Re'eh: In Addition to Reward

Sefer HaChinuch7 derives an ethical insight from the mitzvah of ha’anakah, the obligation of a master to give his Jewish servant a severance payment when he becomes free.8 Although one is obligated in this mitzvah only in the era when the mitzvah of the Jubilee year is practiced9 – because in the era when the Jubilee year is not practiced, the law of a Jewish servant does not apply – we can, nevertheless, gain a lesson from this mitzvah also in the present time. As Sefer HaChinuch states:

“A wise person should pay heed and gain an [ethical] lesson.”10 If he hires a [fellow] Jew who works for him, whether for a long time or even for a short time, [when the worker departs from his employ], he should give him a severance payment (a ha’anakah) according to the blessings that G‑d gave him.

Minchas Chinuch11 comments on the inference – which is derived from the mitzvah of ha’anakah with regard to a hired worker in the present age – that because of the virtuous ethical character of the employer, he should give a worker a ha’anakah when the worker leaves his employ. Minchas Chinuch maintains that this inference applies only according to the opinion12 that a master is obligated in the mitzvah of ha’anakah both with regard to a servant sold by the court and to a person who sells himself as a servant.

However, there is a second opinion13 – that the mitzvah of ha’anakah applies only to a servant sold by the court. The Talmud14 derives this from the verse that speaks of a servant sold by the court,15 “You shall certainly give him a ha’anakah,” interpreting it as an exclusion. The ha’anakah must be given “‘to him,’ [i.e., to the one who was sold by the court,] but not to someone who sold himself [as a servant].”16 According to this view, the reason for giving a servant a ha’anakah is not because of an ethical mandate, but because of a Divine command, (“and who knows what its reason is.”)⁵ Were the mitzvah to have been an expression of ethical virtues, there would be no reason to differentiate between the two categories of servants. Thus, according to the second opinion in the Talmud, the mitzvah does not serve as a source for an ethical lesson regarding a hired worker in the present age.

On this basis, Minchas Chinuch raises an issue, which he leaves unresolved. He points out that Rambam17 rules that the mitzvah of ha’anakah applies only regarding a servant sold by the court. However, the ethical lesson derived by the author of Sefer HaChinuch applies only according to the opinion that a ha’anakah must also be given to a servant who sells himself. This is slightly problematic since it is uncommon “for the author [of Sefer HaChinuch] to deviate from Rambam’s opinion unless he specifically states as such.”⁵

It is possible to offer the following resolution:

There are two ways of explaining our Sages’ derivation of the concept that the mitzvah of ha’anakah applies only regarding a servant sold by the court and not regarding a servant who sells himself:

a) The novel concept the verse teaches is that a ha’anakah must be given to a servant sold by the court, as the Torah commands, “You shall certainly give him a ha’anakah,” for seemingly there is no reason for that obligation. It is well known that when the Torah introduces a novel concept, the rule is that the novel concept applies only in that specific instance.18 Consequently, it follows that there are no grounds for an obligation to give a ha’anakah to a servant who sells himself.

According to that understanding, a lesson regarding a worker in the present age cannot be derived from the obligation to give a ha’anakah to a servant sold by the court.

b) The novel concept is not that a ha’anakah must be given to a servant sold by the court, but rather that it must only be given “‘to him,’ and not to someone who sells himself,” thus, excluding one who sells himself as a servant; the latter does not receive a ha’anakah.19

According to this understanding, it follows that even according to the Sages who maintain that a person who sells himself as a servant does not receive a ha’anakah, it is possible to derive conclusions from the law obligating a ha’anakah to be given to a servant sold by the court.20 It could be said that there is an obligation to give a severance payment resembling ha’anakah in other comparable situations, as long as they do not resemble a situation in which one sells himself as a servant, for that was explicitly excluded from the obligation of ha’anakah.

As such, since Sefer HaChinuch does not speak about a person who sells himself as a servant – a situation that is not relevant in the present era – but regarding a hired worker, a lesson can be derived from one sold as a servant by the court. As an expression of proper ethics, an employer should give an employee a severance payment when he leaves one’s hire.

