Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 4

The Rambam does not mention an animal that had relations with a person, for that is not possible with regard to a fowl.

The Rambam mentioned this concept in the previous chapter. In this chapter, he outlines the details of these restrictions. The point of this halachah is that the restrictions apply to a fowl as well as to an animal.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:16; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:1.

Even if slaughtered according to Jewish Law (Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:22; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:9).

In matters of financial law, the testimony of one witness is of consequence only in that it can require an oath.

Similarly, the testimony of a person regarding his own property is of no consequence.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 8:1), the Rambam mentions two other instances where this law applies: the animal was consecrated before being brought to court or the forbidden sexual act was performed by a gentile.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 6:5 which explains that such an animal is not executed, because Exodus 21:28 requires such a punishment: “When an ox gores…,” i.e., that it does so on its own initiative, and not when it was prompted to gore.
See the gloss of the Radbaz to Chapter 3, Halachah 5, where he states that such an animal should be forbidden to the altar under all circumstances just like a sodomized animal is.

For relations with a male are not significant until that age (Hilchot Ishut 11:3; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 1:16).

See Hilchot Melachim 9:5-6 which states that although a gentile is liable to be executed for engaging in sexual relations with an animal, the animal itself is not executed. Nevertheless, involvement in the transgression disqualifies it as a sacrifice.

See Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:8, et al, where it is explained that until a girl is three years old, sexual relations with her are not significant.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on the latter point, noting that the ages the Rambam mentions are relevant with regard to the punishment of execution by stoning. Nevertheless, he argues that since the animal is disqualified from being offered as a sacrifice, because it becomes offensive to offer it after it engaged in forbidden relations, that concept would seemingly apply regardless of the age of the human with whom it engaged in those relations. Moreover, since the animal derived pleasure, the sexual activity should be considered significant. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that what is significant here is the halachic definition of sexual relations, not the pleasure the animal experiences. Since halachicly, the act is not considered as sexual relations, the animal is not forbidden.

The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about both an animal which is itself going to be worshipped, and also an animal that will be used for the service of a pagan deity.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that if one designated an animal as a false deity, that is sufficient to cause the animal to become repugnant and forbidden as a sacrifice, even if a deed is not performed. The Radbaz brings support for the Ra’avad’s ruling from Isaiah 30:22 which, when speaking about making the covering of idols’ impure, uses the expression: “Tell it: ‘Be gone,’” implying that “telling it,” i.e., speaking, is sufficient to cause an article to be considered as an idol.
The difference between the Rambam’s view and that of the Ra’avad results from a variation in the text of Temurah 29a. According to the Rambam, the passage is speaking about an animal dedicated to the service of a false deity, while according to the Ra’avad, it refers to an animal intended to be worshiped as a false deity. (The standard printed text supports the Rambam’s version, although Rashi mentions the other version as well.).
The Radbaz explains that according to the Rambam an animal is forbidden as a sacrifice only when it is forbidden to benefit from it. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:1, whether an animal is designated to be worshipped or as a sacrifice to a false deity, it does not become forbidden until a deed is performed. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the prohibition against benefiting from the animal is different from the prohibition against offering the animal as a sacrifice. More stringent rules apply in the latter context.

The Radbaz states that in an instance where two witnesses did not observe the transgression (as stated in Halachah 2), the person who engaged in relations with the animal is not at all liable to its owner financially, for he is not prohibited against benefiting from the animal.

In contrast to an animal which kills, which is not disqualified if it was goaded into killing (see Halachah 3), an animal that engaged in relations with a human is disqualified in all instances. Since the act causes it to be considered loathsome, the circumstances under which the act was performed are of no consequence.

This applies even (as stated in the previous halachah), he performed a deed indicating that the animal was set aside for pagan worship (Radbaz).

For once he consecrated it as a sacrifice, it is as if it no longer belongs to him.

Since a transgression has not been performed with it as of yet, it is not considered as loathsome (Radbaz).

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim (and in many other sources) a person cannot. cause an article that does not belong to him to become forbidden.

The Ra’avad quotes Avodah Zarah 54a which states that the above restriction applies only when one performs a deed with the article he worshipped. From the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:1, it is apparent that he maintains that the principle that a person cannot cause property that does not belong to him to be forbidden to be used applies even if he actually worships the article as a false deity and even when he performs a deed. The Rambam here is speaking about causing the article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to the altar and for that, a deed is not necessary.

Chapter 3, Halachah 10. Since the animal was consecrated, it cannot be used for ordinary purposes until it is redeemed and it cannot be redeemed until it is blemished.

