De'ot - Chapter Seven

The Hebrew מרגל would usually be translated as “spy.” Rashi, in his commentary to the verse in Leviticus, explains that a spy and a gossiper act very similarly. Both gather information to tell others.
His commentary also explains that the Hebrew letters ג and כ are sometimes interchangeable, so that רכיל which is usually translated as “gossip’’ is synonymous with רגל. Thus, Psalms 15:3 uses the word רגל to mean “gossip’’ and II Samuel 19:28 employs וירגל to mean “slander.’’

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 301) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 236) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. As mentioned in the following halachah, this prohibition also includes lashon hora.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1, the Rambam states that lashes are not administered for this transgression, because it does not involve a deed. (Generally, speech is not considered equivalent to action in halachic terms).

Derech Eretz Rabbah also notes the placement of these two prohibitions side by side and concludes: “Gossipers are murderers.”

I Samuel, ch. 22, relates how Do’eg told King Saul that Achimelech, the priest in charge of the sanctuary at Nob, gave David food and a sword. In rage at the assistance afforded to the man he was pursuing, Saul ordered the slaying of Achimelech and all the priests of Nob. Although Do’eg told the truth and Achimelech himself would have offered King Saul the same information if he had been asked, since he had not intended to act against King Saul, Do’eg’s remarks brought about the deaths of many (See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 30:1).

רוכל translated as gossiper sometimes means “peddler.” Rashi (loc.cit.) comments on the similarity between the two. A peddler takes his wares and travels around offering them to potential clients. In much the same way, a gossiper peddles his words.

As in the case of Do’eg mentioned above.

In his commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 1:16), the Rambam writes:
Since I have mentioned lashon hora, l will explain it... because people are terribly blind about
the matter. It is a very serious sin which people frequently violate.

It appears that lashon hora is more serious than gossip because in lashon hora, one’s intent is obviously defamatory.
The Radbaz (Vo1. 5, Responsum 1374) sees lashon hora as more serious than gossip because it often does not involve an ulterior motive. Generally, a person relates gossip in order to derive benefit from the person to whom he tells it. In contrast, lashon hora involves committing a sin without the motive of personal benefit; i.e., transgressing for the sake of transgression.

For this reason, we have left the term lashon hora in Hebrew, without translating it. Often, it is translated as “slander’’. However, slander by definition involves the invention of false information. Thus, we see the uniqueness of the ethical approach required by the Torah. Even though everything one says is true, relating such information is prohibited.

The commentaries question which prohibition includes the sin of defamation of character. The Rambam does not say that it is included in the sin of gossip. In Hilchot Sanhedrin (21:7) and Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 281), he states that the prohibition “Do not accept a false report’’ (Exodus 23:1) also applies to lashon hora. However, perhaps his terminology in those sources is less precise and he is referring to defamation of character as well as lashon hora.

The Hebrew בעל לשון הרע literally means “a master of lashon hora;” i.e., one who is constantly involved with lashon hora (Kessef Mishneh).

Arachin 15b states:
What is considered lashon hora? For example, a person asks another: “Where can I find fire?”
and the latter replied “Where is fire? In so and so’s house there is an abundance of meat and
fish, and they are always cooking there.”
As Arachin, ibid., states such statements are considered as lashon hora only when one’s intent is derogatory.

Tosefta, Peah 1:2, Arachin 15b.
There is also an allusion to this concept in the verse: “May God cut off all guileful lips, the tongues which speak proud things,” quoted above. In Hilchot Teshuvah 8:5, the Rambam defines being “cut off”, as being denied a portion in the world to come (Merkevat HaMishneh).

Hilchot Teshuvah 3:6 states: The following individuals do not have a portion in the world to come. Rather, their [souls] are cut off and they are judged for their great wickedness and sins forever.
All four sins (i.e., idol worship... lashon hora) mentioned here are listed in that halachah. For a more precise understanding of what it means to be deprived of a share in the world to come, see Hilchot Teshuvah 8:5.

In the above-mentioned halachah, the Rambam uses the expression בעלי לשון הרע, meaning people who frequently speak lashon hora. Accordingly, most authorities maintain that a person who unwittingly speaks lashon hora from time to time, is not punished in this manner.

The Chafetz Chayim (Shemiras HaLashon, Chapter 1) explains this concept as follows: Torah study surpasses all the other mitzvot. Why? Because it involves speech and thought, in contrast to the other mitzvot which involve only our actions. Conversely, since lashon hora involves using these higher faculties for undesirable purposes, it is considered more severe than other sins that involve only deed.

