Shechitah - Chapter 12

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 16:3) mentions a difference of opinion concerning this matter, for some authorities forbid partaking of the meat. The Rama clarifies that the difference of opinion applies only with regard to the second animal. The first animal is permitted. Moreover, even the more stringent authorities maintain that the prohibition applies:

a) only that day, and

b) only for the transgressor himself. It is a penalty imposed upon him by the Sages and not a prohibition of Scriptural Law. See Maggid Mishneh; Turei Zahav 16:23.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 101) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 294) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, ch. 48, that states that this prohibition was given to us to prevent cruelty. For an animal will be severely aggrieved if its offspring or its mother is slaughtered before its eyes. Note, however, Hilchot Tefilah 9:7 where the Rambam emphasizes that the Torah's mitzvot were not given to us for the sake of any particular rationale. Note, however, the conclusion of Hilchot Temurah which explains that there are two dimensions to every mitzvah: that it is God's decree and that He issued that decree for a particular rationale. (See also Halachah 3 which indicates that the prohibition is a Divine decree, not limited to that rationale.)

The Torah (and the Rambam) use the masculine although the prohibition applies primarily to a mother and its offspring. See Halachah 11.

For the prohibition concerns slaughter.

And it is forbidden to slaughter an ordinary animal in the Temple courtyard.

And thus may not be sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard.

I.e., either the one that was sacrificed inside the Temple or the one sacrificed outside. The point of these statements is, as stated in Halachah 6, even though the slaughter is not befitting, within the context of this prohibition, it is considered as ritual slaughter.

I.e., the slaughter was unacceptable. If, however, it was discovered that the animal was trefe, it is considered to have been slaughtered and it is forbidden to slaughter the second animal (Halachah 6, Siftei Cohen 16:18).

If, however, they slaughtered under the supervision of a knowledgeable adult, their slaughter is acceptable (Chapter 4, Halachah 5). Hence, this prohibition applies. See Rama (Yoreh De'ah 16:9).

Hence it is equivalent to cutting off the head of the animal and the previous halachah applies.

For perhaps the animal was kosher and one would be violating the prohibition.

Because there is a doubt involved.

Rambam LeAm questions why this concept is mentioned. It was already stated in Halachah 2.

In all these instances, it is forbidden to benefit from the slaughtered animal. (See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:9; Hilchot Rotzeach 10:6, Hilchot Parah Adumah 1:7; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:2.)

Seemingly, the same principles stated in the previous halachah would apply in this instance. Nevertheless, in this case, there is another factor involved as the Rambam continues to explain.

As befits one who sacrifices to a false deity. One is not liable for both capital punishment and lashes for the same act. Since he is liable for capital punishment, he is not held liable for lashes. (See Ketubot 33b; Chullin 81b.)

I.e., when the witnesses administered the warning, they mentioned the lesser transgression and not the more severe one.

For in this instance, he is not liable for the more severe punishment. There is a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Talmud concerning whether one is absolved from liability for lashes in such a situation or not and the halachah follows the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan who maintains that one is liable. See Ketubot 34b-35a, Chullin, loc. cit.

See the Sifra to the verse which states that the first excludes wild beasts and fowl.

See the Turei Zahav 16:11 and the Siftei Cohen 16:16 who debate the rulings of the Rashba and the Maharshal who permit one to slaughter the deer and its offspring even as an initial and preferred option.

I.e., a kosher domesticated animal.

Since ultimately, the ancestor of the hybrid deer was a domesticated animal, we hold the slaughterer liable (see Chullin 80a). Although in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro quotes the opinion of the Rashba who does not hold the slaughtered liable for lashes, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 16:8), he cites the Rambam's view. The Turei Zahav 16:12 and the Siftei Cohen 16:17 debate this issue and side with the more lenient views, questioning the Rambam's ruling in light of his position in Halachah 11.

And not a separate entity for whose slaughter one is held liable.

If the fetus does not step on the ground, it need not be slaughtered (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 5:14). Hence, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring would not apply.

The Tosefta states: Since it is not required to slaughter such an animal, one is not liable for slaughtering it together with its mother.

This issue was apparently a matter of uncertainty for the Rambam, for in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 5:6) he revised his interpretation several times. His final text (see Rav Kapach's version which differs from the standard published text) parallels the text here. Note, however, Bechorot 7:7 which appears to refer to this prohibition with regard to males.

For he violated the prohibition twice.

For he performed one forbidden act.

For in this instance as well, he violated the prohibition twice.

Although the same act caused two violations of the prohibition, since it was only one deed, the majority opinion in Chullin 82a only holds the person liable for set of lashes. As Rashi explains: There is one prohibition, one deed, and one warning.

I.e., they both desired to slaughter their animal that day.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 16:6) states that this law applies only when the two purchased the animals from the same person. If they purchased them from different individuals, neither has precedence over the other.

In other situations, it is not necessary to notify him, for it is not certain that either purchaser will slaughter the animal on that day.

This is the holiday of Shemini Atzeret/Simchas Torah, a day of great rejoicing. Hence it is appropriate that meat be part of the festive meals. On the first day of Sukkot, by contrast, because the people are involved in preparing a sukkah and a lulav, they do not have the energy for excessive celebration.

For the Seder is a time of great rejoicing and celebration. The seventh day of Pesach, by contrast, is not considered that important a festival.

Rashi explains that the animals were necessary for sacrifices to be brought for the holiday. Tosafot states that Shavuos is customarily marked by great celebration in commemoration of the Giving of the Torah.

For it is customary to begin the new year with celebratory feasts.

The fact that he shows repose indicates that he may be purchasing the animal for a later date. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the person's repose is taken into consideration only when he purchases the animal on the day before the day preceding the festival. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 16:6) quotes the Raa'vad's ruling.

That the other animal was also sold. This applies even if he did not sell them both on the same day [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 16:6)].

I.e., it is a calendar day according to the Jewish calendar, not a day from sunrise to sunset or a 24-hour period beginning from the time one animal is slaughtered.

This term literally means "between the suns." It refers to the time between the setting of the sun and the appearance of the stars. There is an unresolved doubt whether the day ends at sunset or at the appearance of the stars. Hence, the halachic status of this period of time is one of question.

Lest the period until the appearance of the stars be considered as part of the previous day.

For punishment may not be given in a situation where doubt exists.