Maaser Sheini - Chapter 2

Similarly, it can be used as a beverage or for anointing oneself, for these are also considered equivalent to “eating.”

As mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, there are authorities who consider partaking of the second tithe as an independent mitzvah. The Rambam, however, considers it as part of the mitzvah of separating the second tithe.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6: 15 which states that the holiness of Jerusalem is not nullified even though the Temple is destroyed, for the city’s holiness derives from the manifestation of God’s presence and that holiness can never be nullified.

When the Temple is not standing, the second tithe must be separated, but we do not partake of it. Instead, we redeem it, as stated in the following halachah.

Sifri to Deuteronomy 14:23.

A commitment to observance that goes beyond the basic requirements of the law.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 4:1) relates that the Sages of the Talmud would conduct themselves in this manner.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, 18.

100 silver coins.

A copper coin of minimal value. Since when the Temple is standing, after the fact, such an exchange is acceptable, in the present era, it can be accepted as an initial and preferable measure (Radbaz).

For, after all, it is being destroyed (Siftei Cohen 331: 149).

Which can be redeemed in this manner as an initial and preferable measure (Hilchot Arachin 8:10).

I.e., in a place where it will permanently be lost.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:17. Both here and in that source, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that a silver coin must be used for these redemptions. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s position. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 4 and notes.

For the Temple is not standing, as stated in Halachah I. Moreover, we are all ritually impure, and the second tithe may not be eaten in a state of ritual impurity, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah l.
It must be emphasized that with the term Jerusalem, we mean the city limits in the era of the Second Temple. The fact that an area is included in the contemporary metropolis of . Jerusalem is not at all significant.

For money.
The Kessef Mishneh states that if produce from the second tithe becomes ritually impure, it can be redeemed as indicated by Halachah 8. The Tur ( Yoreh De’ ah 331) [based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 3:6)] writes that we can water produce that has been detached so that it will become susceptible to ritual impurity. When it becomes ritually impure, it can be redeemed. These concepts are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 331: 135).

For other produce. The rationale is that produce from the second tithe should not be redeemed or exchanged in Jerusalem, as stated in Halachah 8.

See also Chapter 3, Halachah 17.

See Halachah 9.

I.e., because it will be condemned to rot.

See Hilchot Terumot I 0:2.

I.e., he partook of the produce after it was taken to Jerusalem and then taken out, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., in cities outside Jerusalem.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 141-143) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 442-444) include these as three of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam explains the rationale for this in General Principle 9 of his Sefer HaMitzvot, quoting Keritot 4b, and giving the explanation that he offers in this halachah.

I.e., since the Torah mentions all three types of produce in both the positive and negative commandments, we can assume that the repetition was meant to teach us that one is liable for each type of produce individually. In his Hasagot, the Ramban disagrees and maintains that one who administers three sets of lashes for partaking of these types of produce is liable for striking a fellow Jew unnecessarily.

Tosafot (Makkot 19b) explain that the violation of a positive commandment is involved, for we are commanded to redeem the produce from the second tithe that is not brought to Jerusalem.

A punishment ordained by the Rabbis for breaking Rabbinic commandments or negative commandments that result from a positive commandment.

I.e., one might think that he would be liable, because a portion of the produce was brought into the city. Hence, it is necessary to state that he is not. See Hilchot Bikkurim 3:2, for it is the source of this law.

I.e., one might think that he would not be liable, because the entire quantity of produce was not brought into the city. Hence, it is necessary to state that he is.

Even though produce . from the second tithe that is pure should not be redeemed in Jerusalem, as stated in Halachah 4, it should be redeemed if it becomes impure. The rationale is that, otherwise, it will be worthless, since it may not be eaten in that state.
Pesachim 36b derives this concept as follows: The mitzvah of redeeming produce from the second tithe is derived from Deuteronomy 14:24: “If you cannot carry it .... “ Se ‘as, the term for “carry” used in that verse is also used in connection with food, as stated in Genesis 43:34. Hence, the verse can be interpreted as meaning that the produce should be redeemed if it cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem. The verse speaks about the redemption of the second tithe.