Any garments or ornaments used to adorn the false deity. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 6:1), the Rambam explains that the reason for this restriction is that the ornaments were worshipped together with the false deity.

See Hilchot Avadat Kochavim 8:7.

Since they have not been worshipped, one is permitted to benefit from them and they may even be used as sacrifices [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

See Hilchot Avadat Kachavim 8:1 which states that “Any article that was not touched by human hands or made by man is permitted to be used even though it was worshipped as a false deity.”

Or any other part of the Temple building (Radbaz). As stated in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:16, the altar was made with whole stones, both large and small, over which is poured a liquid with lime, pitch, and molten lead. In the above instance, since the stones were taken from a mountain that was worshipped, it is inappropriate for them to be used for the altar.

Implied is that if the water is not his own, it may be used even as a libation even though it was worshipped (Rav Yosef Corcus). The Radbaz notes that no such leniency is granted with regard to the stones mentioned in the previous clauae. He differentiates between the two as follows: The water of a spring is constantly flowing. Thus, the water that was worshipped is not the same water that will be used for the libation. The stones of the mountain, by contrast, were worshipped themselves. Hence even though they are not a person’s private property, they may not be used for the Temple.

In this instance as well, an ordinary person is permitted to use the water, but it is inappropriate to be used for the altar.

I.e., the water libation offered during the Sukkot holiday. See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 10:6-10.

A tree that is worshipped. See Exodus 34:13; Deuteronomy 7:5, 12:3, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:3; et al.

In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:8, the Rambam writes that once a gentile nullifies the connection of a worshipped entity to paganism, it is permitted to benefit from it. The subsequent halachot in that chapter, describe the process of nullification. Here the Rambam is emphasizing that although it is permitted to benefit from the article afterwards, the fact that it was once worshipped - or served as an accessory to an article worshipped - prevents it from being offered as a sacrifice.

Similarly, the branches of a palm tree that was worshipped should not be used as a Lulav (Hilchot Lulav 8:1).

See the conclusion of the tractate of Kinnim which mentions how a sacrificial animal can be used for these purposes.
There the Mishnah states that the wool is unacceptable for use as techelet. The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 3, Halachah 14, the Rambam ruled that even though wheat was worshipped, the flour made from it is not disqualified for use as a meal offering, because it underwent a change. Nevertheless, in this and the other instances mentioned below, although the color and the form of the article may have undergone a change, that change does not alter its fundamental nature and it is still disqualified for the altar and its service.
Such wool is also disqualified for use in tzitzit or for any other purpose associated with a mitzvah. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 11:8).

I.e., as shofarot that are sounded together with the trumpets (Hilchot Taaniot 1 :4).

Among the instruments sounded in the Temple service were flutes (Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 3:4-6). Apparently, the thighs of sacrificial animals were hollowed out and converted into such instruments.

Because it was an integral part of an entity that was worshipped.

This general principle summarizes the concepts mentioned in the previous halachot. The Rambam now goes on to discuss other reasons why animals were forbidden as sacrifices.

Which is forbidden to be used as a sacrifice as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

Which is forbidden to be used as a sacrifice as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

I.e., in exchange for intimacy.

The Rambam is explaining that here the emphasis is on the halachic meaning of the term zonah (“harlot”) and not its popular meaning. The point is not that the present is forbidden because it was given in exchange for intimacy, but that it was given in exchange for intimacy with a woman who meets the halachic definitions of that term. That definition is given in Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 18:1: “Based on the Oral Tradition, we learned that the term zonah used by the Torah refers to one who is not a nativebom Jewess (thus excluding a gentile woman or maidservant) [or] a Jewish woman who engaged in relations with a man she was forbidden to marry, violating a prohibition that is universally applicable” (excluding the prohibited relations the Rambam mentions).

Incestuous and adulterous relations for which one is liable for karet (Hilchot Ishut I :5). These forbidden relationships are mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 18.

The nine forbidden relationships mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 1:7.

I.e., although he is engaging in intimacy out of lust and in exchange for payment, the woman is not termed a harlot, as Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:2 states: “Whenever a person has relations with an unmarried woman, even if she is a harlot who wantonly makes herself available to everyone ... she is not deemed as a zonah ... for she is not forbidden to marry [the people with whom she engaged in relations].”

I.e., she has experienced menstrual bleeding and has not purified herself afterwards.

For such relationships are also punishable by karet (see Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:1). Nevertheless, the fact that a woman is in the niddah state does not prevent the consecration of a woman from taking effect.

