Sechirut - Chapter 13

The mitzvah described in this chapter is not directly connected to the subject of Hilchot Sechirut, “The Laws of Rentals and Employer-Employee Relations.” Nevertheless, since it relates to the mitzvot discussed in the previous chapter - and indeed, certain laws are derived from the interrelation of these mitzvot - the Rambam mentions it in this place.

Once it has been unloaded, however, it may not partake of the produce, because it is no longer performing labor.

This ruling can be explained as follows: As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, permission for the animal to partake of food is derived from the verse: “Do not muzzle an ox while threshing.” “Do not muzzle” implies that a person may not prevent the animal from eating what it desires. There is, however, no license to feed it when it does not take the produce on its own (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 219) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 596) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Lashes are given because muzzling the ox involves the performance of a deed that violates a Scriptural prohibition for which another punishment is not stated. Indeed, since this prohibition is mentioned directly after the Torah relates how the punishment of lashing is administered, it is considered the paradigm from which we derive which prohibitions are punishable by lashes and which are not.

I.e., he prevents the animal from eating by shouting at it.
Bava Metzia 90b explains that he is liable for lashes for performing such an act. Although one receives lashes only when violating a transgression by performing a deed, shouting at the animal is also considered a deed.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, the Rambam describes taking a false oath, transferring the sanctity of an animal and cursing a colleague as transgressions that do not involve a deed, seemingly implying that transgressing a prohibition with speech is not considered to be performing a forbidden deed. The Maggid Mishneh, however, distinguishes between the two instances. For in our halachah, by shouting, the person brings about a deed. Cursing, transferring the sanctity of an animal and taking a false oath, by contrast, will never lead to deed. See Hilchot Temurah 1:1 where the Rambam states: “These three prohibitions will never involve a deed.”
Alternatively, the Maggid Mishneh explains that since transgression of the prohibition against muzzling an ox generally does involve a deed, a person is liable even when he violates through speech that is not considered a deed.

I.e., he must reimburse the owners for the amount the animal would normally eat during the day. If he rents the ox for a lesser time, he may reduce his payment proportionately (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:9).

Performing the kinyan of meshichah and thus formalizing the rental transaction.

Since the transgressor does not become liable for both obligations - lashes and the financial penalty - at the same time, he must suffer both punishments. It is only when he becomes liable for the two simultaneously that he is excused from lashes. See Hilchot Geneivah 3:1.

Since the Torah states the prohibition without any details, we assume that it applies in all instances when a Jew is involved. Thus, it applies even when the produce also belongs to the gentile (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:11).

For a gentile is not required to observe this mitzvah. This applies even if the gentile threshes the Jew’s grain.

Since the Jew does not perform the prohibition himself, he is not liable. The Maggid Mishneh notes that on the basis of Bava Metzia 90a, some authorities maintain that there is no prohibition involved in telling a gentile to muzzle one’s animal. As reflected by Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 16:13; the Rambam, however, considers telling a gentile to violate a prohibition as forbidden by the Torah.

Bava Metzia, ibid. explains that this law is speaking about an instance where a thorn became stuck in the ox’s throat accidentally and the worker did not remove it. If, however, the worker places the thorn there, he is considered to have muzzled the ox.

In which instance, the animal will not eat because of its fear of the lion. In this instance as well, Bava Metzia, ibid., states that if the worker places the lion there himself, he is considered to have muzzled the ox. Instead, the law is speaking about a situation where the lion came on its own accord.
Significantly, with regard to the case of the thorn, the Rambam uses wording that alludes to the Talmud’s explanation. With regard to the case of the lion, by contrast, the Rambam uses the phrase that the Talmud rejects, as explained above. Although the Kessef Mishneh maintains that there is a printing error in the Mishneh Torah, most printings and manuscripts contain the problematic text.

In which instance, the animal will not eat because of its desire to be with its son.

Since the animal is thirsty, it will eat less.

In this way, the animal will not see the grain. Therefore, it will not have any desire to partake of it.

