Shvuot - Chapter 4

This is a principle applying to all of the Torah’s prohibitions concerning eating.

In such an instance, as stated in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 4:7-8, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, but the violator is not punished. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 238:1) rules that it is forbidden for the person who took such an oath to partake of even the slightest quantity of food.

Because he singled out a specific article and by partaking of it broke his oath.

For tasting does not imply eating a full measure of food. Since he used that expression, it is clear that his intent was to forbid partaking of even the slightest measure of food.

Sh ‘vuot 22b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 14:23: “And you shall eat before God, your Lord. the tithes of your grain, your wine, and your oil.” Implied is that partaking of wine and oil is also eating.

As in Halachah 5.

This expression indicates a conclusion derived by the Rambam from logic without any explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source.

I.e., a fourth of a log. In contemporary measure, a revi'it is equivalent to 86 cc. according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc. according to Chazon Ish.

The Radbaz explains that since this is the measure which the Torah considered significant in other contexts, one can extrapolate that anything less is not considered significant enough to warrant liability. Alternatively, with regard to oaths and vows, we follow the commonly accepted implications of the terms used and people do not consider partaking of a smaller measure as “drinking.”

I.e., for one set of lashes or one sacrifice. As will be explained, this applies only when the transgressor did not become aware of his oath between eating.

The minimum measure for which one is liable as stated in Halachah 1. The Radbaz states that the superficial implication of the Rambam’s words is that it is not necessary for one to partake of such a portion of each of the foods separately to be liable. He differs and maintains that the person must partake of all of them to be liable.

Otherwise, it would be considered as eating as stated in Halachah 3.

If, however, he mentioned “bread” only once, he is liable only once. See Halachah 5.

I.e., the emphasis is one repeating his colleague’s words, while stating each one individually. That shows that his intent is focused on each one individually. If, however, he made such a statement on his own initiative, without repeating his colleague’s words, they are not considered to have been singled out [Rav Kapach’ s edition of the Rambam’ s Commentary to the Mishneh (Sh ‘vuot 3:4)].

I.e., if he drank half of a revi ‘it of wine and half of a revi ‘it of milk, he is not liable.

Chapter 4, Halachah 16.

We assume that his intention when taking the oath was to interpret the term eating according to its halachic definition (Radbaz).

Since he spoke in a colloquialism, we assume that he was not referring to the halachic meaning and instead, meant the entire loaf.

Whether an olive-sized portion or the entire loaf.

Because once eating an olive-sized portion of the loaf is forbidden by an oath, a second oath concerning that same loaf cannot take effect, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.

The implication is that he would not eat an olive-sized portion of food that day.

The Ra’avad accepts the principle stated by the Rambam, but explains that this is not a good example of it. For in this instance, the second oath does take effect, for it applies not only on the day that the first oath applies, but for all time. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would agree that the second oath will take effect at the end of the day on which the first oath is in effect. This, he maintains, is why the Rambam mentions eating it “that day.”

For example, that mentioned in Halachah 12.

he rationale for this principle is that a sh ‘vuat bitui applies only with regard to matters that are dependent upon one’s volition, not on those forbidden by the Torah (Chapter 5, Halachah 17). Accordingly, once something is forbidden by an oath, it is no longer a matter dependent on one’s volition. Hence, a sh ‘vuat bitui cannot take effect (Kiryat Sefer).
As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 17, if the person has the first oath nullified, the second oath takes effect.

Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 8:6 states that although one prohibition does not take effect when an object is already prohibited, there are exceptions. One of them is when the second prohibition includes other entities that were not included in the first prohibition (issur kollel). Similarly, in this instance, since the second oath includes something which is not prohibited by the first oath (grapes), it takes effect.

For he cannot eat nine or ten without first eating eight. Hence, the second and third oaths do not take effect, for one oath does not take effect when the objects it concerns are already forbidden.

For each oath was separate. After he took the oath forbidding ten, nine were still permitted. And after he took the oath forbidding nine, eight were still permitted. Hence, the later oaths take effect.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 238:13) states that if the person specifies 10 specific items in his oath, he is not liable if he later reduces their number to eight, for all ten have become forbidden to him.

I.e., he takes an oath against eating an olive-sized portion of each type of fruit. He does not violate his oath unless he eats both of these portions. Since the second oath also includes grapes, it takes effect with regard to the figs based on the principle of issur kollel.

For breaking his first oath.

For to be liable he must eat grapes and figs together. By realizing his transgression, he makes a distinction between the figs he ate and the grapes.

I.e., his first oath involved ten specific items. His second oath involved nine additional items from a larger group. The Ra’avad claims the Rambam’s ruling is a distortion of Sh ‘vuot 28b. See also Rashi and Tosafot who discuss the proper wording of that source.

This version, slightly different from that of the standard printed text, is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The intent is that the second oath included the original ten, plus a second nine. In this instance as well, had he not realized his first transgression, he would have been liable twice for eating the second nine.

This ruling follows the version of Sh ‘vuot 28a suggested by Rabbenu Chananel. The standard published text of the Talmud reverses the ruling. Thus in the instance stated by the Rambam, one would be exempt as the Ra’avad notes. The ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:16) follows that of the standard printed text of the Talmud.
The Rambam’s rationale can be explained as follows: Since the person willfully transgressed by eating the larger loaf, he is liable for lashes. The fact that he inadvertently caused the oath to take effect is not of consequence.
The person is liable for lashes only when he is given a warning before transgressing. From this we see that even if a warning is given conditionally, it is effective.

He is exempt from lashes, nor is he required to bring a sacrifice. As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 6, and notes, this is considered as if he violated an oath due to forces beyond one’s control.
The Rambam’ s rationale is that he did not perform the transgression knowingly. At the time, he partook of the larger loaf, he was not aware that it was forbidden. In this instance as well, the Rambam’s ruling does not follow the standard printed text of the Talmud. Hence there are authorities who differ.

I.e., without awareness of the oath.

For both lashes and a sacrifice as in the previous clause.

For lashes (Ra’avad).

And thus it becomes forbidden only retroactively. Although it was already eaten, when he eats the smaller loaf, his eating the larger loaf becomes a prohibited act.

I.e., not only the large loaf dependent on the. smaller loaf as in the previous instance, but each one was dependent on the other as the Rambam continues to explain.

For lashes as in Halachah 16. Again, this runs contrary to the standard published text of the Talmud and there are other authorities who differ.

As stated in Halachah 17.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2. Note the following halachah.

Hence he is liable for lashes, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 3, 7.

In the Hebrew, the Rambam restates this phrase using slightly different wording.

The double negative implies that an oath will take effect if he does eat. See Tosafot, Sh ‘vuot 36b.

I.e., it is not considered as if each one is an independent oath, because an oath cannot take effect when an object is already forbidden by another oath.