His pleasantries are smooth like butter, but his heart is at war. His words are smooth like oil, but they are drawn swords.
PSALMS 55:22
You have deceived this people and Jerusalem, saying, 'You will have peace’ when the sword is at our throats.
JEREMIAH 4:10
An immediate ceasefire appears to be the most straight forward solution to any armed conflict. The logic is simple: People are killing each other — so why not just stop it? Perhaps Hamas committed violent acts against Jews, massacring over 1400 and kidnapping more than 230. They might have launched a few thousand rockets. But those events happened in the past. Not responding would prevent further suffering. Taking the high road might eventually lead to peace. Though this approach may sound appealing, there are several reasons why, on deeper inspection, it is ineffective.
A) A Net Victory for Terror
Unconditional ceasefires send the message that violence is tolerated, inviting more severe atrocities in the future.1 Moreover, terror attacks are calculated to gain publicity, making a ceasefire without decisive action against them a tacit victory. Furthermore, these ceasefires jeopardize Israeli security by leaving dangerous enemies intact.
B) Ceasefire as a Tactical Pause
The underlying hope is that unconditional ceasefires will pave the way to enduring peace. But do ceasefires without completing military objectives lead to such peace? Let’s consult the historical record
Ceasefires between Israel and Hamas are a fragile affair, with a short list including the ceasefires of June 2008, January 2009, November 2012, August 2014, June 2021, and May 2023. On each of these occasions, Hamas broke the ceasefire. Given this impressive list of ceasefires made and subsequently broken, we see that ceasefires with Hamas, Hezbollah, and similar organizations do not achieve the intended outcome of fostering long-term peace.
Israel’s interest in ceasefires clearly stems from a desire to protect its citizens from further harm. But what might motivate Israel’s enemies to clamor for a ceasefire? Rafael Eitan, an Israeli general who served in the 1982 Lebanon War, offered the following insight:2
We again saw the well-known Middle Eastern tactic that has recurred in every battle and war. The moment an Arab country receives a heavy blow, the world wakes up and forces us to enter a ceasefire in order that we not achieve our objective.
Such ceasefires are not sincere attempts at peace, but rather a tool used by the enemy from a position of weakness to stop Israeli advances. Eitan further suggests that these hostile groups weaponize the “international community” to pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire.
Let’s imagine that terrorist groups propose ceasefires when they are at a disadvantage in order to ensure their survival. What follows next? Will the terrorists abandon their aspirations of Israel’s destruction, lay down their arms, and begin to build their local economy? Will they turn Gaza, Jenin, Lebanon, or Yemen into peaceful oases? Once again, the historical record provides sharp insight into the outcomes of unconditional ceasefires when the underlying issues are not addressed.
C) Time to Regroup: Terror Groups and Ceasefires
Israel’s enemies utilize ceasefires as opportunities to regroup. So, ceasefires without achieving military objectives are not recipes for peace, but for wars of attrition. The weaker side, be it Hamas or Hezbollah (but the same was true of Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s key terrorist predecessor, the PLO — Palestine3 Liberation Organization — and all other skilled terrorist groups), uses ceasefires to prevent its destruction and to regroup.4 Its aim is to emerge more powerful in the future and harm Israel.
At the very least, it seeks to gradually damage Israel, sow terror in its communities, and tarnish Israel’s public image, weakening the country. Israel’s enemies, in their various guises, have infinite patience.5 As long as they survive, they maintain the hope that they can cripple Israel and ultimately annihilate it: either by wearing down Israel’s collective resolve or by holding on long enough for geopolitics to shift.6
D) The Terrorist’s Playbook
A theme that we will return to is that Hamas, Hezbollah and their ilk are best understood not as localized phenomena, but as examples in the wider global trend of terrorist organizations. While Western media tends to focus on Islamist terrorism, we have no shortage of other modern terrorist groups to consider. One crucial example of a hardened terrorist group that was ultimately defeated is the Tamil Tigers. For nearly thirty years, until their decisive defeat in 2009 by the Sri Lankan military, the Tamil Tigers perpetrated incessant acts of terrorism against the Sri Lankan people in a bid to create an independent Tamil ethnic state within Sri Lanka.
