Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Mishneh LiMelech emphasizes that even though the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply, it is forbidden to benefit from these sacrifices according to Scriptural Law.

I.e., even after the sacrificial animals were reduced to ash, the prohibition against me’ilah applies to their ashes until the ashes are removed from the altar. Once they are taken to the ashheap, the mitzvah associated with them is completed and the prohibition against me’ilah no longer applies [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 2:4)].

Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

In which instance, they should never be taken down from the altar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:12).

In which instance, the meat is still acceptable to a certain degree (see ibid. 1:32).

As in the case of the meat of sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity, to which the prohibition against me'ilah does not apply once the blood has been cast on the altar.

As in the instance of the fats and organs mentioned in this halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

All of the entities mentioned in this halachah are burnt entirely on the altar.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:16; Hilchat Shegagot 12:1.

We have strayed from the literal translation of the term used by the Rambam (borrowed from Me’ilah 2:3). In his commentary to that Mishnah, he explains that the root of the Hebrew term is toch, meaning “inside” or “hollow.” The intent is that the meat be consumed by the flames “until it is hollow..., i.e., like a sponge. This occurs to the meat after its burning is completed.”

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's statements, for the prohibition against me'ilah also applies to articles consecrated for the upkeep of the Temple, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.
He explains that it is possible to explain that the intent is that a red heifer is neither consecrated to the altar, nor dedicated to the improvement of the Temple. Hence, one might think that the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to it.

And thus the prohibition against me’ilah does apply to it.

Menachot 51b-52a [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 7:7)] explains that according to Scriptural Law, the prohibition against me’ilah applies only to the flesh of the red heifer, but not to its ashes.
Originally, the Sages saw that the ashes were not being given the proper respect (the priests would apply them to their wounds). Hence, they ordained that the prohibition should also apply to them.
Nevertheless, afterwards, because of this ordinance, the people would refrain from having the ashes sprinkled upon them unless they were definitely impure. The proliferation of instances of questionable impurity created difficulties. Hence, they rescinded their decree and returned the issue to its Scriptural status.

Menachot 51b-52a [see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 7:7)] explains that according to Scriptural Law, the prohibition against me’ilah applies only to the flesh of the red heifer, but not to its ashes. Originally, the Sages saw that the ashes were not being given the proper respect (the priests would apply them to their wounds). Hence, they ordained that the prohibition should also apply to them. Nevertheless, afterwards, because of this ordinance, the people would refrain from having the ashes sprinkled upon them unless they were definitely impure. The proliferation of instances of questionable impurity created difficulties. Hence, they rescinded their decree and returned the issue to its Scriptural status.

See Halachah 2.

The thin membrane that clings to the hide and separates between it and the meat; it is not fit to be eaten (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 14:7).

They should be buried (Kessef Mishneh).

At which time, their consecration takes on a different level of severity (see Hilchot Ma’aseh Hakorbanot 13:12).

This is equivalent to offering the blood of an animal sacrifice.

And at that time, the prohibition of me’ilah no longer applies.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:20.

As discussed in Menachot 12a. The Sages there speak of an offering whose substance has been reduced. The Rambam, however, concludes that the same difference of opinion would apply in all situations where the meal-offering was disqualified. See also Chapter 3, Halachah 9, where an apparent contradiction to this ruling is raised and a resolution is offered.

For this offering, this is equivalent to offering the blood of an animal sacrifice.

As explained in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:11, the term refers to “two holes in the southwest corner [of the Altar], resembling two thin nostrils.”

As stated in Hilchot Temidim Umusafim 10:6-7, a golden jug that was not a sacrificial vessel was filled with the water for the libation and left overnight. On the morrow, the water was placed in the pitcher used for the libation.

For it was drawn for a sacrificial purpose.

Since it was not placed in a sacred utensil, it was not consecrated.

Which was a sacred utensil.

I.e., even if the pitcher contains more than the required measure, the prohibition against me’ilah applies to all of the water (Me’ilah 13b).

