Shabbat - Chapter 12

This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath.

In the construction of the Sanctuary, it was necessary to kindle a fire in order to cook the herbs used for the dyes. Similarly, much of the metal work was perfomed after the metals were heated in a fire.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 8.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Kuntres Acharon 495, which explains that in this halachah, the Rambam outlines two types of fires for which one is liable. He begins the halachah with the statement that a person is liable for kindling a fire, “provided he needs the ash that it creates.” This refers to a fire kindled for no purpose other than the production of ash.
Afterwards, the Rambam begins to describe when a person is liable for kindling fires that are used for constructive activity. e.g., to generate warmth or to cook. In these instances, there is no requirement that one require the ash.

The commentaries have raised many questions concerning this ruling and have also noted the apparent contradiction to the ruling in Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which holds a person who heats metal liable for cooking.
There are three positions among the Rishonim in this regard:
a) That of the Rambam, mentioned in this and the following halachah, which holds one liable for heating and extinguishing iron in order to strengthen it;
b) That of the Ra’avad, which exempts a person for both kindling and extinguishing metal. He maintains, however, that a person who performs these actvities is liable, the liability stemming from other categories of forbidden labors;
c) That of Rashi (Shabbat 42a, 134a), which holds a person liable for kindling metal, but exempts him for extinguishing. (See also the Sefer Yereim, which explains that, in the construction of the Sanctuary, the heating of metal and its refinement was necessary for the goldsmiths and silversmiths.)
Rav Kapach explains the Rambam’s position, emphasizing that there is a difference between iron and other metals. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. In contrast, as iron is made into steel, it becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, just as the labors of kindling and extinguishing are associated with making charcoal—a new entity—so, too, it is these categories of labor that relate to the process of making steel. (See also the responsum of Rav Avraham, the Rambam’s son, mentioned in the notes on the following halachah.)

This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. Extinguishing was necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, because it was used to create coals that were needed for the fires used to cook the herbs used for dye. Although these fires could also have been heated with wood, a fire heated with coals burns better (Kiryat Sefer).
See also the Sefer Yereim which mentions that extinguishing was necessary for the work of the goldsmiths and silversmiths.

Regardless of the size of the fire, a piece of charcoal is created.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 7, this ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that one is liable for the performance of a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed (a הכאלמהניאש(. הכירצ הפוגל
As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 27:1, 334:27, differ and do not hold a person liable in such an instance. According to these authorities, a person is liable for extinguishing only when he requires the coals produced.

In one of his responsa, Rav Avraham, the Rambam’s Son, mentions the difference between a glowing piece of metal and a coal that comes from wood. When a fire fueled with wood is extinguished, a new entity—charcoal—is produced. Hence, one is liable for performing a forbidden labor. ln contrast, when a glowing piece of metal is extinguished, no change is made in the metal itself unless the metal was heated with the intent of purifying it.
lt must be noted that there are authorities who preceded the Rambam—Rav Yehudai Gaon, Rav Hai Gaon, and Rabbenu Chanan’el—who hold a person liable for extinguishing a glowing piece of metal. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most of the authorities in the Rambam’s era, and surely those in the subsequent eras, exempt a person for such an activity.
lt also must be noted that different rulings apply with regard to extinguishing an electric light or heater. ln this instance, there are recent authorities who maintain that one is surely liable for kindling and extinguishing glowing metal. (See Achiezer, Vol. 111, Responsum 60 and Tzafenat Paneach, Responsum 273.)

According to the Rambam, this applies only with regard to a glowing piece of metal and not to a burning coal. The authorities who maintain that one is not liable for performing a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש,הכאלמ however, would allow one to extinguish a burning coal in this instance. Because of the danger involved, the Rabbinic prohibition against performing such an activity is waived (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:27).

As mentioned above, although there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, it is waived because of the danger.

