Nezirut - Chapter 5

See Halachah 15 and onward.

See Halachah 11.

Whether grapes or wine.

E. g., peels or pits. See the following halachah.

Numbers 6:3.

E. g., a brandy, vermouth, or the like.

I.e., a quarter of a larger measure called a log. A revi’it is 86 cc according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc according to Chazon Ish.

This represents a contrast to other Torah prohibitions. As stated in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 4:16, “when a person takes a small amount of fat, a small amount of blood, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher animal, a small amount of the meat of a nevelah, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher fish, a small amount of the meat of a non-kosher fowl, or the like from other prohibited substances, although he collects an olive-sized portion from the entire mixture and partakes of it, he is not liable for lashes.”

He must, however, eat the olived-sized portion within the time it takes to eat three eggs, as explained in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 14:8.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that eating and drinking are not combined to reach a single measure.

This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages (Nazir 35b-37b). Although there is an opinion which maintains that with regard to a nazirite - in contrast to all the other prohibitions of the Torah - the permitted food should be counted as part of the forbidden measure, the Rambam does not accept this view as Halachah.

Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 15:3.

The measure described in the previous halachah.

See Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 14:9 where the Rambam states that to be liable for lashes, one must drink a prohibited substance in the time it takes to drink a revi ‘it. Here, however, he mentions the time it takes to eat k’dei achilat p ‘ras. It is possible to explain that here, the person is “eating” the wine, i.e., ingesting it as it is absorbed in solid food. Hence, he uses a measure of time that involves eating. In Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot, he speaks about drinking. Hence, he uses a measure of time that involves drinking.

We have translated the verse according to its halachic interpretation. Its literal meaning is somewhat different.

Nazir 37a exemplifies this concept as follows: One soaked grapes in water and the flavor of the water became that of grape juice.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 15:3.

I.e., as stated in Hile hot Ma’ achalot Assurot 15:12, if a prohibited substance becomes mixed into another entity, its presence is nullified if there is so much of the permitted entity that the flavor of the prohibited substance cannot be detected. (When it is impossible to have someone taste the mixture, we require 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance.)

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 15:2-3. There the Rambam states that if there was less than an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat in a portion the size of three eggs, it is considered as if the substance of the prohibited substance is not present. Hence, according to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition, even if the flavor of the forbidden fat is detectable.
The Ra’avad differs and quotes authorities who maintain that although lashes are not given in such an instance, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.

The Rambam is indicating that grape juice and wine are governed by the same laws. Alternatively, that grapes and grape juice are not considered as part of the same prohibition.

See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :5; see also Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

I.e., the verse uses vinegar as a descriptive term for wine and mentions only one prohibition. Thus the prohibition is against drinking wine, even wine that has become vinegar. Even though two separate adjurations are mentioned in the prooftext, there is no separate prohibition for drinking vinegar from wine and vinegar from alcoholic beverages coming from wine, because the end product, vinegar, is the same in both instances.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that there is a separate prohibition against drinking vinegar, just like there are separate prohibitions against eating grapes and eating raisins. See the gloss of the Radbaz for a discussion of this matter.

And God will mete out punishment to him for every violation [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 6:4)].

See Halachah 8.

The warning causes every violation to be considered independently (Radbaz).

Avodah Zarah 59a.

For if he comes close, he might be tempted to partake of the grapes.

The prooftext cited below indicates that the hair must be removed as effectively as a razor does. It does not, however, indicate that only cutting it with a razor makes a person liable. Note the contrast to the prohibition against cutting the hairs of one’s beard. As mentioned in Hi/chot Avodat Kochavim 12:1, that prohibition applies only to removal of one’s hair with a razor.

From a comparison to the laws governing the prohibition against shaving the comers of one’s head (lbid.:l), it would appear that the person whose hair is cut is not liable for lashes unless he assists the person doing the shaving by moving his head or the like. Otherwise, he will not have performed a deed and one is liable for lashes only when his violation involves a deed.

Nor are the days of one’s nazirite vow nullified by such an act (Nazir 39b).

The Radbaz explains the rationale for this leniency: When applying the potion, the person is not removing the hair with his own hands.

Even though he had no intention of removing hairs, were it impossible to scrape his head with his nails without removing hair, it would be forbidden for him, because doing so would be tantamount to willfully removing hairs, as the Rambam continues. Compare to Hilchot Shabbat l :6.

