When Is War Over?

An artistic illustration of an infinity symbol intertwined with the map of Israel, rendered in textured black and teal tones against a parchment-like background faintly overlaid with place names. - Art by Sefira Lightstone

You shall lay siege to the city that is waging war against you until it is subdued.

DEUTERONOMY 20:20

A hallmark of Israel’s wars is that they appear to go in cycles, or “rounds,” as the Israeli idiom has it. Israel has fought war after war in Gaza and in Lebanon (and the same observation can be extended to Israel’s wars with Iran). Beyond proactive defense, how might we end the cycle of violence and make peace? The answer is simple. Instead of engaging in timid, piecemeal, responses, a Jewish army must fully neutralize threats.

Halachic Foundations

The Torah teaches,1 “You shall lay siege to the city that is waging war against you until it is subdued.” Shammai, a Mishnaic Sage, interprets the verse, “until it is subdued,” as a directive to continue fighting until the enemy surrenders.2 Maimonides codifies this as normative Jewish practice.3

The Rebbe’s Critique of Israeli Military Strategy

The word “subdued” means that the enemy must be brought to a point where it can no longer fight, no longer poses a threat, and will not pose a threat in the future.4 Therefore, the Rebbe vocally critiqued the Israeli government’s tendency to engage in limited military operations rather than pursuing conclusive victories. The Rebbe called for a decisive approach: once engaged in conflict, it is crucial to persist until the enemy is subdued. This is more than just strategic; it is a moral and religious imperative to avoid prolonged conflict and additional loss of life.

Practical Implications of “Until It Is Subdued”

The Rebbe explained that this principle has far-reaching implications for a broad range of military objectives and security policies. Furthermore, mere adoption of this doctrine as a perspective positively impacts Israel’s ability to win wars and protect the lives of its soldiers and its people.

1. The Ethics of Warfare

The Rebbe applied the idea of “until it is subdued” as a directive that gives perspective and shifts the way a Jewish army fights wars. For the Rebbe, this doctrine teaches the importance of avoiding ground operations in urban environments, as they can be costly and counterproductive. Instead, the doctrine demands siege tactics and precision airstrikes. This orientation minimizes collateral damage while disrupting terrorist groups’ operations and supply lines. It increases pressure on the enemy while lowering risks for the Jewish army. Fighting with a mindset of “until it is subdued” seeks to compel the enemy’s quick surrender, leading to a swift resolution of the conflict without the need for extensive, urban combat operations which inflict heavy costs on both sides.5

2. Ending Domestic Terrorism

Persistent terrorist attacks against Israel necessitate decisive responses. The alternative is a lenient approach that avoids prosecuting terrorists. The Rebbe firmly endorses the first option, emphasizing the necessity of neutralizing terrorists to deter future attacks. This aligns with the principle of pursuing enemies “until they are subdued.”6 A softer approach emboldens terrorists, perpetuating the cycle of violence.

Security operations must be comprehensive, eliminating threats and establishing lasting security, actualizing the biblical promise that “you will lie down [to sleep] and have no fear.”7 Scripture warns us against treating threats indecisively, stating,8 “And those [hostile people] that you allow to remain shall become stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall harass you in the land in which you live.”

3. The Alternative: “Mowing The Grass”

The alternative to fighting an enemy “until it is subdued” is an approach referred to in works of military strategy as “containment.”9 In Israel’s conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah, (and one can perhaps see this in Israel’s conflict with Iran) this policy had been explicitly articulated and adopted, referred to by Israeli military theorists as “mowing the grass.” This approach prescribes recurring, limited responses to persistent terrorist threats.10 It involves tactical operations aimed at temporarily crippling terrorist capabilities without fully eradicating them. It fails to offer a long-term solution for eliminating belligerents. Under containment, Israel’s diverse enemies emerged strengthened. Only decisive military action quelled the PLO, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

4. The Only Way to Honor the Memory of the Fallen

The Rebbe stresses that containment squanders resources and lives, allowing the enemy to return and inflict more damage. Conversely, fully subduing the enemy validates the expenditure of resources and honors the memory of those who perished in battle, as it paves the way to lasting peace. As the Rebbe expressed it:11

Soldiers died in order to conquer and defend these territories which are vital for national security. They laid down their lives with the simple faith that by doing so, they were defending the Land of Israel and the Children of Israel. If we give away these territories, then the Jewish soldiers who fell (each of whom is “an entire world”) made a pointless sacrifice.

This is not merely theoretical. In the course of writing Make Peace’s first edition, during the 2023 Israel-Hamas War, I was privileged to spend time with many active duty soldiers in the IDF. One soldier shared, “If we return to the status quo in Gaza after the war, I feel that all my friends who died, young men with wives and children, with dreams and aspirations, will have died in vain. And that I and my future sons will end up going back to fight in Gaza.”

The Rebbe’s call for a decisive approach has often been disregarded by Israel’s military and political leadership, as well as by many in the general public, particularly those not under direct fire themselves. The October 7 massacres led to a paradigm shift for many, with even Professor Eitan Shamir, one of the key articulators of the “mowing the grass” containment strategy, moving towards a stance more aligned with the Rebbe’s view.12 In the following case studies, we will explore the consequences of failing to neutralize threats. Then, we will explore case studies which demonstrate the doctrine’s soundness.

Case Studies: Israel’s Failure to Neutralize Military Threats

A) Compassionate Jewish Naivete: Israel and Aram

Before delving into contemporary case studies, let’s journey back 3,000 years to the ancient Kingdom of Israel.13 The biblical Book of Kings14 recounts how the Aramean king, Ben-Hadad,15 along with thirty-two allied warlords and their armies, laid siege to Samaria, the Kingdom of Israel’s capital. He sent messengers to King Ahab, the Israelite king, who proclaimed: “Your gold and silver, your women and children – are mine.” Ahab responded by offering to pay taxes to Aram, yet Ben-Hadad still threatened to invade the Kingdom of Israel and enslave its people. Encouraged by G‑d’s prophet,16 the Israelite Kingdom heroically defeated Ben-Hadad and his allies.

The prophet warned Ahab that despite Aram’s defeat on the battlefield, they would attack again the following year. Indeed, Ben-Hadad regrouped with a more formidable coalition, but once more, G‑d granted the Israelite army a victory. Ben-Hadad fled, but his advisors told him, “The Jews are a merciful people. If you surrender, they may spare your life.” Ben-Hadad’s men came to Ahab wearing sackcloth17 and begged for mercy. Overjoyed at the Arameans’ interest in peace, Ahab agreed to a peace treaty, sparing Ben-Hadad’s life.

