Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This refers to either a head tax or an income tax.

Provisions for his court and household expenses. As mentioned in Halachah 3:4, the king may not amass personal wealth through taxation.

This is also considered a need of the nation as a whole.

This includes both sales tax and customs duty.

Bava Kama 113a explains that these refer to duties that were enacted directly by the king. In contrast, the Greek and Roman rulers of Eretz Yisrael would frequently appoint tax collectors and sell them the right to collect taxes from the people as they saw fit. There is no obligation to pay taxes of this nature.

Halachah 3:8 stated that the king has no right to confiscate property. However, it is possible that his power is only limited in regard to punishments meted out for affronts to his honor. In contrast, tax evasion and other monetary infractions can be punished by seizure of property.

As one who rebels against the king’s authority, as described in Halachah 3:8.

This verse is part of the Biblical passage describing the rights of a king that will be explained.

In the same passage, Samuel had already told the people: “He will take your sons... your daughters... your servants... and your finest young men.”
Thus, in telling the people they will be servants, he obviously had another implication. Hence, the meaning of that term in this context can be derived by comparison to the verse in Deuteronomy. Previously, [Deuteronomy 20:11] states: “they shall be subject to your levy and they shall serve you.”

One of the thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis is gezerah shevah, an association between two verses on the basis of the use of a common word or phrase. In this case, the words “serve” and “servants” establish the analogy between the two verses. Just as the servitude in Deuteronomy is expressed through the payment of taxes, similarly, the servitude mentioned by Samuel can be interpreted in this fashion.

Mishpat Kohen (Hilchot Melachim 144:15) explains that all the privileges which are granted a king for the nation’s welfare (as opposed to those granted him to protect his honor), also apply to any government aside from a monarchy. Accordingly, such governments are also empowered to levy taxes. See also Drashot HaRan 11.

The Talmud and Rabbis frequently use the expression: “The laws of the ruling kingdom are law.”

When the people asked Samuel to appoint a king (1 Samuel, Chapter 8), God told him: “Obey their request. However, warn them solemnly and relate to them the rights of the king who will reign over them.” Samuel described to them in blunt terms how harshly the king could rule over the people.
Sanhedrin 20b records a debate between two Amoraim: Rav and Shmuel. Rav maintains that Samuel’s address was intended to frighten the people and, in fact, the king is not entitled to the privileges described in that passage.
Shmuel disagrees and maintains that though Samuel obviously intended to chastise the people, nevertheless, he also conveyed a true picture the rights and privileges to which the king is entitled.
In Hilchot Gezeilah, Chapter 5, the Kiryar Sefer explains that a tax collector appointed by any king, even a gentile, is “entitled to collect taxes because ‘the statutes of the kingdom are law’ as derived from the Biblical passage concerning the king as explained in Hilchot Melachim.” Tosafot, Sanhedrin 20b does not accept this view, maintaining that the privileges Samuel granted a king are reserved only for kings who rule over all Israel by Divine decree. Similarly, other commentaries (Rashbah, Yevamot 46a, Ritbah, Bava Metzia 73) explain that the application of the principle “the statutes of the kingdom are law” to gentile authorities stems from the king’s “conquest” of the land. Just as a king takes possession of a subject from another country when he subjugates them in a war, based on a similar rationale, he is given authority over the subjects of his own kingdom.
The latter viewpoint allows us to understand the statements of the Ran (Nedarim 28a), that in Eretz Yisrael, it is impossible for anyone to rule according to the principle of “the statutes of the kingdom are law.” By dwelling in any other country, a person willingly subjects himself to the rule of its king. He has the choice to accept that rule or find another homeland. In contrast, Eretz Yisrael is every Jew’s native home. No ruler has the right to force one to leave. Accordingly, dwelling there does not necessarily constitute acceptance of the local government.
In contrast, the perspective of the Kiryar Sefer which recognizes the authority of even gentile nations as stemming from the mandate granted by the Bible, would also recognize the rule of other Jews in Eretz Yisrael aside from the Torah appointed kings.
It is difficult to define which viewpoint the Rambam follows. In Hilchot Gezeilah 5:11, he writes “The statutes of the king are law... whether the king is Jewish or not.” He further clarifies the matter (ibid. 5:18): “In which case does this apply? When the king... is accepted by the inhabitants of that land who have placed their trust in him as their lord and [consented] to be his servants.” The terminology used appears to be closer to the view of the Tosafot and Ran.
This argument is not just a matter of theory, but is reflected in the different attitudes with which the Torah community views the secular government that presently exists in Eretz Yisrael. There are some who recognize the government’s laws according to the principle “the statutes of the kingdom are law,” while others do not accept its authority.

This and the following halachot continue to describe the privileges granted the king in the passage from I Samuel cited in the previous halachah.

It is curious why neither the Rambam nor the passage in Samuel mention the infantry. Throughout the centuries, armies were always primarily made up of these soldiers.

It is interesting to note that though a king could not own an extra horse to run before him (Halachah 3:3), he could employ humans for that purpose.

II Samuel 15:1 and I Kings 1:5 relate that when both Avshalom and Adoniyahu attempted to take control of the monarchy, they set up “horsemen and chariots and fifty men to run before them.”

Commenting on that verse, the Metzudot Tziyon interprets “finest” as “most attractive.”

By contrasting the wording used by the Rambam in this and the above halachah, the Rambam LeAm derives that the king’s soldiers were not paid wages. Instead, they were given room and board at the king’s expense.

If instead of purchasing them, he rents them temporarily.

If he purchases them.

The Targum renders this verse: “He will take farmers to plow... and craftsmen to make instruments.”

The “servants and maids” refer to Canaanite servants who are considered the property of their master. A king may requisition them for his own use.

I Kings 1:3 descries how “they sought for a fair maiden throughout the entire territory of Israel” to serve as an attendant to King David.

According to Torah law, marriage is a two staged process. In the first stage, referred to as kiddushin, a man consecrates a woman as his wife. From this time onward, she may not marry another man without divorce. Sexual relations with other men are considered adultery and are punishable by death. Nevertheless, the bride and groom are not permitted to live as man and wife.
The second stage of marriage, nissuin, involves the consummation of the marriage and the beginning of the couple’s life together. To allow for a harmonious home environment, the Sages developed basic guidelines outlining the obligations of a husband to his wife and vice versa. These responsibilities are recorded in the ketubah, marriage contract. Some of the ketubah’s obligations govern the married life of a couple. Others are instituted in the event the couple divorces or the bride is widowed. The ketubah takes effect only after the couple complete the second stage of marriage, nissuin. The details of the ketubah are outlined in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 12.

This definition is a point of controversy in Jewish law. Rashi in his commentary on Genesis 25:6, interprets concubines as having been consecrated to their men (kiddushin), but having agreed to live without a ketubah. Accordingly, a marriage bond has been established and relations with other men would be considered adultery.
The Rambam does not accept this view and designates a king’s concubine with a unique status in Jewish law. On one hand, she is not married. On the other hand, a relationship between her and the king has been established to the point where she can no longer engage in relations with other men.
The Rambam’s opinion allows us to comprehend an otherwise difficult Biblical narrative. II Samuel, Chapter 16 relates that when King David fled Jerusalem because of the rebellion of his son Avshalom, he left his ten concubines to care for the palace. When Avshalom occupied the palace, Achitofel, his counselor advised him to engage in relations with those concubines as a public act of defiance.
Avshalom followed his advice and his act strengthened his support among the people. Were the concubines to have enjoyed the status of wives, the Jewish people would never have approved of such open immorality. However, since the concubines were not considered as wives proper, though relations with them constituted a sin, it did not have the severity of adultery and hence, was not regarded as a moral affront (Radbaz).

Literally, yichud means to single out or designate. The Rambam LeAm maintains that the king establishes his bond with one of his concubines by designating her as his. Halachically, the term, yichud, means entering a private room where sexual relations could be carried out. Other commentaries maintain that the king must follow this practice in order to acquire his concubine.

