Arachim Vacharamim - Chapter 5

Arachin 27a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:27.

See Hilchot Shemitah VYovel 10:3, 8-10 which explains that the Jubilee years is observed only when the entire Jewish people live in the Holy Land. Hence when the tribes of Reuven and Gad were exiled - decades before the destruction of the First Temple - the observance of the Jubilee no longer had the status of Scriptural Law.

Chapter 4, Halachot 19-20. Since either the person who redeems it or the priests will pay for it, the Temple treasury will ultimately receive its due. Hence, there is no need to compel the owner to redeem it.

As evident from Chapter 8, Halachah 8, this refers to a time when the Temple is standing, but the Jubilee year is no longer observed.

Were the person not to be compelled, it is possible that the Temple treasury would not receive its due (Radbaz).
The Ra’avad differs and states that the person is not compelled to redeem his field, but the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s understanding.

The owner is compelled to make the initial bid, because he is required to add a fifth and thus the Temple treasury will be profiting more than if another person would offer the same price. Also, we assume that since it was his property, he is attached to it and will pay more to repossess it (Arachin 27a).

I.e., for the price people are willing to pay, not for the standard value decreed by the Torah. Since the laws pertaining to arechim are taught as a single unit in the Torah and all the particulars do not apply, this fundamental factor is also not applied.

For anything less than a p ‘rotah is not financially significant.

Since a field that he consecrated will never return to him if he does not redeem it, he is given a greater opportunity to do so (Arachin 30a).

In which instance, these restrictions do apply. See Hilchot Shemitah VYovel 11:17-18; 12:2.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 116) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 354) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The laws involving kosher animals are found in Halachot 57.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 115) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 353) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This - and not a standard value - is what the person must pay. The Torah established a standard value only for humans and fields.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and notes.

I.e., as long as another person has not redeemed it first. As stated in Hilchot Shemitah VYovel, ch. 12, there is a difference in the relevant laws with regard to the sale of such dwellings to private individuals. A home in a walled city must be redeemed from a private purchaser within a year. Otherwise, it becomes his property forever. These restrictions do not apply with regard to a home in an unwalled habitation.

I.e., it does not return to the original owner in the Jubilee. It is as if the purchaser acquired the field from the owner.

As would be the law had he purchased it from him directly.

I.e., were the animal to have a blemish that disqualifies it from being offered as a sacrifice, these laws would not apply.

As obvious from Halachah 7, this applies when he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for this purpose.

As stated in the following halachah.

In contrast to an animal consecrated as a sacrifice which is redeemed only when it is blemished. See Halachah 11.

See Halachah 12. The commentaries have noted that in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, the Rambam mentions that a priest is required to participate in the evaluation of humans and fields, but not in that of movable property. He makes no mention of the evaluation of animals. There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Sanhedrin 15a.

I.e., depending on the type and gender of the animal it is fitting for some sacrifices and not others.

See Temurah 7b.

A blemished animal like those mentioned in the verse.

I.e., although the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, since the Torah did explicitly forbid it by saying: “Do not consecrate an unblemished animal for this purpose,” it is not considered as the transgression of a negative commandment. Temurah 7b states that a negative commandment is also involved. Nevertheless, based on our Sages’ statements in the Sifra, the Rambam considers that passage as merely an asmachta, the derivation of support for a concept by the Rabbis and not a Scriptural prohibition.

Although they could also be used for other types of sacrifices, it is preferable to offer them as burnt offerings.

Which may not be brought as burnt offerings.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this issue, offering a different interpretation of the Rambam’s source, Shekalim 4:7-8. The Radbaz explains the rationale behind the Rambam’ s ruling. Since animals can be redeemed, we assume that he consecrated them with the intent that they be redeemed and that the money be given for improvements to the Temple building. Since these other items cannot be redeemed, by contrast, we assume that from the outset, his intent was that they be consecrated for the sake of the altar alone. These concepts also apply with regard to Halachah 9.

As stated in Halachah 7.

See Halachah 11.

The Ra’avad notes that fine flour, wine, and oil may be redeemed if they became impure before being placed in a consecrated vessel. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since they cannot be redeemed once they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, that is most significant. For until they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, they have not been sanctified in a complete sense. See Hilchot Issurei Bi ‘ah 6:4-5.

As explained in Hilchot Shekalim 4:12, in every year that is not a leap year, there is a certain amount of incense left over. For 365 portions were prepared for daily offerings and there are either 353, 354, or 355 days in such a year. Thus there were extra portions left over. The holiness associated with these portions of incense was then transferred to money and that money used to purchase burnt offerings. Afterwards, the portions of incense would be given to the craftsmen who prepare the incense as their wages. They would then sell this incense back to the Temple treasury, so that it would be purchased back with the funds designated for communal sacrifices for the new year.
This halachah is speaking about an instance where one of those craftsmen consecrated the incense in his possession to the Temple treasury. It should be given to other craftsmen as their wages and then purchased back as above.

I.e., it should be given to the craftsmen as part of their wages and then purchased with the money designated for the purchase of communal sacrifices.

I.e., a blemish that will not become healed (Radbaz).

Bechorot 37b explains that the intent is not an animal from an impure species, but rather an animal from a kosher species that became disqualified because of a blemish, for there is a second verse (27 :27) that speaks about evaluating non-kosher animals. See also Hilchot lssurei Mizbeach 1:10.