Ahab quickly overlooked Ben-Hadad’s hostility, referring to him as “his brother” and even agreed to a trade deal with Aram. After three years of quiet, this episode of misplaced trust ended with another attack by the Aramean armies. In this battle, the Aramean forces, acting on Ben-Hadad’s orders, killed Ahab and routed the Jewish armies.

The moral of the story, says the Rebbe, is that Israel must not relent in battle until it has rendered the enemy incapable of future aggression. The Rebbe emphasizes that the Torah’s stories are not mere historical tales; they are eternal, actionable lessons that we must learn from and apply to our present reality.18 The Rebbe laments how contemporary Israel has mirrored Ahab’s naivete, failing to apply this crucial lesson of the need for decisive victory and failing to recognize naivete of “peace treaties”. It trades a clearheaded approach for a false sense of “justice.”19 This ancient story sets the stage for examining similar patterns in Israel’s more recent conflicts.

B) The Yom Kippur War: Damascus and Cairo

During the Yom Kippur War, the Rebbe advocated decisive Israeli military action, urging the IDF to capture the Syrian capital, Damascus. He argued that doing so would humble the Syrian government and send a powerful message to never again attack Israel.20 It would also serve the immediate goal of securing the northern front, allowing Israel to focus all its efforts on defeating Egypt in the south. The Rebbe suggested a similar approach to Cairo, with the aim of undermining Egypt’s military capabilities and establishing deterrence.21 Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff General David Elazar echoed the recommendation to conquer Damascus.22 However, Prime Minister Golda Meir vetoed this course of action.

Commenting on her decision, the Rebbe drew a parallel to the forty years the Jewish people spent wandering in the desert – a situation that could have been avoided had it not been for their slave mentality. He noted a similar mindset in modern Israel’s surrender to Western pressures, leading to unnecessary tragic outcomes.23

Syria has posed a minimal threat to Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, largely due to Israel’s aerial superiority and Syria’s internal conflicts. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, Israel decisively defeated the Syrian Air Force in the largest air combat engagement in modern military history,24 and since 2011, Syria has been embroiled in a bloody civil war that has absorbed its resources, preoccupying it from attacking Israel. In December 2024, in large part due to Israel’s crippling of Hezbollah, the Syrian regime fell and Israel eliminated most of Syria’s military assets. Nonetheless, the Rebbe’s recommendation for a more assertive approach in Israel’s conflicts with Syria remains a broadly applicable point of reflection.

Despite Israel’s successful defense and strategic gains, which positioned it to capture Damascus and advance toward Cairo, the Yom Kippur War ended with a ceasefire. While Israel emerged tactically victorious, the Arab narrative framed the conflict as a defeat for Israel.25 This promoted a perception of Israeli vulnerability among its adversaries. The war resulted in a lingering narrative of half-measures. This was a deviation from the principle of “until it is subdued,” which, if applied, could have significantly altered the region’s geopolitical landscape in Israel’s favor. Reflecting on the war in a letter to then Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, the Rebbe wrote:26

Another recent development bore out a view I expressed during the Yom Kippur War. I urged then, on the basis of halachah, to pursue the enemy [“until it is subdued”] (Deut. 20:20; and see also Num. 33:55), namely, to take Damascus – not for occupation, but to ensure that it “never” again would pose a threat. It was then also common knowledge that Soviet advisors were present there, with headquarters, etc. Only a few hours of occupation would have been sufficient to accomplish the task. But for “strange” reasons, it was not done. The results of the failure are evident, and have been particularly underscored recently by the military actions that were necessary to counter Soviet penetration.

C) The Gaza Wars

1. Years of Unrest

During British rule over the Gaza Strip (1920-1948), local Arabs grew increasingly hostile towards both Jewish immigrants and Jews who had been living in Gaza for generations. This hostility ultimately culminated in Arab riots, looting, and murder. In the aftermath of Israel’s victory in the 1948 War of Independence, Egypt seized control over Gaza, using it as a hub for Palestinians, many of whom had been displaced during the war. In 1967, Israel took control of Gaza in the Six Day War. It established Jewish towns in the region, collectively known as Gush Katif. Nonetheless, Gaza retained its (hostile) Palestinian majority. Israel granting greater autonomy to the Palestinians in 1993 in the Oslo accords only worsened matters. Between 1993 and 2005, Gaza was a center of terrorism, serving as a base for Palestinian terrorists carrying out suicide bombings and missile attacks against Israel.

2. Disengagement: More Violence

Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, intended to reduce tensions and present Israel as a moral actor on the world stage, was followed by Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 and the subsequent Gaza Civil War, leading to Fatah’s violent expulsion by Hamas.27 Crushing Fatah was only the beginning of Hamas’ reign of terror in Gaza. In June 2006, Gaza-based Palestinian terrorists kidnapped Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit. Israel responded with restrained military operations. This began a local cycle of violence that eventually culminated in the October 7 massacres blowing open the powderkeg that resulted in the subsequent multifront war. Let’s take a tour through history and examine the results of failing to apply the doctrine of “until it is subdued” as it pertains to Israel’s treatment of Gaza.

3. The First Gaza War (2008-2009): Operation Cast Lead

The military operations, artillery exchanges, and border skirmishes in the Gaza withdrawal’s aftermath ultimately led to the First Gaza War, “Operation Cast Lead.”28 Following international outcry, Israel relented to a ceasefire and withdrew from Gaza, leaving it damaged but still under Hamas control. This withdrawal gave Hamas the opportunity to restock its arsenal and fortify its defenses. Meanwhile, the “international community” pledged $4.5 billion29 in aid to rebuild Gaza. Of course, the aid money was not primarily invested in the Gazan economy. Instead, it went to line the pockets of senior Hamas members and their families. Gaza’s leadership invested the rest of the money in building terror tunnels, developing or purchasing missiles, and in training a terror army to attack Israel.

4. The Second Gaza War (2012): Operation Pillar of Defense

The ceasefire following the First Gaza War was short-lived, as Hamas continued to launch rockets and build tunnels into Israel. This led to “Operation Pillar of Defense,” a week-long campaign marked by heavy missile volleys from Gaza and Israeli counter-strikes.30 The conflict ended with an internationally brokered ceasefire, bringing the violence to a temporary halt.