Generally, sexual relations are not permitted without kiddushin. In Hilchot Ishut 1:4, the Rambam writes: “Anyone who has relations with a women with an immoral intent, without kiddushin, should be lashed according to Torah law.” An exception is made for a king. He may have relations with his concubines though he has not consecrated them as wives.

This statement is disputed by many authorities including the Ra’avad (Hilchot Ishut, ibid.) and the Ramban (Responsa). The Ramban cites a number of examples of righteous men, Caleb (I Chronicles 2:46) and Gideon (Judges 8:31), who possessed concubines though they did not serve as kings. (The Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Ishut resolves these incidents with the Rambam’s opinion explaining that these women may have been female maid-servants.)

Exodus 21:8-9 states: "If she is not pleasing to her master and he does not designate her as his wife..." Implicit in the sale of the girl as a maid-servant, was the provision that her master could later designate her as a wife for himself or his son. Nothing further had to be given the girl or her father. All that is necessary is that the master declare: "You are my designated bride" (Hilchot Avadim 4:7).
There is a difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. The manner in which a king takes a concubine resembles the consecration of a Hebrew maid-servant for in both cases, there is no necessity to give the woman kiddushin. However, the status of the two women is totally different. Once the Hebrew maid-servant is designated as a wife, she is considered having kiddushin and a ketubah. Indeed, the Torah’s description of a husband’s obligations to his wife (Exodus 21:10) are taken from the passage describing the relationship with a Hebrew maid-servant.

Similarly, the narrative from 11 Samuel cited above relates how David charged his concubines with supervision of the palace in his absence.

Two concepts can be derived from the wording used by the Rambam: a) A king may appoint an officer to his service against the latter’s will; b) By nature, a Jew should not desire authority and position. He must be forced to accept it.

Exodus 18:21 mentions a further division of authority “Leaders of thousands, leaders of hundreds, leaders of fifties, leaders of tens.”

Fields refer to fields of grain. Thus these represent the three primary agricultural necessities. Similarly, we find the Torah frequently grouping these three together as in Deuteronomy (11:14): “You will have ample harvest of grain, oil, and wine.”

Tosafot, Sanhderin 20b, questions this law based on the narrative of King Achav and Navot of Yizrael.
Achav desired Navot’s vineyard and the latter refused to sell it to him. To satisfy Achav’s desires, Izevel, his wife hired two false witnesses to testify that Navot cursed both God and the king. Navot was executed because of this testimony and Achav acquired his vineyard on the basis of the principle (Halachah 9) “The property of all those executed by the king, [belongs] to the king.” Why didn’t Achav take possession of the vineyard by exercising the regal privileges granted him in this halachah?
Among the resolutions offered are: a) the king may only take possession of a field or vineyard to provide food for his servants while Achav desired to take Navot’s vineyard as his personal property. b) the king is only entitled to commandeer the produce of a field or vineyard. He may not take possession of the property itself, as Achav desired (Radak).
Kin’at Eliyahu offers a resolution based on the Rambam’s words. The Rambam continues: “if they have no source of nurture other than them,” and in Achav’s era, there was no lack of vineyards.

The Rambam’s wording implies that the king is only allowed this right in extreme circumstances.

Bava Kama 60b mentions that David’s troops paid for produce taken to feed their animals. See also the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhderin 2:5.

Commenting on the verse in Samuel, the Radak explains that the king can keep this tenth as his personal property.

The king’s tenth comes in addition to the first tithe which must be given to the Levites (Numbers 18:21-24) and the second tithe (Deuteronomy 14:22-29) which in certain. years must be eaten in Jerusalem and in other years, given to the poor.

Aside from this obligation, we are required to offer a tenth of the beasts born to our herds and flocks as sacrifices in the Temple (Leviticus 27:32).

The Radbaz cites Ezekiel 48:21 “And the remaining portion shall be for the Nasi” as the source for the Rambam’s statements.
Other commentaries cite the Rambam’s source as Bava Batra 122a which states that in the Messianic age, Eretz Yisrael will be divided up into thirteen portions. One portion will be given to each of the tribes and the thirteenth to the Nasi, i.e. the Mashiach.
That Talmudic passage speaks about Eretz Yisrael proper while the Rambam speaks about the lands to be conquered. Nevertheless, a correlation between the two statements can be made for Pesikta Rabesi teaches that, in the Messianic age, Eretz Yisrael will spread out over the entire world.

Becoming their personal property.

Therefore, in the narrative of Achav and Navot cited above, Izevel’s hired witnesses testified that Navot had cursed the king. Accordingly, as explained in Halachah 3:8, he could be executed as one who rebelled against the king and his property could be taken by the king.
This law applies only to those executed for rebelling against the king. The property of a person executed for violation of one of the sins that carries the death penalty is granted to his heirs (Hilchot Evel 1:9).
The Radbaz (Responsa 533) writes that even a non-Jewish king is entitled to the property of those executed for rebelling against him.

Sanhderin 20b considers it as a logically accepted principle that the personal property of one king should only be acquired by another king.

A Jewish soldier was not allowed to loot for his own personal benefit. Rather, the spoils of war were considered the property of the army as a whole and divided among them as described.

Sanhderin 20b, 21a derives this principle as follows: I Chronicles 29:22 states: “And they anointed Solomon as governor and Tzadok as [High] Priest” establishes an equation between a king and a High Priest. Accordingly, just as a High Priest is given half of the showbread, similarly, a king is given half of the spoils of war.

Rashi (Sanhderin 20b) explains that the king is entitled to select the first and better half as a token of respect and honor.

I Samuel, Chapter 30 relates that, in David’s absence, Amalekites plundered Ziklag, the city in which he had been encamped. When he returned, David and his troops set out after the raiding party. A third of his men, faint from their journey, were unable to keep up with the pace set by David and abandoned the chase. David left any unnecessary baggage with them and resumed his pursuit.
He was able to overtake the Amalekites and rout their camp. All the spoil that the Amalekites had previously taken became David’s. When he returned to the troops who had remained to guard the baggage, “the bad and worthless of those who accompanied David protested: ‘Since they did come with us, we will not give them of the spoil.’”
David answered them as quoted by the Rambam. The passage concludes: “He made it a statute and ordinance for Israel to this day.”
Bereishit Rabbah 43:9 explains that David continued an existing precedent. When Abraham defeated the four kings and returned with their spoil (Genesis, Chapter 14), he granted a share of the spoil to his companions, Aner, Eshkol, and Mamre, even though they did not take part in the actual battle.

As his personal property. This halachah refers to other kings besides the Messiah. Hence, there is a difference between this halachah and Halachah 8. Alternatively, Halachah 8 speaks about lands that Israel (i.e., the people as a whole) will conquer, while this halachah speaks about lands conquered by the king himself.

Since these lands become the king’s personal property, he may divide them as he sees fit.
The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 497) questions the source for this halachah. The Mishpat HaMeluchah suggests that the Rambam’s source is Gittin 8b which describes Syria as “territory conquered by a single individual,” David. On that passage, Rashi comments that David did not conquer Syria for the sake of the entire people, but for his own needs.

I Kings 3:9 relates that when God granted Solomon a wish, the latter asked for “an understanding heart to judge our people.” Similarly, Kalah Rabesi, Chapter 8 relates how royalty is acquired with 30 distinctions, among them “justice and righteousness, as (Proverbs 16:12) states: ‘His throne shall be established through righteousness. “‘

It is interesting to note that, according to Sanhderin 20b, this quote is taken from the words of the common people who “spoiled the tone” to the nation’s request from Samuel.
The Rambam’s words have the tone of a summation because this halachah concludes the laws which are directly related to the king as an individual. The following chapters discuss other issues: among them; wars, relations to gentiles, and the Messianic age.

