Maaseh Hakorbanot - Chapter 16

For he has not fulfilled his vow.

For it is as if the promise to bring the smaller animal included the possibility of bringing the larger one.

An animal in the first year of its life (Chapter 1, Halachah 14).

One that is more than one year and one month old (ibid.).

An animal in the second year of its life (ibid.).

The laws to follow also apply with regard to a peace-offering. They do not apply with regard to a guilt-offering or a sin-offering, for those sacrifices may not be brought voluntarily.

A sheep that is between the age of one year and one year and one month. Thus it is no longer a lamb, but it is not yet considered as a ram (ibid.).

There is an unresolved doubt regarding the status of a pi/gas. Hence, the person cannot be considered as having fulfilled his obligation. Nevertheless, since its status is unresolved, we are not definitely certain that he did not fulfill his obligation.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why is he not considered to have fulfilled his obligation if he vowed to bring a lamb. As stated in the previous halachah, if one vows to bring a small animal and instead, brings a large animal, he is considered to have fulfilled his obligation. Thus in the case at hand, if a pilgas is considered a lamb, he will have fulfilled his obligation and if it is considered as a ram, he would have fulfilled his obligation, based on the principle stated in Halachah 1. The Kessef Mishneh answers that the animal’s status is considered one of doubt, an intermediate state between the two. Hence it is not considered as acceptable as either type.

This law applies only with regard to burnt-offerings, for peace-offerings may not be brought from fowl.

Turtle doves may only be brought as sacrifices when they are small and under-developed. Ordinary doves, by contrast, may be brought as sacrifices only when they have developed and reached a mature state (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:2).

An intermediate stage in which the fowl is unacceptable, because it is too mature for a turtle-dove and not mature enough for an ordinary dove (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:2).

Since there is an unresolved doubt concerning a fowl that reached this state of development, a person who brings one such dove would certainly not fulfill his obligation. In this instance, however, since he brought one for each species, one might think that it is considered as if he fulfilled his vow. For if this is considered as a stage of development, he will have fulfilled the vow, because he brought an acceptable ordinary dove. And if it is not considered acceptable, he would have fulfilled the vow, because he brought an acceptable turtle dove. Nevertheless, since a priest is not permitted to offer such a fowl as an initial preference, he is not considered to have fulfilled his vow.

For he did not bring the animal that he vowed to bring as a sacrifice.

This follows a general principle stated by the Rambam, that with regard to the interpretation of the wording used in vows, everything is determined by local custom.

I.e., and not a calf.

As Malachi 1:14 asks rhetorically: “You bring the stolen and the lame and the sick and offer it as a sacrifice. Shall I accept it from you?” See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 7:1.

Although ibid.:11 states: “One who desires to gain merit for himself, subjugate his evil inclination, and amplify his generosity should bring his sacrifice from the most desirable and superior type of the item he is bringing,” this is a desirable ethical standard, but not a halachic imperative.

Menachot 13:8 mentions prices to be paid for animals offered as sacrifices. In the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, he explains that the prices mentioned were the average prices for animals at that time.

As long as the animal is unblemished.

100 silver pieces.

The wine, meal, and oil brought together with the offering, as stated in Chapter 2.

In this instance, since the ox was consecrated as a burnt-offering and was no longer fit to be offered as such, the proceeds of its sale must be used for that purpose. It does not matter, however, which animal(s) is purchased for that purpose.
In the previous halachah, it was not acceptable for him to bring two oxen that have a combined worth of 100, for he made an explicit vow to bring one ox worth 100 and until he does so, he does not fulfill his obligation. In this halachah, once the consecrated animal is disqualified, there are no qualifications regarding which animals may be brought as burnt-offerings. See Menachot 108a.

I.e., the sacrifice he brings need not even be of the same species as the animal he originally designated for sacrifice.

The new point this clause is teaching is that even if two animals were originally consecrated, one may be brought with the proceeds of their sale.

For when taking the vow, he did not specify what animal he would bring. This applies provided people of this locale also refer to a sheep as a burnt-offering (see Halachah 3). Moreover, if he had pledged to bring that particular ox as a burnt-offering, he is not obligated to bring any sacrifice at all (Radbaz).

Even if the animal is disqualified, he is obligated to bring another one like it as a sacrifice.

For we assume that anyone who consecrates his property does so generously (Menachot 108b).

For it is also possible that this was his intent, since consecrating the middle one is still acting generously, because there is a smaller one.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s words as implying that once the second one becomes blemished, the holiness automatically falls on the third. This runs contrary to Rashi’s approach (Menachot, loc. cit.) which requires the person to make a stipulation conditionally transferring the holiness that might have fallen on the middle ox.

