1

A rebellious elder who differed with the Supreme Sanhedrin concerning a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering is liable for execution. This applies whether the court forbids the matter and he permits it or the court permits the matter and he forbids it. Even if he bases his statements on the received tradition, saying: "This is the tradition I received from my masters," and they say: "This is what appears to us as appropriate on the basis of logical analysis," since he differs with their ruling and performs a deed or directs others to do so, he is liable. Needless to say, this applies if they also rule on the basis of their having received teachings through the Oral Tradition.

Similarly, he is liable for execution if he differs with them with regard to a decree that they issued to safeguard a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering is liable for execution. For example, if he permits the consumption of leaven on the fourteenth of Nissan during the sixth hour or forbids deriving benefit from it in the fifth hour, he is worthy of execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

א

זֶה שֶׁחָלַק עַל בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל בְּדָבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. בֵּין שֶׁהָיוּ הֵן אוֹסְרִים וְהוּא מַתִּיר בֵּין שֶׁהָיוּ הֵן מַתִּירִין וְהוּא אוֹסֵר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב מִיתָה. אֲפִלּוּ הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר מִפִּי הַקַּבָּלָה וְאָמַר כָּךְ קִבַּלְתִּי מֵרַבּוֹתַי וְהֵן אוֹמְרִים כָּךְ נִרְאֶה בְּעֵינֵינוּ שֶׁהַדִּין נוֹתֵן. הוֹאִיל וְנָשָׂא וְנָתַן עֲלֵיהֶן בַּדָּבָר וְעָשָׂה אוֹ שֶׁהוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר אִם הֵם מוֹרִים מִפִּי הַקַּבָּלָה. וְכֵן אִם חָלַק עֲלֵיהֶם בִּגְזֵרָה מִן הַגְּזֵרוֹת שֶׁגָּזְרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת וּזְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת. כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִתִּיר הֶחָמֵץ בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר בְּנִיסָן בְּשָׁעָה שִׁשִּׁית. אוֹ אֲסָרוֹ בַּהֲנָאָה בְּשָׁעָה חֲמִישִׁית. הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב מִיתָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

2

The above applies whether the rebellious elder disputes a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering or he disputes a matter which leads to a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

What is implied? If they disputed whether relations with a woman are adulterous or incestuous, if a shade of blood would render a woman ritually impure or not, if a woman is impure because of birth or not, if a woman is a zavah or not, if this fat is forbidden or permitted and the like, their difference of opinion involves a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

What is meant by a matter that will lead to a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. For example, the Sages differed concerning the declaration of a leap year, if the leap year must be declared before Purim or may be declared throughout Adar, he is liable. For this leads to partaking of chametz on Pesach. Similarly, if they differed with regard to a matter of financial law or with regard to the number of judges able to adjudicate matters of financial law, he is liable. For according to the opinion which maintains that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, everything which he expropriated from him was expropriated according to law and according to the decisions of the court. But according to the opposing view, whatever he expropriated is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated. And yet according to the opinion that the person expropriated his own property, the consecration is valid. If another person engages in relations with her willfully, he is liable for kerait and if he engages in relations with her inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin offering. Thus their difference of opinion led to a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

Similarly, if their difference of opinion concerned lashes, if one person was liable to receive lashes or not, or they differed with regard to the number of judges in whose presence lashes must be administered, he is liable. For according to the opinion who says that he should not be lashed, the court is injuring him and the judges are liable to make financial restitution. Anything expropriated from them is taken according to law. But according to the opinion which says that he is liable for lashes, everything he expropriates from them is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated.

Similarly, if they differed with regard to whether or not a person is obligated to pay after making an endowment evaluations or interdicted property, he is liable. For according to the opinion that says that he is not liable to pay, if it is taken from him, it is stolen property and if it is used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Similarly, he is liable if he differed with the majority concerning the redemption of consecrated property, had they been redeemed or not. For according to the opinion that the redemption is invalid, if he used that article to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Similarly, if they differed with regard to bringing an eglah arufah, whether a city is obligated to bring or not, he is liable. For according to those who say that city is obligated to bring the calf, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it and if he uses it to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to orlah. And similar concepts apply with regard to leket, shichechah, and pe'ah, if they differ whether it belongs to the poor or to the owner, he is liable. For according to the opinion which says that it belongs to the owner, it is stolen property in the hands of the poor and if one consecrates a woman with it, she is not consecrated.