The words, milchemet mitzvah, mean “a war which is a mitzvah.” Waging each of the three wars mentioned in this halachah fulfills one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Sifri, Ekev, relates that God criticized David for conquering Syria before he conquered the totality of Eretz Yisrael. The conquest of Eretz Yisrael is a milchemet mitzvah, while the conquest of Syria was not. God rebuked him, “You did not drive out the Jebusites living close to your own palace and yet, you found it necessary to conquer Aram.”

See Halachah 4.

See Halachah 5.

In his commentary to the Mishnah, Sotah 8:6, the Rambam differentiates between the two wars previously mentioned and the war that follows. He describes the previous two wars as chovah, an obligation and the latter as mitzvah, fulfilling God’s command. See also Sotah 44b.

Leviticus 19:16 commands “Do not stand still over your neighbor’s blood.” Sefer HaMitzvot (neg. command 297) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 237) interpret this verse as a mitzvah to protect a Jew’s life when he is in danger. As an extension of that principle, Numbers 10:9 obligates us to “go to war against an enemy who attacks you...,” promising that “you will be remembered by God and delivered from your enemies.” See also Eruvin 45a.
This principle applies in the Diaspora, as well as in Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 229:6, relates that if gentiles attack Jews, even on the Sabbath, it is a mitzvah to organize a defense force and mount a counter-attack.
The Ramah adds that even if the enemy have not mounted their attack, but it is well known that they desire to attack the Jews, war should be waged against them. This concept has contemporary relevance as well. For example, based on this principle, many of the Rabbinic leaders in Eretz Yisrael declared the 1982 war in Lebanon a milchemet mitzvah, for the Palestinians made no secret of their desire to attack the Jews.

Once the totality of Eretz Yisrael has been conquered, Amalek annihilated, and there is no danger posed to Jewish settlements.

I.e., to conquer additional territory.

Also implied is the acquisition of wealth through plunder as obvious from Berachot 3b.

This also has a certain military value. Enhancing Israel’s reputation will make other nations less eager to attack her.

The Sanhderin, Israel’s highest court, composed of 71 judges.
This Halachah is derived by analysis of the wording used in Sanhderin 2a and 20b. In both places, the Mishnah states that the king needs the approval of the Sanhderin to wage a milchemet hareshut, implying that their approval need not be sought for a milchemet mitzvah.

The Ramban (Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 17) adds that it is also necessary for the king to consult the urim vitumim as oracles before embarking on any war, even a milchemet mitzvah.
Berachot 3a states explicitly that David would consult the urim vitumim before a milchemet hareshut. Similarly, the commentaries (Ramban, Rashi) on Numbers 27:21 explain that Joshua would consult the urim vitumim regarding the conquest of Eretz Yisrael which is a milchemet mitzvah.
Although here, the Rambam does not mention the urim vitumim in regard to either of these wars, in Hilchot Klei HaMikdash which describe the consultation of the urim vitumim, he mentions inquiring of them before setting out to wage war.

As explained in Halachah 7:4, the entire nation, even a groom from his marriage chamber, may be mustered for a milchemet mitzvah.

From the Rambam’s words, it appears that after the nullification of the Sanhderin, the Jewish people are only able to fight defensive wars.

The bracketed additions are based on Rashi’s commentary, Sanhderin 20b.

To allow for passage of his troops. Significantly, Rashi, loc. cit., appears to interpret the Talmudic passage as referring to the king’s right to requisition property to provide food for his troops.

On the contrary, a person who does so is considered as rebelling against the king and is liable to be punished accordingly.

To the width or length.

Bava Batra 100b relates that normally a public thorough-fare is 16 cubits wide; the highways leading to the cities of refuge, 32 cubits; and “there is no limit to the road a king may make.”

Though, as explained in Chapter 6, Halachot 8-10, we are prohibited from wantonly destroying fruit-bearing trees, the king is allowed to proceed to his battle field without making any deviation. See also Bava Kama 60b.

Apparently, this Halachah applies both in regard to a milchemet mitzvah and a milchemet hareshut (Lechem Mishneh).

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 187), Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 425).

The Canaanites, Chittites, Amorites, Girgishites, Perizzites, Chivites, and Jebusites (Deuteronomy 7:1).

In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam explains that these nations were to be destroyed because they were "the essence of idol-worship." Otherwise, God feared that Israel would learn from their behavior. As related frequently in the Book of Judges, Israel's hesitation in fulfilling this command showed how well-founded these fears were.

The use of the expression “anyone” has significant implications. At the conclusion of the section of Sefer HaMitzvot dealing with positive commandments, the Rambam explains that certain commandments are incumbent on the nation as a whole and others, on each person as an individual.
The commentaries explain that the mitzvah to annihilate the seven nations is incumbent on the nation as a whole. In contrast, the prohibition against allowing a Canaanite to live is an individual responsibility.

See Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 49, Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 528.

See also the commentary to Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 187) states that David completed the destruction of these nations except for a small remnant who became assimilated among the other nations without preserving their identity.
In his description of this mitzvah, the Rambam touches on a point of debate. When he defined the governing principles for including a command as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah, the Rambam specified that a mitzvah must be a command for eternity and not for a specific time period alone. On that basis, a number of commands, for example, the command to wage war against Midian (Numbers 7:2), were excluded from this reckoning.
The Rambam explains that the command to annihilate the Canaanites should be considered a mitzvah, though it can no longer be fulfilled, because a time limit was never placed on the mitzvah itself. Had these nations’ identity not been obliterated in the previous generations, we would still be obligated to destroy them today. In contrast, the mitzvah to wage war against the Midianites was only an immediate proposition. There was no mitzvah to continue this struggle in the coming generations.

See Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 188, Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 604.

In his explanation of the mitzvah to annihilate the seven nation in Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam writes that, in contrast to the seven nations, Amalek still exists today.

The mitzvah to obliterate Amalek is more inclusive than that destroy the seven nations. AII traces of Amalek’s identity must be wiped out. Even their herds and cattle must be slain. In contrast, spoil could be taken from the seven nations. (See Sifri, Ki Teitzei and the commentary of Rav Yosef Caro on the Tur, Orach Chayim 690).

See Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 189, Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 603.

Exodus 17:8-16 describes how Amalek attacked Israel at the beginning of the journey through the desert. Deuteronomy (loc. cit.) explains that Amalek did not attack Israel head on. Rather, they ambushed the stragglers who tarried behind the entire camp.
Amalek’s attack had a particularly negative aspect. After the miracles of the ten plagues and the splitting of the Red Sea, no other nation would have dared to attack the Jews. Undaunted, Amalek challenged them in battle. Although they were severely beaten, they reduced the awe with which the nations had regarded the Jews.

Megillah 18a explains that we are obligated to make a verbal statement recalling Amalek’s attack. Therefore, each year before Purim, the passage from Deuteronomy mentioning Amalek is read from the Torah. This time was chosen because Purim commemorates the downfall of Haman, who was a descendant of Amalek. In addition, certain communities follow the custom of reciting this passage every day.
However, by using the term “constantly” above, the Rambam implies that these readings do not represent a complete fulfillment of the mitzvah. Rather, the remembrance of Amalek must always be in our minds.

This is also counted as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 59, Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 605).

As mentioned in Halachah 2, the approval of the court is necessary, for these wars are milchamot hareshut.

Hilchot Terumah 1:2 states:
Eretz Yisrael as referred to at all times is defined as lands conquered by a king of Israel or a prophet with the backing of the majority of Israel. This is referred to as a “conquest of the people at large.”
However, if an individual, family, or tribe of Israel go and conquer a place on their own, even if it is within the land promised to Abraham, it is not considered Eretz Yisrael with regard to the observance of the mitzvot.

