Shemita - Chapter 9

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 141) and Se/er HaChinuch (mitzvah 477) includes this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Rambam’s wording implies that the nullification of the debt comes as a result of the person’s action. It is not automatically nullified at the conclusion of the seventh year. For that reason, the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person comes to pay a debt after the conclusion of the seventh year, the creditor must say that he is nullifying the debt (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII, p. 289ff.).

For, according to the Rambam, the debt is not nullified until the conclusion of the Sabbatical year (Halachah 4).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 230) and Se/er HaChinuch (mitzvah 475) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As stated in Chapter. IO, Halachah 9, after the exile of the tribes of Reuven and Gad, the laws of the Jubilee year no longer applied according to Scriptural Law.·

See Chapter 10, Halachot 13, 15, for details regarding this concept.

Gittin 36a.

I.e., according to the Rambam’s interpretation of, the nullification of debts applies in the present era, even in the Diaspora. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:1). In his gloss to that text, the Rama quotes different opinions among the Ashkenazic authorities. Some maintain that the Rabbis did not ordain the observance of this law in the present age. Others maintain that it should be observed as a custom. Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halvaah, subsec. 34, follows the Rambam’s view.

I.e., even according to Rabbinic Law (see Tosafot, Gittin, loc. cit.).

With regard to the Hakhel ceremony. The interrelation of these verses has its source in the Sifri.

According to other authorities, although the debt is not remitted until the end of the Sabbatical year, the creditor is forbidden to demand payment from the beginning of the Sabbatical year. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit. 3.6

Since the people considered the day as a festival, the recipients of the meat could not pay for it in an ordinary manner. Hence they promised to pay for their shares later, considering the money as a debt [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:2)].

When the laws of the annulment of debts would no longer apply. The Rambam is speaking about a situation that could have occurred in the time the new month was sanctified based on the testimony of witnesses (in contrast to the present era, when we follow a fixed calendar). In that era as well, the court had a presupposition of the day when Rosh HaShanah would fall and the people celebrated it as a holiday in anticipation of its sanctification. Nevertheless, the moon was not actually sanctified - and thus the holiday officially declared as such - unless witnesses came. Now it was possible, especially if the night was cloudy, that witnesses did not see the moon and hence could not go to the court to give testimony. Hence the day could not be declared as Rosh HaShanah.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, based on the principle (stated in Halachah 11), that a debt stemming from money owed on account to a grocer is not nullified at the end of the Sabbatical year. Indeed, the source for this law (the Jerusalem Talmud, Sh’vi’it 10:1) states that it follows the opinion that maintains that such an
account is nullified by the Sabbatical year. The Radbaz, however, explains that the situations are not identical. For it is common practice for a grocer to sell on account. A butcher, by contrast, expects immediate payment. A similar distinction is suggested by the Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., once a loan is recorded in a promissory note, in the event the debtor does not pay, the creditor can use the promissory note to collect the debt from the landed property belonging to the debtor at the time of the loan (even if it was subsequently sold to others). Since the property is on lien, one might think that the situation is comparable to a loansupported by security (Halachah 14), which is not nullified by the Sabbatical year. That law, however, does not apply in the present instance, because although the lien applies to the debtor’s property, it is not associated with a specific property.

Since the land has been designated as payment, it is as if the loan has already been paid.

For example, a person claimed that a colleague owed him 100 zuz and the colleague admitted only to owing 50. In such an instance, the colleague is required to take an oath regarding the other 50 zuz. If he fails to take the oath before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, that obligation is nullified.

This is a specific term that, as explained in Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:5-6, refers to oaths administered because of the denial of a specific and definite claim that would create a monetary obligation were the defendant to have admitted to it.

See Hilchot Sh ‘vuot, loc. cit., which explains that these individuals can be compelled to take an oath even though the plaintiff does not have a definite claim against them.

With regard to a watchman, the explanation is that - unlike a loan,- the property being watched is considered as always being in the possession of the owner. Hence, the obligation for it is not nullified by the Sabbatical year (see Radbaz). A partner is considered as a watchman (Bava Batra 42b).