Tzara’at is a skin affliction resembling, but not analogous to, leprosy that is visited on a person for undesirable speech (see the conclusion of Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at). After a person’s affliction is purified, he must undergo a purification process which includes bringing several sacrifices including a guilt-offering and a log of oil (see Leviticus, ch.14). As stated in Hilchat Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2, after the blood of the guilt-offering is cast on the altar, some of the oil is poured into the hands of a priest and sprinkled seven times toward the Holy of Holies. Then a small amount of the oil is placed on the ear, thumb, and large toe of the person being purified.

For there is still service to be performed with it.

For the primary service permitting the oil has been performed.
Significantly, in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 4:3, the Rambam writes that one who partakes of the oil before the placements are made is liable for lashes like one who partakes of the sacrifices before their blood was cast on the altar.

By casting the blood on the altar.

A small river outside the Temple Mount, into which the blood poured on the altar would flow through a drainage channel (see Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:11).

The Ra’avad comments on the Rambam’s ruling, stating that from Yoma 59b, it appears that the prohibition against me’ilah is Rabbinic, not Scriptural, in origin. This issue was obviously a matter which the Rambam himself debated at length. As Rav Kappach relates in his notes to the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 3:3), the Rambam changed his commentary to this mishnah several times. Originally, he wrote (and this is the version in the standard printed text of his Commentary): “The halachah does not follow Rabbi Shimon who maintains that the prohibition against me’ilah applies after atonement.” In his later version, he wrote: “The words of Rabbi Shimon here are correct and there are no conflicting views.” And in his final version, he added: “Perhaps Rabbi Shimon differs with regard to the blood that flowed out to the Kidron River. He maintains that the prohibition against me’ilah applies according to Scriptural Law. The Sages maintain that the prohibition against me’ilah applies only according to Rabbinic Law. Accordingly, the words of Rabbi Shimon would be superseded.” Thus, his final conception concurs with that of the Ra’avad.

As a cure for that animal's illness.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the prohibition against me.’ilah applies only with regard to sacrifices of the most sacred order. According to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to benefit from sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity, but the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply.

I.e., it is not considered as merely an ancillary aspect of the animal, but as part of its substance.

This is a general term referring to blood vessels, nerves, and sinews (Commentary to the Mishnah, Zevachim 3:4).

Even though they are not fit to be eaten.

This refers to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, and communal peace-offerings; i.e., sacrifices of the most sacred order whose meat is eaten afterwards.

Since the bones were separated before the blood was cast on the altar, they should not be offered on the altar afterwards. They are considered as distinct entities and there is no activity that will cause them to be permitted (Rav Yosef Corcus, based on Zevachim 86a).

Once the blood has been cast on the altar, the prohibition against me'ilah no longer applies to any of the portions of the animal that are not offered on the altar's pyre (Kessef Mishneh).

Implied is that before the blood is cast on the altar, the prohibition does apply.

For the bones that are separated before the blood is cast on the altar are not fit to be offered on the altar’s pyre. And the casting of the blood causes them to be permitted like the casting of the blood of a sin-offering causes its meat to be permitted (Rav Yosef Corcus, based on Zevachim 86a).

And thus were not together with the animal when it was offered on the altar’s pyre.

Since they were separated, they should not be offered on the altar in their own right. Hence they remain forbidden, because there is no further act that will cause them to be permitted.

I.e., because of the heat of the altar, the bones being burnt there fly up in the air and then fall to the ground [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 9:6)].

The Mishnah (Zevachim, toe. cit.) speaks of limbs that fly off the altar. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam equates bones with limbs. This equation is, however, questioned, because the limbs of a burnt-offering should be returned to the altar. Hence, the prohibition against me’ilah can be applied to them. The bones, however, should not be returned to the altar. Hence, it is questionable why the prohibition against me’ilah should be applied to them. Indeed, the Har HaMoriah maintains that there is a printing error in the text and it should read “the limbs of a burnt-offering.”

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 6:3.

Me’ilah 9b explains that Zevachim, loc. cit., states that such a coal should not be returned to the altar. Accordingly, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply. Nevertheless, just as it is forbidden to benefit from the ashes of the altar even after they have been taken out of Jerusalem (Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 2:15), so too, it is forbidden to benefit from such a coal (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Because it has no substance (Rashi, Beitzah 39a).

Generally, we follow the principle that the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply once the mitzvah associated with a particular substance has been completed. Nevertheless, since there is still a mitzvah associated with the ash until it is deposited outside of Jerusalem (see the conclusion of ch. 2 of Hilchot Temidim Umusafim), the prohibition against me’ilah is still relevant. Once it is placed down outside Jerusalem, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to it. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to benefit from it.

Based on Rashi (Me’ilah 11 b), it appears that this refers to ash once it was removed from the inner altar and the Menorah. While the ash is in these sacred utensils, that prohibition applies. Tosafot and Rav vadiah of Bartenura offer a more stringent view.

This refers to animals in the first week of their lives or an animal whose mother was slaughtered on that day (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:8; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:9).

As will be explained in the following chapter.

By mentioning “[animals] consecrated for the altar,” the Rambam deviated from his source, Me’ilah 12a which mentioned merely “consecrated animals that died.” It would appear that the implication is that animals consecrated for the improvement of the Temple may be redeemed after their death. This conclusion, however, runs contrary to the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Arachin 5:12, there he writes:
Whenever a person consecrates an animal in its lifetime - whether a kosher animal or a non-kosher one, whether it was consecrated for the sake of the Temple treasury, it was consecrated to be offered on the altar and it became blemished, or it is an unblemished animal which is fit to be offered as a sacrifice as will be explained, it must be brought to stand [before the court] for evaluation, as implied by the phrase: “You shall have the animal stand [before the priest....]” Therefore, if the animal died before it is evaluated and redeemed, it should not be redeemed. Instead, it should be buried.
The implication is that there is no difference between an animal consecrated for the improvement of the Temple or one consecrated as an offering, if the animal is disqualified, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to them. The rationale is as follows. They are not fit for any purpose, because they may not be redeemed, since an animal can be redeemed only if is brought to “stand before the priest” and this is impossible when the animal has died (Temura 32b). Alternatively, there is a general principle that consecrated animals should not be redeemed in order to be fed to the dogs and in this instance, that would be the only reason for redeeming such an animal, since it is forbidden to a Jew (Pesachim 29a).
On the basis of the Kessef Mishneh’s gloss to Hilchot Arachin, it is possible to say that here the Rambam is excluding animals that were physically blemished before they were consecrated, for in such an instance, there is no need to have them stand before a priest to be evaluated. Alternatively, as the Kessef Mishneh states here, the Rambam’s words were not intended to serve as an exclusion. He mentions animals consecrated for the altar, for that is his present subject of discussion.

This follows the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (Me’ilah Sa). Although there is another view, that of Chizkiyah who understands that the matter depends on whether or not it was fit to cast the blood on the altar, since the Talmud brings support for Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion, it is accepted by the Rambam (Kessef Mishneh).

Excluding burnt-offerings which are not intended to be eaten.

Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

Instead of in the northern portion, as required by Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:2. The blood of these types of sacrifices must also be received in that portion of the Temple Courtyard (ibid.).

According to law, the sacrifices must be slaughtered during the day and the blood presented on the altar at that time.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 13 and onward.

Either of these acts would disqualify the sacrifice and prevent its blood from being cast on the altar.

Which would disqualify them.

These acts would also disqualify the meat.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 6:3, the Rambam defines this term as “blood that flows out [from the animal] when it is slaughtered, killed, or decapitated, as long as it is tinted red.” See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 5:1).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:28.

In cases when the majority of the priests are impure, in which instance the communal sacrifices are offered by impure priests (Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:9). The Rambam mentions communal service, because individual offerings are never offered in a state of ritual impurity.

Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 13:1.

The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus note that Me’ilah 3b appears to reject this teaching. Nevertheless, from a careful reading of the text, that conclusion need not be accepted.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1.

See ibid., ch. 4, which mentions several instances where this ruling is given.

See ibid. 4:3.

I.e., by two separate priests (Rashi, Me’ilah 7b).

For there was no time when the blood of the second animal could be cast on the altar. Hence, the prohibition of me'ilah always applies to it.

This refers to the place on the altar where the blood should be presented. The blood of burnt-offerings of fowl should be presented on the upper half of the altar and the blood of the sin-offerings must be presented on the lower half. If one did the opposite, the sacrifice is disqualified. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 6:20; 7:6.

And they are required to bring another burnt-offering (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:1).

Since portions of a sin-offering may be eaten, the prohibition against me'ilah does not apply to it as stated above. Accordingly, that prohibition does not apply to a fowl offered in this manner even though it was originally consecrated as a burnt-offering.

Either of these actions would disqualify the meal-offering.

For offering the handful of meal on the altar causes the remainder of the offering to be permitted to be eaten, like casting the blood of a sacrifice causes its meat to be permitted (see the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:19.

Rav Yosef Corcus explained that this ruling applies only when a portion of the remainder was taken out of the Temple Courtyard. If, however, the entire remainder was taken out of the Temple Courtyard, the prohibition against me’ilah applies. This parallels the law stated in Halachah 1 with regard to sacrificial meat, that if a portion of the meat was taken out of the Courtyard, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply, but if all the meat was taken out, it does apply. For, as reflected in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:30, 11:20, the laws applying to the remainder of a meal-offering parallel those applying to the meat of animal sacrifices.
The Kessef Mishneh raises a question, noting that the Rambam’s ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Chapter 2, Halachah 7, where he states that there is an unresolved doubt whether they were disqualified. Har Hamoriah explains that it is possible that there the Rambam is referring to meal-offerings disqualified for a different reason, e.g., they became worm-infested.

All of these entities are offered on the altar’s pyre and the prohibition against me’ilah applies to them.

More precisely, the benefit he received and the additional fifth he is obligated to pay due to the violation of the prohibition against me’ilah (Rashi, Meilah 9b).

The Rambam appears to be stating that the money should be used to purchase communal burnt-offerings that are offered when the altar is free. See the explanation of the term kayitz lemizbeiach in Hilchot Shekalim 4:9. This follows the interpretation of Tosafot, Me’ilah, loc. cit. Rashi offers a different interpretation.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as referring to the Temple treasury, where the funds will be used for the maintenance of the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 4.
The Kessef Mishneh also notes that the Rambam’s ruling is the direct opposite of the popularly accepted text of the conclusion of the Tosefta, tractate Me’ilah. He suggests that perhaps the Rarnbam had a different version of that text.

Rashi, Me’ilah 10a. states that certainly this applies after the casting of the blood.

Me’ilah, loc. cit., explains that in this instance, he is exempt because he does not cause any loss to the altar, for the entities are unfit for offering on the altar’s pyre, nor may they be eaten by an ordinary individual. Even though they must be burnt by the priests, this burning is not an element of the Temple service. If they became impure after the casting of the blood, there would have been a time when the meat of the sacrifice would have been permitted to be eaten and from that time onward, the prohibition against me’ilah would not apply. Since the sacrifices have become impure, they are no longer called “entities consecrated unto God” and the prohibition against me’ilah no longer applies.

This addition was made so that the Rambam’s ruling here does not contradict his ruling in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, where it states that the prohibition against me’ilah applies until after the ash of a sacrifice was taken out to the ashheap. Here, however, that rule does not apply, because there is no fundamental obligation to bum these fats and organs (Rambam LeAm).

In which instance, the ruling is that since they have become “the food of the altar,” they should not be brought down from the altar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:12).

Because the mitzvah involved in offering them is complete. Even though the priests are still required to tum them over on the altar so that they are consumed completely, that is not an integral part of the offering (Me’ilah, loc. cit.).

The prohibition against me’ilah does not apply because the milk and the eggs are not fit to be offered on the altar. Note the contrast to the following halachah.

