Shvuot - Chapter 2

The concept that a person is considered to have taken an oath when he responds Amen to the statements is derived from the Torah’s statements with regard to a sotah, a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5:22). For she is required to answer Amen to the oath administered to her by the priest and yet, it is considered as if she took the oath herself.

Although in most instances, statements made by such gentiles are of no significance according to Jewish Law, this is an acceptance. Here also there is an allusion to this concept in the Bible itself. Ezekiel 17:13 and II Chronicles 36:13 speak of Nebuchadnetzar having King Tzidkayahu take an oath. Nedarim 65a states that this oath was binding. Similarly, Sh‘vuot 36a speaks of an oath Moses took to Jethro, his gentile father-in-law (Kessef Mishneh).

This is derived through a comparison to gentiles.

I.e., not only in lashon hakodesh, the Hebrew used in the Bible and by the Sages.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 1, Chapter 8, Halachah 7, and Chapter 9, Halachah 1, which mention instances where a person is considered to have taken an oath even if he does not respond Amen.

If he takes a false sh ‘vuat bitui or takes an oath in vain.

If he takes a false sh‘vuat hapikadon or sh‘vuat ha‘edut.

I.e., the name Yud-Hei-Vav-Hei.

Note, however, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:5, which states that even when these descriptions are used to refer to Him, they are not considered to have the same holiness as one of His names.

The Rambam uses the expression “in the full sense of the term” to differentiate between this instance and the law mentioned in Halachah 4. Note the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz who explains that there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim if a sh ‘vuat bitui must contain God’s name for one to be liable as appears to be the Rambam’s opinion or whether His name need not be mentioned as is the view of the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher, and others. The Ra’avad takes an intermediate view, stating that one transgresses by talcing a false oath and is liable to bring a sacrifice, but he is not liable for lashes unless he mentions one of God’s names.
All authorities agree that God’s name must be mentioned for one to be liable with regard to a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut or a sh ‘vuat hapikadon. On that basis, the Radbaz supports the Rambam’s position, asking why a differentiation should be made between one type of oath and another. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 237:1) and commentaries.

Both these terms mean “curse.”

Sh ‘vuot 36a derives this concept from the verses cited above with regard to Tzidkayahu’s oath, for there he used the term “curse.” See also I Samuel 14, 24, 27 which indicates that saying that one will be cursed is equivalent to an oath.

And is liable for taking a false sh ‘vuat bitui, as indicated by Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

I.e., the Rambam is giving an example of all four types of oaths.

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2 for a list of the seven names of God.

For that reason, when called to take an oath in a secular court or the like, one should refuse. Instead of saying “I swear,” he should say, “I affirm.”

The repetition and the mention of God’s name indicate that he is not merely making a statement, but intending that it have the severity of an oath. The Kessef Mishneh states that since the person mentioned God’s name, seemingly, it is not necessary for him to repeat yes or no, the mention of His name alone should be sufficient for his statement to be considered an oath. He explains that we are speaking about an instance when God’s name was not mentioned in direct connection with the statement. Nevertheless, the fact that he repeated no, or yes, while mentioning God’s name, albeit indirectly, is sufficient for his statements to be considered an oath.

Nazir 3a states that “the arm of His strength” refers to His left arm. Otherwise, the verse would be redundant.

Sh ‘vuot 20a notes that Numbers 30:7 understands this term as referring to an oath.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that the Rambam’s choice of wording - “He is not liable” rather than “It is permitted” - implies that although he is not liable, he is forbidden to break the commitment he made. Although other Rishonim differ, he follows this interpretation in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:9-10). See the following halachah.

This is one of the distinctions between oaths and vows. One who “appends” - i.e., says “And I will be like him” - to a colleague’s vow is liable. See Hilchot Nedarim 3:3M4.

The Radbaz explains that the Rambam elaborates here in contrast to the previous halachah - for here there is greater reason to think that he will not be obligated. The explanation is based on a fundamental understanding of the difference between a sh‘vuah - oath - and a neder - vow. When a person takes an oath, he places a prohibition upon his person - he is forbidden to perform the activity concerning which he took the oath. When he takes a vow, the article becomes forbidden for him. Hence, since he spoke about the article and not himself, one might think that his statement has no effect at all.

For as Sh ‘vuot 26b implies, one’s heart and one’s lips must be in concord.

In some authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this sentence is the conclusion of the previous halachah. The present. halachah begins: “Therefore.” Compare to Halachot 15-16.

I.e., if he makes this statement when given the warning, we accept his word and do not hold him liable (Tosefta, Taharot 6:9).

To be liable for lashes, a transgressor must acknowledge the warning. Since, at that time, he did not mention the lack of concurrence between his intent and his statements, we assume that he is fabricating the matter (Sanhedrin 12:2).

And since the stipulation was not met, the vow is not binding.

For he has already lied concerning this oath.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries with regard to the interpretation of the Rambam’s statements. Some explain that the intent is that the husband used the halachic convention of hafarah and made the statement nullifying his wife’s vow in a hushed tone. If, however, he did not make a statement of hafarah at all, the vow is not nullified, as stated in Hilchot Nedarim 13:7. The Tzaphnat Paneach states that the intent is that he used the halachic convention of bittul. In such an instance, a statement need not be made (Hilchot Nedarim 13:4).

Thus the person cannot claim that his statement did not reflect his intent.

I.e., this law applies even if the person takes the oath on his own volition, not only if it is administered by others.

I.e., require an oath of a person who denies a plaintiffs claim. See Chapter 11, Halachah 18.

Thus afterwards the person cannot claim that he had these-and-these thoughts in mind when taking the oath (Radbaz). See also Nedarim 25a.

“Greetings to you, my teacher.” We have cited the term in transliteration for we are speaking about the amount of time it takes to say these three Hebrew words.

Nedarim 87a states that this principle applies with the exception of four situations: a blasphemer, one who accepts a false deity, one who consecrates. a woman as a wife, and one who divorces her. Rabbenu Nissim explains that when taking an oath,. a person has in mind that he might change his mind in this brief amount of time. Hence, his oath is not binding until this time passes.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, saying that the objections of others cannot by connected to his oath. In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 210:3), Rav Yosef Caro and also the Radbaz explain that since the others protested immediately after his oath and his acceptance also came immediately afterwards, it is as if he never completed taking the oath.

This applies even if the oath has not taken effect as of yet (Radbaz).

I.e., without verbalizing his retraction.

The Radbaz emphasizes that he must also make his statements with intent. Just as his mouth and heart must concur when making an oath, so, too, they must concur when retracting it.