Mamrim - Chapter 4

Sanhedrin 87a derives this concept through accepted techniques of Biblical exegesis. There are two different opinions concerning the extent of the difference of opinion between the elder and the court in that Talmudic passage. In this and the following halachah, the Rambam follows one opinion (that of Rabbi Meir) and Halachah 3, his rulings relate to the other one (that of Rabbi Yehudah). See the notes to that halachah.

This underscores that the reason he is executed is that he is undermining the authority of the court, not because he is causing others to commit a serious transgression.

Our translation differs slightly from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah and is based on authoritative manuscripts.

But they maintain that the tradition is different than that maintained by the rebellious elder.

The Rambam’s position is not accepted by all authorities. The Ramban, in his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 1, states that a sage is never considered a rebellious elder because of a difference of opinion with regard to a question of Rabbinic Law. For there is no point of Rabbinic Law whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. Kerait and sin offerings are relevant only when speaking about Scriptural prohibitions.
The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that since the prohibition against chametz itself is punishable by kerait or a sin offering, the Rabbinic safeguards against this prohibition also are included in this category. The Kessef Mishneh explains that these Rabbinic safeguards could lead to a situation whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. If a man consecrates a woman with chametz in the fifth hour of the day on the fourteenth of Nissan, according to our Sages, the woman would be consecrated, while according to the rebellious elder, she will not be. Relations with this woman is a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

As stated in Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:8-9, the Torah prohibits partaking of chametz from midday of the fourteenth of Nissan onward. As a safeguard for that prohibition our Sages decreed that it is forbidden to partake of chametz from the beginning of the fifth hour of that day and it is forbidden to benefit from it from the beginning of the sixth hour of that day. If the rebellious elder issues directives that conflict with this decree, he is liable.

As an example of such a difference of opinion, Sanhedrin 87b speaks of a person who has relations with a daughter born from a woman whom he raped. Since the prohibition against relations with a daughter is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah (- it is instead, inferred from the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter’s daughter), there is room for a rebellious elder to argue that such relations are not punishable by kerait.
Similarly, in all the cases that follow, Sanhedrin, loc. cit., gives examples of the types of differences of opinion that could arise. We will not explain all these hypothethical situations. A reader who is interested in those details should consult that source.

A condition involving vaginal bleeding at times other than a woman's menstrual period. Such bleeding renders the woman ritually impure.

In these three instances, if the woman is impure, relations with her involve a transgression whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

The latter view represents the halachah.

For the month the majority of Sages consider as the second Adar will be Nisan, according to the rebellious elder. And the month the Sages consider as Nisan will be Iyar for him. Thus he will - or instruct others to - partake of chametz on Pesach. Hence, the difference of opinion ultimately leads to a transgression whose willful violation is punishable by kerait.

Since the object used to consecrate her did not belong to her prospective husband, the consecration is not valid. For the stolen article must be returned and thus she never received anything for consecration.

While, according to the other opinion, the consecration is valid and relations with her involve a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

E. g., they differed about the endowment obligation of a child less than a month old, must the child’s worth be given or not? See Sanhedrin 88a.

E. g., they differed if interdicted property (cherem, see Leviticus, ch. 27, Hilchot Arachin V’Charamin, ch. 6) whose objective was not specified should be given to the Temple treasury or to the priests. According to the opinion that it should be given to the priests, it is his private property and can be used to consecrate a woman, while according to the other view, if it is used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

I.e., their difference of opinion concerned whether the evaluation of the consecrated article’s worth was carried out according to required principles and the redemption is valid, or whether those requirements where not met, and hence the redemption was invalid (Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).

A calf whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder (see Deuteronomy, ch. 21).

The fruits produced by a tree in the first three years after it was planted. It is forbidden to benefit from these fruits. Hence according to the opinion that they are forbidden, if they are used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Produce which falls from the reapers’ hands that must be left for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22).

Produce forgotten by the reapers which must be left for the poor (see Deuteronomy 24:19).

The corners of the field which must be left for the poor (see Leviticus, loc. cit.).

The Rambam is referring to blemishes caused by tzara’at, a spiritual affliction resembling leprosy. See Leviticus, chs. 12-13. These blemishes render a person ritually impure.

As related in Leviticus, ch. 14, tzara’at can also affect a building. In such an instance, anyone who enters the building becomes ritually impure.

Similarly, as stated in Leviticus, ch. 13, tzara’at can also affect a garment which in turn can convey ritual impurity upon a person.

For the same question, can that person enter the Temple and partake of consecrated foods, applies.

When a husband suspects his wife of committing adultery, he may warn her not to enter into privacy with a given man. If she violates this warning, she is given special water to drink. See Numbers, ch. 5.

The brother of her husband who must marry her if her husband died childless. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements, noting that although a sotah is forbidden to her yevam, that prohibition is not punishable by kerait, merely by lashes. (See Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 6:19 which bears out that statement.) The Kessef Mishneh does not offer a resolution to the matter. Note the Merkevat HaMishneh who does, suggesting a situation that depends on an understanding of the intricacies of the laws regarding yibbum.

For as mentioned, our worry is not that he is releasing a stringent prohibition, but that his directives will spur controversy among the Jewish people and prevent there being a unified halachic consensus (Radbaz).

As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 1, there are two different opinions in Sanhedrin 87a with regard to when a rebellious elder becomes liable. In Halachot 1 and 2, the Rambam followed one opinion (that of Rabbi Meir). Here his rulings relate to the other one (that of Rabbi Yehudah).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that the different opinions are conflicting and cannot be reconciled with each other. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s position.

Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Ushia explains Rabbi Yehudah’s perspective as follows: “He is not liable unless [the difference of opinion] concerns a matter that comes fundamentally from Scripture, but whose interpretation is Rabbinic. It must be able to add to our Sages’ [interpretation of how to observe the mitzvah], and that addition must degrade [and disqualify the mitzvah].”
If at the outset, the person made five compartments, he is not making an addition that degrades; he is not fulfilling the mitzvah in the proper way from the outset. In this instance, however, the four compartments make the tefillin acceptable. By adding the fifth compartment in the manner described by the Rambam, he disqualifies one of the first four, thus making the tefillin unacceptable.

For unlike tefillin, with regard to these mitzvot, they are either acceptable or unacceptable from the outset, there is no concept of it being acceptable and then being disqualified. For to add a new strand tzitzit or a new species to the four for the lulav, one would have to undo the existing bond. And the new bond would not be acceptable from the outset (Ra’avad).
The Radbaz emphasizes that although the elder is not judged as rebellious for issuing such rulings with regard to tzitzit and a lulav, if one adds a strand or another species, one does violate the prohibition against adding to the Torah’s commandments.

I.e., he came in contact with an article or a person that came in contact with a source of ritual impurity. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 3:15, if a person enters the Temple after coming into such contact, he is not liable for kerait.

He should, however, be punished in other ways, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.