5. The Third Gaza War (2014): Operation Protective Edge

In 2014, the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli high school students in Judea and Samaria by Hamas terrorists prompted the IDF to arrest most of Hamas’ active militants in that region.31 Hamas retaliated with a barrage of thousands of rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel, leading Israel to counterattack by bombing Gaza. This was followed by an Israeli ground offensive in Gaza – “Operation Protective Edge” – with the objective of dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities. Although the IDF demolished many terror tunnels and dealt a blow to Hamas’ infrastructure, they did not decisively cripple Hamas and instead withdrew from Gaza.

6. The Fourth Gaza War (2021): Operation Guardian of the Walls

On Jerusalem Day32 in 2021, Gaza-based terrorist organizations, Hamas and PIJ, fired a barrage of almost 4,400 rockets into Israel. Israel responded with airstrikes on over 1,500 terrorist targets in Gaza, including launch sites, command centers, and weapons’ caches, as well as by neutralizing hundreds of terrorists.33 However, despite this strong response, the terrorist organizations in Gaza managed to maintain their operational capabilities.34

7. An Uncertain Future

Clashes continued between Israel and Gaza, with intervals of rocket attacks and border skirmishes followed by IDF response with airstrikes. These intermittent attacks and exchanges of fire continued until October 7, 2023, when various Gazan groups raided Israel. They took 251 hostages, brutally murdered over 1,139 Israelis, and violated many of the women and girls. Israel responded with heavy airstrikes on Gaza, followed by full invasion with the objective of dismantling Hamas.

The question has now become: Will this be the final Israel-Gaza war? Does Israel possess the fortitude to take bold action and alter the status quo? Or will Israel once again fail to decisively end the cycle of violence, paving the way for future conflicts?

Although Israel has devastated Gaza, if it allows Gaza to be rebuilt under an autonomous Palestinian government, we can be certain, barring miracles, that the cycle of violence will perpetuate. To consider just how real a possibility this is, consider the following comments from a soldier who fought in the 2023 Israel-Hamas War. In early April 2024, I met up with a friend who was serving as a tank gunner. He had briefly returned from fighting in Khan Younis and was set to soon return to begin the Rafah incursion. “Sure, we devastated the place,” he said, “but there’s been no fundamental policy change. I’m going to bet that twenty years from now, there will be another Gaza war.”

Defeating Terrorists and Restoring Peace

As we have seen, the Rebbe emphasized the necessity of a decisive military approach to deter and defeat terrorist groups. This strategy demands not only military action, but also unwavering determination to confront and neutralize its adversaries, preventing attacks in the first place. But is there any precedent for such an approach? Has it proved successful elsewhere in the world?

If we consult recent military history, there are numerous examples of terrorist groups around the world conducting reigns of terror against civilian populations. These groups are often hosted by sympathetic (or terrorized) local populations. Can such groups be defeated? Let’s explore two case studies from around the world.35 Notably, both groups are “terrorist,” but neither are Islamist.

A) Peace in Sri Lanka: The Tamil Tigers

Sri Lanka endured over 25 years of civil war fueled by ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. Some Tamils formed a militant group, known as the Tamil Tigers, seeking to establish an independent state. From 1983 until 2002, the Tigers engaged in terrorism and controlled significant territory in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern regions. The Tigers were notorious for their use of suicide bombers and child soldiers, as well as for pioneering the use of women in suicide attacks.36 The Tigers were far more formidable than Hamas has ever been37 and enjoyed vast streams of international aid.38

In 2002, international mediators brokered a ceasefire, leading to a temporary halt in hostilities. However, several rounds of peace talks failed to produce a lasting agreement. The ceasefire collapsed in 2006, leading to renewed heavy fighting. In response, the Sri Lankan government launched a massive military offensive against the Tigers, successfully recapturing its territory. This time, despite appeals from the international community and the Tigers for ceasefires, the Sri Lankan government did not budge.39 The conflict culminated with the Sri Lankan military defeating the Tigers decisively in 2009.40 Since then, the once fierce Tigers have ceased to exist, no longer terrorizing the Sri Lankan population.

B) Ending Gang Violence in El Salvador

To further prove the point that the Torah’s doctrine of fully neutralizing threats can be effective in real world scenarios, let’s consider another example. This case study, along with the tale of the Tigers, shows that these principles are effective against domestic terrorism across ethnic and cultural lines. In recent years, El Salvador has experienced a victory in its battle against gang violence, primarily driven by President Nayib Bukele’s aggressive tactics to combat violent gangs like MS-1341 and Barrio 18.42

Before Bukele’s presidency, El Salvador grappled with one of the world’s highest homicide rates, largely due to gang violence. The gangs were deeply rooted in Salvadoran society, committing extortion, drug trafficking, and brutal violence. The government’s previous efforts, including the “Gang Truce of 2012,”43 failed to lower the murder rates.

Upon assuming office in 2019, Bukele launched a forceful and comprehensive initiative to address gang violence. His approach, known as the “Territorial Control Plan,” placed enhanced law enforcement and military intervention in gang-dominated areas. The plan culminated in the establishment of the “Terrorism Confinement Center” and the arrest of over 71,000 suspected gang members. This unyielding approach resulted in a significant drop in homicide rates and weakened the gangs’ influence.44

Securing Stability:National Security Overrides External Pressure

Both Sri Lanka and El Salvador faced condemnation from the “international community” – including the U.N.45 and media outlets like Al Jazeera – for their seemingly aggressive strategies. However, by prioritizing national security over external pressures, both nations successfully achieved peace and improved public safety. These examples suggest that if Israel consistently adopted similar tactics against terrorist threats,46 it could create a more tranquil and stable environment, allowing both sides of the conflict to lead peaceful, productive lives.

Conclusion

Military strength and strategy, while important, are not the ultimate keys to winning a war – G‑d ultimately grants victories.47 On the other hand, G‑d created a natural world and wants us to operate within its principles. As such, we must strike a balance between faith and practical action.