The Sifri, Ekev derives this principle as follows:
Deuteronomy 11:24 states: “Every place upon which your feet tread shall belong to you.” Why is this verse necessary?
Its purpose cannot be the definition of the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael, for the same verse continues “Your boundaries shall extend from the desert [to] the Lebanon, from the river, the Euphrates...” Thus, we must conclude that it teaches that every place which you conquer beyond these boundaries is yours... and the mitzvot [applicable to Eretz Yisrael] must be kept there.

Hilchot Terumah 1:7 defines the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael as conquered by Joshua and the subsequent leaders as follows (see the map on page 41):
[The southern border runs] from Rekem in the east... to the Mediterrean Sea. [The western border] is the Mediterranean Sea from Ashkelon, in the south... to Akko in the north. From Akko, one proceeds [northeastward to Kziv. The area to one’s right, on the east, can generally be assumed to be of the Diaspora unless it is specifically known that it was part of Eretz Yisrael. The area to one’s left, to the west, can generally be assumed to be part of Eretz Yisrael unless it is specifically known to be part of the Diaspora. From the slopes of the Umenum Mountains and to the south is Eretz Yisrael,... to the north, the Diaspora.

Hilchot Terumah 1:3 states: “The lands which David conquered outside of Eretz Canaan... are not considered Eretz Yisrael... even though he was a king and his deeds were approved by the Sanhderin....
“Why were they given a lesser status than Eretz Yisrael, because David conquered them before he conquered all of Eretz Yisrael.”
See also the commentary to Halachah 1 and the Sifri quoted there.

As explained in Halachot 9-12, there is a great advantage in living in Eretz Yisrael. However, a Jew is not obligated to dwell there and may settle in other lands as well.

A parsah is a Persian measure of distance (parsang) approximately 4 kilometers in modern measure.

Modern day Ethiopia, according to most commentaries. Similarly, Ezekiel 29:10 places Kush as Egypt’s southern border. Shmot Rabbah 10:2 relates that there were frequently border squabbles between Kush and Egypt.

The Sahara. Its eastern border is the lake of Alexandria (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 46).

Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 500) include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. AII of the three admonitions are considered as one negative commandment.
The Kaftor ViPerach, Chapter 8, relates that frequently, the Rambam would sign his correspondence: “The writer who transgress three prohibitions every day.”

Sukkah 51 b relates that Alexander the Great massacred millions of Jews in his conquest of that city. This punishment came as retribution for their violation of this prohibition.

Both to buy and sell merchandise.

See the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhderin 10:8.

The Hagahot Maimoniot notes that throughout the ages, Jews have settled in Egypt. Frequently, the Egyptian Jewish community was large, wealthy, and influential. Even the Rambam himself lived there.
The Radbaz offers a number of explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, he mentions the opinion of the Yereim (309), although he rejects it as insufficient, that the prohibition consists of "returning on this way," i.e. from Eretz Yisrael to Egypt.
Secondly, he mentions that most of the people who settled in Egypt did not originally come for the purpose of settling there. Rather, they came to engage in trade, but economic and social pressures elsewhere caused them to make their stay permanent. Hence, their initial entry was not forbidden. In regard to the continuance of their stay, it is possible that their Torah authorities had a more lenient view than the Rambam.
In regard to the Rambam himself, the Radbaz explain that he was forced to stay in Egypt by the Sultan who appointed him as his personal physician and would not let him leave.
In the same statement, the Radbaz explains that he personally lived in Egypt for many years. He originally came for the purpose of studying Torah. He stayed to teach others and ultimately, made aliyah to Jerusalem.
The Kabbalistic Sage, Rabbi Isaac Luria, who also lived in Egypt, explains the concept from a mystical perspective (Pri Etz Chayim, Section 8, Chapter 3).
Every aspect of creation possesses a Godly spark which gives it life and maintains its existence. However, the material nature of the world conceals this inner Godliness and prevents its expression. The purpose of a Jew’s life is to elevate and refine the environment in which he lives, revealing the Godliness concealed in the world's physical substance.
When the Jews left Egypt after the years of bondage, they took with it all her material wealth, leaving it "as a granary without wheat, a net without fish" (Berachot 9b). Together with the country’s material assets, they also removed her spiritual possessions, the Godly sparks allotted to that land. A Jew was forbidden to go back to Egypt because there was nothing for him to do there. All the Godliness had already been elevated.
However, with the passage of centuries, people came to Egypt from other lands, bringing with them Godly sparks from their native countries. Accordingly, there was a need for Jews to elevate these Godly sparks and hence, the Egyptian Jewish community was renewed.

For one may enter for commercial purposes.

An earthly court cannot administer punishment whenever there is no deed involved in the violation of a Torah prohibition (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2). Thought is not considered a deed. Thus, once a person is already located in Egypt, his decision to stay does not warrant punishment. Nevertheless, it does constitute a violation of a Torah command.

This phrase introduces a conclusion reached by the Rambam that has no explicit source in previous. Rabbinic literature.

For then, it would no longer be considered Egypt, but rather, part of Eretz Yisrael.

Here, the word “individuals” implies people and communities other than the king and the Sanhderin who represent the people as a whole.

Many authorities (see Minchat Chinuch, Mitvah 500, Chayim Sha’al, Responsum 91) rationalize the existence of Jewish communities in Egypt as follows: The prohibition against dwelling in Egypt was instituted lest the Jews emulate the depraved behavior of the Egyptians. When Sannecherib conquered the world, he engaged in a process of mass population transfer, moving nations from one land to another to the point that none of Israel’s neighbors were able to preserve their national identities.
Thus, though Deuteronomy 23:8-9 forbids marriage with an Egyptian convert until three generations pass, the Rambam maintains that this prohibition is no longer applicable. For “the Egyptians presently dwelling in the land of Egypt are of a different nationality” than those who initially inhabited that land (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:5).
Similarly, these authorities maintain that the prohibition against dwelling in Egypt is also dependent on the presence of the original Egyptians. Hence, since they no longer live in Egypt, a Jew is not forbidden to live there.
(The commentaries note that this opinion appears to run contrary to Sukkah 51b quoted above which states that the massacre perpetrated by Alexander the Great, many years after Sannecherib’s conquest, took place as retribution for the Jews settling in Egypt.)
The Rambam also does not accept this view. He maintains that the prohibition stems from the land itself. As long as it is inhabited by gentiles, the nature of the land itself will impart depraved character traits to its inhabitants. (Note a similar concept in BaMidbar Rabbah 20:22.) Only when it will be conquered by the Jews and incorporated into Eretz Yisrael will this nature change.

There are three aspects to the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael: a) the holiness of the land. Kelim (1:6, quoted by the R. ambam, Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:12) states that Eretz Yisrael is holier than all other lands. Note the Mishnah Achronah which explains that this holiness is a totally independent factor than the obligation to perform mitzvot there. b) There are many mitzvot that can be fulfilled only there. In his commentary to Bava Batra 91 a, the Rashbam writes that the prohibition against leaving Eretz Yisrael was instituted because by doing so, a person forsakes the mitzvot. (See also Tashbaytz, Responsum Vol. 111, 200; Maharit, Vol. 1, Responsa 47.) c) God’s choice of the land. “Eretz Yisrael is dear... for when God created the world he apportioned the other lands to the... nations, and chose Eretz Yisrael (Midrash Tanchuma, Re’eh).

In his Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 4), the Ramban counts the mitzvah of conquering and settling Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Rambam does not subscribe to this view. Though this and the following three Halachot emphasize the great importance and dearness of Eretz Yisrael, as evident from Halachah 7, the Rambam does not consider a Jew obligated to live there.
To explain in greater detail. According to the Rambam, the mitzvah to annihilate the seven Canaanite nations also includes the mitzvah to conquer Eretz Yisrael. This mitzvah is incumbent on the people as a whole. There is no mitzvah incumbent on an individual to settle in Eretz Yisrael. The Raman, by contrast, maintains that every person has an individual obligation to settle Eretz Yisrael.
Although according to the Rambam, living in Eretz Yisrael is riot a mitzvah, a person is allowed to leave Eretz Yisrael only for the reasons mentioned below. The commentaries question whether the obligation to remain in Eretz Yisrael applies only to those who live there permanently or also, to those come as tourists or on business.