Arachin (loc.cit.)

Rabbenu Yonah explains that lashon hora is judged so severely because such capricious behavior shows that the person is not conscious of God’s presence.
The Maharal (Chiddushei Aggadot, Arachin, loc.cit.) explains a spiritual dimension of this concept. God created the world with speech. Therefore, one who uses his quality of speech against God’s will is denying God’s creative power.

Arachin (loc.cit.), The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 21:7, the Rambam writes that a person who listens to lashon hora also violates a Torah commandment. (However, see our commentary to Halachah 2.) Pesachim 118a states: “A person who listens to lashon hora is worse than one who recites it.’’

Our Sages point to the instance mentioned in Halachah 1, where Do’eg spoke lashon hora about Achimelech to King Saul. Ultimately, all three of them were killed.

This clause is not included in our text of the passage from the Jerusalem [or the Babylonian] Talmud cited above. (Some commentaries surmise that it might have been included in the text possessed by the Rambam). As a source, the commentaries point to Shabbat 56b which relates that when King David believed the lashon hora he was told about Mephiboshet (II Samuel, Chapter 19) and ordered that he lose half his field, God ordained that David’s descendants would lose half his kingdom.
Alternatively, the severity of the listener’s culpability can be deduced from the instance involving King Saul and Doeg. Doeg alone was slain, while Saul was killed together with his three sons (Knesset HaGedolah).

I.e., though such speech is not lashon hora, it is an extension of that sin, for it leads to people saying (or at least, thinking) negative things about a colleague.

Which implies that obviously this was not the person’s ordinary mode of conduct.

The Chafetz Chayim (1:8) states that even hinting at a person’s unfavorable qualities or actions is considered as actual lashon hora and not merely, “the tinge of lashon hora.’’ However, he accepts the Rambam’s contention that remarks similar to those mentioned here can be considered as “the tinge of lashon hora” if no details are mentioned and thus, the hint remains very vague.

“In the presence of his enemies” is the Rambam’s addition to Arachin 16a. One may conclude that he permits praising someone in the presence of his friends (Kessef Mishneh). The Hagahot Maimoniot, however, mentions that it is not proper to praise a person extensively, even in the presence of his friends, lest some envy be aroused.

Bava Batra 164b relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi spoke to his son admiringly about the way a book of Psalms had been copied. When his son informed him of the identity of the scribe, he told him, “Cease speaking lashon hora.” The Talmud explains that the scribe’s enemies would surely respond by criticizing the scribe, thus turning his praise into shame. See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, (Avot 1:16).

See Arachin 16a.

The notes to the text Chafetz Chayim (3:2) explain that although he includes this law in this halachah, the Rambam does not mean to imply that such speech is mere “the tinge of lashon hora.” Instead, it must be considered as actual lashon hora.

In this instance as well, the notes to the text Chafetz Chayim (3:5) explain that the Rambam does not consider such speech as merely “tinge of lashon hora.” Instead, it must be considered as actual lashon hora.
To illustrate this case, the Jerusalem Talmud (Peah 1:1) relates the following incident: A number of Jews from Tzippori were conscripted by the Romans for a certain task. One of those conscripted, Yochanan, did not appear for work one morning. At first, the Romans did not notice his absence. However, afterwards, the workers began talking among themselves and one said to the other, “Let’s visit our friend, Yochanan, after work.” The Romans overheard and noticed that he was missing.

The commentaries note Rashi’s comments (Numbers 12:1) which explain that Miriam’s remarks about Moses were considered as lashon hora even though she personally had no intention of embarrassing him.

Note Arachin 15b which states:
Rabbah declares: Any statements made in the presence of the person involved are not lashon
hora.
Abbaye told him: Surely, it is both arrogance and lashon hora.
Rabbah answered him: I follow the approach of Rabbi Yossi... [who said]: “I never made a
statement for which I [would have to] turn around [and check whether the person about whom
I was talking was present].”
The Rambam appears to follow Abbaye’s opinion. The Kessef Mishneh and others had a different version of this Talmudic passage which caused them to question the Rambam’s definition of lashon hora here. However, based on the statements of Tosafot, Arachin, loc.cit., the Avodat HaMelech explains that both Rabbah and Abbaye agree that a derogatory remark is considered lashon hora whether it was made in the presence of the person involved or not. Their difference of opinion cited involves only matters which are considered as lashon hora within an extended context.
The commentaries also cite the Sifri (Devarim 24:9) which defines Miriam’s remarks about Moses as lashon hora even though they were not made in his presence.