The Maggid Mishneh states that seemingly the opinions that do not accept Rabbi Yehudah’s view regarding a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש הכאלמ would not hold the person liable unless his intent in extinguishing the candle was for the charcoal produced. See the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:1).

As the Ra’avad emphasizes, this ruling follows those views which maintain that a person is liable for performing a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש.הכאלמ According to the view which differs, even though it is forbidden to extinguish a fire to save one’s money, one would not be liable. This allows for greater leniencies, as will be explained.

Needless to say, if there is a threat to life the fire may be extinguished.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 23.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:26) follows the view that one is not liable for performing a הפוגל הכירצ הניאש,הכאלמ and the prohibition against extinguishing a fire is merely Rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, he states that in the present time, it is permissible to extinguish a fire that has begun to blaze in a city.
In his time, it was common for the commotion caused by a fire to serve as an invitation for the gentiles to raid the Jewish quarters of the city, rampaging, pillaging, and creating havoc. In such a situation, it was very possible that Jewish lives would be threatened. Hence, he maintains that it is preferable for the fire to be extinguished than for such a situation to be created. Furthermore, in the cramped conditions of the ghettos, it was highly possible that the lives of the children, the elderly, and the disabled would be threatened by a fire.
Nevertheless, even the Ramah did not grant wholesale leniency on this matter and stated that, in practice, the ruling must be determined on the basis of our appreciation of whether there is a threat to life according to the circumstances at hand. Contemporary authorities add that because of the threat of electrical fires, gas explosions, and the like, a fire constitutes a real danger and should not be allowed to spread.

Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against even indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished, this prohibition is waived in the face of property loss (Ramah, Orach Chayim 334:22).

The printed text of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2) states “lt is forbidden to cause [indirectly] a fire to be extinguished.” Rav Kapach notes, however, that in authoritative manuscripts of that t~xt, this line is erased. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 13.
This equivocation in the Rambam’s mind is also reflected in a difference of opinion between the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:22) quotes the Rambam’s ruling that it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly. The Ramah, however, states that this is permitted lest a loss occur. This implies that there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, but that the prohibition is waived because of the possibility of property loss.

This act is permitted on the Sabbath itself. Although the bowl is being used for the sake of the beam, an article which may not be moved on the Sabbath, there is no prohibition involved (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 277:8; Mishnah Berurah 277:23).

Needless to say, the bowl must be suspended in a manner that allows enough ventilation for the lamp to continue burning.

Our translation is based on Rav Kapach’s version of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:5).

In his Commentary on · the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that a goat skin will become singed by a fire, but will not burst into flames.

I.e., one is not liable. Furthermore, it is permissible to do so. Since it is not a certainty אשיר(,קיספ see Chapter 1, Halachah 6) that the fire will be extinguished, this was not forbidden.
The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) states that one may not have the intention of extinguishing the fire, but merely of preventing it from spreading further. Note the difference of opinion between the Magen Avraham and the Turei Zahav if that ruling is accepted.

Tosaf ot, Shabbat 120a, accept the basis of the ruling cited by the Rambam, but maintain that one must use liquids other than water. Pouring water over a garment resembles the forbidden activity of laundering and is not permitted on the Sabbath, even in this situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:24) favors Tosafot’s opinion.

Based on Shabbat (loc. cit.), Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ra’avad differ and forbid this leniency. They maintain that although it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly, placing water in such proximity to the fire is no longer considered an indirect activity. As obvious from the previous note, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this opinion.

I.e., it was not placed there with the intention that it remain there on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 277:12).

The commentaries have raised many questions about this ruling, since it is almost certain that the candle will be extinguished when it falls. Although the person does not intend to extinguish the candle, since this is an inevitable result of his actions אשיר(,)קיספ seemingly, it should be forbidden, as stated in Chapter l, Halachah 6. (Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 277:14).
For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:3) states that this applies only with regard to a wax candle or an oil lamp if the oil has already burned out. In this instance, it is possible that the candle will continue burning even if it falls. In contrast, an oil lamp that contains oil may not be moved in this manner.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that the Rambam’s ruling can be accepted even with regard to an oil lamp which contains oil. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed היל (אחינ אלד אשיר.)קיספ To apply that concept to the present situation, although spilling the oil from the lamp is considered as extinguishing the lamp, since th person did not intentionally desire to spill it and he regrets the loss of the oil, he should not be held liable. The commentaries also point to several other rulings that indicate that the Rambam accepts this principle.

