Shabbat - Chapter 9

According to the opinion that reckons only the labors necessary for the construction ofthe Sanctuary, cooking—and not baking- was the labor performed. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the commentary on Chapter 7, Halachah 1, the Mishnah (and, therefore, the Rambam) mentioned these activities in the order associated with the preparation of bread, for this was more common (Shabbat 74b).

As obvious from the continuation of the halachah, the intent is not to boil the water, but to warm it enough so that it is comfortable to use for washing.

The Mayim Chayim states that generally water was heated for the purpose of washing. (Although hot drinks were served in that age as well, the “cooking” of these beverages involves mixing in other ingredients.) Note the S’dei Chemed (Vol. 111, Section 1, Chapter 230), which questions whether heating water (for purposes other than washing) is prohibited by the Torah.

As stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2, this refers to the amount of water necessary to wash the small toe of a newborn baby.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, stating that our Sages (Tosefta, Shabbat, Chapter 10) mentioned a minimum measure, the amount necessary to dye a small cloth used as a hair-net. The Lechem Mishneh attempts to resolve the difference of opinion, explaining that the Rambam also recognizes that measure (as reflected in Chapter 18, Halachah 2). Depending on the nature of the dye used, however, there is a difference in the amount of cooking necessary to dye the cloth.
Rav Kapach accepts the principle stated by the Lechem Mishneh, but notes that the minimum measure for dyeing is specifically stated by the Rambam in Halachah 14 of this chapter as “enough to dye a thread four handbreadths long.”

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:2), the Rambam translates the Hebrew לגלגתת as referring to “mixing” or to “becoming slightly cooked.”

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that the kettle had already been removed from the fire. Nevertheless, because it remained hot from the fire’s heat, it is considered a “derivative of fire.”

Before the era of refrigeration, salt was used a preservative. Rashi (Shabbat 145b) states that this refers to fish that was preserved by salt for over a year.

Our text is based on Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Machshirin 6:3. Other commentaries offer different translations.

Note Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 6:4, where the Rambam mentions small fish whose cooking is completed by washing them with hot water. Perhaps there he is also referring to sole. Alternatively, perhaps even large sole can be prepared merely by pouring hot water over them.

Even ifthe food cooks thoroughly, one is not liable, because this is not the ordinary way food is cooked.

Were one to be allowed to cook by using substances warmed by the sun, one might err and cook using substances warmed by fire. It is, however, permitted to leave food to be cooked by the sun itself (Shabbat 39a; Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 22, Halachah 9).

Although one of the Sages states that a person who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias is liable, the Talmud immediately clarifies that the intent is “liable for ‘stripes for rebelliousness,”’ the punishment given for violating a Rabbinic ordinance (Shabbat 40b).

This statement implies that until the food is completely cooked, one is liable for cooking. This relates one of the points of difference between the Rambam and the Ashkenazic halachic authorities who were cited in our commentary on Chapter 3, Halachah 4. The latter maintain that since food that is one-third or one-half cooked is fit to be eaten, there are leniencies with regard to the laws governing leaving food to warm on the Sabbath and returning food to a fire on the Sabbath. The Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) develops this view further and maintains that once food has reached this stage of being cooked, one is not liable for cooking it further.
The Rambam (Chapter 22, Halachah 8), however, maintains that if food has been completely cooked one may place it in hot water on the Sabbath to warm. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:4), however, follows the view of the Ashkenazic authorities who accept this leniency only when the food is dry. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) also questions if this leniency also applies with regard to food that was baked or roasted.