The consecration of such a woman is binding and she is considered as his wife (Hilchot Ishut 4:14).

Because he is forbidden to marry her and thus the present meets the criteria mentioned in the previous halachah.

See Temurah 29b.

The Radbaz explains that the Rambam’s intent is that although in a strict halachic sense, there is no prohibition against offering such an article as a sacrifice, it is an abomination unto God and should not be offered.

There are two points expressed by this halachah:
a) that, as stated above, a Canaanite maidservant is considered as a harlot;
b) that even though the present is not being given by the person engaging in the intimate relations, the present is still forbidden as a sacrifice.

Hilchot Avadim 3:3-4.

I.e., one might think that the law applies only with regard to a bondsman and his master, for the master has authority over the bondsman and has certain responsibilities toward him, but not with regard to two free men who are not associated in this manner (Kessef Mishneh).

And not an ordinary gift (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh). This applies evert when he does not explicitly say that he gave them to her because of the relations they shared (Radbaz).

Because it was given to her in exchange for relations. It is not significant whether it was given before the relations or afterwards.

Because they had not engaged in relations yet. We do not say that since it was designated as “a present for a harlot,” it is forbidden as a sacrifice (Radbaz).

Thus she was the legal owner at the time it was sacrificed.

If he did not make such a stipulation, he remains the legal owner of the animal. It is in the woman’s possession as security, but she is not its owner.

Temurah 29b considers this question and does not reach a conclusion.

And from the time an entity is consecrated, it is considered as having been given to the Temple. Hence, it could be considered as if it already had been sacrificed.

Instead, it should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish.

As evident from Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:20, this is the ruling whenever there is a question whether a substance offered as a sacrifice is acceptable.

The principle under which this halachah operates is that for a “present to a harlot” to be forbidden as a sacrifice, it must be acquired by the woman at the time of relations even though it does not come into her full possession until afterwards (Temurah 29a).

I.e., if the gentile woman later desires to offer this animal as a sacrifice, it is not accepted from her. Although we do accept animals brought by gentiles as burnt offerings, the animals must be acceptable.

According to Scriptural Law, an exchange is completed when an exchange is made. Hence, at the time the two engaged in relations, the lamb became the woman’s property. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that movable property is not transferred to the legal domain of the recipient until he acquires it through meshichah, physically drawing it into his possession (Hilchot Mechirah 3:1). Our Sages, however, did not impose this decree with regard to gentiles and transactions with them follow the original guidelines of Scriptural Law (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14). Hence a gentile harlot became the legal owner of the lamb directly after the relations. Hence it is considered as “the present of a harlot.” The fact that it was not given to her until years afterwards is not significant.

Because a person’s courtyard can acquire an article on his or her behalf when it is placed within it (Hilchot zechiyah UMatanah 4:8). Hence, while the woman is holding the lamb in lieu of the money, it is considered to have entered her possession.

Or other entities.

The finished product is considered as different from the raw material from which it is made.

For a consecrated article is not considered as his personal property. Hence, it is not his to give her (Temurah 30b).

To partake of a Paschal sacrifice, one must be designated to partake of it from the outset.

This refers to the festive offering brought on the fourteenth of Nisan to accompany the Paschal sacrifice. See Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:11.

Although the owner retains the right to give others to partake of the offerings, they are not considered as his private property. Instead, he is giving them the right to partake of consecrated property, not his own possessions.

For at that point - since the owner has despaired of its return and it has departed from the possession of the thief the harlot becomes its legal owner (as evident from Hilchot Geneivah 5:3). Accordingly, it is disqualified as a sacrifice.

I.e., the Rambam understands Temurah 30b as deriving this law from the exegesis of a verse. According to logic, we would apply the principle: A person cannot cause an article that does not belong to him to be become forbidden.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding the interpretation of the above passage. He maintains that it is speaking about ordinary doves. Nevertheless, since blemished doves are acceptable as sacrifices (Chapter 3, Halachah 1), one might think that a present to a harlot is also acceptable. Therefore, the Torah must teach us that this is not the case. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh favor the Ra’avad’s understanding of the passage.

Which is forbidden for the altar, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

For a certain portion of each one is being given in exchange for the dog.

For the article being offered is not considered as the article exchanged.

I.e., a person sodomized a dog and separated a lamb as a fee.

I.e., a person gave a colleague a lamb in exchange for a maidservant who was a harlot.

I.e., the articles donated to the Temple treasury are sold and the money used for improvements. Thus the distasteful article itself is not becoming part of the Temple.

See Temurah 30a.