In the latter instances, although the person performs a deed that prevents the animal from eating, he is not liable. The rationale is that the animal will not be prevented entirely from eating. Instead, it will eat less than usual.

Although the animal itself might desire to partake of the grain, since it is ultimately not to its benefit, it should be prevented from eating.

The heap offering of grain - one fortieth to one sixtieth of the crop - which must be given to the priests and may not be used by an Israelite. In the instance described above, since the animal that is threshing is not the property of a priest, he may not feed it terumah (Hilchot Terumot 9:8).
There is no requirement to separate terumah from grain until it is separated from its husks, and brought into a silo for storage. Nevertheless, if one designates terumah earlier, that designation is binding. As Rashi (Bava Metzia 90a) explains, in this situation, the owner of the grain designated a portion as terumah before it was threshed.

As opposed to grain about which there is a doubt whether it is terumat ma’aser, as mentioned in the following halachah.

Terumat ma’aser refers to the tenth portion of the tithe that the Levites must separate from the tithe and give to the priests. All the restrictions that apply to ordinary terumah apply to it as well.

Since the animal is forbidden to partake of this grain, the prohibition against muzzling it does not apply.

Ma’aser sheni means the second tithe. In four years of the seven year Shemitah cycle, after the first tithe is given to the Levites, a second tithe must be separated and taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. This grain is not considered to be a person’s private property, but as belonging to God. (See Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 3:17.) Therefore, the animal is not allowed to partake of it. Hence, there is no prohibition against muzzling the animal.

Even though they do thresh grain when passing through, since this is not intentional, they may be muzzled.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, offering an alternate interpretation of Bava Metzia 90a, the source for the Rambam’s ruling. The Rambam’s interpretation is, however, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 338:8) and other authorities. The Tur and the Ramah do not state that they differ with the Rambam, but do quote the Ra’avad’s view.

An onlooker might not be aware that the crops are terumah or ma’aser sheni and would think that the prohibition is being violated. It is not necessary to take such a safeguard when the cows veered off their path, because then it is obvious that they were not intended to thresh grain (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:15).

Demai is a term that refers to produce grown by common people who we fear were not careful with regard to the separation of the tithes (Hilchot Ma'aser 9:1-2). The word demai is a composite of two Aramaic word da mai, meaning "This. What is it?"- i.e., has the produce been tithed or not?" (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot 7:1). Nevertheless, we are not certain that the produce has not been tithed. Indeed, according to Scriptural Law, there are no restrictions against partaking of it.

This refers to an instance where a person sowed grain that was terumah. According to Scriptural Law, such produce is not considered terumah and may be used like ordinary produce. Nevertheless, our Sages restricted the use of this produce, requiring it to be treated as if it were terumah.

In Hilchot Terumah 11:28, the Rambam explains how one should thresh such grain: “He should tie a food sack around the neck of the animal and place that type of grain within. Thus, he is not muzzling the animal, nor is he feeding it terumah.”

Which is being hired to thresh.

Which will create thirst.

I.e., while on their lunch break, they may dip their bread in brine. While they are working, they may not partake of bread or salt with their grapes, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 10.

I.e., the worker. The prohibition applies whether the worker is poor or not. The Rambam, however, is referring to the source (Deuteronomy 24:14) that states: “Do not withhold the wage of a poor person.”

See Chapter 11.

The fourth blessing in grace was ordained by our Sages. At the time they ordained its recitation, they did not require a worker to recite it lest it take him away from his work (Hilchot Berachot 2:2). At present, since employers are more generous with their workers and are not as stringent in their demands on their time, workers are obligated to recite the fourth blessing in grace.

The term tzaddik as employed by the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah refers to a person who upholds Torah law, fulfilling his obligations. By describing Jacob with this term, the Rambam indicates that the requirement to work with “all one’s strength” is not an extra dimension of piety, but a requirement of the law itself (Likkutei Sichot, Volume XXV).

Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe’ah 1:1), which states that through observing the mitzvot between man and man, a person receives a reward not only in the world to come, but also in this material world.