Shabbat 40b mentions this principle with regard to oil. Other examples are fresh fruits and vegetables that are usually eaten raw (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term “not liable,” רוטפ in Hebrew, also implies that this activity is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree. Thus, recooking food or cooking fresh produce on the Sabbath is definitely forbidden.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on Beitzah 34a and the Tosefta, Shabbat 12:4. There are, however, slight differences between the wording chosen by the Rambam and the wording of those sources. Furthermore, the Talmud implies that the person who brought the fire is liable, not for performing a derivative of the labor of cooking, but for the labor of kindling. (See Rashi, loc. cit.) This is definitely not the Rambam’s intent.
In resolution of this difficulty, the Kessef Mishneh quotes his teacher, Rav Ya’akov bei Rav, who explains that the first clause describes a situation in which all the individuals performed their act virtually simultaneously, with a shared intent. Hence, since the end result of their activity is the performance of a forbidden labor, all are held liable as if they had performed the labor themselves.

As the Ra’avad mentions, Beitzah (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to a situation where a new pot is used. Thus, heating the pot hardens it as would heating in a kiln. This is is also a derivative of the labor of cooking. (See Halachah 6 and Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 3:11.)
According to the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned above, this is unnecessary. Since the pot was brought together with the other elements for the sake of cooking, the person bringing it is liable, even if it is an old pot.

Even those who do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh would hold such a person liable, since a person is liable for heating water, as explained in Halachah 1.

Here too, the obligation is clear, for the person is cooking food.

Since the spices contribute flavor to the food, adding them to the pot is sufficient to make one liable for cooking, even according to the opinions that do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh.

for stirring hastens the cooking process. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:18) emphasizes that one is liable for stirring only when the food is not completely cooked. Once it is cooked, there is no prohibition against stirring.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that even after food is completely cooked, one should not stir it. The later authorities emphasize that although there is reason to follow this stringency with regard to stirring, there is no difficulty in removing food from the pot if it is already cooked and removed from the fire. (While the pot is cooking this is forbidden, for in the process of taking out the food, one will stir the remaining food.) See Chapter 3, Halachah 11.

According to the Kessef Mishneh, this is the key phrase in understanding the difference between the first clause and the second. “Another came”—i.e., he came after, and without any connection, to the first individual. Hence, the responsibility is not shared by the entire group. Accordingly, since the actions of the persons mentioned first could not bring about cooking in their own right, they are not held liable.

The person bringing the fire would probably be liable for kindling, but that is not the Rambam’s concern in this halachah. He is not liable for cooking, for without the wood the flame would burn out in the near future.

Once the wood begins to burn, the fire will have the potential to cook the meat. Hence, the person who brings it is liable.

Since the person stirred the food after it began to cook, he is liable. Although he acted independently of the others, the act he performs in its own right is sufficient to incur liability.

Although the places where the meat cooked are separate, their size is combined, and the person is held liable if the sum reaches the size of a dried fig.

This is the Rambam’s definition of the term used by our Sages’ יאסורד זב,לכאמב“like the food of ben D’rosai.” Rashi (Shabbat 20a) relates that ben D’rosai was a wanted bandit who would eat his food hurriedly because he was always running to avoid detection.
Significantly, Rashi interprets יאסורד זב לכאמכ as being only one-third cooked. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:2) and many later authorities quote the Rambam’s view. The Mishnah Berurah 253:38, i1owever, states that in a difficult situation, one may rely on Rashi’s opinion.

Since the meat can be eaten in its present state, one is liable for cooking it.

The addition of this term is significant. Shabbat 4a also mentions this law in an instance when one purposely violated the Sabbath laws. The Rambam explains that this leniency applies even when one performed such an activity.גגושב (See the Maggid Mishneh; note also the Lechem Mishneh’s objections.)

But not a colleague (Magen Avraham 254:21). Since removing the loaf from the wall of the oven in previous eras involved a Rabbinic prohibition (as mentioned in Chapter 22, Halachah 1), this was forbidden. A person is not allowed to sin so that his colleague will merit.

The Rabbis explain that it is desirable to remove the bread in an abnormal manner, because of the prohibition mentioned above. Nevertheless, if it is impossible to do so before the loaf bakes, one may remove it in the ordinary fashion so that one does not transgress the prohibition against baking (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 254:12; Mishnah Berurah 254:41).
It must be emphasized that the baking procedure followed today is different from that referred to by the Rambam. At present, there is no prohibition involved in removing a loaf placed in the oven to bake.