We see that the only way to end the cycle of violence is decisive military action. Ideally, this should be accomplished through military deterrence, stopping the battle before it starts. This deterrence should stem from a formidable military force and the perception that Israel will use it unqualifiedly if provoked. If faced with the possibility of a real threat, Israel must preemptively neutralize it. Finally if Israel is attacked, it must retaliate until the enemy has been neutralized and cannot regroup to fight another day. While other paths may appear more benevolent, they perpetuate the cycle of conflict. We must end the cycle and make peace.

Exercises:

Comment below: Should a modern state balance religious legal traditions with contemporary international law? Are these frameworks compatible?
Comment below: Based on the principles presented, what would a policy of "full neutralization" look like in Gaza?
Comment below: When is an enemy truly "subdued"?

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What Is the Jewish Claim to the Land?

Footnotes

Deuteronomy 20:20

See Shabbos 19a. The broader context of Shammai’s teaching is that sieges should not be initiated less than three days before Shabbos in order to minimize the risk of Shabbos violation. However, if a siege has already begun, it should not be halted, even for Shabbos.

See Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Shabbos, 2:25 and Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Melachim U'Milchamoseihem, 6:11. Aruch HaShulchan Ha’Asid, Hilchos Melachim, 75:16. [Note Shulchan Aruch does not deal explicitly with the rules of war, while Maimonides does.]

See Rashi on Deuteronomy 20:20.

See Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 2, p. 136, Kedoshim 5741 (1981); pp. 260-262, Chukas-Balak 5742 (1982).

See Daas Torah, p. 225.

Leviticus 26:6. See Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 51, Noach 5734 (1973); pp. 194f., 20 Menachem Av 5737 (1977); pp. 274f., Tzav 5738 (1978); p. 347, Night of Shemini Atzeres 5739 (1978); pp. 401f., Motzaei Shabbos Mikeitz 5739 (1978); Vol. 2, pp. 104f., 18 Tishrei 5741 (1980); p. 245, 7 Tammuz 5742 (1982). See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 20, p. 424, 17 Kislev 5741 (1980).

Numbers 33:55. See Letter to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, Elul 5741 (1981), p. 2. See also Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 2, p. 230, 3 Tammuz 5742 (1982); p. 246, likkut of sichos for 22 Sivan, 3 Tammuz, 7 Tammuz 5742 (1982); Video of Sichah. For further analysis of this verse, see the essay by Rabbi Yechezkel Sofer entitled “Stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides: Territorial Compromise and Minority Rights in Israel — Then and Now” in Maayanei Rashi, Vol. 2, pp. 197-210.

Dehez, D. (2010, November 24). Iran: The flaws of containment.; Yedid, B. (2022, November). PA weakness and Israel’s policy of containment propel Sinwar and Hamas toward Palestinian national leadership.; Matza, D. (2021, May 14). Hamas must be comprehensively routed.; Cavanaugh, M. L. (2014, August 13). Asking big questions: Containment and rollback ride again.

10.

See Inbar, E., & Shamir, E. (2013). ‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict. 37 (1), 65–90. The IDF even officially referred to the policy as such. See Yitch, Y. S. (2021, October 25). 19 operations in one night: We joined the “mowing the grass” of Etzion 36 hours before the end of the operation; Hammes, T. X. (2014, August 19). Israel and the demise of “mowing the grass”.

11.

Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 2, pp. 251-252, likkut of sichos for 22 Sivan, 3 Tammuz, 7 Tammuz 5742 (1982). See also Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 39, Matos-Maasei 5730 (1970); p. 45, Yechidus with Yonah Cohen, Summer 5730 (1970); Vol. 2, p. 222, 22 Sivan 5742 (1982); p. 236, 3 Tammuz 5742 (1982); p. 276, 13 Tammuz 5742 (1982).

12.

Shamir, E. (2023, October 22). The end of mowing the grass: If Israelwants to continue to exist, it must uproot Hamas from Gaza.

13.

For the Rebbe’s account of this narrative and its application, see Sichos Kodesh 5734, Vol. 1, p. 401, Terumah (1974); Sichos Kodesh 5736, Vol. 1, p. 252, 19 Kislev (1975); Sichos Kodesh 5738, Vol. 1, p. 400, 24 Teves (1978); Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 21, p. 288. See also Daas Torah, pp. 59- 60; Toras Menachem 5742, Vol. 2, p. 278, Simchas Torah (1981); Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 21, 13 Tammuz 5729 (1969); pp. 23-24, Matos-Maasei 5729 (1969); pp. 53-54, 19 Kislev 5731 (1970); pp. 181-182, 2nd day of Shavuos 5737 (1977); Vol. 2, p. 147, 18 Elul 5741 (1981); p. 153, 4th Night of Sukkos 5742 (1981); p. 414, Yechidus with Rabbi Efraim Eliezer Yalles, 2nd Day of Chol HaMoed Pesach 5742 (1982); Shemen Sasson MeiChaveirecha, Vol. 2, pp. 75-76, Letter to Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, dated 13 Iyar 5735 (1975). See the same letter and analysis in Menachem Meishiv Nafshi, Vol. 1, p. 364.

14.

I Kings Ch. 20.

15.

Aram consisted of ancient city-states in Syria. Ben-Hadad was king of Damascus and the surrounding region.

16.

See Rashi on I Kings 20:13, s.v. Navi Echad. There, we learn that the prophet is Michiyahu, the son of Yimlah. See also Seder Olam Rabbah, Ch. 20.

17.

Sackcloth was traditionally worn as a sign of mourning. See Genesis 37:34; Jonah 3:6; Esther 4:1.

18.

This is a major theme throughout the Rebbe’s thought. See Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 21: “The Torah’s stories are not mere tales. Instead, they are meant to offer practical lessons”; Vol. 2, p. 243, 7 Tammuz 5743. See also Maamarei Admur HaZakein HaKetzarim, p. 171; Chanah Ariel, Vol. 1, p. 38; Sefer HaMaamarim 5716, p. 385; Toras Menachem 5729, Vol. 4, p. 107, 13 Tammuz (1969).

19.

See Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 23, Matos-Maasei 5729 (1969); Toras Menachem 5729, Vol. 4, p. 107, 13 Tammuz (1969).

20.

See Sichos Kodesh 5734, Vol. 2, p. 106, Emor (1974).

21.

See Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 100, Yechidus with Israeli Air Force General Ran Ronen-Pekker, 5735 (1975); see also Yom Yom Im HaRabbi, p. 297, 299; Sichos Kodesh 5736, Vol. 1, pp. 721-722.

22.