During the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009), the Tigers requested ceasefires several times, often using the “international community” as leverage. The Tigers invariably7 used the ceasefires as opportunities to rearm, consolidate their power, and weaken Sri Lanka. We should view Hamas and Hezbollah’s requests for ceasefires through this lens. They may be cruel, but they are not stupid. Terrorism is a political strategy, and we should expect terrorist groups to implement the strategy to the fullest.8 Ceasefires are an important weapon in any skilled terrorist’s arsenal.9
E) Cultural Precedent: Hudna
To better understand how Islamist terror groups employ ceasefires, it’s important to consider some cultural context.10 When Islamist military groups declare a ceasefire, they use the term “hudna,” roughly translated as a truce or a period of calm, modeled on the medieval “Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.”11
The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, intended to last ten years, held for only two, ultimately leading to the surrender of the originally more powerful party. This treaty served as precedent for Anwar Sadat’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel.12 On several occasions, Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO, also compared his participation in the Oslo accords13 with Israel to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.14 The implication of these comparisons is that, from a terrorist perspective, peace agreements are regarded as temporary measures. Ceasefires are no different; they serve as strategic pauses, allowing time for the weaker side to regroup and ultimately gain the upper hand.15
Hamas leaders have routinely offered hudnas. Notably, in 2004, Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi offered Israel a ten-year hudna in return for:
- A complete Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.
- The right of return for all Palestinian refugees.
- The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
However, he emphasized that this hudna would not indicate Hamas’ recognition of Israel. Instead, he offered the hudna as it would be “difficult to liberate all our land at this stage.”16 The phrase “all of our land” refers to the entire territory of Israel.17 Given this historical context, a hudna is a tool of war, used to pause the battle to regroup and eventually destroy one’s enemies.18
Having contextualized ceasefires strategically and culturally, let’s explore the Rebbe’s explicit commentary on historical ceasefires:
Ceasefire: A Prelude to the Yom Kippur War
In 1970, after a three-year war with Israel known as the War of Attrition, Egypt proposed a ceasefire with Israel. The Rebbe offered the following insight into Egypt’s motivation for the ceasefire:19
[Egyptian President Nasser’s] sudden request for a ceasefire is not motivated by a desire for peace, as any intelligent person would understand. A peace treaty can be discussed even during war, [so Egypt’s insistence on a ceasefire raises suspicions about their true intentions]. It is evident that Egypt wants a ceasefire since they cannot rebuild their fortifications and rearm while Israel is bombing. Nasser’s aim is to use the ceasefire as a means for future war, [not to engage in sincere peace negotiations].
The moment a ceasefire is signed, Egypt will immediately begin rebuilding its fortifications along the Suez Canal. Furthermore, a ceasefire will render all of the money spent [during the war of attrition] and soldiers’ lives sacrificed in vain, since Egypt will simply regroup and launch another attack against Israel in the future. How can we justify the money we spent and the soldiers’ lives we sacrificed? And how can we justify the future expenditures?
Moreover, during World War II, when the defeated side20 requested a ceasefire before entering into peace negotiations, allied military experts unanimously rejected the proposal. They explained that a ceasefire would be exploited [by the defeated nations] for rearmament. The experts also argued that a ceasefire would lower the odds of achieving a lasting peace.
In fact, Nasser immediately violated the terms of the ceasefire, taking advantage of it to fortify Egyptian positions and rearm, significantly increasing Egypt’s military threat. This paved the way for Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat to launch the lethal Yom Kippur War in 1973.21
In a 1970 letter to IDF’s head of Southern Command and future prime minister Ariel Sharon, the Rebbe had more to say on the ceasefire with Egypt — comments again relevant to Israel’s contemporary enemies:22
With each passing day, our opponents become stronger and fortify their positions further. Despite the formal protests [from Israel and the United States,] the enemy uses each day to intensify their power and import the most advanced modern weaponry. It is clear that the United States will not go to war with the Soviet Union over [potential Egyptian aggression against Israel, considering Egypt’s status as a Soviet client state at the time].