The commentaries question when a person becomes liable for baking. 1s it when a crust forms (see Chapter 3, Halachah 18), or must the loaf bake thoroughly? (See Tosafot, Menachot 57b, which compares the forming of a crust to food cooking to the point of being לכאמכ. (ןב יאםורד

The commentaries question the difference between this point and the ruling of Chapter 12, Halachah 1, that a person who heats iron is liable for kindling. Rav Kapach explains that the difference depends on the nature of the metals involved. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. Iron, in contrast, becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, its processing is associated with the labors of kindling and extinguishing, which have to do with making charcoal. (See the commentary on that halachah.)

This halachah emphasizes that the forbidden labor of cooking applies to substances other than food. The Rambam explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) when defining the nature of the forbidden categories of labor.

The Rambam has concluded his description of the eleven categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of food, and with this halachah begirl!נ discussion of the categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of clothing.

I.e., a surface where hair or wool that would be useful for making a garment does not grow.

This is the minimum measure for which one is liable for performing the labors associated with making thread.

In three differ. ent places in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines the term “the width of a sit”: Orlah 3:2, Shabbat 13:4, and Keilim 13:4. In these sources, he defines the width of sit as he does in this halachah. (See also Halachah 10 where the Rambam states that twice this measure is equivalent to four handbreadths.)
In the sources mentioned above, and similarly in Halachah 18, the Rambam differentiates between the terms sit and “the width of a sit.” Note that Rashi defines both these measures differently.

A zeret is defined as the distance between one’s thumb and pinky when one’s hand is fully extended. This is understood to be half a cubit, three handbreadths (24 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 30 centimeters according to Chazon Ish).

Although the women preparing the goats’ hair for the Sanctuary spun it while it was on the goats themselves (see commentaries to Exodus 35:26), one is not liable for performing such an activity on the Sabbath, for this is not the ordinary manner in which one spins thread (Shabbat 74b).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, the Rambam holds one liable for performing a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש,הכאלמ a forbidden labor for a purpose different from the purpose for which the labor was performed in the Sanctuary. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that this decision is not shared by all authorities.
According to the authorities who differ, there is a difference of opinion whether or not one is liable for cutting one’s hair and nails. Tosafot (Shabbat 94b) maintains that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the labor of shearing was performed for the sake of the wool. Therefore, up. less a person had a need for his hair or nails, he would not be held liable. The Rivash (Responsum 394), however, explains that before they were used, the tachash skins were shaved to remove the hair. Hence, if one cuts off one’s hair or nails for cosmetic purposes, one is liable. (See, however, the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 5, which differentiate between the forbidden labor of shearing and the forbidden labor of smoothing.)

Since this is not the usual way of cutting hair or nails, one is not liable. (See also Chapter 22, Halachot 13-14, which discuss the Rabbinical prohibitions involved with cutting hair.)

The popularly accepted text of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:7) states that one who removes a colleague’s hair or nails is liable even if he does so by hand. Rav Kapach maintains that the original text of the Rambain’s Commentary on the Mishnah in fact makes such a statement, but that the Rambam amended the text, and the final version resembles the rulings of this halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh protests the decision that a person who cuts off a wart with a utensil is not liable, pointing to Eruvin 103a, which appears to obligate one for such an activity.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1521) explains the Rambam’s ruling, stating that this applies only in the Temple. A wart is considered a blemish that makes an animal unfit for sacrifice and a priest unfit for service (see Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:10), and by removing the wart one becomes fit for service. Thus, one is liable, not for performing the forbidden labor of shearing, but for the labor of שיטפב,הבמ making an entity ready for use. (See also the Tzafenat Paneach, who offers a similar interpretation.)
Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 340:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:6, which state that the liability foז cutting a wart stems from the forbidden labor of shearing.

Not only is one freed of liability, but doing so is permitted, because this is not the ordinary process. Although outside the Temple, this would be forbidden as a sh’vut (Rabbinic decree), there are no such restrictions in the Temple.

Note the Ma’aseh Rokeach, which states that since the wart was dry and shriveled, it is considered as if it had been removed already. Nevertheless, as Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc cit.) and the Mishnah Berurah (loc cit.) state that outside the Temple it is forbidden to remove a wart even if it is dry and shriveled.

Two hairs are significant, and, therefore, one who cuts them off is held liable.

Since one desires to appear young, removing even a single grey hair is significant. This applies to both men and women. Note also the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:10, which prohibit a male from doing this even during the week, since by doing so, he would be adorning himself as a woman does.

Note the gloss of Rav David Arameah and also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:31), which questions whether “upward” means towards the end of the finger or towards the body. Since there is no clear cut answer, one must act stringently; in practice, it is forbidden to remove such a nail at all (Mishnah Berurah 328:99).

Since the majority of the nail has split or the skin has peeled, the remainder is considered as if it has already been removed according to the Torah. The prohibition against removing it is merely Rabbinic in nature and is waived because of the annoyance the person is suffering when he removes them by hand—i.e., in an abnormal manner (Mishnah Berurah 328:96).

Our translation follows the Biblical meaning of the word.ינש There is, however, a difficulty—what is the difference between this fabric and ordinary wool. The Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 157) explains that this refers to wool that has already been dyed crimson. Others note that at times ינש can also refer to silk. See Rav Kapach’s notes to Hilchot Sefer Torah 9:3.

See Halachah 7.

N ote the Kessef Mishneh, who states that according to the Rambam, this prohibition applies also to liquids other than water.
This is a matter of question. Tosafot (Ketubot 6a) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 320), differ, and maintain that one is liable only for wringing out water.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rashba and others view wringing out liquids as related to two different forbidden labors. According to these authorities, wringing out water is a derivative of laundering, while wringing out other liquids relates to the forbidden labor of threshing.
The Ramban, however, states that although squeezing juice from fruits is considered to be a derivative of threshing, squeezing liquids other than water from garments is not. Some commentaries have associated this with the principle mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 7, “[The forbidden labor otן threshing applies only with regard to the earth ‘s produce.”

See Chapter 22, Halachah 15, which mentions the Rabbinic prohibitions enacted as safeguards for the Torah prohibition against wringing out liquid.

Rashi (Shabbat 128b) explains that hair never absorbs water.

The Avnei Nezer (Responsum 157) explains that since the Rambaזri considers wringing out liquids as a derivative of whitening, this will apply only when wringing out the liquid will affect the color of the entity from which one is extracting it. This will not happen with regard to hair or leather.
It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:9) forbids rubbing leather to clean it. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:19 states this is merely a Rabbinic prohibition (thus following the Rambam’s view). The Mishnah Berurah 302:39,42, however, differs and maintains that one is liable for such an act.

Our translation of the Hebrew ץפנ is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). Since these fabrics are natural, beating them makes them more pliable. Other authorities translate ץפנ as “comb”—i.e., comb impurities from the fibers.

Cord made from animal sinews is used to sew Torah scrolls and tefillin.

We have translated the Rambam’s wording literally, although it appears somewhat clumsy, because of a concept that can be derived from it. Permanence is a relative concept in our world. Hence, when a person performs an activity that appears permanent on the Sabbath itself, he can be held liable for it although later there is a possibility for change (Rav Kapach).

Shabbat 12:1 states, “Anyone who performs a labor—and that labor has an enduring effect on the Sabbath—is liable.”