See Bergman, R., & Meltzer, G. (2003). Milchemet Yom Kippur — Zman Emet, Tel Aviv: Miskal. p. 134; Israel Hayom. (2012, December 4). Why didn’t we attack earlier? [In Hebrew]. – cited in B’Rega HaEmet, p. 178. See the Rebbe’s comments in Sichos Kodesh 5734, Vol. 1, pp. 118-119; Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, pp. 69-70, Noach 5734 (1933).

23.

See B’Rega HaEmet, p. 177.

24.

Operation Mole Cricket 19. For a description and analysis of the operation, see Yogev, H., Cohen, R. A., & Lewin, E. (2022). Revolution in military affairs - The operation mole cricket 19 as a case study for the technological race during the cold war. 25(2), 138-156.; Flightline Weekly. (2023, January 3). Operation Mole Cricket 19: IAF’s most decisive victory.; Atlamazoglou, C. (2024, May 11). How the Israeli Air Force once destroyed over 60 enemy jets and dozens of Soviet missile systems in battle without losing a single fighter.

25.

For arguments framing the Yom Kippur War as an Arab victory, see Washington, A. (1988, March 25). A Clausewitzian victory: The 1973 Ramadan War.; Washington, A. (2015). Clausewitzian victory: The 1973 Ramadan War - War College Series. War College Series; Bean, J. W., & Girard, C. S. (2001). Anwar Al-Sadat’s grand strategy in the Yom Kippur War.; Illusion Of Defeat: Egyptian Strategic Thinking And The 1973 Yom Kippur War.; Gawrych, G. W. (1996). The 1973 Arab-Israeli war: The albatross of decisive victory (Leavenworth Papers No. 21).;

See Meek, S. R. (2016, June 4). Illusion of defeat: Egyptian strategic thinking and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, p. 45, where we learn:

Sadat went to war not for territorial gain, but to create a crisis that would disrupt the status quo, open the way for negotiations, and increase Egypt’s diplomatic flexibility. Golda Meir acknowledged as much in her memoirs, where she conceded that Sadat’s conduct of the war and overtures to the United States put Egypt in a far stronger position diplomatically than Israel. While Egypt had lost tactically, they won politically. Negotiations for the return of at least some of the territories Israel had captured in 1967 were inevitable.

26.

Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 2, p. 501, Letter to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, Elul 5741 (1981)

27.

Fatah is the most dominant faction in the PLO and the ruling party in Palestinian cities in Judea and Samaria.

28.

IDF Editorial Team. (2017, October 30). Operation Cast Lead.

29.

Over six billion in 2024’s U.S. dollars.

30.

IDF Editorial Team. (2017, October 30). Operation Pillar of Defense.

31.

IDF Editorial Team. (2017, October 30). Operation Brother’s Keeper.

32.

Yom Yerushalayim (Jerusalem Day) — Observed on the 28th of Iyar, this day commemorates the reunification of Jerusalem during the Six-Day War of 1967 (5727), when the Old City and the Kosel HaMa'aravi (Western Wall) returned to Jewish sovereignty for the first time in nearly two thousand years. The Rebbe spoke on numerous occasions about the miraculous nature of this victory and emphasized the eternal, indivisible connection between the Jewish people and Jerusalem.

33.

In this war, the IDF did not conduct a ground invasion and instead used airstrikes and artillery. This dealt a heavy blow to Hamas, but also allowed it to remain in control of Gaza and relatively intact.

34.

During the May 2021 Gaza war, the IDF destroyed over 62 miles of Hamas’ underground tunnel network. After the war, Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, claimed that the group possessed over 500 kilometers (approximately 310 miles) of tunnels and that at best, Israel had “only destroyed 20 percent of the tunnels.” See Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2023, October 28). Hamas tunnels to Egypt played a key role in arming Hamas.
For more on the war, see IDF Editorial Team. (2021, June 14). Operation Guardian of the Walls.

35.

On the importance of citing case studies from the general/non-Jewish world to reinforce teachings from the Torah, see Sichos Kodesh 5736, Vol. 1, p. 126, Simchas Torah; Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 106, Simchas Torah 5736 (1975).

36.

From 1987-2008, the Black Tiger suicide bombers perpetrated over 378 suicide attacks, with women making up over 25% of the attackers. Through suicide attacks, they assassinated a Sri Lankan president and the former prime minister of India. See Premaratne, N. P. (2015). Impact of Changing External Conditions on Counterinsurgency: The Sri Lankan Experience. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. On p. 25, we read:

Apart from the death of thousands of civilians, LTTE [the Tigers official name – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] was also responsible for the killings of two heads of states, 104 politicians, 1,555 Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) personnel, 23,387 Sri Lankan security forces personnel, and 2,825 missing in action (MIA).

37.

For perspective, see De Silva, A. I. P. (2013). International intervention in intra-state conflicts: The case in Sri Lanka. Naval Postgraduate School. On p. 92, it reads:

By that time, the LTTE controlled one-third of the country with full-fledged military forces, a policing system, and an administrative system. It was a separate state with all the basic necessities, even though it did not have legal recognition as such.

P. 93 continues to explain:

At the beginning of the war, India did not believe that Sri Lankan forces would win the war in Sri Lanka militarily, since the LTTE – at that time – was a strong force that could overrun army camps, killing thousands of soldiers in a day. For instance, on July 18, 1996, the LTTE killed 1,200 soldiers and acquired U.S. $70 million worth of military equipment from the Mulativu army base.

38.

See Premaratne, N. P. (2015). Impact of Changing External Conditions on Counterinsurgency: The Sri Lankan Experience. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. On p. 64, it explains:

At one point, the LTTE had collected 80 percent of its annual operating budget through the Tamil diaspora. By 2007, this fund had reached ‘an output of 200-300 million USD.' Other than through the diaspora, the LTTE raised funds through both legal and illegal businesses like 'international shipping, arms smuggling, human trafficking and other businesses.’

For more on the Tigers’ funding sources, see Manoharan, N. (2004, October 20). Financial fodder: External sources of LTTE funds. The Tigers even exploited international aid earmarked for hurricane relief to fund their terror organization. See U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2007, November 15). Treasury targets charity covertly supporting violence in Sri Lanka.

39.

Ramesh, R. (2009, February 5). Sri Lanka rejects international call for ceasefire with Tamil Tigers. Following the ceasefire in 2002, which the Tigers utilized as an opportunity to rearm, the Sri Lankans wisely chose to end the cycle.