Similarly, if the rebellious elder differs with the court with regard to a category of factors that impart ritual impurity, e.g., blemishes on the skin, blemishes on homes, or blemishes on garments, he is liable. For according to the opinion that the person is pure, he is permitted to enter the Temple and partake of consecrated foods, but according to the opinion that he is impure, if he enters the Temple or partakes of consecrated food willfully, he is punishable by kerait, and if he does so inadvertently, he is liable for a sin offering. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to the purification of a person afflicted by tzara'at, if he can be purified or not.

Similarly, he is liable if they differ with regard to the obligation to make a sotah drink the water which conveys the curse: Is a woman required to drink the water or is she not required? For according to the person who says that she must drink, if her husband dies before she drinks, she is forbidden to her yevam, while according to the person who says that she is not required to drink, she may perform the rite of yibbum. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is necessary to investigate and examine whether a difference of opinion will lead to these consequences. If it will lead to another consequence - which after a series of even 100 consequences - that will bring about a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering, the rebellious elder is liable. This applies regardless of whether he ruled leniently and the others ruled stringently or he ruled stringently and they ruled leniently.

ב

אֶחָד שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. אוֹ שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ בְּדָבָר הַמֵּבִיא לִידֵי דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. כֵּיצַד. נֶחְלְקוּ בְּאִשָּׁה זוֹ אִם הִיא עֶרְוָה אִם לָאו. אִם מַרְאֵה דָּם זֶה מְטַמֵּא בְּאִשָּׁה אוֹ לֹא. אִם זוֹ טְמֵאָה לֵידָה אוֹ לֹא. אִם זוֹ זָבָה אוֹ לֹא. אִם חֵלֶב זֶה אָסוּר אוֹ מֻתָּר. וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ. הֲרֵי זֶה חוֹלֵק בְּדָבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. וְכֵיצַד דָּבָר הַמֵּבִיא לִידֵי דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת כְּגוֹן שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ בְּעִבּוּר שָׁנָה אִם מְעַבְּרִים עַד הַפּוּרִים אוֹ בְּכָל אֲדָר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁזֶּה מֵבִיא לִידֵי חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּדִין מִדִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אוֹ בְּמִנְיַן הַדַּיָּנִין שֶׁדָּנִין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. שֶׁהֲרֵי לִדְבָרָיו שֶׁל זֶה שֶׁאוֹמֵר שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּב לָזֶה כָּל שֶׁנָּטַל מִמֶּנּוּ כְּדִין נָטַל וְעַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין נָטַל. וְלִדְבָרָיו שֶׁל זֶה שֶׁאוֹמֵר פָּטוּר אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר שֶׁאֵין אֵלּוּ רְאוּיִין לָדוּן כָּל שֶׁנָּטַל גֵּזֶל הוּא בְּיָדוֹ וְאִם קִדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וּלְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר שֶׁלֹּא נָטַל הַבָּא עָלֶיהָ בְּמֵזִיד עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת בְּשׁוֹגֵג חַיָּב חַטָּאת וְנִמְצָא הַדָּבָר מֵבִיא לִידֵי דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּדִינֵי מַכּוֹת אִם זֶה חַיָּב מַלְקוֹת אוֹ אֵינוֹ אוֹ שֶׁחָלַק בְּמִנְיַן הַדַּיָּנִים שֶׁלּוֹקִין בִּפְנֵיהֶם הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה חוֹבְלִין הֵם בּוֹ וְחַיָּבִין לְשַׁלֵּם וְכָל שֶׁיִּטּל מֵהֶן כְּדִין נוֹטֵל. וּלְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר בֶּן מַלְקוֹת הוּא כָּל שֶׁיִּטּל מֵהֶן גֵּזֶל הוּא בְּיָדוֹ וְאִם קִדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בַּעֲרָכִין אוֹ בַּחֲרָמִין אִם זֶה חַיָּב לִתֵּן אוֹ אֵינוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לִתֵּן אִם לָקְחוּ מִמֶּנּוּ הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּזֶל וְהַמְקַדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם חָלַק עֲלֵיהֶן בְּפִדְיוֹן קָדָשִׁים אִם נִפְדּוּ אוֹ לֹא נִפְדּוּ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵין זֶה פִּדְיוֹן אִם קִדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בַּעֲרִיפַת הָעֶגְלָה אִם אֵלּוּ חַיָּבִין לְהָבִיא אוֹ לֹא הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר חַיָּבִים לְהָבִיא הֲרֵי הִיא אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה וְהַמְקַדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּעָרְלָה. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה אִם זֶה לַעֲנִיִּים אוֹ לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּזֶל בְּיַד הֶעָנִי וְאִם קִדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם חָלַק עֲלֵיהֶן בְּאָב מֵאֲבוֹת הַטֻּמְאָה כְּגוֹן נִגְעֵי בָּשָׂר אוֹ נִגְעֵי בָּתִּים אוֹ נִגְעֵי בְּגָדִים הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר טָהוֹר מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ לֶאֱכל קָדָשִׁים וּלְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר טָמֵא אִם נִכְנַס אוֹ אָכַל בְּמֵזִיד עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת וּבְשׁוֹגֵג חַיָּב חַטָּאת. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּטָהֳרַת מְצֹרָע אִם יֵשׁ לָזֶה טָהֳרָה אוֹ אֵין לוֹ. וְכֵן אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בְּהַשְׁקָאַת סוֹטָה אִם זוֹ צְרִיכָה לִשְׁתּוֹת אוֹ אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר צְרִיכָה אִם מֵת הַבַּעַל קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּשְׁתֶּה הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה לִיבָמָהּ וּלְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה מִתְיַבֶּמֶת. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה צְרִיכִין לִבְדֹּק וְלַחְקֹר אִם הָיְתָה מַחְלֹקֶת זוֹ מְבִיאָה לִידֵי דָּבָר זֶה וְדָבָר זֶה מֵבִיא לִידֵי דָּבָר שֵׁנִי אֲפִלּוּ אַחַר מֵאָה דְּבָרִים אִם יָבוֹא בַּסּוֹף לְדָבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת. בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה הַזָּקֵן מֵקֵל וְהֵן מַחֲמִירִין בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה הוּא מַחְמִיר וְהֵן מְקִילִין חַיָּב:

