Shabbat - Chapter 8

Since one can plant a seed in even the tiniest hole, even the smallest amount of plowing is considered significant (Shabbat 103a).

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 12:2. Note Rashi and others, who offer different interpretations.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that if one’s intent when performing these activities is to gather the growths one is cutting, one is liable for reaping. If one’s intent is to improve the tree so that it will grow better, one is liable for sowing, as stated in the following halachah.

Note Shabbat 73b, which states that the Rambam’s statements apply when these activities are performed outside. A person who performs these activities inside a house is liable for building. See Chapter 10, Halachah 12.

One is liable for sowing even the tiniest seed, since from it, a large plant can grow.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 3, and notes.

Since watering does not involve a seed, plant, or tree itself (as do all of the activities mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachah 2), it is considered merely a derivative of sowing.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that the source for his statements is Zevachim 94b, which mentions that one is liable for soaking seeds so they sprout. Others point to Shabbat 17b, which states that one is liable for soaking vetch, a type of bean fed to cattle.

Reaping is important because it provides food for us to eat. Since an amount smaller than a dried fig is not considered a significant measure of food, one is not held liable for reaping until one reaps that amount.

Plucking the fruit is considered merely as a derivative, because in contrast to reaping, which is done with a utensil, plucking is done by hand (Lechem Mishneh).

I.e., since these plants grow naturally in these places, one is held liable for removing them.

Such plants grow naturally in the ground. By planting them in a flower pot, one separates them from their normal place of growth. Hence, they are no longer considered to be connected to their source, and according to the T orah there is no prohibition against picking fruit from such a plant. There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:7-8.)

It is able to receive nurture from the earth through the hole. (See Rashi, Shabbat 107b.) The above applies only in homes with earth floors where there is no interruption (except air) between the flower pot and the earth. See Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchasah, p. 326.
The difference between a flower pot that is perforated and one that is not perforated is relevant in many different contexts within Torah law. (See Hilchot Kilayim 1:2, 5:16; Hilchot Mechirah 3:16, and other sources.)

Although the person performed merely one activity, since this activity produces effects that parallel those accomplished by two separate forbidden labors, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each.

Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 81b) and others maintain that one is not held liable in this instance. Although such activity is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, since the connection between the flower pot and the ground was never interrupted, one is not considered to have uprooted the plant (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:12).

Since they remain attached to the tree, they are governed by the same rules as other fruit.
Tosafot (Shabbat 150b) maintains that this ruling applies only when the stems attaching the fruit to the tree are still fresh. lf they have also dried out, one is not held liable for picking the fruit. (See Be’ur Halachah 336.)

See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 2:4-5.

Although the latter are most frequently used as fodder for animals, at times they are cooked and eaten by human beings. (See Sh’vi’it 7:5 and the Rambam’s Commentary.)

As evident from the laws that follow, this is the minimum measure for which one is liable for all forbidden labors associated with food. Eating a lesser amount is not significant.
The Nodeh BiY’ hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. 11, Responsum 34) notes that Shabbat 103a states that this measure applies when one gathers these substances in a field belonging to a colleague. When gathering in one’s own field, by contrast, one is liable for even the slightest amount, since in doing so, one clears one’s field, a derivative of the labor of plowing.
The Noda BiY’hudah explains that the Talmudic passage does not contradict the Rambam’s decision. As mentioned in the previous halachot, one can be liable for transgressing two different forbidden labors when performing a single activity. Thus, as soon as one gathers any of these substances, one is liable for plowing. Should one one gather the amounts mentioned by the Rambam in this halachah, one is also liable for reaping.

Based on Shabbat 76a, it appears that a mouthful of a kid is slightly less than the size of a dried fig.

This is the smallest amount of kindling wood that will be useful for a person.

Although collecting food is a forbidden labor in its own right, the Rambam mentions it within the context of this halachah, because the measures for which one is held liable correspond exactly to those mentioned with regard to the previous law.

In contemporary measure, the size of an egg is determined as 57.6 cubic centimeters by Shiurei Torah and 100 cubic centimeters by Chazon lsh.

The Ra’avad states that this measure is not exact, and the actual amount is slightly larger. The difference between their opinions is based on the interpretation of Eruvin 80b and 82b. Similarly, their understanding of those passages affects their determination of many different significant measures in Torah law, for example, י פ תליכא (the measure of time associated with the mitzvot and prohibitions connected with eating). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:3) mentions both opinions.