Permission is granted to leave Eretz Yisrael to study Torah because of its fundamental importance in Jewish life. One’s entire Jewish practice depends on one’s study.
This license is even granted when there are qualified teachers in Eretz Yisrael for each person’s nature differs and it is necessary to find a teacher with whom he feels comfortable (Avodah Zarah 13a).
Many authorities grant license to leave Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of teaching others Torah (Siddur Ya’avetz, Sulam Bet El 6)

Marriage endows a person with stability and personal equilibrium. Similarly, it allows one to fulfill the mitzvah of “be fruitful and multiply.” Hence, it was considered sufficiently important to allow one to leave Eretz Yisrael.
The Shialtot D’Rabbenu Achai Gaon maintain that Torah study and marriage are only mentioned as examples and a person may leave Eretz Yisrael in order to perform other mitzvot as well. However, this view is not accepted by most commentaries. They maintain that leniency was granted in these two instances alone because of their paramount importance.

On a number of occasions, the Talmud grants leniencies because “a person becomes overly agitated when his property is at stake.” For example, because of this tendency, Shabbat 120a relaxes certain facets of the prohibition against moving objects from one domain to another to allow a person to save his property from fire. Based on the same principle, Avodah Zarah (ibid.) allows an individual to temporarily leave Eretz Yisrael to sue gentiles or rescue one’s property in other ways.

Rav Chaninah forbade a Torah scholar from going from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum (marrying the widow of his childless brother) because the marriage would require him to settle in the latter place (Ketubot 111a).

Mo’ed Kattan 14a explains that leaving Eretz Yisrael to do business is equivalent to leaving to obtain food. For through this commercial activity, one will be able to sustain himself and family.

When inflation has reached the point that basic living necessities are being sold at double their normal price, one can permanently leave Eretz Yisrael. It can possibly be inferred that one may leave temporarily under less severe conditions.

Bava Batra 91a mentions one opinion which allows a person to leave Eretz Yisrael in the face of inflation only if he cannot purchase his basic necessities. Since the Rambam does not make this qualification, we may assume he does not accept it (see Kessef Mishneh).

Eruvin 82b relates that once food was being sold at half the market price in Tiberias and yet, the city was filled with people starving from famine because there was no money available.

Pikuach Nefesh, risk of life, supercedes observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah. However, if there is no danger to life, it is pious to remain in Eretz Yisrael though a certain degree of privation is involved.

The husband and brother-in-law of Ruth.

Though they left in a year of severe famine (Ruth 1:1), they were punished by death for abandoning Eretz Yisrael. The Alshich explains that they were punished because they were the only family that left. Though the rest of Israel also suffered severely from the famine, none considered leaving Eretz Yisrael.

Acre is on the northern border of Eretz Yisrael. Before he left the land or when he entered, Rav Abbah would kiss its stones as a sign of endearment (Ketubot 112a).
The Talmud continues, relating that “Rabbi Chaninah would lift up its stones.” Rashi explains that he would remove obstacles from the streets of that city so that people coming to Eretz Yisrael would not receive a bad impression.
Tosafot, basing its commentary on Midrash Tanchuma, Shelach, relates that when Rabbi Chanina made aliyah from Babylonia, he frequently asked whether he had already entered Eretz Yisrael. No one could answer him.
To clarify the matter, he would pick up the stones and weigh them in his hands. When the stones were light, he was sure that he had not left the Diaspora. However, when he felt that the stones were heavier, he lifted them to his mouth and kissed them. “These are the stones of Eretz Yisrael,” he exclaimed. Afterwards, he recited the verse from Psalms quoted above.

Rav Chiyah bar Gamda would follow this practice out of his love for the land (Ketubot 112b).

Commenting on this verse, Rashi relates that the exiles carried with them stones from Jerusalem to Babylon to build a synagogue there.

Metzudat David interprets this verse as follows: The inhabitants of Jerusalem will not be sick because of difficulties and troubles. They will not be plagued with these for all their sins will be forgiven.

Ketubot 111a relates that being buried in Eretz Yisrael is like being buried under the Temple altar.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Kilayim 9:5) relates that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi bar Keria saw coffins being brought to Eretz Yisrael. The latter commented: “Why bother to bring them now? Why didn’t they live in Eretz Yisrael? The verse (Jeremiah 2:7): ‘You have come and made My land impure’ applies to them.”
Rebbi Eliezer answered: “As soon as they enter Eretz Yisrael and its dirt is placed on their coffins, they are granted atonement. The land atones for them.”
The Hagahot Maimoniot explains that it is also customary to place earth from Eretz Yisrael in the graves of people buried in the Diaspora.

The Sages decreed that the earth of any country outside Eretz Yisrael is ritually impure (Gittin 8b).
Amatziah, priest of Bethel, wanted to banish Amos from Samaria. Amos responded to him harshly, prophesying “Your wife will be a harlot in the city. Your sons and daughters will die by the sword. You shall die in an impure land and Israel will be exiled from her land.”

The Sage, Ulah, would frequently visit Eretz Yisrael. However, he died in the Diaspora. When his students informed Rav Eliezar of his passing, the latter exclaimed: “Ulah! Why was it fitting for the fulfillment of the prophesy ‘you shall die in an impure land’ to befall you?”
The students protested that he would be buried in Eretz Yisrael. However, Rav Eliezer did not accept that rationalization, replying as quoted by the Rambam (Ketubot 111a).

Who commanded Joseph to bury him in Eretz Yisrael (Genesis 47:30).

Who made the Jews swear to take his coffin with them from Egypt to Eretz Yisrael when they would be redeemed (Genesis 50:25). Note the comments of Ketubot 111a.

Certain authorities maintain that living in Eretz Yisrael is only significant when the Temple is standing. Tosafot, Ketubot 110b explains that at present, when we are unsure of how to fulfill many of the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation to live there. With the expression, "at all times," the Rambam negates both these views.

The Tosefta, Ketubot writes that generally a high priority is placed on living in a Jewish environment. Similarly, in Hilchot De’ot 6:1, the Rambam writes:
It is human nature for a person’s... behavior to resemble that of the inhabitants of his country. Therefore, a person should always associate with the righteous and dwell among wise men, so that he will learn from their behavior... Similarly, if he is in a country whose ways are bad and whose inhabitants do not follow a straight path, he should go to a place whose inhabitants are righteous....
Nevertheless, these factors are of lower priority than living in Eretz Yisrael.

Ketubot (ibid.) quotes the same principle as the Rambam, but uses the expression: “Whoever lives in the Diaspora...” rather than “whoever leaves...” (The exact expression employed by the Rambam is also used by Torat Kohanim, Behar.) By choosing the word “leave,” the Rambam emphasizes that the criticism is directed at someone who departs from Eretz Yisrael and forsakes the land chosen by God.

These statements were made by David to King Saul. He asked the king if his decision: to pursue him was inspired by God or if men had urged him to that step. He continued: If they be men: "Cursed be they..., because they have driven me out..."
The commentaries declare: Saul’s advisors would never have thought of having David worship idols. However, his forced departure from Eretz Yisrael could be equated to that sin.

Ezekiel prophesied against the false prophets who consoled Israel with vain visions of grandeur rather than warn them to repent and return to God. Among his curses was: "They shall not come...."
When Rav Eliezar made aliyah, he offered thanks to God for preventing this curse from befalling him (Ketubot 112a).

Rather than use the expression Eretz Yisrael as previously in the chapter, in this statement, the Rambam uses the expression,” the land.” He chose the terminology to emphasize the aspect of God’s choice for, as will be explained, a parallel to this quality exists in regard to Babylonia...