40.

For more on applying the Sri Lankan technique in the current conflict, see Caschetta, A. J. (2023, November 10). To defeat Hamas, emulate the destruction of the Tamil Tigers. The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Originally published under the title A Rajapaksa plan for the total destruction of Hamas in Middle East Forum, October 7 Retrospective.; Hindwan, T. (2011, April). Defeat of LTTE: A lesson in COIN operations (Long paper). The Tamil government’s defeat of the Tigers has been the subject of numerous studies and is widely regarded as a paradigmatic example of how to overcome insurgencies. For further reading on this point, see Khan, A. S. (2013). Sri Lankan counterinsurgency operations during Eelam War IV: Comparative analysis of Galula and Rajapaksa models to determine future applicability. The study discusses the Rajapaksa COIN (counterinsurgency) model used by Sri Lanka against the LTTE insurgency during the Eelam War IV (2005-2009). The Rajapaksa model had eight key principles: political will, ignoring criticism, no negotiations, regulating media, no ceasefires, operational freedom, young commanders, and keeping neighbors informed. It defeated the LTTE insurgency. See also Manage, N. (2012). Counterinsurgency principles for contemporary internal conflict. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; Chandradasa, E. M. (2012). Adaptive COIN in Sri Lanka: What contributed to the demise of the LTTE? Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; Blaha, C. (2013). Defeating insurgencies with minimal force ratios. Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

41.

See InSight Crime. (2024, February 28). MS13.

42.

See InSight Crime. (2018, February 13). Barrio 18.

43.

See Vuković, S., & Rahman, E. (2023, April 24). Negotiating with gangs: Lessons from the 2012 truce in El Salvador.

44.

For an analysis of the justice of Bukele’s policies, see Caplan, B. (2024, February 12). The justice of Bukele? Yes, it’s complicated!; Hanania, R. (2023, March 8). The invisible graveyard of crime: A cost-benefit approach to the crackdown in El Salvador; Hanania, R. (2023, March 14). The midwit meme and the denial of tradeoffs: More thoughts on crime in El Salvador.

45.

For U.N. and human rights organizations’ criticism of Sri Lanka, see Tamil Guardian. (2022, October 6). UN passes resolution on collecting evidence for Sri Lankan war crimes trials;

United Nations. (2023, September 6). Accountability key to Sri Lanka’s future: UN rights chief;

Amnesty International. (2012, November 14). Sri Lanka: How UN failed during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict; For criticism of El Salvador by human rights organizations, including calls for sanctions, see Strayer, A., & Uppal, S. (2023, November 7). Human rights abuses in Bukele’s El Salvador demand sanctions; Amnesty International. (2022, June 2). El Salvador: President Bukele engulfs the country in a human rights crisis after three years in government. Consider Bukele’s response, available in Bukele, N. A. (2023, September 19). Statement by His Excellency Nayib Armando Bukele, President of El Salvador, at the General Debate of the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Here Bukele unapologetically responds to critics, saying:
[Foreign powers] made us sign false peace agreements, which had nothing to do with peace, and which only enabled the two warring factions to share the spoils.

We tried every formula they gave us and nothing worked. Then, under the protection of foreign powers, we handed the country over to the right. Then, again under the protection of foreign actors, we gave power to the left. This is how they kept us for 30 years post-war, where there were more deaths than in the civil war, more poverty, and more violence. Nobody did anything to change the root of the [problematic] system, neither the institutions nor the laws.

Everything that happened during those years was done with the backing, financing, consent, and imposition of those who have always called themselves great defenders of human rights and democratic institutionality. Instead of giving us medicine to heal, they were giving us poison.…

But this time we said no! We rejected the poison and, for the first time, we tasted our own medicine. Thank G‑d, it worked!

The first thing we did was to make sure we were on the side of G‑d and the people, because no worthwhile transformation can be accomplished by obeying external powers. Secondly, we created our own method, a method designed for our own reality, created by those who live in that reality.
If we had listened to [foreign powers and human rights organizations], we would still be losing thousands of Salvadorans to terrorists. Thank G‑d we did not listen to them!

46.

See Trinquier, R. (1964). Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency. p. 8. One of Trinquier’s key arguments is that terrorist groups can only thrive when they have the support of the local population. Thus, a key aim of counterterrorism is to erode the terrorist group’s capabilities and diminish their backing within the population.

47.

See Deuteronomy 8:17. See also Karasi V’Ein Oneh, Vol. 1, p. 34, Naso 5730 (1970).

Rabbi Elisha Pearl is a writer and researcher at the Sichos In English institute. He has lectured and written extensively on Jewish Law, Philosophy, and Mysticism, and holds Rabbinic ordination from Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Yeshiva University, where he also did graduate studies in philosophy and psychology.

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Sarah January 4, 2026

B"H, Thank you for the great lecture Rabbi Pearl ! Q1: pikuach nefesh (religious tradition) must be prioritized. This is the same as saying that survival of a country and its people is a priority over any law anyone else out of this country has invented at any given time. Q2: Complete victory, imprison active terrorist, move out the entire population permanently, declare sovereignity over all Gaza. Q3: If the enemy is inside the borders the proven terrorist must be dealed by the local legal system (imprisoned etc) and the entire population moved out of the borders. If the enemy is out of the borders the methods must involve the needed strategic, military and diplomatic movements to assure it will never be a danger. Reply

Herja Josiahssen January 3, 2026

1. No. Religious legal traditions are incompatible with contemporary international law. International law is based on human “wisdom” with the end goal being “everyone just somehow get along how we tell you, and every viewpoint is correct no matter what”. Religious legal tradition (Bible based, not Sharia law or other religious legal traditions) recognizes the difference between good and evil, and that godly severity is necessary to achieve what is good.
2. “Full neutralization” in Gaza would look like executing or imprisoning every single terrorist and evicting any civilians who refuse to live under Israeli authority peacefully.
3. An enemy is truly subdued when they can no longer fight back to pose a threat to you. Reply

Marina January 3, 2026

1. Religious and international law are only compatible as long as the latter does not become a shrine and retains its capacity to evolve and improve, while the former is convincingly applied to modern conditions.

2. It would be demilitarization, which is the destruction of terrorist leadership and any weapons as well as facilities used to make them, with no international assistance possible.