As explained in Halachah 5.

After its consecration. The laws applying to the consecration of a blemished animal are the same as those applying to other movable property. See the gloss of the Ra’avad.

Some commentaries suggest emending the wording of the text and having it read “as was explained,” i.e., referring to Halachah 5. The Merkevet HaMishneh suggests that the text should be left as is and that the reference is to Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which refers to consecrating to the Temple treasury an animal that was already designated as a sacrifice.

For the holiness that rested upon a consecrated animal cannot be transferred to money after its death. (See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Temurah 7:3). Instead, it must be buried so that no one will make use of it.

The windpipe and the esophagus. These are referred to as 'the signs' of ritual slaughter. See Hilchot Shechitah 1:9.

For that is sufficient for the slaughter to be acceptable (ibid.).

Note a similar ruling in Hilchot Sha ‘ar Avot HaTumah 2:1.

The commentaries note that according to the Ratnbam, this applies even if the animal is incapable of standing unsupported. There are, however, other authorities who differ; see Shitah Mekuhetzet (Bava Kama 76a).

I.e., the person desired that the animal be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed.

Since the animal is. fit to be sacrificed, it is dedicated to the altar and should be sacrificed itself (Temura 19b).

Based on Temurah I lb, the Or Sameach explains that were a person to consecrate the limb itself, there is no question that the sanctity would spread throughout the entire animal. The question is since the person did not consecrate the limb itself, merely its worth, do we make two extensions: from the worth of the limb to the limb itself and from the limb to the entire body. There are, however, those who note that in Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot 15:2, the Rambam does not accept the principle that the sanctity spreads from a limb or organ throughout the entire animal unless the limb or organ is of vital importance.

For we cannot require the donor to sacrifice the entire animal (for perhaps it did not become consecrated), nor may allow him to regard it as his personal property (for perhaps it did).

As the commentaries to Temurah llb explain, there is a difficulty when one limb of an animal was consecrated and another person purchases it to offer it as a sacrifice, for it is as if the person offering the sacrifice is offering an animal lacking a limb. For that limb was not consecrated by him, but by the original donor. They explain that this is referring to an instance where the purchaser pledged to purchase a burnt offering of a certain value and the animal is worth that amount, even without the limb in question. See Hilchot Maaseh HaKorbanot 15:2.

We follow the principle that when there is a question concerning ownership, one who desires to expropriate property (in this instance, the Temple treasury) from a colleague (the donor), must prove the validity of his claim. Since that is not possible (because the question is unresolved), the donor may retain the proceeds from the portion of the animal that was not consecrated.

Since the animal could not live without that limb, consecrating it is equivalent to consecrating the entire animal.

Since the animal is unfit to be sacrificed, we do not say that the sanctity spread throughout the entire animal.

The animal should be sold and the proceeds from the sale of that limb or organ used to purchase a burnt offering.

Since neither a donkey or a servant is fit to offer on the altar, the principles mentioned in the previous halachah apply.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that a person’s severed head is of no monetary value whatsoever, for it is forbidden to benefit from any portion of a corpse. And seemingly, if we would evaluate his head separately, it would be considered as equivalent to his entire worth, for of what worth is a person without a head? Hence, the Temple treasury should be the sole owner without leaving any portion for the person himself. Therefore the Ra’avad suggests that the intent of saying that they are partners is that the consecrated entity’s value is divided in half.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Talmud clearly mentions evaluation in that passage and therefore, does not accept the Ra’avad’s view. How is a head evaluated? The Kessef Mishneh explains that we consider the tasks the servant or the person performs. To the extent he is involved with those that require intellectual activity, his head is worth more. If, by contrast, his activity is primarily physical, his head is worth less.
The Radbaz maintains that if a limb or organ is of vital importance to the animal or person, the value is divided in half as the Ra’avad states. The Rambam speaks of evaluating the worth of the organ only when it is not of vital importance.

I.e., for improvements to the Temple, for as stated in Halachah 7, whenever a person consecrates an entity without explicitly stated the purpose for which it was consecrated, we assume that it was consecrated for improvements for the Temple.

Since the animal or person would not be worth anything without this organ, there is no difference between the worth of that organ and the worth of the entire entity.
The difference between this instance and those mentioned in the previous halachot is that the previous halachot involve limbs or organs explicitly consecrated to be offered on the altar. Thus that is all that may be done with them. Even when an article itself may not be sacrificed on the altar and hence, we understand that the person is referring to the value of the article, since he is singling out that limb or organ, we consider his intent to be that its individual value be offered on the altar.
In those instances, the holiness is focused on the physical substance of the limb or organ. Its value is only a substitute for that physical substance. Hence, we look it at as a particular and not part of the person or animal as a whole. In the instances referred to by this halachah, from the outset, we are concerned with value. Hence, we consider the value of the limb or organ in a more encompassing manner.

I.e., the fixed amount required by Torah law, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

In which instance, were we speaking about a person who pledged his airech, he would be required to pay according to his financial capacity, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

And there are no other instances where a pledge to the altar can be fulfilled by giving less that the article’s worth (Arachin Sa).

A shekel and a pundiyon for each year until the Jubilee, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachot 2, 5.

And the Temple treasury is always given the benefit of the doubt. If the airech is more, the donor must pay the airech. If the worth is more, he must pay the worth.