Shechitah - Chapter 2

This is the term the Sifri to the above verse and other Rabbinic texts use to describe ordinary meat in contrast to animals offered as sacrifices.

Since the slaughter was acceptable, the animal is not considered as a nevelah. Hence it does not impart ritual impurity.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:13-14.

Without intending to partake of the meat. I.e., using the meat for this or the following purposes is forbidden.

For the prohibition is only against slaughtering ordinary animals in the Temple courtyard, for this resembles the slaughter of the sacrifices (Kessef Mishneh). Since none of the above actions are considered as ritual slaughter, they do not cause the animal to become forbidden.

The Rashba (as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh) questions the Rambam’s ruling, stating that the prohibition applies only to fruit that resemble the first fruits and bread that resembles the loaves of the Thanksgiving offering.

Since the prohibition is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, he is not liable for lashes - as appropriate for the violation of an explicit Scriptural prohibition (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, since the source for the prohibition is a Scriptural verse, it has the weight of a Scriptural commandment. Others, however, interpret the Rambam as implying that the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic. The verse cited previously is merely an asmachta.
The above applies to the prohibition against slaughtering in the Temple Courtyard. With regard to partaking of the meat, all authorities agree that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. See Hilchat Ma ‘achalot Assurot 16:6.

As stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:13-14, when a pregnant animal is slaughtered, the fetus it is carrying is considered as one of its limbs. Even if it lives, it does not have to be slaughtered again; the slaughter of its mother causes it to be permitted.
In this instance, the mother may not be slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. Since there is no other way for the fetus to be permitted, the slaughter of the mother inside the Temple courtyard does not cause it to be forbidden.

I.e., pour the blood directly into.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 2:9), the Rambam writes that we suspect that the person worships “the element of water,” water in its pure elemental state and not the water before us.

In this context also, the Rambam (ibid.) explains that we fear he is worshipping the power that controls the image seen in the water.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 11:3) writes that we fear that onlookers will say that he is collecting blood to offer it to false deities.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 12:2) mentions this ruling, but also the ruling of the Rashba that, after the fact, the slaughter is permitted. The Rama rules that, in the present age, when pagan rites are not commonly practiced,, one may rely on the more lenient view.

As long as he is not slaughtering directly into the water, it does not appear that he is worshipping it.

And thus the knife was above its neck.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 6:4) rule that slaughtering an animal in such a manner is unacceptable even if the slaughterer states that he is certain the animal’s throat was not pierced in this manner. The rationale is that an animal’s head is heavy and its weight will most likely cause its throat to be pierced.

Chapter 3, Halachah 11. Even though the throat of the animal is cut, it is not considered ritual slaughter. Ritual slaughter involves bringing the knife back and forth across the neck or bringing the neck back and forth across the knife. Any other act that cuts its throat is not acceptable.

Since a fowl is light, one can hold it securely and maneuver it back and forth over the knife without difficulty.

Provided the slaughter of the animal is accomplished in that one action. If the slaughterer lifts the knife, that disqualifies the slaughter.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 24:2) requires that a knife be of this length even if one does not cut off the animal’s head.

For it is not feasible that passing a knife the length of the animal's neck alone will be sufficient to slice off its head in one motion [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)]. Hence, we must assume that the animal's head was severed by pressing the knife against the neck. This disqualifies the slaughter as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 11.

He cut in a slant, cutting the windpipe at an angle and continuing to descend at that angle and cutting the gullet.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that the person cut in several places on the signs. Others interpret it as meaning a cut that slants back and forth (Turei Zahav 21:3).

In contrast to the slaughter of sacrificial animals (see Hilchat Pesulei HaMukdashim 1 :3).

Here, we are not speaking about refined spiritual intentions; the Rambam is stating that even if the person slaughters the animal without paying attention to what he is doing or even if he had no intent to slaughter it, the slaughter is acceptable.

Since the deed is significant and not the intent.

While he is intoxicated, he may reach the point where he is no longer able to control his conduct. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 1:8).

The others must watch. Otherwise, there is no way that we can ensure that the slaughter is acceptable. Indeed, if such a person slaughters in private, the slaughter is disqualified [Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah I :5)].

This applies only after the fact [Radbaz; see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah I :5)]. At the outset, only a person fully in control of his intellect and emotions should be entrusted with ritual slaughter.

On its own accord or because of the wind. If, however, a person pushed the knife, since it was set in motion by human action, the slaughter is acceptable (Chullin 3 la).

For the animal was slaughtered by the power of the water and not by human power.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 7:1) rules that the slaughter is acceptable only after the fact. At the outset, one should not slaughter in this manner. The Siftei Cohen 7:1 states that this is the Rambam’s opinion with regard to the first clause of the halachah as well.