It could be said that these two ways of understanding the derivation of the novel concept involved in the obligation to give a ha’anakah are dependent on two rationales that can be given for the practice of giving a ha’anakah:21

a) It could be said that the ha’anakah falls into the category of payment for the worker’s labor. This seems to be implied by the Talmud, which states,22 “[In the above verse,] the Merciful One referred to [a servant as] a ‘hired worker.’ Just as [the wage for] a hired worker’s labor [must be given] to his heirs [in the event of his death], so too, [what a servant earned through] his labor [must be given] to his heirs.”

According to this approach, it is logical to say that the novel concept and the Scriptural decree is that a servant who was sold by the court receives a ha’anakah. The rationale is that considering the severance payment a servant is given as payment for his labor – although he was renumerated fully for all his work23 – is a novel concept. Thus, logic dictates that it only applies in the specific instance – a servant sold by the court – ordained by the Torah.

b) Alternatively, it can be said that providing this severance payment is categorized as tzedakah, charity24 – a kindness that the master shows his servant in recognition of his work. According to this approach, logic dictates that the novelty and the Scriptural decree involved is that a servant who sold himself does not receive a ha’anakah because the fact that a servant sold by the court must be given a ha’anakah has a reason – it is being given in recognition of his work – as explained above.

What is Rambam’s approach to the above? We can gain insight from the fact that, in his Sefer HaMitzvos,25 Rambam does not list the mitzvah of ha’anakah among the mitzvos pertaining to a Jewish servant and a Jewish maidservant,26 but directly after the mitzvah of tzedakah.27 Placing it in this order28 implies that Rambam considers the ha’anakah to be in the category of tzedakah.29

Based on this explanation, it is not necessary to say that Sefer HaChinuch is deviating from Rambam’s understanding. For even according to Rambam’s approach – that the Torah excludes a person who sold himself as a servant from receiving a ha’anakah – it is possible to derive an ethical lesson from the obligation to give a severance payment to a servant sold by the court:30 As an act of charity, a hired worker in the present age should also be given a severance payment on the termination of his employment.

Since the lesson derived by Sefer HaChinuch can be interpreted as applying according to all the approaches to the subject – including even the opinion that maintains that a person who sells himself as a servant need not be given a ha’anakah – it is appropriate to publicize and encourage people at large to pay attention to this lesson:

When a person hires another to work for him and the term of his employment comes to an end, the worker should be given a severance payment. How much more so does this apply if the employer terminated the worker’s employment before its term comes to an end regardless of the reason, whether the employer now has enough workers without him, or even when the employer was not satisfied with the worker’s labor.

If the worker leaves the job on his own before the term of employment comes to an end, the concept of a severance payment does not apply. This also has a source in halachah. The law is that a servant who flees his master and one who terminates his period of servitude by paying out the money owed his master for the remainder of his term of servitude (גרעון כסף) is not given a ha’anakah.31 However, when the employer terminates a worker’s employment, a severance payment is necessary.

Since the ha’anakah is an expression of tzedakah, it is obvious that it is not sufficient for an employer to merely pay a worker what he owes him. Of course, he must pay him the wages owed him for his work in full. Furthermore, any extra bonus that the employer promised the worker beforehand is also not included in the severance payment that parallels the ha’anakah, since this extra bonus cannot be considered as tzedakah.

