Issurei Mizbeiach - Chapter 5

For the prooftexts says "No...." Although setting an entity afire is significant only if one sets afire an olive-sized portion (as stated in Halachah 3), if one mixes a small amount of a leavening agent or a sweetener together with other substances the size of an olive, one is liable for setting the mixture on fire.

Divash, the term used by the prooftext and the Rambam, means "honey." Here it is interpreted in a broader sense applying to date honey, bee-honey, and sweet sap from other fruits.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 98) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 117) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

If, however, he sets them afire for the sake of fuel, he is not liable as stated in Halachah 3.

Although one is liable for lashes for each individually, since both transgression are mentioned in the same verse, one is liable for only one set of lashes. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that he is liable for two sets of lashes. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the standard printed text of Menachot 58b appears to follow the Ra'avad's understanding, but a more comprehensive understanding of the issue would favor the Rambam's view.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 4:5) states that honey would greatly enhance the aroma of the incense offering. Nevertheless, it is forbidden by Divine decree.

On the Inner Altar where the incense offering is brought. If he would offer the incense on the Outer Altar, he would not be liable for lashes, because that is not the place where it is burnt (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., not together with a sacrifice.

As explained in the following halachah.

All of the entities the Rambam mentions are sacrifices or portions of sacrifices that were intended to be eaten and not offered on the altar.

See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:1; 9:1, which outlines the portions of the sacrifices that were eaten.

Ibid. 10:1.

Ibid. 12:9.

Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:12.

Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:7.

Ibid. 12:3.

Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:11.

Hilchot Mechusrei Kapprah 4:2-3.

From the exegesis of Leviticus 2:12, the Sifra and Menachot 57b derive that the altar's ramp is equivalent to the altar in this context.

The verse speaks about the two loaves offered on Shavuot and from them, inference is drawn to other sacrificial entities.

Although the Rambam considers this prohibition as Scriptural in origin, he does not consider it as one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot, Moreover, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that although this prohibition is derived from the exegesis of the verse cited above, since it is not explicitly stated in a verse, lashes are not given for its violation.

Here the prohibition applies only to the altar and not to the ramp.

Which was designated to be eaten and not consumed.

I.e., non-kosher. Conversely, in this context, "pure" means kosher.

And generally, lashes are given only when a negative commandment is violated and not when a positive commandment is violated.

As stated in Deuteronomy 14:6; see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 2:1.

In the verse stated at the conclusion of this halachah.

Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 2:1-2. There the Rambam explains that "with regard to the camel, the pig, the rabbit, and the hare, [Leviticus 11:4] states: 'These you may not eat from those which chew the cud and have split hoofs.' From this, you see that they are forbidden by a negative commandment, even though they possess one sign of kashrut." And he concludes "Certainly, this applies to other non-kosher domesticated animals and wild beasts that do not have any signs of kashrut." Thus although other non-kosher animals are not specifically mentioned in the prohibition, since they are included in the converse of the positive commandment, we conclude that the negative commandment applies to them as well.

The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, maintaining that just as one does not receive lashes for offering an animal with a blemish, so too, he does not receive lashes for offering an impure animal. His objection appears to be based on the principle that punishment is not given for transgressions that are derived by logical inference. Accordingly, since the obligation for lashes is explicit, even though it could be derived by logical inference, we should not make such a conclusion. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain the Rambam's perspective: these cannot be considered as prohibitions derived from logical inferences, because they are forbidden due to the positive commandment. Logic only expands the scope of the person's liability.

All sacrifices are brought from behemot, domesticated animals, or fowl, not from chayot, wild beasts.

The term tzon, translated here as "flocks," can be used in reference to both sheep and goats. This is the intent here.

This is a general principle, applicable in many different contexts. See Chapter 3, Halachah 8, Hilchot Ishut 1:8, et al.

The Radbaz quotes Bava Kama 66b which explains that this refers to an instance where a person steals an animal set aside as a sacrifice and offers it as that sacrifice. It reaches that conclusion for it is obvious that if the animal was not consecrated beforehand, its offering is not acceptable, for a person cannot consecrate an object that does not belong to him.

When it comes to questions of monetary law, the owner's despair of the object's return is not enough to cause it to be acquired by the thief (Hilchot Geneivah 5:2-3; Hilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah 2:1). Nevertheless, it is possible to say that according to Scriptural Law, the owner's despair is enough to effect the transfer of the property, further requirements are Rabbinic in origin and the Sages did not apply their decrees with regard to a sacrifice (Kessef Mishneh). Alternatively, with regard to questions of monetary law, a change of possession together with the owner's despair is sufficient to effect the transfer of the property (Hilchot Geneivah, loc. cit.). Similarly, in this instance, consecration of the animal is comparable to a change of possession (Lechem Mishneh, gloss to Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 18:14).