3. With a meaningful change of their government to one with genuine peaceful intentions. Reply

Gabrielle January 2, 2026

Sometimes, we need to look at the fundamentals of human behavior to understand that the setting of clear, irrevocable boundaries is a functional attribute of survival. When passivity, in its' self-veneration, allows for the violent incursion of an enemy, it is not spiritual enlightenment but a parasitical empathy with evil. Such insanity leads to both to our destruction and the reintroduction of terror into our communities as confirmed through the history of wars and terror in Israel.
Our passive cooperation repeatedly elevates Hamas' savage behavior. Their well-designed propaganda as Israel's "victim" created us, in the world's eyes, as the de facto facilitator of this evil.
It is too often those who have never worn a uniform, defended themselves or anyone else from a potentially existential attack, whose "compassion" is unacknowledged subjugation.
Hamas used ALL OF GAZA, with hostages, as a human shield against Israel aggressively prosecuting the war they initiated, and we complied. Reply

Felipe de Jesus Zamudio Alejandre San Antonio, coayuca, Puebla, Mexico January 1, 2026

Israel has to destroy, once for all, Hamas because for this terrorists war is a busines, Iran is rearming with more precise weapons, technology will play a vital role in the next war against Iran.
Unless that the regime falls in this upheaval.
We will see another war Israel-Iran because the Ayatollas are spreading their hate toward Israel, spending millions in weaponry instead of spending this money for the welfare of the common citizens. Reply

Scott Goldman Laughlin January 1, 2026

Rebbe Schneerson was very astute, politically tuned, and so learned. If only political leadership listened or take heed to what he was recommending that should have been done. Kudos Mr. Pearl to point it out to the reader no doubt according to halachic Jewish law and political and military realities and practicalities make a military so strong to place fear in the enemy will not provoke or attack. If they do, attack "Subdue the enemy" go all in to defeat and humble where they will not do it again. Sadly, making treaties or ceasefires with those who do not seek to just steal goods or properties, giving up territory has been utter failure so much Jewish bloodshed spilled when war needs to be clear, concise, and victory defined where there will be no more wars. Find it interesting in example like the history in Judges-Writings/prophets every time when war was fought it was clear victory and period of true peace would prevail forty years after each time, one time eighty believe. Reply

Steven Kovner USA January 1, 2026

Question 1:
The problem is, "contemporary international law" is only applied to Israel, and thus is antisemitic by the IHRA definition.
Israel should make it clear it will observe the international law as it is applied to other countries. Reply

Sarah January 5, 2026

in response to Steven Kovner:

Dear Steven Kovner, can you please explain the facts behind what you write about that "contemporary international law" is only applied to Israel"? Reply

SDK December 31, 2025

G-d judges our nation differently than G-d judges the rest of the world.

We are no longer guided by prophets and that means we cannot take lessons from that time directly into our time. The second intifada started 40 days after Baruch Goldstein murdered innocent people at prayer in Hevron. He too believed in massive violence. How many more people died from that sin?

It is always possible to say "we should have used MORE violence". A theory that cannot be disproven is a theological belief and not an argument. Yet - you are not prophets. As a nation, we must look at ALL messages from Hashem. The nations of the world - the UN, the West, the Gulf - who prevent us from doing the worst they have done - are also a message from Hashem. The failure of violence to end violence - at least so far - is a message from Hashem.

May we - and our enemies - know no more suffering as we come to understand G-ds will. Reply

David Harold Chester Petach Tikva, Israel January 1, 2026

in response to SDK:

We cannot be sure that we are being collectively punished for the harm that Baruch caused. The idea for us to "use more violence", was about how we should respond not initiate in the event of a private or public battle.

"An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" does no longer make sense, but to turn the other cheek clearly is a wrong attitude, and it invites worse violence from the enemy. Sometimes the Torah can fail to be usefully applied. Reply

Sarah January 5, 2026

in response to SDK:

B"H, Dear SDK, One should do the needed and not keep back out of fear to sin, which is the worse sin. Nobody can know who is a prophet, at any given time. I think the Rebbe was a prophet of our days and others as well. If Jews would adhere to no violence, now there would be no Jews, because the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 would have killed all Jews. If the Jews would have done the correct military operations, completing every goal, ensuring the borders of 1967 and moving out all Arab population in its entirety, plus consequent regional military stabilization out of the borders, now there would be peace in Israel. The sin of not doing your mission e.g. to protect life, because of a fear to sin, is a classical error some Christians do (a passive sinner mentality). But, the existing Christian countries never do that error, if you look back the history. Maybe it works if you are 1 Billion people against a few, as with Gandhi, but even this might not be possible anymore, due to modern warfare. Reply

Willy Kazadi Brussels /Belgium December 30, 2025

1.They are different, but they've certain points of similarity because cetain parts of the contemporary international law have some parts their roots from the Religion. (Bible).
2.Persistance and fighting against the terrorists until they'll be subdued.

3. When is not more representing any real threats and is completly stopped to fight. Reply

Tom Vukdelich Boise, Idaho December 30, 2025

To David HC: 100% agree. To Raul Rabinovici; what is bandied about in the media as "international law" does not exist. Hopefully it will become extant at some unknown future date.

Meanwhile, the law of the jungle, as demonstrated on 7 October 2023, is what we must totally deny, defeat, and crush. Reply

Raul Rabinovici Petach Tikva December 30, 2025

Thank you very much! Yishar Koach! Excellent material!
A. Modern international law, accepted by most countries in the world, is based on non-religious principles, but rather on humanitarian ideals or simply the narrow interest internal or external of each individual state. Therefore, there is often a conflict and a clash between the Laws of Israel (Halacha), the commandments of God (HaKadosh Baruch Hu), and international law.
B. It is very difficult to pass judgment when I am not familiar with the specific details of the war.
C. This is also complicated to state. In my humble opinion, a major part of "Victory" is a drastic and comprehensive overhaul of the educational system in Gaza, the Arab education in Judea and Samaria, and throughout Middle Eastern countries. Education for peace and coexistence with the State of Israel, and a shift in the mentality of Middle Eastern nations toward the Jews and the State of Israel, is the true victory. Reply

Raul Rabinovici Petach Tikva December 30, 2025

Josh Benjamin January 5, 2026

in response to Raul Rabinovici:

He mentions this in book quoting the Rebbe, roughly here that the Rebbe suggested encouragement through school, and teacher monetary incentives, for Arab schools to teach a normal Arab/Muslim curriculum, with input from Israel, about the history of Israel, ect. In another chapter he mentions about incentivizing the Arabs to move from Israel all together, if I remember correctly. Keep in mind that was many years ago, and the modern Arab, is much more educated, and radicalized.