The source for the Rambam’s ruling is a matter of question. The Maggid Mishneh mentions Shabbat 18a, which states that a person who mixes a concentrate of ink with water is liable.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, noting that although in the construction of the Sanctuary, the dyes were made by cooking the herbs in water, the Talmud states that one is liable only for cooking and does not mention the dyeing of the water.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in truth, a person would be liable for two transgressions by cooking dyes: for cooking and for dyeing the water. The Talmud mentions cooking only, because that is the subject of the discussion. Rav Kapach offers a unique explanation, stating that the Rambam is not speaking about instances when water is dyed through cooking, but when two liquids of different colors are mixed to cause a new tint.
There are authorities [Ginat Veradim (Section 3, Chapter 9) and HaElef Lecha Shlomo] who accept the Rambam’s ruling and on this basis state that one should not make tea or coffee on the Sabbath, for one is coloring the water. The Mishnah Berurah 318:39 and the K’tzot HaShulchan state emphatically that there is no concept of dyeing foods.

Vitriol is produced by the rusting of metals. As mentioned in Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, when both these substances are mixed together, a black ink which leaves a permanent mark is produced.

A plant producing a deep blue dye.

Which is yellow.

Others render the Hebrew notzah as “down.”

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling. Rav Levi ibn Chaviv supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that the intertwining of fibers necessary to make felt resembles spinning.

The Hebrew ךירינ יתב is generally translated as “houses of string.” In the weaving process, it refers to the following practice: Weaving involves passing the threads of the woof over and under each of the consecutive threads of the warp. In order to facilitate this process, two frames are made, each possessing many threads with a loop (referred to as a “heddle”) in the middle of these threads. The threads of the warp are passed t, hrough the~ loops, one from one frame, and next from the other consecutively. (See also Rav Kapach’s commentary, which explains that nir in Arabic means woof. Thus זירינ יתכ would mean “houses for the woof’—i.e., holes through which the woof thread is passed.)
When this is completed, the weaver lifts the two frames alternately. As he raises one up, he passes the woof through. In this manner, he is able to thread the woof through the entire warp at one time. (See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:2 and Keilim 21:1.)

All these objects are made by weaving materials other than thread. It is questionable why the Rambam considers them as derivatives of this category of forbidden labor and not the labor of weaving.

This halachah presents a unique question with regard to the authenticity of the different versions of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). The popular version of the text cites Shabbat 75b, which relates that the number of categories of forbidden labor, “forty minu~ one,” is repeated at the conclusion of the Mishnah to negate the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that beating the threads of the warp and straightening them (see Halachah 19) should be considered as categories of forbidden labor. Instead, they are derivatives of the labors of mounting the warp and weaving.
In his version of the Commentary on the Mishnah, which is based on authoritative manuscripts, Rav Kapach states that these two activities are derivatives of שיטפכ,הכמ“completing a task.” (See Chapter 10, Halachah 16.) According to this version of the text, originally the Rambam relied on another source and later, when authoring the Mishneh Torah, he changed his opinion based on the Talmud.

Shabbat 13:4 states that a person is liable for weaving the fullness of a sit. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam differentiates between “the width of· a sit” as defined in Halachah 7, and “the fullness of a sit.” The latter term refers to the distance between the thumb and the index finger when open, but not stretched. This is two fingerbreadths. [Note Rashi (Shabbat 105b) who offers a different interpretation.]

Since one completes the garment with this thread, one’s actions are significant despite being slight.

Here also, although the weaving does not have the width normally required, since it is significant (for it makes a hem), one is held liable.

See the notes on the previous halachah, which discuss the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2).

This refers to hair that has been cut already. Braiding hair that is still attached to a person’s head is forbidden by the Rabbis. (See Chapter 22, Halachah 26.)

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s definition of this activity. He offers a definition similar to that of Rashi, Shabbat 73a, stating that עצוב resembles עצופ and refers to cutting off the remaining unwoven threads after the weaving process is completed.

When a garment is mended in this fashion, the mending is hard to detect, because it is rewoven.

As mentioned previously, every category of labor has a derivative. If braiding is a derivative of weaving, one may assume that unbraiding is a derivative of unweaving.