For he did not intentionally remove the hairs (Kessef Mishneh). The Shiurei HaKorban explains that since these activities do not produce a razor-clean shave, he is not liable for the violation of a negative commandment. According to the Radbaz who maintains that such a commandment is in fact involved, the question arises: Since it is inevitable (a p ‘sik reishah) that the hairs will be removed, why is he not liable?

I.e., the ritual impurity incurred when he touches or carries a corpse or is located under the same covering as it.

See Chapter 7, where this subject is discussed in detail.

The Mishneh LiMelech and other commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling, noting that in Hilchot Tumat Meit 3:3, he writes: “All ritual impurity resulting from a corpse for which a nazirite is not required to shave does not stem from Scriptural Law.” If the impurity does not stem from Scriptural Law, why is the nazirite punished by lashes?
The Ma ‘aseh Rokeach explains that there are times when the Rambam uses the tenn midivrei sofrim, which usually means “stemming from Rabbinic decree” to refer to matters that are of Scriptural origin, but derived by our Sages using the accepted principles of Biblical exegesis (see Hilchot] shut 1 :2; Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 2). Similarly, with regard to the contraction of ritual impurity in question: Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, it could be considered of Scriptural origin, because it was derived through the laws of Biblical exegesis. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 1, where this issue is discussed.

The Rambam’s ruling can be explained based on the following concept: When a person is in contact with a corpse, a person he touches is impure for seven days. When, however, he is not in contact with a corpse, a person he touches is impure only until the evening.
Thus if he is in contact with a corpse, there is no difference halachically if he touches another corpse. If, however, he is not in contact with a corpse, it is halachically significant if he touches another corpse, because the impurity resulting from touching him is more severe. And since touching the corpse is halachically significant for others, it is also halachically significant for him. Hence he is liable for lashes for such contact.

I.e., while he is in a closed container, it is as if he is not under the same shelter as the corpse and he does not contract ritual impurity.

If the container is opened without his consent, he is not liable, for he is considered to have transgressed due to forces beyond his control. See Hilchot Eve! 3:5.

For as mentioned in the mitzvot cited in the introduction to these halachot and in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, there are two prohibitions involved in this instance as the Rambam continues to explain.

The removal of the top of the container brings about his “entry” into the place where the corpse is located and, at that same time, he becomes impure.

See Hilchot Tuma ‘at Meit I: 11.

Compare to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:18. In this instance, since he is already ritually impure, the prohibition against entering a place of ritual impurity does not appl to him (Nazir 43a).

I.e., he was not aware that a corpse was located in this place or that it was a cemetery.

The commentaries question why the person is liable for lashes. Although he is performing a transgression by remaining in the cemetery, seemingly, the performance of that transgression does not involve a deed and hence, he should not be liable for lashes. The Lechem Mishneh explains that since he performed a deed when he entered in violation of the prohibition, he is liable when he remained afterwards in conscious violation of the prohibition. Others cite the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Sechirut 13:2 which explains that whenever a transgression usually involves a deed, as a nazirite would usually perform a deed to contract ritual impurity - one is liable for lashes even when one violates the transgression without performing a deed. See also Hilchot Eve! 3 :4.

See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:21-24.

See Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14 which interprets this as a general prohibition, warning a person against causing a colleague to transgress.

The nazirite is not liable because he did not transgress intentionally. The other person is not liable for the reasons the Rambam proceeds to explain.

See Hilchot Evel 3:5 which states that in a parallel situation when a person causes a priest to become ritually impure, the person who causes him to incur the impurity is indeed, liable. For it is the person who causes him to incur impurity who violates the prohibition. And similarly, one who shaves a nazirite’s head is liable (Halachah 11).

See the gloss of the Radbaz to Hilchot Kilayim 10:31 which comments on the apparent contradiction between that halachah and the ruling here.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 4; Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim 1:1; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:13, with regard to the nature of this prohibition.

By incurring ritual impurity.

The commentaries question: Since he was in the cemetery at the time he took the vow, seemingly, his violation of the prohibition does not involve a deed. Generally, when a transgression does not involve a deed, lashes are not given. Why then is he liable? Among the resolutions offered is that failing to depart is also considered a deed (Tosafot, Nazir 17a).

See Halachah 18.