Thus excluding salt or similar substances (Shabbat 73b). (Note the Kessef Mishneh’s comments regarding the proper te~t of that Talmudic pass:ג. ge.) As the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 11, there is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition against gathering salt.
The Hagahot Maimoniot (21:8) state that just as sheaves are collected in a field—the place where produce grows—similarly, all activities that are derivatives of this forbidden labor must take place in or near the field or orchards in which the produce grows. The Tur (Orach Chayim 240) and others also accept this ruling. From Chapter 21, Halachah 11, it appears that the Rambam also follows this approach.

Rav Moshe Kohen mentions that a person is liable only when he collects the fruit near the grooves of trees where they grow. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted outright by the later authorities. (See the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:15 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:38.)

The commentaries have not cited a direct source for the laws stated in this halachah [although there is a parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2)]. Some cite this as an example of the Rambam’s use of his own powers of deduction to determine derivatives for forbidden labors, so that every category of forbidden labor will be associated with derivatives.

Rav Moshe Kohen questions this statement, for the derivatives of a forbidden labor must resemble the forbidden labor itself. Thus it is difficult to understand how the Rambam can make such a statement and also state that one is liable for extracting food or for milking an animal.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rivash (Responsa 121) state that an animal that lives on the land (as opposed to fish and other creatures that live in the sea) can be considered as produce of the earth, because it derives its life from the earth’s produce.
The Rambam’s son, Rabbenu Avraham, however, does not accept the basic premise of the question and explains that a derivative of a forbidden labor can differ drastically from the forbidden labor itself. Accordingly, even though threshing applies only with regard to produce, its derivatives can involve animals (Birkat Avraham, Responsum. 18).

This applies to extracting kernels of grain from their husks or legumes from its pods. Nevertheless, the Eglei Tal allows one to remove the shells of onion and garlic, and Sh’vitat HaShabbat permits the removal of the hard shells of nuts.

The Rambam’s opinion is also accepted by Rashi (Shabbat 95a) and other authorities. Rabbenu Tam and other Rishonim agree that milking is forbidden according to Torah law, but consider it a derivative of other categories oflabor. The Ramban (Shabbat 145) considers this merely a Rabbinic prohibition.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:20), which states that one may tel1 a gentile to milk an animal. This leniency is permitted because the animal will suffer pain if it is not milked. Other leniencies are also granted on the basis of the Rambam’s statements in Halachah 10.
The question of milking animals attracted much attention in the early years of agricultural development in Eretz Yisrael, when the question arose regarding milking herds of animals when a gentile was not available. (See K’tzot HaShulchan, Vol. VI, p. 34 ff. and other sources.)

This concept is defined in Halachah 9.

Although it is universally accepted that one is liable for drawing blood from an animal, the Rishonim differ under which category of forbidden work this prohibition falls. Rashi, Shabbat 107a, mentions an opinion that extracting blood falls into the category of dyeing. Tosafot, Shabbat 75a, Ketubot 6b, offers a different interpretation, explaining that it is included in the category of slaughtering.

To use as a remedy or as food for a dog or other animal (Shabbat 106a; the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 14:1).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the m1n1mum measures for liquids differ than those of foods. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s decision, explaining that since he considers these activities as derivatives of threshing, the minimum amount for which one is liable is the same as for threshing. It must be emphasized that according to the opinions of Rashi and Tosafot (see note 31), one is liable for extracting a quantity of blood smaller than the size of a dried fig.

This ruling depends on the Rambam’s decision, Chapter 1, Halachah 7, where he states that one is liable for performing a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש.הכאלמ Although the person is performing the forbidden labor for reasons very different from those that were involved in the construction of the Sanctuary, he is held liable because he is fulfilling his intent.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, based on his interpretation (which parallels that of Rashi) of Shabbat 105b. The Rambam, however, interprets this passage differently. (See the Maggid Mishneh.)

Leviticus 11:29,30 mentions that the carcasses of these animals convey ritual impurity. There are various different opinions regarding the meanings of the Hebrew names for the species mentioned there. The Living Torah offers the following interpretation: the weasel, the mouse, the ferret, the hedgehog, the chameleon, the lizard, the snail, and the mole.

The hides of these animals are tougher than the flesh beneath them. Therefore, there is a possibility that a wound will cause internal bleeding and that the blood will never be reabsorbed by the body.