The commentaries cite Shabbat 33b which relates that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai made unfavorable remarks about the Roman authorities. Rabbi Yehudah ben Garim passed on the statements — without meaning to cause Rabbi Shimon any harm — to others. The report spread, and ultimately, became known to the Roman authorities, forcing Rabbi Shimon to hide for thirteen years.

Generally, the phrase “such statements” is interpreted to refer to information about another person which could be considered derogatory (Chafetz Chayim 2:3). The Avodat HaMelech, however, understands this law as a continuation of the previous concept and thus, the term is referring to information that, if made public, could harm the person involved.

Arachin 16a. The Kessef Mishneh states that this only applies when the person making the statement does not tell his listeners to keep the matter a secret.

Casually without any negative intent.

In which case it would be forbidden. The Chafetz Chayim (2:3-9) explains that even in this instance, there is no outright license regarding the matter and he advises refraining from such speech if possible.

Arachin 15b quotes God as saying: “I cannot dwell in the world together with people who speak lashon hora.” It is not proper for a Jew to dwell where God’s presence cannot be found. See also Midrash Tanchuma, Korach, sec. 4, which notes that many members of the tribe of Reuven were drawn into Korach’s mutiny because they were his neighbors.

In his last testament to his son, Hurkanos, Rabbi Eliezer warns him: My son, do not sit among a company of people who speak unfavorably of their fellow men. These words ascend to the heavens and are written in a book and all those assembled there are recorded as an evil company and slanderers (Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer). See also Chafetz Chayim 6:5-6.

Compelling them to wander 40 years.

I.e., because of the spies’ unfavorable report of Eretz Yisrael and the Jewish people’s acceptance of it.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 304) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 241) consider this one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Since the prohibition does not involve a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin18:1). Even if one performs a deed of revenge, the prohibition is not in the deed itself, but rather on having the feelings which motivated such an act (Avodat HaMelech).

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc.cit.), the Rambam quotes the Sifra the source for this example.

I.e., surely anyone who seeks to harm a colleague violates this prohibition, however, even such a refusal is forbidden.

Note, however, Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:13, which obligates a Torah Sage to seek revenge for any public affront to his honor.

The Minchat Chinuch notes that Yoma 23a appears to imply that the prohibition against taking revenge only applies to monetary matters, but not to causing emotional discomfort. Hence, he questions the Rambam’s statements. Nevertheless, other commentaries resolve the difficulty by offering a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage.

This refers to David’s sparing of King Saul who pursued him. Though David was given two opportunities to kill Saul, he did not take revenge and prevented his men from harming the king (1 Samuel, chs. 24 and 26).

The commentaries question why the Rambam mentions “another Jew” in this halachah, while in the previous halachah, he speaks about “a colleague.” The Avodat HaMelech explains that this prohibition has a larger scope. Vengeance is forbidden against only “a colleague,” i.e., a peer, a person who is on one’s own level, while bearing a grudge against any Jew is forbidden, regardless of his social status.
[This interpretation is somewhat problematic for, according to the Rambam, bearing a grudge is only a safeguard against revenge.]

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 305) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 242) consider this one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Here, as well, the Sifra prefaces this example with the question, “How far does (the prohibition against) bearing a grudge extend?” implying that this is an extreme example.

Here, the Rambam gives us an ideal example of ethical development. Not only does the person control expression of an undesirable emotion, he wipes the negative feelings from his heart entirely.

The Rambam’s statements shed light on a question discussed by the Rabbis: Does each mitzvah have a self-contained purpose or are there mitzvot which exist only as a safeguard to prevent the transgression of more serious prohibitions? (See Lekach Tov chapter 8.) The Rambam’s statements here clearly indicate that he accepts the latter position.

To the extent that one feel the same way to a person who wronged one as to any other individual.

Human nature being what it is, it is natural that people will say or do things that will upset each other. lf everyone were to take revenge and hold grudges, we would soon be faced with a continuous see-saw of negative feeling that would prevent the creation of a stable social framework.
The Rambam begins Hilchot De’ot with directives for the development of one’s own personality and concludes with guidelines regarding relations with others. The two are interdependent. The only way a person is able to develop viable and meaningful relationships with others is when he works on developing his own character. Conversely, a person cannot concentrate solely on self-development and ignore his ties with others. It is fusion of both self-development and social interaction that constitutes the middle path, “the path of God,” the heritage which Abraham transmitted to his descendants throughout the generations.