Regarding the outcry over Egypt’s failure to honor its promises, no one genuinely believed they would refrain from exploiting the ceasefire. This sentiment was shared by members of the government in Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union, given Egypt’s history [of breaking promises three years ago during the Six-Day War] and fourteen years prior [during the 1956 Sinai War], as well as on several other occasions. Arguments will continue to accumulate, but ultimately, the decision will be made to maintain the current status quo.
Consequently, it is apparent that during the peace negotiations, after the opposing side has entrenched [and fortified their military positions], Israel will find itself at a disadvantage. The security situation will have completely changed between the day the ceasefire was implemented and the conclusion of the negotiations regarding the demands and terms [of the peace treaty].
I hope that the other side will make a foolish move, as they did at the start of the Six-Day War, which will necessitate the cancellation of the ceasefire. In such a scenario, G‑d will once again work miracles, enabling the swift mobilization of all forces after the ceasefire ends. Defense will be renewed through an attack, the only effective means of doing so, and all forces will be fully mobilized, not in the half-hearted manner seen until now, but in a true defense. Only then is there hope for a lasting ceasefire and finally achieving peace. The current situation, however, leads directly to the renewal of war, G‑d forbid, under far worse conditions than those at the start of the ceasefire.
I have elaborated on this matter in response to your comment that my writings about the canal are no longer relevant. I fear that this issue will soon become pertinent once again. While I hope to be proven wrong in my assessment, based on the prevailing attitudes, it unfortunately seems unlikely.
Three years before Egypt’s fateful violation of the ceasefire which began the Yom Kippur War, the Rebbe saw the “writing on the wall.” At the end of a 1970 talk addressing Israel’s ill-advised ceasefire with Egypt, the Rebbe broke down crying, citing the verse,23 “Why have I come, yet there is no one? I have called out, yet no one answers.” This captures the Rebbe’s sense of urgency over Israel’s precarious security situation and his sadness over the fact that, despite his clear vision on the matter, no one seemed to listen. Now, more than fifty years later, we see retrospectively that failing to follow the Rebbe’s prescription has created enduring sorrow.24
Summary
We have learned that there are at least five compelling reasons for skepticism about the effectiveness of unconditional ceasefires without completing military objectives:
- Ceasefires demonstrate a tolerance for violence.
- Ceasefires allow terrorist groups to survive, regroup, and rearm.
- Ceasefires are a classic insurgent strategy used in modern warfare to weaken states, irrespective of cultural context.
- In Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s cultural context, ceasefires have a clear precedent as an implement of war.
- Ceasefires both dishonor the memory of the fallen and squander the funds spent on defense.
If this is the case, then:
- Unconditional ceasefires with hostile militant groups are not in Israel’s interest, until the hostile militant group ceases to pose a credible threat.
- Those calling for a ceasefire are either unintentionally or intentionally seeking to strengthen Israel’s enemies.
In light of the above, unconditional ceasefires without achieving military objectives perpetuate the cycle of violence by allowing terrorist groups and regimes to survive and fight another day. If we aim to end the cycle of violence and allow all people in the region to lead prosperous, happy, terror-free lives, then a ceasefire, no matter how initially attractive it may seem, is not the answer. But what if we modified the ceasefire? What if, instead of an unconditional ceasefire, the international community or the U.N. would monitor and enforce the ceasefire?
Exercises:
- Comment Below: How has your view on ceasefires changed after learning about the history of their use?
- Comment Below: If ceasefires without addressing underlying issues are ineffective, what would addressing "root causes" actually require? Is this a realistic alternative, and what would genuine root cause resolution look like in practice?

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