The Rambam states that one is not liable for wounding other creeping animals even if one causes them to bleed. This decision is not accepted by most authorities (see Rashi and others, Chulin 46b), who maintain that one is not liable for causing these creatures to bleed internally. If, however, one causes external bleeding, one is liable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 316:8) accepts the opinion of the other authorities. This decision depends on the difference of opinion mentioned in note 31 as to the category of forbidden labor of which causing bleeding is a derivative. As mentioned, the Rambam considers this activity a derivative of the labor of threshing, and threshing involves removing a substance from a hard shell. Since the hides of the other crawling animals are not tough, causing them to bleed cannot be considered a derivative of this labor. According to the opinion that bleeding is a derivative of slaughtering, however, one is liable for making any animal bleed, regardless of the nature of its hide (Ziv HaMishneh).
The question whether one may kill creeping animals that are dangerous is discussed in Chapter 10, Halachah 25 and notes.

Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose which grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.
(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered as liquids, but as food. See Hilchot Tum’ at Ochalin 1 :4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these as two separate rationa:es.)
Note Chapter 21, Halachah 12, which states that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against squeezing other fruits that are frequently used for juice (Shabbat 144b gives as examples, berries and pomegranates). If, however, it is not common to use a fruit for juice, there is no prohibition at all against squeezing juice from it. Note also the discussion in the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 320) regarding squeezing lemons to make lemonade.

Rabbenu Chanan’el does not accept this leniency and maintains that one is liable. In a responsum, Rabbenu Asher states that a person who observes this stringency will be blessed (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320).

It is prohibited to do this even if one ultimately intends to mix these beverages into food. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 320:6, which states that since one ultimately intends to mix the liquid into food, the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature.

The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this law applies only on a festival, but not on the Sabbath. Since the animal may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath, it is not considered as “food.” Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 505) quotes this law with regard to the laws of festivals ar1d not with regard to the Sabbath laws.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 14. Based on this leniency, there are authorities who allow one to suck the juice from grapes and other fruits. Other authorities forbid this. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1.)

The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:21 states that a person who milks an animal and lets the milk flow from the animal to the ground is not liable, for this is not the normal manner in which an animal is milked. This can be interpreted as the implication of the Rambarn’s words: “One is liable only when one milks into a container.”

With regard to separation, this can also be interpreted as separating the unwanted matter (whether more or less than the size of a dried fig) to produce an amount of food the size of a dried fig (Minchat Chinuch). The Yeshu’ot Ya’akov 319:1 differs and maintains that both the food and the unwanted matter are counted when reckoning the amount equal to the dried fig.

See Halachah 14 and also Chapter 21, Halachah 17, for more particulars regarding the separation of dregs from liquids.

See the Eglei Tal, who questions whether these three activities can be combined. Thus, if one winnowed an amount of grain one third the size of a dried fig, and one separated and sifted the same amount, is one liable for a sin offering under such circumstances or not?

Primarily, the forbidden labor of separating involves separating unwanted matter from food. ln the Sanctuary, it involved separating unwanted matter—pebbles and the like—from the herbs used for the dyes. Nevertheless, if one uses a utensil that is made for the purpose of separation, one is liable even when separating food from unwanted matter.
See also the Turei Zahav 319:12 who states that the prohibition against separation applies, not only to the separation of unwanted matter from food, but also to the separation of unwanted matter from substances other than food. This opinion is accepted by the later authorities.

In this instance, since one does not wish to partake of the other food, it is considered unwanted matter, and it is forbidden to separate the food one desires from it. When, however, one separates one portion of one type of food from another portion of the same food, one is never considered to be separating (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:4-5; Mishnah Berurah 319:15).

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Rashi translates this as a sieve. His interpretation is accepted by most authorities.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit:l.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 319:1) explains that “immediately” means “for the purpose of the meal that one is attending.” If one separates the food for use at a later time, one is liable, as stated in the following halachah.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, this is the primary form of the labor of separating.

The word “one” is not found in the authoritative Yemenite manuscripts. It is, however, included in the quotation of this halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:4). The Mishnah Berurah 319:17 notes that some texts of the Shulchan Aruch also do not include it.
According to those versions that do include it, the intent is that using only one hand is not considered an abnormal way of performing this labor.

As explained in the notes on Chapter 3, Halachah 12, the turmos beans are very bitter and must be cooked seven times before they are edible. The shucks help absorb some of this bitterness. Hence, they are not considered as unwanted matter. (See Rashi, Shabbat 74a.)

One is not held liable for separating food in the process of eating, for the Torah’s intent was surely not to prevent a person from eating in the normal manner. Separating food and setting it aside to be used later is not necessary to allow one to eat normally. Hence, it is considered in the category of this forbidden labor (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 1-2).