The rationale is that the obligation was not firmly established before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, for until the borrower’s admission of the debt or the substantiation of the claim by witnesses, the creditor cannot press for payment in a court of law. Hence, the end of the year does not lead to the nullification of the debt. See the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh’vi’it 10:1). The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, but it is supported by the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh and quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:7). Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch does add to the Rambam’s wording the concept that the debtor took an oath to support his denial. In his gloss to the Tur, the Darkei Moshe explains that addition, stating that unless the debtor has taken an oath to support his denial, then we are speaking of an ordinary loan and the conclusion of the Sabbatical year nullifies both the loan and the obligation of an oath to support one’s denial, as stated in Halachah.6

For in ten years time, he will demand payment of the debt.

For the loan has not become due. And as long as there is no payment demanded, the debt is not nullified, for the Sabbatical year only nullifies a debt for which payment is called for (the Responsa of Rabbenu Asher, sec. 86).

The Radbaz and Rav Yosef Corcus explain that even though the collector has promised not to demand payment of the debt, since there is a payment date before the end of the Sabbatical year, the borrower is under obligation to pay. Hence, it is as if payment is being demanded from him.

The Radbaz and Rav Y osef Corcus explain that even though the collector has promised not to demand payment of the debt, since there is a payment date before the end of the Sabbatical year, the borrower is under obligation to pay. Hence, it is as if payment is being demanded from him.

This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts. Whenever a person establishes a stipulation that runs contrary to the Torah’s laws, his stipulation is nullified.
For the Torah is not given over to man’s will and no mortal can bend it to fit his whims
(see Makkot 3b; Hilchot /shut 6:9).

The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:14) offers two explanations for what is meant by “establish[ing it] as a debt”: a) setting a time for payment; b) totaling up the account to arrive at a sum.

The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:14) offers two explanations for what is meant by “establish[ing it] as a debt”: a) setting a time for payment; b) totaling up the account to arrive at a sum.

For in such an instance, it is no different than any other debt.

Here also the Kessef Mishneh explains that since it is not common for a worker to demand payment of his wages immediately, until he does so, they are not considered as a debt.

See Deuteronomy 22:28-29, Hilchot Na ‘arah, ch. 1.

See Exodus 22:15-16, Hilchot Na’arah, ch. 1.

See Deuteronomy 22:13-21, Hilchot Na’arah, ch..3

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 10:2), the Rambam explains that debts are obligations which a person accepts upon himself. Hence they can be nullified. These obligations, by contrast, are penalties imposed upon the transgressor by God. Hence, he cannot absolve himself from them unless he makes payment. The Kessef Mishneh questions this explanation, for the Torah also requires a person to satisfy the monetary obligations he takes upon himself. He therefore explains that the intent is that since these penalties are written in the Torah, it is as if the debts were handed over to the court, in which instance, they are not nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 1.5 Rambam LeAm explains the difference between the two on the basis between the distinction between mamon, a financial obligation between men, which a man can release, and k’nas, a penalty required by God from the transgressor that, although paid to the person violated, is not an obligation to him.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:16) defines “establish[ing] as a debt” as calling the defendant to court. Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:31 emphasizes that once the court’s decision is written up, it is considered as if the debt has been handed over to the court.

The money he agrees to pay in the event of a divorce (or which his estate must pay in the event of his death).

Since the obligation need not be paid until the woman demands payment, it is not considered as a debt that could be nullified by the Sabbatical year.

I.e., she admitted that a certain portion of the money owed her had already been paid. See Hilchot Ishut 16:1.4

Kiddushin 9b states: “A creditor acquires the security given him.” Thus when the loan is given in return for security, it is as if he transferred ownership of the security for the loan until it is repaid [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 9:2)]. Thus it is as if there is no outstanding obligation for the Sabbatical year to nullify.

For this amount is not in his possession. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quote other opinions which do not accept this view and maintain that this portion of the debt is not nullified. In his Kessef Mishneh, however, Rav Y osef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam, s position.

Giving them the actual promissory note, not merely assigning it to them (Rav Yosef Corcus, explaining why this is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, while a pruzbol is merely a Rabbinic institution).

The verse continues: “The Sabbatical year is drawing near and you will look negatively at your brother and refrain from giving him.” See Halachah 30 which discusses this charge.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 10:3), the Rambam cites the interpretation of this term in Gittin 37a: “the amendment of a matter.”