3

If the difference of opinion between the rebellious elder and the court will not lead to such a situation, the rebellious elder is not liable for execution unless the difference of opinion concerns tefillin.

What is implied? If the rebellious elder gave a directive to add a fifth compartment to tefillin or he himself made tefillin with five compartment, he is liable. This applies provided he first made four compartments as required by law and then made a fifth compartment and attached it to the outer compartment. For when an outer compartment is not exposed to the open space at all times, it is unacceptable.

The obligation of a rebellious elder in such a matter is a law transmitted by the Oral Tradition. If, however, they differed with regard to other mitzvot, e.g., he disputed one of the laws concerning a lulav, tzitzit, or a shofar, one claiming that it is unacceptable and the other claiming that it is acceptable, one claiming that the person fulfilled his obligation and the other claiming he did not fulfill his obligation, or one says: "He is pure," and the other says: "He is impure two degrees removed," the elder is not liable for execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

ג

וְאִם לֹא תָּבִיא הַמַּחֲלֹקֶת לִידֵי כָּךְ הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. חוּץ מִמִּצְוַת תְּפִלִּין בִּלְבַד. כֵּיצַד. הוֹרָה לְהוֹסִיף טוֹטֶפֶת חֲמִישִׁית בַּתְּפִלִּין וְיַעֲשֶׂנָּה חָמֵשׁ טוֹטָפוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בַּתְּחִלָּה אַרְבָּעָה בָּתִּים כְּהִלְכָתָן וְיָבִיא חֲמִישִׁית וִידַבֵּק בַּחִיצוֹן. שֶׁהַבַּיִת הַחִיצוֹן שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה אֶת הָאֲוִיר תָּמִיד פָּסוּל. וְחִיּוּב זָקֵן מַמְרֵא עַל דָּבָר זֶה הֲלָכָה מִפִּי הַקַּבָּלָה. אֲבָל אִם נֶחְלְקוּ בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת כְּגוֹן שֶׁחָלַק בְּדָבָר מִדִּבְרֵי לוּלָב אוֹ צִיצִית אוֹ שׁוֹפָר זֶה אוֹמֵר פָּסוּל וְזֶה אוֹמֵר כָּשֵׁר. זֶה אוֹמֵר יָצָא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ וְזֶה אוֹמֵר לֹא יָצָא. זֶה אוֹמֵר טָהוֹר וְזֶה אוֹמֵר שֵׁנִי לְטֻמְאָה הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִן הַמִּיתָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה: