Shoftim: Where Past and Future Meet

Devarim 19:8-9.

Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 8:4.

Hilchos Melachim 11:2.

Yeshayahu 2:4.

Devarim 19:6.

Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 12:5.

Devarim 19:1ff.

Devarim 19:2; 19:7 uses the words, “You shall separate three cities.” Similarly, Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeiach 8:1, states, “There is a positive commandment to set aside cities of refuge, as it is written, ‘You shall separate three cities.’ ” Also, when listing the mitzvos at the beginning Hilchos Rotzeiach (mitzvah 9), Rambam defines the mitzvah as “to set aside cities of refuge and to prepare* roads to them.” That wording implies that “prepar[ing] roads to them” is also part of the mitzvah. In Sefer HaMitzvos (positive mitzvah 182), Rambam describes the mitzvah as “to prepare** six cities of refuge… and to set up a road to them.” As a prooftext, he cites the verse (Devarim 19:3), “prepare a road for you.” And in the listing of the mitzvos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, Rambam describes the mitzvah as “to prepare six cities of refuge, as it is written ‘prepare a road for you and you shall divide your land in three.” This is not the place for further discussion of the different phraseology used.

* When listing the mitzvos in the order of halachos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, Rambam also mentions “preparing a road for it.” See the Jerusalem, 5724, edition of Sefer HaMada which mentions different versions of the text, one using the term ולכויןas in the main text here, and one using the term ולכונן .

** Both the Heller and Kappach editions of Sefer HaMitzvos use the term “to separate.” Similar wording is found in Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 520.

Devarim 19:3.

Ibid., 19:8-9.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Makkos 2:6. See Tosefta, Makkos, the end of ch. 2.

Rashi, Devarim 19:8.

Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 8:4.

See Zayis Raanan (compiled by the author of Magen Avraham) on Yalkut Shimoni on these verses. He concludes, “Peruse the AriZal’s kavanos.” See Likkutei Torah and Sefer HaLikkutim of the AriZal, Shaar HaMitzvos on this verse in our Torah reading, Sifsei Kohen al HaTorah on this verse; Shelah, the end of Beis David (p. 24a ff.); Maskil LeDavid on Rashi’s commentary concerning this verse; et al.

The literal translation of the word rotzchim in the main text is “murderers.” This Hebrew word is used in the AriZal’s Likkutei Torah, Sefer HaLikutim, and Shaar HaMitzvos, loc. cit., “that there should not be rotzchim,” and “then there will be many rotzchim.” On the surface, the term rotzchim is appropriate for someone who intentionally slays a person.* [This is also relevant in the present instance because a person who slays intentionally must also first flee to a city of refuge (Makkos 10b; Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 5:7).] However, our Torah reading (Devarim 19:4, 6)** also uses that term, rotzei’ach, regarding a person who slays accidentally. Similarly, that term is used in Bamidbar 35:11, 25ff. with that intent. The same is true regarding the Midrashim of our Sages and Rambam in several sources (see Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 5:2,9, et al.). This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.

*Note Rashbam, Shmos 20:13, who says that the term rotzei’ach refers to “intentional murder.” This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.

** The wording in Devarim 19:3, “any rotzei’ach,” could be interpreted – albeit in a somewhat forced manner – as referring even to someone who slays intentionally since, as mentioned above, even such a person must first flee to such a city. Nevertheless, the verses that follow in this passage, (ibid., 19:11) do not support that interpretation. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.

Yeshayahu 2:4.

This is the wording in Likkutei Torah, Sefer HaLikutim, and Shaar HaMitzvos, loc. cit. Similar phrasing is used in Zayis Raanan, loc. cit. See footnote 17.

Makkos 10b; Rashi, Shmos 21:13. See Rashi, Bereishis 9:5.

Shmos, loc. cit.

See the AriZal’s Likkutei Torah, Parshas Vayikra, and his Taamei HaMitzvos on the verse (Vayikra 2:13), “Offer salt on all your sacrifices”; Tanya, Iggeres HaKodesh, the end of Epistle 28. These sources explain that a person sins accidentally because of hidden evil within his soul that seeks to be rectified and, therefore, it is expressed through the accidental sin. In this way, he is given the opportunity to rectify that inner evil.

I.e., the fact that the person killed another person accidentally showed that he had a connection to killing within his soul.

This is the entire purpose of a sin offering, as Rashi states Sh’vuos 2a, s.v. toleh, and Rashi, Bereishis 9:5. There is a well-known discussion regarding whether a person who accidentally transgresses a Rabbinic prohibition requires atonement. See Nesivos HaMishpat 234:3; Toras Chesed, Orach Chayim, responsum 31; Asvin D’Oraisa, K’llal 10; Minchas Elazar (Mun­katch), Vol. 3, responsum 12 (and the note in the indices there). On the surface, the reason offered by the AriZal, loc. cit., applies also regarding Rabbinic decrees.

This point is reflected in the question raised by Shelah, loc. cit., “Certainly, no evil will occur because [all] evil will have been eliminated from the world and, most definitely, there will be nothing but good.”

When raising the question in Shaar HaMitzvos, loc. cit., in addition to citing the verse, “Nation will not lift up sword against nation,” the AriZal also cites the verses, “They shall do no evil, nor will they cause destruction…” (Yeshayahu 11:9), and “Death will be swallowed up forever” (ibid., 25:8). On this basis, he asks, “If so, how and why were we commanded to add three [other] cities of refuge in the Ultimate Future? [The implication being] that [the cities will have to be added then, because] there will be more people who kill.”

On the surface, it would appear that the question applies also regarding one who kills accidentally and regarding the possibility of death itself. However, in the resolution the AriZal states:

But not one who kills intentionally, [that will not occur in that era,] because then “nation will not lift up sword against nation,” but there will be accidental slayings and, as such, there will be many who slay unintentionally…. However, know that “innocent blood will not be shed” (cf. Devarim 19:10), i.e., meaning that there will not be intentional [slayings,] only accidental ones, as mentioned, for it is written (Zechariah 13:2), “I will cause the spirit of impurity to pass from the land.”

Similar – albeit briefer – explanations are found in Likkutei Torah and in Sefer HaLikkutim, loc. cit.

However, in Shelah, loc. cit., it appears that the question also applies regarding one who slays accidentally (as indicated in footnote 16). On the bottom of the page cited, Shelah raises a question regarding the existence of the impurity associated with a human corpse, as reflected in the command in Yechezkeil 44:25, that even in the Ultimate Future, a kohen should become impure upon the death of his parents. Shelah asks, how is that possible since, in that era, “Death will be swallowed up forever.” We have to say that the AriZal’s words must also be interpreted in this manner, for in his resolution, he discusses whether the end of exile will be “at its time” or “it will be hastened” (see Sanhedrin 98a, interpreting Yeshayahu 60:22). It is specifically if the redemption will be hastened – and thus, evil will not have been entirely refined and banished – that there will be a possibility for a person killing another accidentally.

See Sefer HaMaamarim 5565, the bottom of p. 799, where the Alter Rebbe cites the question in the AriZal’s Likkutei Torah, stating, “How is it possible that they will need cities of refuge for accidental slayers in the Ultimate Future?”

Perhaps the intent in the AriZal’s teachings should not be understood as referring to accidental slaying in a literal sense, but rather to the spiritual equivalent of the idea, as understood according to Kabbalah. See the statements in those sources regarding the correction of the seed of Hevel. However, this interpretation is forced. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter. See also the maamar entitled Inyan Kayin VeHevel, Toras Chayim, Shmos, and also Or HaTorah, Ba­midbar, Vol. 4, p. 1415.

The second resolution offered by Zayis Raanan, loc. cit.

Mitzvah 520.

Devarim 19:10. It is very difficult to say that this command refers only to the verses that do not immediately precede it, i.e., that it is referring to the command to establish cities of refuge before the Era of Mashiach.

Shelah, loc. cit. Perhaps this is also the intent of the first resolution offered by Zayis Raanan, loc. cit., “It could be said that this [commandment] refers to the Era of Mashiach,” i.e., and not the Era of the Resurrection. See Sifsei Kohen al HaTorah and Maskil LeDavid on our passage.

Berachos 34b, and the sources mentioned there.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 15, p. 417ff., and the sources mentioned there. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 27, p. 191ff. (translated in Selections from Likkutei Sichos, Vayikra, p. 459ff.), where the Rebbe elaborates on these concepts.

Shelah, loc. cit.

Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah, the end of ch. 9, Hilchos Melachim 12:2.

Ibid., the beginning of ch. 12.

Note Raavad’s objections there.

Sifsei Kohen al HaTorah comments on this passage: “Even though [Rambam] follows his established line of thought, as he wrote…, ‘the world will continue according to its pattern,’ it is nevertheless extremely difficult to conceive that there will be murderers in that era.”

His conception requires analysis, since the primary* purpose of cities of refuge is for the sake of those who slay accidentally. Why is it hard to conceive that there will be those who slay accidentally when the world continues according to its natural pattern?

* True, intentional murderers must also flee to cities of refuge initially. However, the primary reason for the establishment of these cities is for the sake of those who slay accidentally.

Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 11:1.

Ibid. 11:2.

The standard editions of the Mishneh Torah begin this quote with the word אם . However, the first printing begins ואם , as is the wording of the verse. In several of the manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, the word כיis used to introduce the prooftext rather than אם .

Regarding the straightforward explanation of the reason why this support is mentioned in a separate halachah, see Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 18, p. 280 (translated in Selections from Likkutei Sichos, Bamidbar, p. 363ff.) and Vol. 34, p. 114ff. (translated in Dvar Malchus, p. 48ff.).

Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 11:3.

The standard printed edition of the Mishneh Torah begins this halachah ואל, employing a vav that could be understood as connecting this halachah to the statements made previously. Some of the manuscripts, however, begin אל , without that letter.

See what Rambam writes in his treatise regarding the Resurrection of the Dead, the beginning of ch. 6, explaining why the Resurrection of the Dead is not a contradiction to the concept that Mashiach will not change the ongoing pattern of existence. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 18, p. 280ff.

This is also evident from Rambam’s wording at the beginning of ch. 12, where he states, “One should not entertain the notion that any element of the natural order will be nullified in the Era of Mashiach.” From this source as well, we see that even after we learned about the addition of cities of refuge in the Ultimate Future and that the criteria for identifying Mashiach is not his performance of wonders or bringing about a new phenomenon in the world, it is possible to suppose that the natural order of the world will be nullified in the Era of Mashiach.

See the main text.

In this footnote, the Rebbe is explaining that even though Mashiach need not prove his identity through working miracles, it is possible to think that his era would be characterized by miracles.

Accordingly, it was necessary for Rambam to add a further halachah (12:1), teaching that the natural order will continue to prevail in that future era.

See Alshich, Devarim 19:8.

The above is particularly true according to the opinions that the lands of these three nations are Edom, Amon, and Moav (see Encyclopedia Talmudis, erech Eretz Yisrael, p. 205, and the sources mentioned there). Even before Mashiach’s coming, there will have been Jews living in these lands.

The statements in the main text can be interpreted as applying even according to the opinion cited by Ritva (Makkos 11b) that for all the laws of a city of refuge to apply “it is necessary that there be a Kohen Gadol who brings about atonement at the time [the person accidentally] killed [another]” and if there was no Kohen Gadol at that time, the killer may never leave the city of refuge. It could be said that this concept only applies when there is a possibility of there being a Kohen Gadol. However, in the case at hand, when there is no Beis HaMikdash, the presence of a Kohen Gadol is not an absolute requirement.

Moreover, according to most opinions, the need for there to be a Kohen Gadol is only at the time the killer is sentenced (Mishnah, Makkos, loc. cit.) and there will be a Kohen Gadol when a person who accidentally killed in the present era will be sentenced in the Ultimate Future.

Note Zevachim 3a which states that “[An improper intent] that is not of the same type does not ruin [an offering].”

Shabbos 12b.

See Yoma 80a, Rashi’s commentary there, and Encyclopedia Talmudis, the end of erech chataas (p. 503), which discuss the obligation to bring sacrifices when the Beis HaMikdash will be rebuilt as atonement for sins committed before that era.

Even if – as explained (see Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 18, p. 416, and as noted in the elaborate explanations in sichas 6 Tishrei, 5741) – it could be said that there is no obligation incumbent on every individual to bring a sacrifice for sins committed during exile and the complete atonement is achieved through teshuvah in the present era, it would have to be said that the obligation pertaining to exile differs from that of a sacrifice, because exile is not only for the sake of atonement but also serves as a punishment.

True, there is a further distinction between a sin offering and the obligation of exile. The sin offering is an obligation and a mitzvah incumbent upon an individual. By contrast, the mitzvah to exile a person who killed another accidentally is incumbent upon the Jewish court, as Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 5:1 writes – (see also Sefer HaMitzvos and the listing of mitzvos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, positive commandment 225) – “It is a mitzvah to exile him.” As such, it could be said that the killer is under no personal obligation to exile himself. Nevertheless, “the positive commandment [to establish cities of refuge] also includes the killer, as it is written (Bamidbar 35:28) regarding the killer, ‘He shall dwell in his city of refuge until the death of the Kohen Gadol’ ” (Sefer HaChinuch, beginning of mitzvah 410).

Even though the statements in Sefer HaChinuch apply only after the sentencing by the court, even initially, there is an obligation on the killer to flee to the city of refuge because of self-defense, as will be stated later in the main text. See footnote 48 below.

Rashi , Devarim 19:6.

Devarim, loc. cit.

Note Maharsha’s Chiddushei Aggados, Makkos 10b, where it is explained that the fundamental obligation of exile is to flee from the avenger of the blood so that he will not slay the killer. When there is no concern that this will occur, there is no obligation for the killer to be exiled. However, many authorities have questioned his words because it is evident from several sources that even when there is no avenger of the blood, one who killed accidentally must be exiled. See Sifri on Devarim 19:5-6, et al.

See Sifri D’vei Rav on Sifri, loc. cit.

See the extensive explanation of Rav Yehudah Yerucham Fishel Perlow in his notes on Rav Saadia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvos, Vol. 3, parshah 17, that the mitzvah to avenge the blood of a slain relative is the personal responsibility of the avenger. He is not acting as an agent of the Jewish court.

One could say that the laws applying to exile and the avenger of the blood do not apply in the present age,* not only because there is an external factor preventing them from being fulfilled,** but because they are fundamentally no longer in effect.*** In other words, it is not only because, in practice, there are no longer any cities of refuge and the Sanhedrin which deals with cases of capital punishment is no longer in session that these laws do not apply; these laws are only relevant when these factors exist. Consequently, because these factors are lacking, the laws are fundamentally not in effect.

Even if we would accept this notion, since the obligation for the sin of slaying of a Jew results “from the consequences [of the act,] which are of a continuous nature,” “the sin is ongoing forever” (Tzafnas Panei’ach, Makkos 5b, s.v. u’kis’vurin). Thus, in the Ultimate Future, when these laws will again take effect, it will be as if the sin was committed then and, consequently, the obligation of exile and the mitzvah to serve as an avenger of the blood will apply.

* See, however, Tzafnas Panei’ach (Warsaw ed.), the end of responsum 215, which states, “Note Sifri, Parshas Maasei, where it is explained that the mitzvah of cities of refuge applies also in the present era. Consult that source. [This applies] even though there is no longer [a Beis Ha]Mikdash, nor an altar, nor a Sanhedrin.” Similar statements are made in Tzafnas Panei’ach, Makkos 7a, s.v. mina hani mili, quoted in Tzafnas Panei’ach al HaTorah, Bamidbar 35:29. See also Ketzos HaChoshen, sec. 2.

** The phrase, “an external factor preventing them from being fulfilled,” is being used to translate the Aramaic phrase, aryeh hu d’ravei alehah, which literally means, “a lion is crouching over it.” See Eruvin 78b, Sh’vuos 22b.

*** See Encyclopedia Talmudis, the end of erech galus and erech go’al hadam, and the sources cited there. See the wording used by the Rishonim cited there. See Rama, the beginning of Choshen Mishpat, sec. 425.

Makkos 2:7 (11b-12a). See the categorization of an avenger of the blood and the concepts explained further in the main text of the Encyclopedia Talmudis, loc. cit., and the sources mentioned there.

Our Sages (Eruvin 51a) explain that the cities of refuge provided sanctuary for a person even when he was outside their perimeters, as indicated by the association of the verses (Bamidbar 35:27), “The avenger of the blood will find him outside the border of his city of refuge,” and “you shall measure from outside the city 2,000 cubits” (ibid., 35:5). Just as the term “outside” in the latter verse means 2,000 cubits, so too the term, “outside” in the former verse means 2,000 cubits. These are considered the “limits” of the city.

See Tosafos, Yoma 87b, s.v. ve’haomer; Yad Malachi, K’llal Shnei HaTalmudim, sec. 10; et al.

Note the approach of Meiri (Makkos 11b) who states that the difference in opinion between Rabbi Yossi HaG’lili and Rabbi Akiva whether it is a mitzvah for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer or merely that he was given license to do so applies not when the killer departs the city of refuge later, but also from the outset, i.e., before he even enters the city of refuge.

See Tzafnas Panei’ach, mahadura tinyana, pp. 16a-b, 32d (included in K’llalei HaTorah VehaMitzvos, Vol. 2, erech arei miklat).

See Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 410.

See Sifri d’vei Rav on Sifri, loc. cit., which states that according to the opinion in the Talmud that it is a mitzvah for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer, that categorization applies even at the outset, as stated in the Sifri, loc. cit. However, in conclusion, that text states that the matter requires analysis.

In his explanations of Rav Saadia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvos, negative commandment 274, Rav Yehudah Yerucham Fishel Perlow writes that the meaning of the Sifri is that the mitzvah is for the avenger of the blood to pursue the killer only so that he flees to a city of refuge, but not to kill him. Consult that source. However, from Sifri d’vei Rav, it appears that the intent of the Sifri is that the mitzvah is for the avenger of the blood to pursue him in order to actually kill him.

Note Tzafnas Panei’ach, Makkos 12a, s.v. rotzei’ach sheyatza, which states that if the killer had not gone into exile, all authorities agree that the avenger of the blood is exempt from punishment if he kills him. Based on the statements in the main text, it could be said that when a killer does not flee to a city of refuge, he does not have the protection the Torah provides for him from the avenger of the blood.

“Is restrained” is a translation of the Aramaic phrase, “a lion was crouching over it.” See the second marginal note in footnote 48.

However, it could be said that, the mitzvah to avenge the death applies specifically after the killer was sentenced by the court to be exiled and, thus, he is obligated to undergo the pain of exile which is almost equivalent to the pain of death (Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 410).

Thus, when the killer leaves the city of refuge, it is a mitzvah for the avenger of the blood to carry out this obligation.

Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 5:10.

Ibid., Hilchos Melachim 12:5.

Devarim 19:6.

See Makkos 2b, Tosafos, Makkos 11b, s.v. midei, et al. See the responsa of Tzafnas Panei’ach, loc. cit., and Tzafnas Panei’ach, Makkos 10a, s.v. halolu, and the sources mentioned there.

For there is no source that would lead to the new concept that the cities of refuge are intended to protect – and bring atonement to – only a person in that region who accidentally killed another person.