As stated in Halachah 2, the nullification of debts in the present era is a Rabbinic injunction. And since it is a Rabbinic institution, Hillel and his court had the power to institute a provision to reduce its application. Were it tohave the power of a Scriptural Law, the Rabbis would not be able to institute such a provision.

The Ra’avad differs with this concept, explaining that it applies even when the Sabbatical Law is observed according to Scriptural Law. The difference between the two authorities reflects a difference between the two Talmudic Sages, Abbaye and Rava, the Rambam follows Abbaye’s understanding and the Ra’avad that of Rava. This, however, is slightly problematic, for Bava Metzia 22b states that, with the exception of six specific instances, whenever there is a difference of opinion between these two Sages, the halachah follows Rava’s understanding.
The Radbaz explains the Rambam’s viewpoint, stating that our Sages’ preference for Rava’s position applies only when these Sages are arguing concerning their own logical conclusions. When, by contrast, they are arguing about the interpretation of another Sages’ position, as in the present instance, the halachah can follow Abaye’s view.

They were the heads of the leading courts in Eretz Yisrael shortly after the beginning of the post-Mishnaic era. Similarly, the court composing a pruzbol must be one of the leading courts in its region and in its era (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

Gittin 36b explains that the institution of a pruzbol depends on the principle hejker beit din, hejker; “When the Jewish court absolves a person’s ownership, the absolution is binding.” As proof of this principle, it cites examples of actions taken by Ezra the Scribe and Joshua. The Rambam understands the Talmud to be saying that even when a financial obligation is Rabbinic in origin, to absolve it, one must have authority comparable to that of Ezra and Joshua. (Significantly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:6 - where the Rambam describes the above principle - and in Hilchot Nachalot 6:12 - where he shows another application of it - he does not state that the courts involved must be made up of judges of unique distinction.)

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 67) does not accept the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that a pruzbol may be composed by any court. The Ramah (loc. cit.:18) states that this leniency can be accepted. Note also the contrast between this law and Halachah 2.7

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 10:4).

The Rambam is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 10:4). Although Rabbenu Nissim interprets this to mean that the Rambam accepts the view (Gittin 33a) that two judges are sufficient to compose a pruzbol, most authorities require that there be at least three judges on a court which officiates over a pruzbol, as indicated by the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:19).

The creditor is not transferring the actual promissory note to the court - in which instance a pruzbol would notbe necessary, as stated in Halachah 1.5 Instead, he is making a formal notification of the matter to the court. See Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:39.

I.e., even after the Sabbatical year passes.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Joe. cit.), the Rambam writes that this wording teaches us that a judge may also serve as a witness. This is not allowed in questions involving Scriptural Law, but in questions involving Rabbinic Law, leniency is granted.

The rationale is that when the borrower possesses land, the creditor's debt is secured, because he may expropriate the land in payment (Radbaz). Even though the land does not appear to be worth the full value of the debt, we follow the principle (see Hilchot Mechirah 13:8) that the land may never be considered overpriced (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 67:41).

Our text follows the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text reads slightly differently. The lender may transfer this property to the borrower without his knowledge, but not against his will [Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:22)].

Even ifhe possesses only a flowerpot with a hole in it. a

Since the borrower is entitled to use the land, he is considered to have sufficient rights to it to enable a pruzbol to be written.

I.e., the man referred to here is the borrower.

Since he is entitled to the benefit from this property, it can be used for a pruzbol.

. I.e., when a guardian took out a loan for the sake of orphans, if the guardian possesses land a pruzbol can be composed because the guardian is considered like a guarantor.

For each one must entrust his debt to the court.

For in the one pruzbol, he entrusts all of his debts to the court.

This halachah, based on Sh’vi’it 10:5, was the subject of much review and rethinking within the Rambam’s own mind. He rewrote his commentary to this mishnah four times, each time, changing his thinking somewhat.
At first, he wrote that only a pruzbol written before a loan prevents it from being nullified. Once a loan has already been given, the laws of the Sabbatical year apply to it, and a pruzbol cannot nullify it. It was not until his second revision of his c~mmentary that he changed it, amending it to read like his conclusion in the text above.

Since that is the date on the pruzbol, its legal power takes effect from that date even though it was written later and it could have included the loans that were given until die date when it was actually composed.