For by saying “An ox,” we assume he meant the choicest one (Menachot, loc. cit.). The commentaries note that the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Meilah 7:7 appears to run contrary to this explanation.

And then his father died without informing him which one was consecrated (Rashi, Menachot, loc. cit.).

For we assume that he intended to offer the most choice one as a sacrifice. The Radbaz explains that this case is different from the one in the previous halachah where concern is also given to the middle one. The rationale is that since he already designated the animal, we assume that he chose the best one.

For even if he originally designated a small animal as a sacrifice, we follow the principle stated in Halachah 1 that a person who vows to bring a small animal, but instead brings a large one fulfills his obligation [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:6); see also Ra’avad].

Whether a ram or a lamb.

Whether a grown goat or a kid.

I.e., he must allow for the possibility that he designated any of the three types of animals that could be offered as burnt-offerings and he must offer a large animal from each species for the reason mentioned above.

He must bring both, because they are considered as two separate species and not as developed and underdeveloped specimens of the same species.

As stated above with regard to burnt-offerings, he is obligated to bring a developed specimen. Unlike a burnt-offering, these sacrifices may be brought from females as well as males. Hence, although bringing a large animal fulfills his obligation even if he originally vowed to bring a small one, he is still required to bring both a male or a female, for he is unsure of the gender of the animal he originally designated.

Peace-offerings may not be brought from fowl, so there is no need to bring doves.

Bringing either will enable him to fulfill his vow.

As stated in Halachah 13, when one brings frankincense, he must bring at least a handful.

Since he said: “For the altar,” we assume he meant something that is only for the altar. As mentioned below, there are other entities which are also offered on the altar, but unlike frankincense, they are not offered on the altar in their entirety. (The hide of an animal offered as a burnt-offering and the feathers of a fowl offered as a burnt-offering are withheld. With regard to the wine, it is not consumed by the altar’s pyre, but poured upon it. And with regard to an offering of flour, since there are types of meal-offerings which are given to the priests to eat, we assume that his intent was not to bring such an offering.)

Since the primary elements of the burnt-offering are burnt on the altar and the wine is poured over the altar, it is possible that this was his intent.

I.e., aside from the wine brought as part of the accompanying offering of flour (Kessef Mishneh).

A large silver coin used in the Talmudic era.

As a burnt-offering. The Radbaz states that this word should be included in the statement of the person’s promise.

In addition to the burnt-offering, this could include wine, frankincense, and flour.

Menachot 106b derives this concept from a comparison to · the flour offered from a meal offering, just as there a handful is offered, so too, a handful of frankincense should be offered.

The Hebrew term is written in the plural. Hence at least two logs are required.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 7:3.

He would place the money in a container designated for that purpose and the priests would take the money and purchase the wood (Tosefta, Shekalim 3:3).

Kin‘at Eliyahu questions how one takes a handful of oil.

As required of all the sacrifices (Hilchot lssurei Mlzbeiach 5:11).

See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.

Although Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, loc. cit., states that salt is not required for wine that is offered on the altar, that refers to wine offered as a libation accompanying other sacrifices. When, however, wine is offered alone, salt is required (Kessef Mishneh).

None is given to the priests to partake of.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:11 which states: “There were two cavities in the southwest corner [of the Altar], resembling two thin nostrils.... The blood [which was poured onto the Altar] would run off through them and... [ultimately,] go out to the Kidron River.”

It is not poured over the fire, because it would - at least partially quench the fire and that is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

As mentioned in Hilchot Ma‘asaer Sheni, ch. 4, when a person lives far from Jerusalem and cannot easily take produce from the second tithe to the holy city, he should redeem it for money. That money must be used to purchase food which must be eaten in Jerusalem according to the strictures that apply to the second tithe.

Because of his vow.

And the second tithe is considered as holy, “consecrated unto God.” This is a general principle. The rationale is that since the person is obligated to bring the offering, it must be brought from resources that belong to him entirely (see the conclusion of Halachah 17).

I.e., the bread is considered as an integral part of that offering and not an additional element. Thus when he vows to bring a thanksgiving-offering, that vow also requires him to bring bread. Hence the bread must come from ordinary property (Radbaz).

As stated below, if he specifies, he is allowed to bring a thanksgiving-offering using the money from the second tithes, for he will partake of the meat of that sacrifice in Jerusalem. What is unique here is the fact that the sacrifice will be from the second tithes and the bread from ordinary funds. Even so, the sacrifice is acceptable.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 7:5; based on Menachot 81b), the Rambam writes that it is indeed more desirable for him to bring the sacrifice from ordinary funds.

In this instance as well, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that it is desirable for him to bring everything from ordinary property.

Chapter 3, Halachah 13.

This refers not only to the wine libations, but to all vows for sacrifices.