The source for this law is Ketubot 111a. Rashi, in his commentary on that passage, explains that one is prohibited from leaving Babylon because “it is a place of Torah and yeshivot are located there.”
By quoting the above verse as the source, the Rambam implies that the Jews should remain in Babylon, for that is the place God choose for them to be exiled until He “takes heed of them... and restores them” to Eretz Yisrael. Hence, just as there is a prohibition to leave Eretz Yisrael because it is God’s chosen land, similarly, there is a prohibition to leave Babylon for that land was chosen for the Jews while in exile.

These terms are explained in the beginning of the previous chapter.
The Sifri, Shoftim, and similarly, Rashi’s commentary to this verse, maintain that we are only obligated to oft. er a peaceful settlement in a milchemet hareshut, not in a milchemet mitzvah. (It must be noted that in Sefer HaMitzvot, ibid., the Rambam himself accepts this view.)
Support for the Rambam’s statements here can be derived from the Midrash Tanchumah, Tzav. Similarly, the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi’it 6:1) quoted by the Rambam in Halachah 5 reinforces this statement.

The obligation to offer a peaceful settlement to these nations can be derived from the offer Moses extended to Sichon, king of the Amorites, one of the seven nations (Numbers 21:21-22).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 190) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 527) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Ra’avad maintains that in a milchemet hareshut, it is not necessary for the gentiles to accept these commands. We are only required to include these commandments in the peaceful settlement offered to Amalek and the seven nations. (In Sefer HaMitzvot, ibid., the Rambam also does not mention the seven mitzvot.) In his commentary to the Torah (Deuteronomy, loc. cit.), the Ramban explains that it was not necessary for the gentiles living outside of Eretz Yisrael to accept the seven mitzvot for there is no way that their behavior would influence that of the Jewish people.
In contrast, the Rambam maintains that once these lands are conquered they become part of Eretz Yisrael. Thus, the possibility exists that Jews would settle in these countries and learn from the gentiles’ behavior. Furthermore, as will be explained in Halachah 8:10, the Rambam considers acceptance of the seven mitzvot of vital importance to the gentiles regardless of the consequences to the Jews.

On the contrary, it is forbidden to do so as explained in Halachah 3.

In Hilchot A vodat Kochavim 10:1, the Rambam also mentions that we are prohibited against entering into a covenant with gentiles unless they abandon idol worship. However, there, he does not mention the need for subjugation.
The two statements need not be considered contradictory. Hilchot Avodat Kochavim may refer to a covenant made in peacetime and thus, subjugation is not required. Here, we are dealing with a situation of war. Therefore, peace should not be granted until the enemy agrees to servitude.

Sifri, Shoftim notes that the verse requires “They shall be your subjects” - i.e., subjugation, and “serve you” - i.e., pay tribute.

Many commentaries point to Joshua’s treatment of the Gibeonites (Joshua 9:23) as the source for these principles. He forced them to be “bondmen, hewers of wood, and drawers of water forever.” They were always kept in this secondary status.
Nevertheless, other commentaries differentiate; noting that the Gibeonites accepted Torah and mitzvot and thus, were included as part of the Jewish people, while these principles deal with gentiles accepting the seven mitzvot of Noah’s sons.

As explained in Halachah 2.

I.e., they could be compelled to perform manual labor.

The Ramban (Deuteronomy, loc. cit.) explains that these Amorites accepted the seven mitzvot. Hence, Solomon did not violate the commandment to destroy the seven Canaanite nations by allowing them to live and serve in these capacities.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachot 2-3, that the king has the right to conscript his subjects for these duties.

In Chapter 4, Halachah 9, the Rambam stated that the army may take spoil from the countries they conquer. Halachah 10 explains that the king is entitled to all the landed property of the nations that he conquers and may do with it as he desires.

To do so would cause Chillul HaShem, the desecration of God’s name.

As explained in Halachah 5, Joshua made a covenant with the Gibeonites as part of his conquest of Eretz Yisrael.
While pursuing King David, King Saul slew an entire village of Gibeonites. Later, they sought revenge on his sons. God told King David to agree to their request and they were allowed to kill seven of Saul’s descendants. (See I Samuel 22:19, II Samuel 21:1-10.)
Why were they allowed to slay these blameless individuals? So that the gentile nations would not think the Jews broke their covenant with this people (Yevamot 79a).
Later on in our national history, we see other examples of the consequences of breaking a covenant made with other nations. Hoshea ben Elah was the final king of the kingdom of Israel. He was more righteous than all of his predecessors, yet the ten tribes were exiled in his day. 11 Kings (17:4) relates that the direct cause of this tragedy was Hoshea’s failure to observe a pact which he made with Shalmanessar, king of Assyria.
Similarly, II Chronicles (36:13) explains that Tzedekiah, Judah’s final king, broke an oath he made to Nebuchadnezzar and rebelled against him. What were the consequences? Nebuchadnezzar conquered Jerusalem, destroyed the Temple, and exiled our people from our land.

Deuteronomy 20:12 relates: “If they do not accept your offer of peace, you shall lay siege [to the city.]”

As mentioned above, in a milchemet hareshut, many authorities do not require the acceptance of the seven mitzvot.

As Deuteronomy continues (20:13) “When God... gives it into your hand, strike down all its males by the sword.”

As the passage continues (20:14) “the women, children, animals, and all the goods in the city, you shall take as spoil.”

Though in the war against Midian, all women above the age of three and all males even those below majority were slain (Numbers 31:17-18), that war had a specific intent: to “avenge the vengeance of the children of Israel” (Numbers 31:1). Accordingly, the strictures against slaying captives were relaxed to execute this vengeance.

To refer to the Biblical wording, “the cities that... are not the cities of these nations,” i.e. countries outside of Eretz Yisrael.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 4, the annihilation of these nations fulfills one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

The status of Amalek differs from that of the seven nations. The mitzvah to destroy the seven nations was instituted “so that they will not teach you the revolting practices with which they worship their gods...” (Deuteronomy 20:18). Accordingly, once they abandoned those practices, there is no reason to slay them (Sotah 35b).
In contrast, the mitzvah to “obliterate the memory of Amalek” was instituted as retribution for Amalek’s attack on the Jewish people “on the way after leaving Egypt” (Deuteronomy 25:17). Therefore, the Mechiltah, Beshalach, and other sources maintain that we are obligated to slay Amalek’s descendants regardless of their present state. On that basis, they explain King David’s execution of the Amalekite convert who brought him word of King Saul’s death (II Samuel 1:13-15). Nevertheless, the Rambam obviously does not accept this view.

And also the observance of the seven mitzvot.

The following verses come at the conclusion of the description of the great wars Joshua fought to conquer Eretz Yisrael.

See the following Halachah and commentary.

31 kings as described in Joshua, Chapter 12.

See Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 6.

Thus, all traces of them and-their repulsive idol worship would be obliterated.

Had the Canaanites not been given the opportunity to choose peace, there would be no need for God to strengthen their hearts to engage in battle. They would not have had an alternative.

The letters were sent in the thirty three day period between the death of Moses on the seventh of Adar and the crossing of the Jordan on the tenth of Nisan.

The Girgishites feared God and followed this advice. God rewarded them by giving them a fine portion of land in Africa (Jerusalem Talmud, Shivi’it 6:1).

The Radbaz explains that there was no time for Joshua to wait for a reply to his first message before he sent the second. Rather, all three messages were sent at the same time.

As explained in the previous Halachah.

It is difficult to understand the reason for this rather obvious message.

Joshua, Chapter 9, relates that after the Jews’ conquest of Jericho and Ai, the inhabitants of Gibeon: Acted cunningly... They took old sacks upon their donkeys, old and rent wine bottles... old, worn and patched shoes... and came to Joshua at Gilgal. They told him:..."We have come from a distant country. Therefore, make a covenant with us.” Joshua made a covenant with them... and the princes of the congregation swore to them.

As explained in the beginning of the halachah.