Our translation is a slight extension of the actual text of the Mishneh Torah, which states,ולזפלזפל concluding with a masculine suffix that seemingly refers to the candle, rather than the board. Nevertheless, as the commentaries point out, it is self-evident that the candle is forbidden to be moved. The new concept brought out by this law is that since the candle was intentionally left on the board before the commencement of the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, the board is considered a base for a forbidden object and is also muktzeh, forbidden to be moved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

As explained in Chapter 6, our Sages forbade a Jew to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Jew’s behalf on the Sabbath. We are not, however, obligated to prevent the gentile from performing a forbidden labor for his own sake. Thus, we cannot tel1 him to extinguish the fire, nor are we required to tel1 him to refrain from doing so. Indeed, this portion of the halachah is quoted in Halachah 4 of that chapter.

Exodus 20:10 states, “Do not perform any work, neither you, your son, your daughter,... “implying that a father is responsible for seeing that his children rest on the Sabbath. For this reason, any forbidden labor that will benefit his father may not be performed by a child (Maggid Mishneh).

The expression “the court” refers to the communal authorities ofthe Jewish people. In a larger sense, it refers to the community as a whole.
From Chapter 24, Halachah 11, it would appear that the Jewish court is required to restrain a child from performing any violation of the Sabbath laws that originates in the Torah itself. This contradicts the Rambam’s statements here and in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 17:27. Among the resolutions ofthis difficulty is that in the halachah cited, the Rambam is speaking about an activity that will benefit the child’s father. See the notes on that halachah.

Shabbat 121a, Ketubot 70b.

I.e., as long as one does not instruct a gentile to extinguish the fire, one may indirectly encourage him to do so. Since the gentile has not been promised anything specific, he is considered to be working on his own behalf.

Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The translation of the standard printed version of the text would be “Bringing articles or removing articles from.... “Whether one is bringing an article in or removing it, one is transferring it. See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1).
The wording of the manuscripts avoids the difficulties mentioned by the Lechem Mishneh and others that arise from Shabbat 96b.

Tosafot, Shabbat 2a, explain that this verse is necessary because, in contrast to the other activities classified as forbidden labors, transferring articles is “an inferior labor”—i.e., we would not ordinarily conceive of it as being forbidden. (See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, which states that transferring articles does not appear to be an activity fit to be considered a forbidden labor.)
Eruvin 17b derives the prohibition against the transfer of articles from one domain to another from the exegesis of Exodus 16:29. Tosafot (Eruvin, loc. cit.; Shabbat, loc. cit.) explain that both verses are necessary: one to teach that bringing an article in from the public domain to a private domain is forbidden, and the other to teach the converse, that it is forbidden to take an article out from the private domain to the public domain.
The Rambam (particularly according to the version of the Mishneh Torah we have quoted) appears to view the concept of transferring as one activity which is prohibited on the basis of the oral tradition. Nevertheless, unlike the other categories of forbidden labor, in this instance there are allusions within the Torah itself. To make this point, he quotes the most obvious allusion, leaving the one in Eruvin for the scholars.

Shabbat 96b.

The bracketed additions are based on Halachot 15 and 18.

his act meets the following three criteria:

As explained in the notes on Chapter 1, it is “purposeful work,” תבשחמ,תכאלמ which the Torah has forbidden. Accordingly, if an object is not of sufficient size to be useful, transferring it on the Sabbath is not considered labor. This minimum amount is referred to with the term.רועיש In Chapter 18, the Rambam lists the minimum amounts of specific substances that are considered useful.