The ethical imperative requiring a severance payment does not depend on how long the worker was employed. To refer back to the wording of Sefer HaChinuch, the lesson applies whether he worked “for a long time or even for a short time.”¹ Similarly, as mentioned above, there is no difference whether the employer was satisfied with the worker or not, and whether – to refer to the wording of our Sages32 – “the [employer’s] household was blessed because of him” or not. Regardless, an employer should give a worker a severance payment33 according to the length of time he worked.34 How much more does this apply when “the [employer’s] household was blessed because of him.” In such an instance,35 the law²⁵ is that the severance payment he gives him should be “proportionate to the blessing;” it36 must be increased commensurate with “[the bounty] which G‑d granted [the employer].”37

The concept of ha’anakah applies – like all Torah concepts – in our spiritual service as well. In his notes38 to Tractate Kiddushin, my revered father explains that a Jewish servant is representative of the spiritual state referred to as mochin d’katnus, an “underdeveloped way of understanding.” For that reason, when he leaves servitude as a free man, he must be given a ha’anakah; mochin d’gadlus, “an expanded intellectual consciousness,” must be imparted to him. This is reflected in the fact that the Torah enumerates three categories which the ha’anakah payment includes, “your herds, granary, and your wine vat,”⁹ which correspond to the three intellectual faculties, chochmah, binah, and daas.39

The spiritual parallel to the concept of a master and a servant is a teacher and a student. In that vein, after being puzzled by a particularly problematic Torah concept, Rabbi Yochanan said40 that if someone would be able to teach him how to resolve it, he “would carry his clothes behind him to the bathhouse,” i.e., perform a task that a servant would perform for his master.

Building on the above, a teacher must know that he has an obligation to give a student a ha’anakah. In other words, the teacher cannot remain content with having engendered mochin d’katnus, an underdeveloped intellectual potential within his student, leaving him with a limited scope of understanding. Instead, he must teach him in such a manner that when the student matures and grows to the extent that he is ready to leave the teacher’s instruction, the teacher has imparted to him mochin d’gadlus, the expanded intellectual potential that characterizes the teacher.

Put simply, this means that, during the teaching process, a teacher must give the student an understanding of “the depth of the halachah with its motivating rationale.”41 And he must continue to teach his student, even repeating the halachah to him several times until the student understands.42 He must convey the depth that is within the capacity of the student’s conceptual grasp, an understanding that until then was beyond the student’s comprehension, even though for the teacher this represents an underdeveloped conception.

However, according to the ordinary pattern of instruction, a teacher is not obligated to convey to the student those concepts that transcend the student’s conceptual grasp, ideas that the teacher himself considers “an expanded intellectual potential.”

The mitzvah of ha’anakah teaches that the above reflects the rudimentary obligation of a teacher to a student. However, ha’anakah as an act of tzedakah requires a teacher to go beyond this basic obligation and devote himself to the student and labor with him to the extent that the student will ultimately grasp the depth of his teacher’s understanding,43 a way of thinking that is initially beyond the student’s own potential. A teacher’s commitment to his student must be such that if there is a concept that is within the teacher’s comprehension, it must in due course be able to be realized by the student.

Similar concepts apply regarding efforts to advance those who are underdeveloped and, regarding their Jewish involvement, are on the level of students, in order to heighten their connection to the Torah and its mitzvos. A person might think that since the other is only a beginner, it is sufficient to merely invest himself in teaching him those matters to which he can presently relate. A true teacher should not satisfy himself with such a commitment. The Torah instructs us that since that person is one’s student – and even if he only taught that student “one letter,” that is sufficient for the teacher to be considered his student’s “master, guide, and confidant”³⁷ – he must give him a ha’anakah. He must devote himself to this student in a way that will enable him to ultimately reach the teacher’s level of Jewish knowledge and practice.

Through the Jews’ Divine service as servants of G‑d in the six years of service44 – which alludes to the 6,000 years of the world’s existence45 – we will speedily merit to the fulfillment of the Torah’s promise, “in the seventh year, he will depart free, without charge,”³⁸ i.e., we will be granted the freedom that will characterize the Ultimate Redemption. Then, not only will G‑d give the Jews a reward commensurate with their service in the present era, but moreover, He will grant them a ha’anakah, which alludes to the most sublime revelations, which can be given only as tzedakah, because they are utterly incomparable to any Divine service the Jews performed.46

These sublime revelations will characterize the seventh millennium, “the day that is entirely Shabbos and rest for life eternal.”47

Adapted from a sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Reeh, 5737 (1977)