The Rambam’s intent should not be misinterpreted: even if one decides to eat the food set aside at a second meal served earlier in the day, one is also held liable. It was merely common custom to eat two meals during the daytime on the Sabbath—one in the morning and one in the evening. (See Magen Avraham 319:6.)

The Rambam’s words literally mean “their filter.” The Shulchan Aruch 319:10 states “filter,” seemingly implying all filters, even one not specifically made for that liquid.

See Halachah 11.

One must, however, do so in a manner slightly different from the way one filters these liquids during the week, as the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 17.

A basket made of woven palm branches.

The Rashba and other authorities differ with the Rambam, based on their interpretation of Shabbat 139b. According to the Rashba, one may filter even cloudy wine with a handkerchief or other strainer of this nature, since this is not the normal manner in which this activity is performed.
According to the Rambam, although one would not be liable for straining the wine in this manner, it would still be forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The only filtering that is permitted is filtering wine that is already fit to be drunk, so that it will become crystal clear. One might ask: Of what value is such an act? The answer is that precisely because most people would not consider this activity of value, and only the most spoiled individuals would require it, is it permitted. (According to the Rashba, such beverages may even be filtered with an ordinary filter.) Though the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:10) mentions the Rambam’s view, the Rashba’s ruling is favored.

The dregs were placed in a strainer on Friday, and one desires to pour the water over them on the Sabbath day (Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Shabbat 20:2).

To remove any residue of wine that might be left in the dregs (ibid.).

The intent is to mix the egg with mustard lying at the bottom of the strainer that has already been strained before the Sabbath (Shabbat 134a). In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 20:2), the Rambam states that when raw eggs are mixed with coarse foods, they cause the lighter matter to rise above the heavier, coarse matter. Thus, by mixing the egg with the mustard, one will cause it to undergo a further process of refinement. Nevertheless, this is not included in the forbidden labor of separating.
It must be noted that the Tur (Orach Chayim 319) explains that the problem in question in this instance is that the egg yolk will pass through the strainer, while the albumen will not. Nevertheless, this is not considered a derivative ofthe forbidden labor of separating. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:15) follows this interpretation.

Since the mustard is already strained and is fit to be used, there is no difficulty in stirring it further. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 12.)

Rashi, Shabbat 139b, explains that this straining process will not be very effective. Hence, it is permitted. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:14 focuses on the Rambam’s words and explains that since the wine and the dregs are considered a single mixture, the forbidden labor of separation does not apply. The concept of separation applies when the desired entity and the dregs are distinct, and this is not true until the wine has completed the fermentation process.

I.e., although it is forbidden to strain mustard using a strainer on the Sabbath, one may strain it through a handkerchief (Or Sameach).

Indeed, in the construction of the Sanctuary, it was herbs that were crushed for use as dyes.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 5, Chapter 21, Halachah 18. In those halachot, the Rambam adds the expression “to cook it,” implying that one is not liable for cutting vegetables one intends to eat raw. When the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12) quotes this law, it omits the above term, leading to the conclusion that one is liable even for cutting vegetables that one desires to eat raw. For this reason, in his gloss the Ramah clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use, if one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 5.

Because any amount of the dust he desires will be useful for him. This is evident from Chapter 18, Halachah 5.

Since he intends to use the wood for kindling, he must have enough wood to perform an an activity of at least minimal importance. (See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.)

The Rambam does not mention derivatives for this category of forbidden labor, because, as mentioned in Halachah 11, sifting resembles the categories of separating and winnowing, and it is not clear which of these categories of forbidden labor the derivatives of these activities fall under.

This addition follows the opinion of the Minchat Chinuch. The Eglei Tal differs, maintaining that for a person to be liable, the flour used for the dough must be this size before water is added.

This measure is derived from Chapter 18, Halachah 11.

The forbidden labor of kneading involves adding water to a collection of granular substances—e.g., flour or cement—and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass. Since the substances mentioned in this clause of the halachah do not adhere to each other, one can never be held liable for performing this forbidden labor with them. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 21, Halachot 33-34, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities.
There is another difference of opinion among the Sages and later Rabbis pertinent to this matter. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one’s hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is, liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour. This opinion is accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot) and is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16).

As mentioned in Halachah 2, if a person places seeds into water so they sprout, he is liable for performing a derivative of sowing. (See Mishnah Berurah 336:51 which states that this applies only when one has the intent that they sprout. A person who soaks seeds so that they soften is not liable.) lf one pours water over the seeds mentioned in this halachah, one is liable for kneading.