One is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another, nor is one liable for transferring an article from a private domain into a carmelit, a domain which is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The definitions of the various domains with regard to the Sabbath laws are found in Chapter 14.

This is referred to as ה

This is referred to as.חחנה Unless a person performs both these actions himself, he is not liable.

This situation is described in the opening Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. If a homeowner picked something up to give to a poor man standing outside, and the poor man took it from his hand—since the homeowner did not place the article down,)חחנה (he is not liable.

In the example cited above, since the poor man did not pick the article up,)הריקע (he is not liable. As the above-mentioned mishnah elaborates, there are several different possibilities for two people to combine in transferring an object, one performing the,הריקע and the other the.ח

Since carrying in the public domain is a derivative of transferring from one domain to another

performing the הריקע himself

so that his act is of value

performing the החנה himself.

Rashi (Shabbat 8a) states that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the craftsmen would throw their needles to each other.

The Maggid Mishneh defines passing over as dragging an article along the ground. The Merkevet HaMishneh and others interpret it as passing an article from hand to hand. It appears that the Maggid Mishneh does not accept that interpretation, because the opening passage of Shabbat describes the transfer of objects from hand to hand as transfer) האצוה (and not handing over.)הזפשוה ((See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to this halachah.)

In the construction of the Sanctuary, the beams for the walls of the Sanctuary were passed from the public domain to the storage wagons, which were considered as private domains (Shabbat 11 :2). Tosafot, Shabbat 2a explain that, in contrast to the other categories of forbidden labor, the consequence of the fact that the status of transferring is “an inferior labor,” is that if the derivatives had not been found in the construction of the Sanctuary, they would not had been forbidden.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 14, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath unless he performs it in an ordinary manner.

Mustard seed is very small. The Rambam chooses this example for certainly a sufficient quantity of mustard seed will have been transferred to the other domain if the majority of the container has been transferred. In contrast, were the container to hold larger articles, it is possible that no one article would have been transferred. Nevertheless, even when the contents are mustard seed, the person is not liable for the reasons stated by the Rambam.

Based on Shabbat 91b, the Merkevet HaMishneh draws attention to an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s decision here and in Hilchot Geneivah 3:2.

This reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of the expression, Shabbat, loc. cit., דגאדגא הימש.ילכ Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan’el interpret this phrase slightly differently. ln this context, it is worthy to note Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s reference to Tosafot, Pesachim 85b. There it is explained that this principle applies only to a container that has a receptacle. If, however, an entity is suspended from a stave, different rules apply.

As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 14, usually a right-handed person is not liable if he performs a labor with his left hand. With regard to carrying, however, this is not the case, since a person will frequently carry an object with his weaker hand.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:39 interprets this as referring to a cloth that one is wearing. Even though the person is not holding the money in his hand, he is liable for transferring it. From this ruling, it is clear that a person who transfers objects in his pockets is liable just as if he transferred them by hand.

As the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying an object on his shoulders, for surely it would be held above that height.

When the Jews broke camp in their journeys through the desert, the Sanctuary was taken down, and erected again at the site of the new encampment. The boards, coverings, and curtains of the Sanctuary would be transported by the other Levite families on wagons. The sons of Kehat would carry the ark, the table, the menorah, and the altars on their shoulders.

More specifically, the verse cited states, “the labor of the Sanctuary is upon them.” Since the Torah specifically refers to carrying in this fashion as “labor,” although, as explained above, there is reason to exempt a person who carries an object on his shoulder, the person is held liable.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:3). Others render this term as “in an abnormal manner.”

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this does not refer to food. If a person walks from one domain to another while eating, he is liable for carrying the food he is holding in his mouth. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 3.)

Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

With this phrase, the Rambam explains the term,ותרנפא Shabbat, loc. cit., according to his Commentary on the Mishnah. Others render this term as “money belt.”

But not in a pocket.

Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

Bava Metzia 105b relates that it was customary to carry a burden weighing four kabbim or more on one’s head. In contemporary measure, this figure is approximately five and a half kilograms or twelve pounds.

The Ma’aseh Rokeach states that a person who does not hold the article with his hand is not liable. Balancing a heavy article on one’s head is a skilled task that only few individuals are capable of performing. Hence, it is not considered an ordinary manner of transferring an article.

The Ma’ aseh Rokeach states that in this instance, even if one holds the article in one’s hands, one is not liable, since this is not the ordinary way in which an article is transferred.

This law applies universally, even in places where it is common to carry articles on one’s head. See Shabbat 92a regarding the practice of the inhabitants of Hotzel, a city in Babylon (Maggid Mishneh).

As mentioned above, the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7 that the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying if he lifts an object above that height while transferring it in the public domain. Nevertheless, since the article does not come to rest in the makom patur, one is held liable (Shabbat 8b,9a).
The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s interpretation of that Talmudic passage and offers an alternative, which is accepted by the Rashba and Tosafot. The Rambam’s interpretation is also offered by Rashi. (Alternatively, it is possible to explain that the Rambam’s intent is that this is an ordinary, and not an abnormal, manner of carrying.

As reflected in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and Chapter 20, Halachah 7, the Rambam does not place any restrictions on carrying within a square of four cubits in the public domain.
In contrast, the Ra’avad maintains that the leniency to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits in the public domain was granted a person only in abnormal situations—e.g., when one established this portion of the public domain as the place where he would spend the Sabbath or when he left the Sabbath limits. Under ordinary circumstances, one is not permitted to carry in the public domain at all. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:1) accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., the d. istance from his elbow to the tip of his middle finger. This measure is adapted to each individual instead of establishing a single uniform figure to allow every individual the opportunity of moving articles from his head to his feet when he is lying down (Eiruvin 48a). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

But his body is of ordinary size (Rashi, Eiruvin 48a, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:1).

According to Shiurei Torah, a cubit is 48 centimeters; according to Chazon Ish, it is 57. 7 centimeters

Eruvin 48a, Mechilta, Beshalach 5, and other sources.

The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to a difference of opinion among the Sages, Eruvin 48a, regarding the extent to which one is allowed to carry in the public domain. Although the prevailing view is that one is allowed to carry in a square four cubits long, there are interpretations that state that one may carry four cubits in any direction. This means that although one may not carry an object eight cubits, one may carry an object four cubits on one side and four cubits on the other side.
The view that the Rambam appears to accept, however, maintains that one may carry only in a single square four cubits long. (See also Chapter 27, Halachah 11.)

I.e., they are less than eight cubits apart. There was no Rabbinic prohibition instituted lest one carry beyond the permitted space.

I.e., the individuals on the extremes are standing between eight cubits and twelve cubits from each other. Thus the squares four cubits long of those on the extremes do not overlap, yet each share a certain portion with the person in the center.

Although they are forbidden to share with each other directly, as explained in the following halachah, each of them may pass an article to the person in the center, who may pass it to the other.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the transfer must take place within the four cubits, the colleague may be standing slightly further removed.

A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that this leniency was mentioned in Eruvin 95b only with regard to an extreme situation—i.e., an instance where tefillin or other sacred articles might be desecrated. He contends that it should not be extended beyond that context.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, some ofthe later authorities (see Turei Zahav 349:1) raise questions about this leniency.

The Rambam is not speaking in exact figures; the actual length of the diagonal is a fraction larger.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there were earlier authorities who maintain that one is liable for moving an article a measure of four cubits. Nevertheless, all the later authorities accept the law stated by the Rambam.

Based on Eruvin 98b, Rashi, Tosafot, and Rabbenu Asher (see also the gloss of the Ra’avad) do not accept the Rambam’s ruling and place no restrictions on carrying within five and three-fifths cubits. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:2) mentions the Rambam’s view, it accepts the decision of the other authorities. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:2, however, states that at the outset, the Rambam’s view should be followed.