I.e., because the mother’s milk is consecrated and cannot be used for ordinary purposes.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 3:7), the Rambam adds another point. It is forbidden to benefit from this animal’s milk, just as it is forbidden to shear it or work with it. Rambam LeAm explains that this point is significant, because, based on this logic, even an animal born after its mother was consecrated is forbidden to nurse from it.

The Ra’avad explains that he should not consecrate the milk - because then, even the consecrated animals would not be permitted to nurse from it but rather should state that it is set aside for them. The Kessef Mishneh explains that perhaps this was also the Rambam’s intent. Alternatively, he explains that since the person specified the purpose for the consecration of the milk while consecrating it, the young animals are permitted to benefit from it.

Because anything produced by a consecrated entity is itself consecrated. See Chapter 5, Halachot 6 and 13.

I.e., so that the fowl will be offered either as burnt-offerings or as sin-offerings.

The rationale for the difference is that, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachot 1-2, the prohibition against me’ilah applies to sacrifices of the most sacred order from the time they were consecrated, but does not apply to sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity until their blood is cast on the altar. As reflected by Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 5:1, money set aside for a sacrifice is bound by the same laws as an animal set aside for that sacrifice.

Based on Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:2, we are forced to say that this refers to a limb or organ on which the life of the animal depends.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that this is the proper version of the text. There are versions which substitute tikaver (“it should be buried”) for tfkrav (“it should be offered”). See Hilchot Arachin 5:14.

The rationale is that one may not redeem a consecrated animal that is unblemished. Hence if the holiness did spread through the entire animal, it would be forbidden to redeem it.

Since it is possible that the holiness did not spread throughout the entire animal, only the money paid for that particular limb is consecrated. The remainder is not (Kessef Mishneh). Alternatively, since it is possible that the holiness spread throughout the entire animal and thus it is not fit to be redeemed, the redemption is not effective and the money has not become consecrated (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Even though the funds are sufficient to purchase the burnt-offering and sin-offering that he is also required to bring, since a specific designation was not made, it can be said that they were all intended for the peace-offering.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

Before purchasing animals for his sacrifices or explicitly designating the funds for each one.

Even though one of the offerings is a sin-offering and the money for a sin-offering for a person who died should be cast away and never used, as stated below, an exception is made in this case, for there was an explicit teaching received by Moses at Sinai to that effect (Nazir 25a).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 5:1.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

The funds set aside for the peace offering should be used for a peace offering (Hilchot Nizirut 9:3). The Rambam does not mention that point here because the prohibition of me’ilah does not apply.

For the burnt-offering and peace-offering that he must bring.

For he certainly benefited from the money set aside for the burnt-offering.

For it is possible to say that he benefited only from the money set aside for the peace-offering.

For the sin-offering and peace-offering that he must bring.

For he certainly benefited from the money set aside for the sin-offering.
The Kessef Mishneh questions this ruling, asking why is this instance different from the first clause where we said that it is possible to say that he would use the entire sum to purchase peace-offerings? The Kessef Mishneh gives two answers: a) since the donor has died, there is no way that he can change his mind and use the money only for a peace-offering; b) since he stated: “The remainder is for my nazirite offering,” it would appear that he desired to bring all of his nazirite offering from those funds.

Setting aside specific coins for each sacrifice.

When he used only some of the money, to be liable, he must use more than the value of a peace-offering. Otherwise, it is not certain that coins that had been designated for the sin-offering and the burnt-offering were used and it is possible that he is not liable. Hence were he to bring a guilt-offering to atone for the transgression of me’ilah, he would be transgressing (Rav Yosef Corcus).

A zav, a zavah, a woman after childbirth, and a convert. The first three are required to bring one dove as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering. A convert brings two doves as burnt-offerings (Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1).

For the prohibition against me’ilah applies to both these types of offerings. There is no peace-offering among them (Kessef Mishneh).

The teaching transmitted to Moses mentioned above includes this instance as well.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:6; Hilchot Shegagot 3:3.