It is forbidden to partake of the animal, because this resembles bringing a sacrifice to a false deity. Nevertheless, since one is bringing the offering for a particular purpose and not in actual worship of the false deity, it is not forbidden to benefit from the animal (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the translation of the Hebrew term mazal; i.e., the person is not worshipping the material entity but the spiritual source from which its existence emanates.

For this is considered as worshipping a false deity.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 11:1; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:2.

He is not slaughtering the animal itself for the sake of the false deity - in which instance, there would be no question that it is forbidden - but, nevertheless, at the time of slaughter, he does intend to offer its blood or fats to the false deity.

In Chapter 15, Halachah 10, of those halachot, the Rambam writes that one who slaughters a sacrificial animal with the proper intent for the sake of sprinkling its blood or burning its fats for an improper intent, the slaughter is unacceptable.

The Turei Zahav 4:2 writes that according to the Rambam, because of the doubt, it is forbidden to benefit from the animal. Others (see also Siftei Cohen 4:2) rule that it is forbidden to partake of the animal’s meat, but one may benefit from it.

As indicated in the following halachah, there are certain sacrifices that a person may offer on his own initiative. Since he has not actually consecrated the animal, the prohibition against sacrificing consecrated animals outside the Temple does not apply ccording to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, because of the impression created, our Sages forbade the slaughter of an animal for that intent (Maggid Mishneh). The Tur (Yoreh De ‘ah 5), however, states that we fear that he might have consecrated it, implying that there is a question of a Scriptural prohibition involved.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 5:1) rules that this law applies even when the slaughtered animal has a blemish which would disqualify it as a sacrifice, for there are times when a person will conceal the blemish.

From the fact that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah, sec. 7) quotes this and the following halachot, we see that these laws also apply in the present age although the Temple is destroyed. See the conclusion of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Halachah 20 which mentions a difference of opinion concerning this matter.

As indicated in the following halachah, there are other sacrifices for which a person may consecrate an animal only when he is required to bring that offering. He may not pledge such a sacrifice on his own initiative.

Since he cannot consecrate animals for such offerings, we do not worry about the impression that may be created. On the contrary, an onlooker will consider the person’s statements facetious.(Siftei Cohen 5:4)

For these are sacrifices that a person can consecrate on his own initiative. Hence slaughtering an animal for this purpose is forbidden as stated in the previous halachah.

Seemingly, the Paschal offering does not resemble the others for it is an obligation incumbent on a person and can be brought only on the fourteenth of Nisan (Chullin 41 b). Nevertheless, it is placed in this category for the reason explained by the Rambam.

The instance of a doubtful guilt offering is debated in Chullin, Loc. cit., without the Talmud reaching a definite conclusion concerning the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah, loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s view. The Tur and the Rama, however, follow the view that a person can consecrate a doubtful guilt offering on his own initiative and hence, forbid ritual slaughter for this intent.

For a firstborn animal is consecrated by birth; a person cannot consecrate it through his statements.

For the tithe offerings are consecrated through the tithing rite; a person cannot consecrate it through his statements.

For unless a person has a consecrated animal at home, there is no reason that an onlooker might think that the substitution is of consequence (Chullin, Loe. cit.).

For these are sacrifices that a person cannot consecrate unless he is required to.

Rashi (Chullin, loc. cit.) explains that when a person is liable to bring a sin offering, he makes the matter known so that he will be embarrassed and thus further his atonement. Therefore the onlookers will know of his obligation and will not regard his statements as facetious.

From the Rambam’s words, it would appear that this is not merely a Rabbinical safeguard, but that his statements bring about a substitution (temurah) of the animal and he is liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple courtyard.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 4, a woman may slaughter animals. And since she may slaughter ordinary animals, her slaughter of sacrificial animals would. be acceptable. Note, however, the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 2:10) _which speaks about a man slaughtering an animal on behalf of a woman.

Since this offering cannot be brought on a person’s own initiative, her statements are considered facetious.

A woman who miscarries is also obligated to bring such a burnt offering.

The word here matches the Rambam’s statements in the revised text of his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) as published by Rav Kappach. The Rambam’s original text - and the version of his Commentary to the Mishnah commonly circulated - present an entirely different conception of this halachah.

Hence we suspect that perhaps he took a Nazarite vow in private and the matter has not become known (Kessef Mishneh, Lechem Mishneh).

Since his activity in slaughtering the animal was significant, his intent is also of consequence.

I.e., without waiting; thus the slaughter is not disqualified.

He makes such statements to make it appear that the slaughter is unacceptable so that his colleague will suffer anguish. Nevertheless, his statements have no effect. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 5:3). The Tur and the Rama state that there are opinions which forbid the slaughter regardless of whether the other person has a share in the animal or not because of the impression that is created.

I.e., even if the gentile considers it as a sacrifice to a false deity.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 14:1.

Who is too young to be involved in the worship of false deities.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachot 11-12, the gentile’s slaughter is not considered halachically significant and it is as if the animal died without being slaughtered.