance, the offspring should be sacrificed as a burnt-offering.

In the discussion to follow, it is important to note that burnt-offerings are only male. Peace-offerings can be both male and female. Sin-offerings may also be female (Chapter 1, Halachot 8-11). Nevertheless, as stated in Hilchot Temurah 4:2, the offspring of a sin-offering is not sacrificed, but instead, set aside to die. Hence the Rambam speaks only of the offspring of peace-offerings.

The difference between the first clause and the second clause is that the first clause speaks about the offspring first. Consecrating the offspring certainly does not determine the mother’s status. In the second clause, by contrast, the person consecrated the mother first. Now consecrating the mother determines the status of the offspring, for the offspring is considered as “the thigh of its mother.” Hence ordinarily if an animal is consecrated as a peace-offering, its offspring also has that status and should be offered as such a sacrifice (Hilchot Temurah 4:1). Nevertheless, in this instance, if the person originally had the intent of consecrating the offspring as a burnt-offering, the offspring is given that status, because it was never meant to be a peace-offering. The person could only make one statement at a time and the fact that he chose to speak about the mother first does not affect the offspring’s status.

The phrase translated as “immediately,” toch kedai dibbur, has a very specific halachic meaning: “Within the time it takes to say Shalom Alecha, Rebbi” (“Greetings my master”; Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:17).

In his Commentary to the MisHnah (Temurah 5:3), the Rambam explains that, generally, if one seeks to retract his statements immediately, the retraction is effective. There are, however, several instances marriage and divorce, the acceptance of a false divinity, blasphemy, the consecration of sacrifices, and the transfer of holiness from one animal to another where retraction is not possible.
Nevertheless, the Rambam’s perspective is not accepted by all authorities. Siftei Cohen (Choshen Mishpat 255:5) takes issue with him and argues that one may retract the consecration of an animal. Other sages, however, support the Rambam’s position.

So that it will be sacrificed for that purpose and hence, the portion of the animal consecrated as a burnt-offering will have been offered as such.

For that limb was consecrated.

There is a difficulty because the person bringing the burnt-offering will be bringing a sacrifice that does not belong to him entirely. The Jerusalem Talmud (Temurah 1:5) resolves this difficulty, explaining that we are speaking of an instance where the person vowed to spend a specific amount to bring a burnt-offering. Since the animal is worth that amount, he has fulfilled his vow.

This concept is debated without resolution by our Sages in Temurah 1 lb. The argument centers on the fact that the concept that one can consecrate a limb from an animal as a sacrifice was derived from the exegesis of a verse (Leviticus 27:9). Now, that verse is referring to an animal sacrifice and hence, our Sages question whether the concept applies to all sacrifices or only those involving animals.

Because there is no way that one animal can be offered for two purposes.

For in this way, his vow will be kept to the fullest extent of his capacity.

Here he must be obligated, because as stated above, a sin-offering may not be brought on one’s own initiative.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1 regarding what is done with the animal. There the Rambam speaks about an animal separated as a sin-offering that was lost and discovered after its owner had brought another sin-offering in its stead. Since this animal was consecrated for a specific purpose and cannot be sacrificed for that purpose, it cannot be used for any other purpose and is hence left to die. Similarly, in the instance at hand, since the animal cannot be sacrificed for the purpose for which · it was consecrated, it is left to die.

For half an animal cannot be sacrificed.

This is a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:24.

Since only its worth was consecrated (for originally, it could not be sacrificed), there is more reason to think that it would not become acceptable afterwards.

Zevachim 59a. This is also a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:23; Hilchot Shegagot 3:8, et al.

Violating the prohibition of Temurah.

And thus from his statements, there is room to say that it could be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an offering rather than it having to be sacrificed itself.

It is male and unblemished.

For any animal that is consecrated and fit to be offered as a sacrifice should be offered (Radbaz).

The Kessef Mishneh elaborates, proving that here also, the Rambam’s intent is that it should be left to pasture until it becomes blemished and then sold.

I.e., an animal from a non-kosher species.

Or any other type of sacrifice.

The animal is not consecrated at all. Not only is it considered as ordinary property, the person who took the vow is under no obligation and need not sell the animal and purchase a sacrifice with the proceeds.
We have punctuated the Rambam’s words in this manner so that there is a direct correlation between the law stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:10 and the one stated here. Others maintain that the source refers to the first clause. In Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach (see below), the Rambam speaks of consecrating an animal “for the altar.” If he states: “This animal is a sacrifice,” no holiness is attached to it at all (see the gloss of the Ra’avad there). Similarly, in this instance, since he wished to designate the animals as a sacrifice, his words are of no consequence at all.

The commentaries explain that this reference is to Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:10 where the Rambam states:
One who consecrates an animal which is a tumtum, androgynus, tereifah … to the altar is like one who consecrated stones or wood …. The holiness does not take effect with regard to its physical substance. It is considered as ordinary property in all contexts. It should be sold and the proceeds of the sale used to purchase any sacrifice one desires. It is not considered like a blemished animal, for a sacrifice may be brought from the species of a blemished animal.
Similarly, in the case at hand, since a sacrifice cannot be brought from such animals, they should be sold and the proceeds used to purchase the appropriate sacrifice.

For we assume that he made his promise in a manner that it would be of consequence (Radbaz).

The Rambam is referring to a difference of opinion among our Sages, Nedarim 29a, whether or not the consecration of the value (but not the physical substance) of an object for a limited time expires if nothing is done within that time. As will be stated, his ruling is that it does expire.

The Rambam is speaking of a situation where the cow’s worth was consecrated, because all authorities agree that if the physical substance of the cow was consecrated, it would have to be redeemed for the first consecration to be nullified (ibid.).

This point is added, because it possesses an added dimension of severity beyond the first instance. For a cow may not be offered as a burnt-offering, but it may be offered as a peace-offering. Thus it is fit to be sacrificed for the sake of the offering.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that the animal must be redeemed for the initial consecration to be nullified. The issue is debated by the subsequent commentaries.

In his gloss to Hilchot Nedarim 12:10, the Lechem Mishneh states that this applies only when the animal is pregnant and thus the fetus exists. If, however, the animal is not pregnant, the person’s words are not binding.

The Radbaz states that the animal of higher quality should be offered as the sacrifice.

For the person’s initial vow encompassed both of them.

Since he is only obligated to bring one sacrifice, he is allowed to sell the second animal and use the proceeds for whatever purpose he desires.

An animal whose gender cannot be determined, because it is masked by a piece of flesh.

An animal that has both male and female organs.

I.e., they are not consecrated at all and they may be used for ordinary purposes. Since the person specified that he was consecrating the offspring as a sacrifice and these animals are unfit for sacrifice, his words are of no consequence whatsoever.

Hilchot Jssurei Mizbeiach 3:10 (cited above). See the second interpretation given in the notes to Halachah 6.

I.e., animals that are of a type able to be sacrificed, but disqualified for a particular reason. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, op. cit.