As is the case regarding a yefas toar, an attractive female captive, with whom the Torah permits a Jewish soldier to be intimate during the time of war (see Kiddushin, the end of 21b; Rashi, Devarim 21:11).

This is evident from the fact that all authorities agree that when a person kills another intentionally, “it is a mitzvah for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer” (Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 1:2). “If [the slain person] does not have a [close relative to serve as the] avenger of the blood, the court establishes an avenger of the blood for him” (Sanhedrin 45b; see Rambam and Kessef Mishneh, loc. cit.). See also Ramban’s Hosafos to Sefer HaMitzvos, positive commandment 13, et al.

See Tzafnas Panei’ach, the beginning of Makkos 10b.

True, the license for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer applies only when the latter has left the limits of the city of refuge (as stated in Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach 5:10). By contrast, before that, i.e., before the killer reached the city of refuge, the avenger of the blood is merely exempt from punishment if he kills him (Rambam, loc. cit., 5:9).

Nevertheless, it could be said that the intent is not that the license for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer begins only when the killer leaves the city of refuge and does not apply before he arrives there. Instead, it began immediately after the killing. However, before the killer enters and then departs from the city of refuge, the avenger of the blood is prevented from killing him because of external forces, as explained in the end of sec. 5 in the main text, according to the opinion that it is a mitzvah for the avenger of the blood to slay the killer.

Rambam , loc. cit., 2:2, with regard to the avenger of the blood when a person slays intentionally.

This resembles the distinction that applies, according to the Torah, to the manner that the laws of mourning must be observed based on the degree of family closeness. (In other words, just as the Torah mandates feeling the pain of mourning based on family closeness, so too, it mandates feelings of wrath and a desire to avenge the blood in such circumstances.)

This is somewhat similar to the law that when a person commits certain sins, “the zealous strike him” (Sanhedrin 82a). According to some opinions, this means that a zealous person is granted license to kill, but is not obligated to do so (Rabbeinu Asher and Yad Ramah on Sanhedrin, loc. cit. See also Rama, Choshen Mishpat 425:4).

Similarly, Mishneh LeMelech (at the end of Rambam, Hilchos Rotzei’ach, ch. 1) equates an avenger of the blood with a “zealous” person.

It can be said that the imperative incumbent upon the avenger of the blood is greater, as reflected by the law that if a zealous person would approach a court, asking what to do, the court would not instruct him to take action (Sanhedrin, loc. cit.). By contrast, an avenger of the blood would be given a charge by the court to slay the killer if he would request it (Sheyorei Korban, Talmud Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin, the end of ch. 9).

Bamidbar 35:27, 32-33.

Devarim 19:10. See Moed Kattan 5a.

See Tifferes Yisrael on the Mishnah, Makkos 2:7, which explains the opinion that the avenger of the blood is merely given license to slay the killer, but there is no mitzvah for him to do so as follows: “It is a minor mitzvah. In relation to commands that are actual mitzvos, [this and] all similar matters are considered as [merely] licensed.”

As mentioned above in sec. 1, Makkos 10b explains that one who was killed accidentally met that fate because he killed another person intentionally, without the murder being observed by witnesses. According to that teaching, it must be said that (even according to Rambam) the possibility that a person will be killed accidentally in the Ultimate Future is because he killed intentionally in the present era (see Alshich, loc. cit.).

Makkos 10a. See Or HaTorah, Bamidbar, Vol. 4, p. 1414ff.

Shmos 21:13. The AriZal’s Likkutei Torah and Shaar HaP’sukim, Parshas Mishpatim; Pri Etz Chayim, shaar Rosh HaShanah, ch. 1.

Shaar HaP’sukim, loc. cit. See similar statements in Likkutei Torah and Pri Etz Chayim, loc. cit.

Rashi, Shir HaShirim 1:2. See the Mitteler Rebbe’s maamar entitled Al Tatzar es Moav.

Or HaTorah, loc. cit., p. 1415.