The Rambam's words imply that certainly the concept would apply if a burnt-offering was involved, but even when a sin-offering is involved, the principle is applied, implying that a sin-offering is a more severe issue than a burnt offering. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the word "even" should be omitted, implying that the two types of sacrifices are of equal standing.

(A similar concept applies with regard to the conclusion of the halachah: The Ma'aseh Rokeach suggests amending the text to read: "How much more so does this apply with regard to a burnt-offering?!" I.e., according to the Rambam, the sin offering is considered more severe, while the Ma'aseh Rokeach maintains that the burnt offering deserves more weight.)

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam uses "even" in reference to the first clause, even though the priests partake of such a sacrifice, it is unacceptable.

The Radbaz asks: How can our Sages rule that the sacrifice is unacceptable and require that the person bring another offering? Since according to Scriptural Law, he has fulfilled his obligation, bringing the second sacrifice is in fact transgressing, for he is slaughtering an ordinary animal in the Temple Courtyard (see Hilchot Shechitah 2:1). The Radbaz answers that from this we see the power of the Sages: that if there is a significant reason - as in this instance - their decrees can nullify the validity of the first sacrifice. Hence, when the person brings the second sacrifice, he is bringing a sacrifice required of him, not an ordinary animal.

But not a sin-offering, for a sin-offering must be brought explicitly for the sake of the person receiving atonement (Radbaz).

I.e., he did not specify the reason for which it should be offered.

I.e., it is as if he had the animal sacrificed himself.

Produce from which the agricultural obligations of terumah and the tithes were not separated. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 10:19-21.

This refers to produce from the five species of grain which is forbidden before the offering of the omer on the sixteenth of Nisan or the passage of that day. See ibid.:2-5.

A mixture of terumah and ordinary produce which may be eaten only by a priest. See ibid. 15:13; Hilchot Terumot 13:1-2. This is unacceptable, because the offerings must come from produce which is permitted to every Jew, not only a priest (Pesachim 48a).

The substances mentioned in the first clause, though forbidden at present, will ultimately be permitted, while those in this clause will never be permitted. Moreover, it is forbidden not only to partake of them, but also to benefit from them.

Produce that grows during the first three years of a tree's growth or replanting. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 10:9-10.

When a species of grain or vegetable is sown together with a vineyard, both plants become forbidden (ibid.:6-8).

This is a principle applicable in many other contexts as well. For example, Hilchot Lulav 8:1 speaks of being unable to fulfill that mitzvah with a stolen lulav.

I.e., once it is consecrated, it may never be used for ordinary purposes again, but must be destroyed like consecrated property that was disqualified.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 10:6), the Rambam uses the previous verse in that Biblical passage as a prooftext.

Implied is that these breads should be the first offerings brought from the new flour. Although it is permitted to be used by an ordinary person beforehand, it should not be used for sacrifices before then.

Since it is permitted to be used by a private person, after the fact, it is acceptable (op. cit.).

I.e., was placed with one's merchandise and was not intended to be used for one's individual purposes. Such wine is forbidden to be used on festivals, but not on the Sabbath. See Hilchot Shivitat Yom Tov 1:17.

Although the Rabbis forbade the use of such wine for private use, it is fundamentally permitted. Hence using it for a libation is not considered as bringing a forbidden substance as an offering. The Radbaz states that the Sages never extended their prohibition to encompass sacrifices.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 62) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 119) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This commandment is mentioned many times in this text; among the references: Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 2:1; 6:4, 21-22; 7:1-2; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 4:10; 6:3; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:16.

Although Menachot 21a explains that this concept can be derived from a verse, apparently, the Rambam does not accept the exegesis mentioned there.

See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 6:12.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 99) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 118) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The question is raised: Why is he liable for lashes? Lashes are not given for a transgression that does not involve a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2). In this instance, seemingly, the omission of salt does not involve a deed. In reply, it is explained that the offering of the sacrifice without salt is a deed and thus warrants lashes.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:16 where this concept is discussed. Salt is not placed on the entire meal offering, only on that fistful which is offered on the altar.

Although a private individual may donate wood for the altar (Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 6:9), he may not demand that this wood be used for his own sacrifice.

See the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 5:17 where the chamber is mentioned.