The Ra’avad disagrees with the Rambam and explains that once the Jews crossed the Jordan, the Canaanites could no longer agree to a peaceful settlement. However, most authorities reject this view. Since the mitzvah to destroy the seven nations was instituted “so that they will not teach you the revolting practices with which they worship their gods...,” there is no reason to differentiate between when their commitment would be made.
Further support for the Rambam’s opinion can be brought from Avodah Zarah 24b which states Arvana, the Jebusite from whom King David bought the Temple site, was a Canaanite who had accepted the seven mitzvot. Thus, it appears that even after the Jews’ entry into Eretz Yisrael, the Canaanites could have avoided being slain by accepting peace and observance.

As the narrative in Joshua continues (ibid.:18-19): "All the congregation murmured against the princes, but all the princes said to the entire congregation:We have sworn to them by God... therefore, we may not touch them.'"

The Ramban (Deuteronomy 20:11) disagrees with the Rambam and maintains that it was permissible to establish a covenant with the Gibeonites because they had already accepted the belief in God. However, the Jews’ first reply to the Gibeonites “Perhaps, you dwell among us? If so, how shall we make a covenant with you?” appears to reinforce the Rambam’s view that all covenants with the Canaanites were forbidden even though they disavowed the worship of idols.

Rather than accepted as equals as implied by the covenant they made.

Avodah Zarah 46a explains that since the oath was taken under false premises, it was not binding. Nevertheless, the surrounding nations would think that the Jews had broken their oath. Thus, were the oath to be ignored, God’s name, on which it was made, would be dishonored.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 56) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 562) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.
The prohibition was instituted as punishment for Ammon and Moav’s lack of sensitivity to the Jews in their time of distress. While they were journeying to Eretz Yisrael, these nations “did not greet them with bread and water” (Deuteronomy 23:5).

Sifri, commenting on that verse.

While it is forbidden to make an overture of peace towards either Ammon or Moav, we may repay their kindness to us. Therefore, King David extended consolation to Chanon, King of Ammon after the death of his father, because the latter had protected David’s family. See 11 Samuel, Chapter 10.
Nevertheless, even though that gesture was permitted, it did not find favor in God’s eyes. He declared: “Whoever shows them mercy will ultimately be shamed.”
What resulted from David’s kindness? Chanon ridiculed his emissaries in public. As a consequence, Israel became engrossed in a fierce war (BaMidbar Rabbah 21:5).

This verse applies to a fugitive slave and by extension, to any gentile who is willing to accept the seven mitzvot.

The Minchat Chinuch 562 explains that even after conversion an Ammonite or Moabite may not dwell in Eretz Yisrael.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:25, after conquering most of the civilized world, Sannecherib engaged in a process of mass population transfer causing all of Israel’s neighbors to lose their national identity. Thus, there are no longer any nations or individuals who can be designated as descending from Ammon or Moav.

The source for the Rambam’s statement appears to be the above verse which forbids “seeking their peace” and does not mention responding to their offer (Minchat Chinuch, loc.cit.).

The Ramban in his hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandments 5) considers this obligation as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Radbaz states that only in a milchemet hareshut should a place be left for the enemy to flee. In a milchemet mitzvah, no leniency of this nature should be made. The Ramban (loc. cit.) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 527) also accept this opinion.
The Minchat Chinuch questions this view, asking how such a concept can be derived from the Rambam’s wording. The Toldot Adam in his commentary on the Sifri explains the rationale for both opinions. According to the first view, this practice is a gesture of peace and mercy required by the Torah.
In contrast, the second view could explain that this practice was instituted for the benefit of the Jews. Were the gentiles to realize that they have no opportunity to flee, they would fight with greater savagery, as a desperate man who has no other alternative to save his life. (See also Meshach Chochmah on the verse from Numbers.)

The verse also supports the latter opinion for the war against Midian was a milchemet mitzvah fought with the intent of slaughtering that nation.

See Sifri; Yalkut Shimoni.

The laws applying to other trees are explained in the following halachah.

The verse from Deuteronomy begins “When you lay siege to a city.” Thus, the trees in question are those growing in the orchards outside the city.

For this will also destroy the trees (Sifri).

The Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 57) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 529) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. See the Turei Zahav (Yoreh De’ah 116:6) which questions why the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not cite this law.

As appropriate for the violation of a negative commandment.

In this instance, the rationale behind the mitzvah defines one’s interpretation of the halachah. The Ramban explains that this prohibition only applies while besieging a city. For our troops can use the trees for food or we might ultimately desire to settle in the land and benefit from the fruit. However, when our forces leave the land, they may cut down fruit trees without reservation to destroy the land.
In contrast, the Sefer HaChinuch explains that the purpose of this prohibition is “to love good and benefit and to cling to them... and to separate ourselves from all evil and destruction.” Accordingly, the prohibition would also apply to property which belongs to gentiles.

This applies even to one’s own trees. Bava Kama 92a relates that Shmuel had a date palm growing among his grape-vines which detracted from the taste of the wine they produced. Hence, he ordered his farmers to remove it.

Bava Batra 25b, 26a prohibits planting trees next to one’s neighbor’s field or well, lest the tree’s roots destroy them. Moreover, if trees were planted too closely at the outset, one may later uproot them.

I.e., it would be more valuable to sell it as wood than to harvest its fruit. The Radbaz maintains that this license is only granted for an older tree that is not producing its full capacity.

The above mentioned passage continues (Deuteronomy, loc. cit.:20): “However, if you know that a tree does not produce food, you may destroy the tree.”

The intent of this phrase is obviously not to permit wanton destruction. As mentioned in the following halachah, the prohibition against wanton destruction (bal tashchit) applies to all articles of value. Rather, the intent is that, with regard to non-fruit bearing trees, greater leniency can be taken than with regard to fruit trees and the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah need not be heeded.

Bava Kama 91a explains that even without the words “if you know” in the verse quoted above it could be understood that it is permissible to cut down non-fruit bearing trees. Hence, that phrase was included with the intention of teaching a further concept; i.e., that the prohibition against cutting down fruit bearing trees only applies when it is worthwhile for their owner to maintain them. This, however, is not considered the exegesis of the verse to the extent that the concept is included in the Scriptural command. Instead, it is merely an allusion (an asmachta).

A kav is approximately 52 ounces in modern measure. Olives were very expensive and the trees require little care. Hence, it is worthwhile to maintain the tree despite this small yield.

These are not rigid rules, but rather, figures that can fluctuate depending on the price of fruit and cost of maintaining a tree.

Shabbat 129a relates that certain Sages would suffer severe chills after letting blood. For lack of any other fuel, they used expensive furniture as firewood. The passage continues: “Doesn’t this violate the command ‘Do not destroy’?” and explains that since the fire was used for the Sages’ physical comfort, no prohibition is involved.

Kiddushin 32a relates that Rav Huna tore a valuable garment in front of his son to see whether the latter would lose his temper or not. Afterwards, the Sages question that statement for such an act appears to violate the prohibition under discussion. They resolve the difficulty by explaining that he ripped the garment on the seams and thus, nothing was destroyed.

II Kings 3:19 relates that Elisha, the prophet, instructed King Jehoram in his battle against Moav: “Destroy every good tree, stop up every stream of water, and fill every good field with stones.” Bamidbar Rabbah 21:6 notes that such advice appears to violate the prohibition “Do not destroy” and explains that an exception is made regarding Ammon and Moav for they are lowly nations whose welfare may not be sought (see Halachah 6 above).
The commentaries explain that the prohibition applies to each element of Elisha’s advice independently and quote this passage as the source for the inclusion of this phase in our halachah.

Shabbat 140b mentions an opinion that views eating and drinking expensive foods instead of cheaper ones as a violation of the prohibition “Do not destroy.” The Talmud does not accept this opinion, explaining that such activities are not forbidden since one’s physical pleasure is involved. Nevertheless, the fact such an issue could be raised demonstrates that the prohibition also applies to wasting food.