And thus he does not even have to walk outside to bring it inside (Kessef Mishneh; Or Sameach ). Rashi interprets the passage differently.

The converse is also true. If he was outside and his burden had been brought inside, it cannot be redeemed (Makkot 19b ).

Produce which is demai may be taken in and out of Jerusalem (Halachah 11). Once the second tithe has been separated from it, however, it may not be taken ·out of Jerusalem after it has been brought in. This represents a reversal of the Rambam’s opinion from that stated in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:6).

The law is not derived from this verse, for as the Rambam stated previously, the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Instead, the verse is an asmachta, a support from the Torah for a Rabbinic law. Significantly, to this writer’s knowledge, our Rabbis have not identified a previous Rabbinic source where this verse is cited as a prooftext.
[This alludes to a question frequently raised: Did the Rambam have sources from the Sages of the Talmud that were lost or were interpretations such as this his original work?]

When a person redeems produce from the second tithe that belongs to him, it is necessary to add a fifth, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1. Here, however, we are speaking about a situation where that fifth is not worth a p'rutah. Thus the redemption of such produce is not feasible. And since its redemption is not feasible, according to Scriptural Law, such produce need not be treated as produce from the second tithe (Meiri to Bava Metzia 53b). Nevertheless, our Rabbis were stringent and required that the fifth be separated even in such a situation.

I.e., although two Rabbinic decrees are involved, we still rule stringently.

For our Sages imposed their decree with regard to produce alone.

And from which the second tithe has not been separated.

I.e., in this regard, we consider it as if the second tithe had already been separated. Hence, since it passed through Jerusalem, it must be eaten there [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

I.e., it cannot be redeemed for money.

I.e., there is no alternative but to partake of the produce in the holy city.

To be squeezed for wine [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

Since there was no obligation to tithe them at the time they passed through Jerusalem, they are not considered to have been taken in by the city’s barriers.

Since the obligation to separate the second tithe from demai was instituted only because of a doubt, our Rabbis did not apply this stringency. See Halachah 9.

And hence cannot be eaten.

See Halachah 4.

I.e., the decree imposed by our Sages must be upheld because this impurity is merely Rabbinic in origin and thus the holiness of the produce was not defiled [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.):9].

For when it was brought into Jerusalem, it was not fit to be eaten and thus did not possess a measure of holiness (ibid.).

That produce that became impure due to conduct with a secondary source of impurity outside Jerusalem can be redeemed or removed from the city after it was brought in. If, however, produce became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity, one’s intent is not significant. A person may remove it from Jerusalem even if he did not have the intent originally.

Instead, it should be redeemed and eaten in Jerusalem.

After it has dried out, by contrast, it is not fit to be eaten. For that reason, it is forbidden to let it dry out [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) 2:3; see also Hilchot Terumah 2:8]. This explanation nullifies the Ra’avad’s objections to the Ramham’ s ruling.

Vetch refers to a species of beans generally used as cattle fodder. While they are fresh, however, they are fit for human consumption with difficulty (see ibid.:4; see also Hilchot Terumah 2:2; Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 1:9).

Since they are not fit for ordinary human consumption, the restrictions that usually apply to produce from the second tithe were not placed upon a dough made from them. Indeed, the laws governing vetch are more lenient than those governing chilba, for chilba is frequently eaten by humans while fresh. Vetch, by contrast, is eaten only when ordinary food is not available.
The Ra’avad understands the Rambam as ruling that the restrictions are relaxed only with regard to dough made from vetch, but not with regard to vetch itself. If the actual beans were taken outside the city, they must be returned. The commentaries accept this understanding.

I.e., in this context, one is considered to be outside the city.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Rotzeach 8: 11; see also Hilchot Ma’aser 4: 16.

I.e., in this context, it is considered as part of the city, because of the entrance. Diagram

For neither the entrance to the home, nor this portion of it is in the city.

Because the entrance is the primary determinant.

For in actual fact, one is within the city’s walls.

The commentaries note the concurrence between this ruling and that of Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:9, but the apparent contradiction between it and that of Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 12: 12. They conclude that there is no one general principle governing the situation and each set of laws has its own rules.