Shabbat - Chapter 24

As stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, these two reasons are the source for the prohibitions placed in the category of sh’vut.

This restriction stems from the fact that the verse mentions, “Restraining your feet.”

Rabbenu Asher, in his gloss on Shabbat 150a, associates this prohibition with discussing matters that are forbidden to be performed on the Sabbath itself. This thrust is reflected in the decisions of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 307:1.
The Rambam mentions these principles in Halachah 3. In this context, it can be noted that all the examples the Rambam gives in this halachah reflect activities forbidden on the Sabbath.

For the verse specifically mentions speech, thus excluding thought from the prohibition. Nevertheless, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:8) emphasizes,” It is a mitzvah not to think of these matters at all. Instead, one’s attitude should be that all of one’s work has been completed.”

According to the later authorities, this prohibition applies only when it is obvious that one’s intent is to take care of one’s own needs. If, however, it appears that one is merely taking a pleasure stroll, there is no prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:2; Mishnah Berurah 306:1). See, however, the notes on the following halachah.

2000 cubits from one's place at the commencement of the Sabbath. (See Chapter 27, where this concept is discussed at length.)

As explained in the following halachah, this refers to a task that is prohibited on the Sabbath itself.

See Halachah 8.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:1), which states that this refers only to an animal that is able to walk on its own. If the animal is too young to walk on its own, it is forbidden to go and wait for it, since even if there were houses, one would be forbidden to carry the animal, because of the prohibition of muktzeh.

One may not, however, say, “1 am riding,” for riding is forbidden on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 307:30).

Similarly, he may ask the colleague to accompany him (Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 307:8).

Although both the employer and the employee understand the implication, since the employer is not making a direct statement—but merely an allusion—this is permitted.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:1) mentions that a person who enjoys talking about news and matters of this nature may engage in such discussions on the Sabbath, since this brings him pleasure. Needless to say, Torah scholars are encouraged to direct their attention to loftier matters (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:2).

The Maggid Mishneh equates activities which involve a mitzvah with matters of communal interest. He emphasizes that it is only the prohibitions against involvement with mundane matters that are relaxed because of the performance of a mitzvah. Other prohibitions—e.g., telling a gentile to perform a forbidden activity, or performing an act that resembles or that may lead to the performance of a forbidden labor (i.e., shvut)—are never relaxed, even for the sake of a mitzvah.
As the Rambam mentions (Chapter 6, Halachot 9-10), the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform an act that is forbidden as a sh’vut is relaxed when a mitzvah is involved, but only when the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:5) mentions an opinion permitting us to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden act for matters of serious communal need, and also a more stringent opinion, that even forbids giving a gentile such instructions. The Ramah also notes a more lenient approach that allows one to tel1 a gentile to perform a task forbidden by the Torah. In practice, the Rambam’s view, as interpreted by the Maggid Mishneh, is accepted by most authorities except in cases where a great loss is involved. In those instances, the leniency mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch is accepted.

The Magen Avraham 306:10 gives as an example, calculating the cost of a feast associated with a mitzvah.

A mikveh must contain 40 seah to be halachically acceptable.

As mentioned in Hilchot Keilim, Chapter 22, a piece of cloth is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only if it is of a specific size. There are different sizes, depending on the type of cloth.

Or for the benefit of a synagogue or other charitable cause.

For earning one’s livelihood is a mitzvah of great esteem. (See also Hilchot Matnot Ani’im 10:18 and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot 4:5.)

The details of financial arrangements involved in the marriage or the instructions should not, however, be discussed on the Sabbath (ShulchanAruch, Orach Chayim 306:6).

See Shabbat 12b, which states that permission to visit the sick and comfort mourners on the Sabbath was granted “with difficulty,” because it runs contrary to the mood of pleasure that should characterize the Sabbath (Rashi). Significantly, the treatment of this subject in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 287:1-3 appears to reflect a different emphasis from that of the Rambam.

In this context, note one of the Rambam’s responsa (208), which emphasizes the importance of refraining from reciting any prayers containing requests whether of a communal or an individual nature on the Sabbath or on festivals.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Eivel 14:6, one of the fundamental aspects of the mitzvah of visiting the sick is to arouse divine mercy on their behalf. Nevertheless, since it is forbidden to plead on the Sabbath, one makes a statement that acknowledges God’s kindness. The phrase cited by the Rambam is also used as the basis of the Mi Sheberach prayers recited for a sick person in the synagogue on the Sabbath.

Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:3).

As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 30, Halachah 13, generally one is not allowed to set out on a sea journey less than three days before the Sabbath so that one will have already acclimated oneself to the travails of sea travel by the Sabbath. Nevertheless, because of the person's involvement in the performance of a mitzvah, this restriction is waived.

The later authorities maintain that particularly because a mitzvah is involved, if the gentile does not agree to halt the journey at the outset, one need not refrain from traveling with him (Mishnah Berurah 248:2).

The Torah gives a husband and a father the right to nullify vows made by his wife and daughter.

The reason that all vows may be nullified on the Sabbath is that a vow can be nullified by a husband or father only on the day that he hears it. Therefore, if he were not able to nullify it on the Sabbath, he would never be able to nullify it in the future. To preserve this right, our Sages did not forbid nullifying vows on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

In this instance, only the vows that are necessary to be absolved tor the sake ot the Sabbath may be absolved on the Sabbath, since there is nothing preventing one from absolving the other vows on the following day (Maggid Mishneh).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 322) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 114) count this commandment as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Note the Magen Avraham 339:3, which questions the Rambam’s statements, asking why lashes that do not involve the violation of the Sabbath laws ares included in this prohibition. He explains that it is inevitable that the administration of lashes will result in bleeding.
Alternatively, the commandment teaches us that no cases of this nature may be judged on the Sabbath. The Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 114) favors this answer, for it also resolves another problem: Why is this restriction given the status of a separate mitzvah? Since the principle that the observance of a positive commandment does not supersede the observance of the Sabbath laws is already known, why is it necessary for the Torah to give us this commandment?

In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that there is a principle that a person who refrains from performing a positive commandment should be beaten until he agrees to perform it. Since these blows are not given as punishment, but rather as a prod to motivate the person to observe the commandments, they may be administered on the Sabbath.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this explanation is an original thought developed by the Rambam.

The Tzafenat Paneach notes that when considering the minimum size of a pebble one is liable for carrying, Shabbat 81a mentions two opinions: a pebble large enough to throw at an animal and a pebble large enough to throw at a bird. He questions why in. Chapter 18, Halachah 11, the Rambam follows the opinion that requires a pebble large enough to throw at an animal, when in this halachah the Rambam mentions a purpose to be served by a pebble large enough to scare away a bird.
In resolution, the Tzafenat Paneach explains that a pebble large enough to scare away a bird can serve a purpose as mentioned in this halachah. Nevertheless, as stated in Shabbat 79a, a person will not take the trouble of carrying an article that is tiny. Hence, the minimum measure for which one is liable for carrying must be more substantial.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 342:1, which states that this applies only when a person has not accepted the Sabbath. If, however, the person or the community in which he is living has accepted the Sabbath, these activities are forbidden even if a mitzvah is involved.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 4, which states that, “There is a doubt whether beyn hash’mashot is considered as part of the day or as part of the night.” Although, as mentioned there, we act stringently regarding the observance of Torah prohibitions during this time, certain leniencies are granted regarding Rabbinic prohibitions, as the Rambam explains.

See S’ deh Chemed (K’ lalim, Pe’ at HaSadeh 2:2) and others, who question whether or not the leniencies mentioned by the Rambam apply both beyn hash’mashot on Friday and beyn hash’mashot on Saturday. There is room to differentiate between them, because during beyn hash’mashot on Friday, the prohibition against these activities has not yet taken effect. On Saturday evening, by contrast, since the prohibitions have been in effect throughout the Sabbath, one might think that they need not be relaxed until the Sabbath has definitely concluded. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 342:1 rules that one may follow the more lenient view. See also the Be’ur Halachah 342 who mentions this issue.

Significantly, most manuscript copies of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 3:3) state that the prohibitions in the category of sh’vut do not apply during beyn hash’mashot, without mentioning the qualification that the matter must be pressing or involve a mitzvah. In one of his responsa (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 14), Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam’s son, explains that the Rambam changed his perspective when composing the Mishneh Torah and adopted a more stringent view than he had originally held.

This is forbidden as a sh’vut, as stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 6.

This is forbidden as a sh’vut, as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 5.

This refers to an eruv t’chumim (which allows a person to extend his Sabbath boundary), as stated in Hilchot Eruvin 6:9-10. Hilchot Eruvin 6:13, the Rambam states that during beyn hash’mashot, only an eruv chatzerot (which allows a person to carry in an enclosed area) may be made, but not an eruv t’chumim). The present ruling does not, however, represent a change of opinion. lt is referring to an instance where the eruv was made before the commencement of the Sabbath, and the person merely desired to move it on the Sabbth.

Note the Birkat Avraham (Responsum 14), which states that, even though tithing is itself a mitzvah, there is no obligation to tithe at a particular time. Here, the intent is that carrying out the activity beyn hash'mashot will allow the performance of a mitzvah that could not otherwise be performed. If that is true regarding tithing produce that definitely has not been tithed—e.g., to provide one with food for the Sabbath—one may separate tithes beyn hash'mashot.

As mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachot 9 and 14.

See Chapter 23, Halachah 15. Although tithing this produce involves a shvut and there is no mitzvah involved, this tithing is permitted, because the prohibition against using the produce is not that severe.

The Rambam’s rulings here have aroused the attention of the commentaries. To understand his perspective, it is worthy to quote Chapter 12, Halachah 7:
Should a child desire to extinguish [a fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father’s behalf. If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him.
Relevant concepts are also reflected in the Rambam’s rulings, Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 17:27- 28:.
[When] a minor eats a forbidden food or performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, the court is not obligated to restrain him, for he is not of intellectual maturity.
When does the above apply? When [the child] acts on his own initiative. We may not, however, feed him [forbidden food] ourselves. This applies even to foods that are forbidden because of Rabbinic decree. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom him to desecrating the Sabbath, even regarding matters that are forbidden as a sh’vut.
Although the court is not obligated to restrain a child [from eating forbidden foods], the [child’s] father is obligated to rebuke him... to train him [to conduct himself] in a holy manner.
According to the Rambam, the court is never obligated to restrain a child from performing a prohibited act, regardless of whether it originates from the Torah itself, or from Rabbinic decree. The child’s father, however, is obligated to educate him. If the father fails to do so, the court should rebuke the father if he allows his child to violate prohibitions that stem from the Torah. If, however, the prohibitions stem from Rabbinic law, the court is not obligated to rebuke the father.
This explanation of the Rambam’s approach is based on the statements of Rav Yosef Karo in the Kessef Mishneh and on his rulings in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1). The Ramah (based on Tosafot, Shabbat 121a) introduces a different perspective: that when a child has reached an age when it is fit to educate him in the performance of the mitzvot, the obligation to educate him falls on the court as well. Therefore, they are obligated to restrain him from transgressing Jewish law.

In this and in the following halachah, the Rambam sets the conceptual basis for the prohibitions described as muktzeh. The particular laws that result from these principles are described in the following two chapters.

See the notes on the beginning of Chapter 21, which use this halachah as a support for the principle that the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath is more than just a restatement of the negative commandment not to perform forbidden labor.

Walking, talking, and carrying.

The three reasons mentioned by the Rambam are the product of his own original thought. The Ra’avad notes that the Talmud (Shabbat 124b) mentions a further reason: lest one come to carry articles from one domain to another.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam did not intend to negate the reason mentioned by the Talmud. Nevertheless, as Shabbat 123b mentions, the prohibition originally instituted was partially relaxed. The reasons why it was not relaxed entirely are stated by the Rambam.

The Rambam’s wording implies that it is forbidden for a person to carry an article unless his act is purposeful. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 3 regarding which purposes are acceptable.) One may not carry a utensil, even one that is used for a permitted activity, without a purpose. (See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.)