For it is nullified by the Sabbatical year.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:7), the Rambam explains that the lender’s word is accepted based on the principle that a person will not in when he could achieve the same result in a permitted manner (Gittin 37b). Since he could easily preserve the debt by composing a pruzbol, we assume that he did so rather than transgress the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 2.6

I.e., in the Talmudic era, the Romans passed many decrees with the intent of stamping out the observance of the mitzvot. One of them was a prohibition to make a Prozbul (for by doing so, they would undermine the observance of the Sabbatical year). Failure to observe these decrees led to very severe punishment. In fear, many people would compose a Prozbul so that they could collect their debts, but destroy it lest it cause them danger (Kessef Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh explains that even though the danger passed, the Rabbis never rescinded the leniency granted to allow for a uniformity in Jewish practice.

Gittin, loc. cit. explains that this is like “opening the mouth of the dumb,” i.e., offering support to a litigant to enable him to collect what is due him.

Below the age of majority [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:28)].

The Radbaz cites (Gittin 37a) which states that the Jewish court is considered as “the father of the orphans” and we assume that they do not want to impose Rabbinic decrees in a situation that will harm the orphan’s interests. This applies both to loans that they themselves made or that their father made and which are due to his estate (Se/er Meirat Einayim 67:50).

And thus the loan would be nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 2.2

Based on the principle of migo, i.e., had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie. This argument is reinforced by the accepted presumption mentioned previously: that if a person has a permitted way to perform a function, he will not use a forbidden path, i.e., he would make the loan with a valid Prozbul, rather than rely on an invalid one.
Generally, a migo is an accepted argument in its own right. Nevertheless, in this instance, the migo must be reinforced by the assumption, for migo is usually employed as an argument in defense of one’s position and not to expropriate money and here the plaintiff is seeking to employ it to expropriate money (Biurei HaGra 67:58).

See Halachah 11.

To lie,. i.e., here too, we are relying on the principle of migo, as reinforced by the assumption the Rambam proceeds to mention.

Lending with a Prozbul.

Lending without a pruzbol.

The Rambam’s wording implies that both the lender and the borrower must be Torah scholars. His ruling is quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:20). The Rama, however, rules that not only Torah Sages, but even ordinary individuals can benefit from this leniency. · This leniency is part of the rationale for the observance of the concept of pruzbol by tbe Ashkenazic community. Since all that is necessary to preserve a loan is a verbal statement made in the presence of three knowledgeable people, it is proper for everyone to do ~o (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva ‘ah:35).

The Ra’avad (as understood by the Kessef Mishneh) objects to the Rambam’s ruling for, as stated in Halachah 1 7, the Rambam maintains that a pruzbol must be composed by a prominent court, while here, he seems to imply that any few students are acceptable. The Kessef Mishneh resolves the apparent contradiction by saying that the students the Rambam refers to here are in fact distinguished judges, and there is no difference in practice between the subjects of the two halachot. Rav Yosef Corcus (in his gloss to Halachah 17) states that as long as the prominent court approves of such an act, the actual pruzbol may be made in the presence of lesser scholars.

As stated in Halachah 18

And thus, according to law, the debt is nullified and need not be repaid. This halachah is speaking about an instance where a pruzbol was not composed.

I.e., they approve of this step and consider it pious behavior. The Sages thought it desirable for a debt to be returned, for in this way, people will continue lending each other money in the future.

For according to law, he can no longer collect the debt.

And thus, by accepting it, he is not violating the Torah’s commandment to nullify the debt. Indeed, he has fulfilled the commandment to release the debt, for Deuteronomy 15:2 introduces this commandment with the phrase: “This is the matter (d’var) of remission.” D ‘var, translated as “matter,” also relates to the word dibbur meaning “speech,” implying that it is sufficient to make a statement of remission to fulfill the mitzvah [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 10:8)].

For the debt has been absolved.

Because it would resemble accepting payment, for a debt.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 23 i) and Sefer HaChinudh (mitzvah 480)

Zevachim I 06a; Sifri to the above verse. The fact that this commandment employs two such terms indicates that it is a severe prohibition.

As opposed to many other mitzvot for which reward is granted only in the World-to-Come. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe’ah 1:1) for a discussion of this matter.