They outright can’t be trusted, and must go. It’s ridiculous to think at this point that we are going to teach them anything at all.

Either you pledge your allegiance to the flag of Israel, or leave, for another one of the many Arab countries.
It makes zero sense to me, how we could bomb, them in Gaza, Beirut, Syria, Yemen, Tehran, and elsewhere, but when it comes to displacing them? Absolutely not, against “International law.”
We should do this now, while Lebanon syria is in shambles, scramble the gazans there Reply

Raul Rabinovici Petach Tikva January 6, 2026

in response to Josh Benjamin:

Excellent! I was unaware that the Rebbe spoke about educating Arabs toward the acceptance of Israel.
Regarding the expulsion of Arabs from the Land of Israel: this occurred to some degree during the establishment of the State of Israel. However, this did not grant Israel peace and tranquility. We are all familiar with the terror organizations that emerged in refugee camps in Middle East along with the support of Iran and Turkey. This implies that expulsion is not a "magic" or ideal solution either. The situation in the Middle East is immensely complex due to history, and various other political, religious, culture factors. Consequently, the solution must also be highly multifaceted, of several components: military, political, religious, and educational. The greatest challenge in achieving a solution lies in its complexity. Israel's victory should be not only military, but also a political and cultural one—a victory of peace and acceptance as a state with equal rights in Middle East. Reply

Sarah January 6, 2026

in response to Raul Rabinovici:

B"H dear Raul, it may take hundreds of years till the Muslim population of the Planet stops believing that they must kill all Jews and all non-Muslims and non-believers and invade all the Planet and that they have the right from Gd to treat non-Muslims in any unethical way, like if they were animals, if this allows them to reach their goal. These things are written in their holy texts. Therefore the aim for now is to assure peace in Israel and assure the survival and maximal stabilization of Israel in the area and not yet " a victory of peace and acceptance as a state with equal rights in Middle East". The victory you mean, would mean complete change of the Muslim countries and people. This is a much more far reaching and difficult plan. But it is a second step and cannot work out, without resolving the first step, namely make Israel a fortress of peace, strength and stability controlling fully its Land and borders. Showing any weakness is welcoming any Muslim enemy to plan its defeat. Reply

Raul Rabinovici Petach Tikva January 10, 2026

in response to Sarah:

Hello Sarah, have a good and blessed week!
You are right! I wanted to say that the military and wars are tools in the "toolbox" of a nation's foreign policy, alongside many other non-military tools. In my humble opinion, the State of Israel should utilize all possible tools, not just the military and wars. These other tools include public diplomacy (advocacy/propaganda), mutual defense alliances (such as the Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance) based on the famous proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend!", espionage, and more.
Thank you very much! Reply

David Harold Chester Petach Tikva, Israel December 30, 2025

From my 60+ years of living here in Israel, and of what I have seen and read about our experiences with Hamas and Iran, I find myself forced to agree with the conclusions provided in this long article and history of terrorism.

There seems to be no alternative but for us to completely defeat these two enemy sources along with several less formidable others that are their proxies. Let us give praise to the IDF in what they have achieved so far and help them to continue with their necessary but distatefull work. Reply

Tom Vukdelich Boise, Idaho December 29, 2025

When the enemy has been shown the wisdom of not being an enemy, AND over a short while, becomes a friend! Reply

Tom Vukdelich Boise, Idaho December 29, 2025

Total conquest, merciful treatment of children, including nutritional and medical care. Mercy upon "palestinian" women also but only after thourough investigation regarding complicity with hamas terrorists.

Humane and even hospitable treatment for all until individual investigations have been finalized.

Vigorousl prosecution, even up to death penalty for those shown to have committed terrorist acts at any time since 1948. Reply

Tom Vukdelich Boise, Idaho December 29, 2025

In my view, this is a very multi-faceted question. G-d's law is not religious law. It is G-d's law. G-d's law is THE law. It is the eternal basis of all that is just and true.

Should earthly human legislation be "balanced" with the law given by G-d? Absolutely not! Should earthly human legislative bodies draw from holy Torah principles? Absolutely yes! Reply

Joshua Benjamin Crown Heights December 29, 2025

*Yidishe Krechtz*

All of these teachings need to be applied to outside of Israel, as well. I read “Make Peace.”

During this long Golus, the idea of self defence has been thoroughly beat or subdued out of our communities, that our only main “Reaction” to antisemitism is “Fight with Kindness”. Pacifism isn’t Judaism. We aren’t Switzerland.

Fighting with kindness doesn’t stop active shooters, guns do. We can’t wait around for the Goyim to love their children enough to not let them rot in their basements on video games and TikTok, until they want to shoot up a school or commit violent attacks.

Anywhere worth protecting, needs to have weapons to protect it, security cameras, security ect. Taking a lax approach to self defense, and then only defend after we have been terrorized, is a bad approach, G-d should bless us, that we should stand up to violence and at the very least self defend, ourselves schools, houses and family. Reply

Halachic Foundations

The Rebbe’s Critique of Israeli Military Strategy

Practical Implications of “Until It Is Subdued”

1. The Ethics of Warfare

2. Ending Domestic Terrorism

3. The Alternative: “Mowing The Grass”

4. The Only Way to Honor the Memory of the Fallen

Case Studies: Israel’s Failure to Neutralize Military Threats

A) Compassionate Jewish Naivete: Israel and Aram

B) The Yom Kippur War: Damascus and Cairo

C) The Gaza Wars

1. Years of Unrest

2. Disengagement: More Violence

3. The First Gaza War (2008-2009): Operation Cast Lead

4. The Second Gaza War (2012): Operation Pillar of Defense

5. The Third Gaza War (2014): Operation Protective Edge

6. The Fourth Gaza War (2021): Operation Guardian of the Walls

7. An Uncertain Future

Defeating Terrorists and Restoring Peace

A) Peace in Sri Lanka: The Tamil Tigers

B) Ending Gang Violence in El Salvador

Securing Stability:National Security Overrides External Pressure

Conclusion

Exercises:

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