Rav Yosef Corcus comments that the Rambam does not state “the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply,” for certainly, if one benefits from the sacrifice, the prohibition against me’ilah applies. His intent is that the act of transferring the sacrifice from one sin to another is not considered an act of me’ilah, because it is not effective.
He also notes that Keritot 27b, the source for this ruling, considers atonement dependent on me’ilah and not the converse, as the Rambam states here. Nevertheless, the difference is that here the Rambam is putting the emphasis on me’ilah, while the Talmud is putting the emphasis on whether the sacrifice brings about atonement.

As Rav Yosef Corcus explains, he is considered to have taken the money for his own personal use and then used it to purchase an animal for a sin-offering.

The mandatory minimum value of a guilt-offering (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:22). See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 6:6) for an explanation of these rulings.

For each sela is worth four dinarim.

As part of his atonement for the transgression of me’ilah.

Even though he paid only a sela for it, he fulfills his obligation, for the profit on the exchange is his.

He is still obligated to bring two guilt-offerings (one for which he was originally liable and one for purchasing one of the rams as an ordinary animal with money set aside to purchase a guilt-offering). And he must make restitution for the sela that he used for the ordinary animal and add an additional fifth.

The four dinarim that he misappropriated plus an additional fifth. This money should come from his own funds.

For one must add a fifth in atonement for me’ilah.

I.e., he should purchase a more valuable animal as a sin-offering.

I.e., he purchased an animal of lesser value for a sin-offering.

Since the money should have been used for the sin-offering and the sin-offering has already been purchased, there is nothing to do with the money, but have it destroyed.
Rav Yosef Corcus comments that this ruling appears to follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon (Me’ilah 10a) who maintains that any animal designated as a sin-offering should be consigned to death if its owners received atonement through the offering of another sacrifice. Nevertheless, in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:8, the Rambam follows the differing view, which maintains that this stringency is applied only when the first animal was lost and it was discovered after the person found atonement. The Sages who follow that view maintain that, in this instance, the money should be used for a freewill offering. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that since he knew that he misappropriated the money for the sacrifice and yet, did not use it to purchase another more expensive offering, it is as if he purposely diverted it from its intended use. Hence the money is consigned to destruction.

I.e., he should have used the money that he misappropriated and the additional fifth to purchase a more expensive offering. Since he failed to do so, one might think that the money should be destroyed as in the previous instance, Nevertheless, that stringency is not followed for the reason stated by the Rambam.

This applies in all instances, because the stringencies mentioned above apply only to a sin-offering and not a guilt-offering.

The animal should be offered as designated for the sake of its original owner (Rashi, Pesachim 89b).

I.e., given back to the purchaser.

For he purchased a consecrated animal.

We do not say that the additional zuz is a present to the owner (ibid.).

And must make restitution of the value of the article and an additional fifth to the Temple treasury (Nedarim 35a).

For he consecrated it only with regard to himself. It is not considered as the property of the Temple treasury.

For it is not really consecrated property and does not belong to the Temple treasury.

For the article itself has been consecrated and is the property of the Temple treasury.

This is speaking about an instance where the loaf is within a radius of four cubits of a person. A person has the right to acquire any property within four cubits of him (Bava Metzia 10a). Since he has the right to acquire it for himself, he also has the right to consecrate it.

I.e., we evaluate how much it would be worth for a person to be able to endow his heirs with such a gift.

I.e., we do not say that once the loaf leaves the property of the person who consecrated it, its consecrated dimension is released.

Hence giving it to another person is not considered a violation of this prohibition. Had he consecrated the article in a universally applicable manner, the giver would have transgressed when he transferred ownership of the object.

The term konem is one of the terms for vows used in the vernacular of the Talmudic era.

I.e., the Rambam is speaking about situation in which a given article is not worth a p’rutah, but all of the articles together are worth a p’rutah.

I.e., his original vow takes effect repeatedly.

For they were consecrated only until they were cut down. Since the plantings themselves were never consecrated, only their value, the person’s stipulation limits the extent to which the consecration applies. Hence, redemption is not required.
This ruling represents a change of opinion for the Rambam. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:4), he rules that after they are cut down, they must be redeemed.

They become his property.

For the vow of the person who consecrated them does not affect them since they now belong to someone else.