As mentioned in the previous halachah, no prohibition is involved if there is a positive reason for the deed.
Shabbat 105b compares the destruction of useful objects in a fit of anger to the worship of idols.

Lashing is only given as punishment for violation of a Biblical command. The extension of the scope of this prohibition to all things is Rabbinic in origin. Hence, lashes are not administered for its transgression. Rather, he receives “stripes for rebellious conduct,” [as instituted by] the Rabbis.
This decision represents a reversal of the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.). There, he explained that lashes are given for the destruction of other valuable articles besides trees.

Lashes are only given as punishment for violation of a Biblical command. The extension of the scope of this prohibition to all things is Rabbinic in origin. Hence, lashes are not administered for its transgression. Rather, a violator receives "stripes for rebellious conduct," as instituted by the Rabbis.
This decision represents a reversal of the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.). There, he explained that lashes are given for the destruction of other valuable articles besides trees.

As given for the violation of a Rabbinic decree. In contrast to the Biblically ordained punishment of thirty-nine lashes for the violation of a Torah command, the extent of punishment for stripes for rebellious conduct is left to the discretion of the court. Their decision is based upon the severity of the violation, the character of the transgressor, and the circumstances involved.

Hilchot Shabbat 30:13 states that this prohibition was instituted “so that the soldiers’ minds will be settled and they will not be agitated and overly preoccupied on the Sabbath.”
Pikuach Nefesh, threat to life, overrides the observance of the Sabbath prohibitions. Hence, battle is permitted on Sabbath. However, to whatever degree possible, an attempt must be made to preserve the Sabbath atmosphere. Hence, by beginning the siege well before the Sabbath, the tension and frenzied activity which usually accompany the first days of a siege will not disturb the Sabbath.

Once a siege was begun before the Sabbath, fighting may be continued on the Sabbath. Our Sages relate that during the Maccabean revolt, the Greeks mounted an attack on the Sabbath. Unaware of the leniency allowing them to fight, our people refused to take up their arms. Thousands fell.

Shabbat 19a; see Hilchot Shabbat, the conclusion of Chapter 2.

Hilchot Shabbat 2:25 relates that Joshua conquered Jericho on the Sabbath.

Commenting on Hilchot Shabbat (ibid.), both the Kessef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh maintain that this clause refers to the previous statement “We may engage in battle... even on the Sabbath,” informing us that fighting may be continued in a milchemet hareshut on the Sabbath. However, the first statement of the halachah requiring us to begin the siege of a city three days before Sabbath, only holds true for a milchemet hareshut. In a milchemet mitzvah, a siege may be begun before the Sabbath.
Though that statement is not accepted by all opinions, all agree that a defensive war may be begun on the Sabbath. See Hilchot Shabbat 2:23, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 329:6.

The owner of the property cannot protest against the encampment.

The Radbaz explains that this law also applies to a soldier who died a natural death.

This law was instituted to prevent the owner of the property from protesting against the burial of a corpse on his land. Even though the departed’s relatives could bury them elsewhere, the army may bury the corpses where they fall rather than carry them with them. However, it is questionable whether there is an obligation to bury them there.

The term meit mitzvah means a corpse which it is a mitzvah for its discover to bury. Hilchot Evel 3:8 states: “What is a meit mitzvah? A Jewish corpse cast away on the road without anyone to bury it.”
When Joshua divided Eretz Yisrael among the tribes, he established ten conditions governing the land and its use. Among them was the provision that a meit mitzvah could be buried wherever he is found. There is no obligation to carry his body to a cemetery (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:3).

This applies to a milchemet hareshut as well as a milchemet mitzvah (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 1:10).

Demai refers to produce purchased from a common person. Our Sages were unsure whether such an individual would separate tithes properly. Hence, they required that Terumat Ma’aser and Ma’aser Sheni be separated by the purchaser of the produce. (See Hilchot Ma’aser 9:1-3.) There was no obligation to observe this stringency in an army camp.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., the Rambam writes “There is no obligation to search for water.” Seemingly, implying that if water is available, one is obligated to wash before eating. In this halachah (and similarly, in Hilchot Berachot 6:3) no such differentiation is made.

One of Joshua’s ten conditions governing the use of land in Eretz Yisrael was that a person was allowed to gather thorns and shrubs from anyone else’s field for use as firewood (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, loc. cit.). Here, license is granted to take wood of a more substantial nature (Eruvin 17a)

Even though it is private property.

An act which obviously implies that it had been prepared by its owner for his personal use

The Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:10) allows this leniency only in a milchemet mitzvah and not in a milchemet hareshut. However, the Babylonian Talmud - and, hence, the Rambam - does not distinguish between the two.

According to Scriptural Law, though it is forbidden to carry in the public domain, there is no prohibition against carrying in a semi-public area, for example a courtyard. Nevertheless, to safeguard the Torah’s prohibition, the Sages also forbade carrying in these areas. However, together with their prohibition, they granted a leniency, eruv chatzeirot, which would allow carrying in such areas.
To establish an eruv chatzeirot, a group of families must fence off the area in which they desire to carry with a barrier and prepare food in a centralized location. Afterwards, they may carry within the fenced off region. See Hilchot Eruvin, Chapter 1. The Sages allowed soldiers in an army camp to rely on the Torah law itself and did not require an eruv.

If the camp is surrounded by a barrier, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature and hence, is relaxed for the soldiers. However, if there is no barrier, carrying violates a prohibition of the Torah itself and is only permitted if there is a danger to life.
Similarly, no leniency is shown regarding eruv techumim for that prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (Kessef Mishneh).

Hilchot Shabbat 16:1.

A barrier of lesser height is not significant.
Manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah brought from Yemen read here: “An army camp is comprised of a minimum of ten [soldiers].” A lesser amount of soldiers are not granted these leniencies.

There is a certain amount of danger even when an army returns for at any moment they may be attacked by the enemy.

Berachot 25a explains that the prohibition also includes urination. However, most Halachic authorities do not take notice of that statement.

The Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 192) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 566) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

The reason for this command is mentioned in the following halachah, so that “your camp shall be holy.”

The Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 193) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 567) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. However, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol counts this and the previous command as one mitzvah..

The Torah uses the word yetaid which is usually rendered as “spike.” However, in this instance, the Septuagint translates the term as “trowel.”

Those mentioned in this and the previous halachah.

Yoma 75b states: “Until the Jews complained about the manna (Numbers 21), it would be totally absorbed by their systems without producing any waste. God declared: ‘l wanted them to be like angels. Now, I will force them to walk three miles (the length of the camp) to perform their functions.’”
This passage obviously implies that the practices mentioned in this halachah were instituted during the Jews’ journey through the desert when the ark accompanied them.
Once the Jews settled in Eretz Yisrael, the ark with the tablets was taken to war only once (See I Samuel, Chapter 4). According to one opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shekalim, Chapter 6), a second ark containing the tablets broken by Moses accompanied the people to war at all times. However, the Sages do not accept this view.

The Yereim (362) states that these mitzvot only apply when the ark accompanies the Jews. The Rambam does not accept this opinion for even if the ark did not accompany them, God’s presence did.

To quote the verse in its entirety: “[These rules are ordained] because God, your Lord, accompanies you, in the midst of your camp; to deliver you and grant you victory over your enemy. [Therefore,] your camp must be holy. Let Him not see anything lascivious among you, lest He turn from you.”
The verse gives the ultimate reason for the above practices. Were we to rely on the considerations of human decency alone, it is possible that the tensions of war would provoke a certain laxity in these matters. However, since they were instituted as respect for God’s presence, they are eternally relevant for He is always with us.
In addition to the rules the verse sets down, it also contains a promise of success. God assures the people: If you will maintain your standard of holiness, I will “deliver you and grant you victory over your enemy” (Sifri).